Return freight strategies and selling formats in e-commerce supply chain: The perspective of consumer fairness concerns and online shopping returns

Returns and consumer fairness concerns put a huge pressure on manufacturers who sell their products online. The optimal selling format and return freight strategy become particularly important for manufacturers in an e-commerce supply chain. Therefore, we build game models for the following scenarios under different selling formats: the seller bearing the return freight costs or the return-freight insurance premiums, consumers buying insurance for themselves, and no one buying insurance. By comparing the optimal solutions of the game models under reselling and agency formats, several conclusions are derived. In the agency format, if the return-freight insurance premium is higher than a particular threshold, then the optimal strategy of the manufacturer is to decrease the selling price to encourage consumers to purchase the insurance, otherwise, the manufacturer should purchase the insurance. As the level of consumer fairness concerns and platform commission rates increase, the manufacturer should gradually move from the agency to reselling format. In the reselling format, if the return-freight insurance premium is lower than a particular threshold, then consumers will purchase insurance and this will make the platform more profitable, and conversely, the platform should bear the return freight costs.     

Online channel strategies under different offline channel power structures

This study explores the manufacturer's marketing and pricing strategies for online channel under different offline channel power structures. Through these strategies, the manufacturer sells products through an offline retailer and an e-tailer. The manufacturer decides the cooperation mode with the e-tailer by the reselling or the agency selling mode and the pricing strategy on the basis of the power structures, i.e., vertical Nash structure (VN), manufacturer Stackelberg structure (MS), and retailer Stackelberg structure (RS). We find the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode when the commission rate is less than the given threshold. As long as the commission rate is more than another threshold, the manufacturer selects the online reselling mode under the VN structure; however, the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode under the other two structures. As well, the offline wholesale price is higher under the MS structure than those under the VN and RS structures. When the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode, the offline retail price is highest under the MS structure, and the online retail price is highest under the VN structure. Meanwhile, consumers can always obtain a higher surplus in the online agency selling mode under all offline power structures.     

Brand and quality effects on introduction of store brand products

This paper considers a supply chain with a single manufacturer selling a national brand product via a single retailer. The retailer has the option to introduce a product under his own brand into the market with the same functionality as the national brand product. We simultaneously consider the consumer bases of the national brand and store brand along with consumers' willingness to pay for quality and the supply chain control (centralized vs. decentralized). By analyzing the game-theoretic models, we offer managerial insights about the influences of brands' consumer bases on the quality and pricing decisions of the retailer, and on the manufacturer's willingness-to-collaborate when the retailer introduces the store brand product. We find that, although it is usually easier for the retailer to introduce a product under a store brand with a large consumer base, doing so with manufacturers of well established national brands can be difficult, when the retailer often has to greatly mark down his store brand product's quality and price. We also find that a store brand product with a small consumer base shall be launched only when the supply chain is switched to a centralized control and when the manufacturer's national brand has a large consumer base. These important findings offer guidance to both national brand manufacturers and retail store managers regarding the launch of store brand products.     

Store Brand Quality and Retailer’s Product Line Design

This study analyzes a retailer’s store brand quality decision in vertically differentiated product categories. We analyze a game theoretic model composed of one or two national brand manufacturers and a retailer, who strategically chooses the quality level(s) of its store brand(s) relative to the well-established national brand position(s) to maximize its category profit. Our analysis reveals that the nature of a retailer’s store brand quality positioning is quite different from the manufacturer’s national brand positioning decision, and that the best position for a store brand is not “as close to a national brand as possible” as previous studies suggest. Instead, the optimal quality position of each store brand is remarkably sensitive to the distribution of consumers’ willingness-to-pay. In particular, the relative proportions of quality sensitive consumers and price sensitive consumers determine the balance of three key strategic forces — the market expansion force, the retail margin force, and the consumer profitability force, leading to different optimal product line designs for store brands across different category environments. Interestingly, against multiple incumbent national brands, the retailer’s optimal product line design includes a store brand positioned at the highest quality level in the category only if most consumers are moderately quality conscious. We also analyze the implications of national brands’ brand equity for retailers’ store brand strategy.     

Money-back guarantee and pricing decision with retailer's store brand

This paper investigates the money-back guarantee (MBG) choice problem in the presence of store brand introduction in a two-echelon supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and one retailer. Game-theoretic models with different MBG policies regarding the national brand and the store brand are examined. We found that the MBG policy could be a strategic tool to help the retailer developing its store brand even when a fairer policy is chosen by the retailer and the store brand is considered by consumers as a low-end substitute for the national brand. The presence of MBG is beneficial to the retailer while unfavorable to the manufacturer, even though the retailer provides a fairer MBG policy, i.e., MBG for both two brands. Although the national brand has advantages over the store brand, MBG will increase the competition and cause customer shifting from the national brand to store brand and thus bring a profit loss for the manufacturer. Moreover, we have found that the manufacturer could provide coordinate contracts for the retailer to improve its performance with which a win-win outcome could be reached for both the manufacturer and the retailer.     

Interplays between manufacturer advertising and retailer store brand introduction: Agency vs. wholesale contracts

In retail supply chains, manufacturers' advertising for national brands and retailers' store brand introduction may relate to each other, and two types of contracts, i.e., agency contract and wholesale contract, are widely used. This paper uses game-theoretic models to investigate the strategic interaction between a manufacturer's advertising strategy and a retailer's store brand introduction strategy. We derive the equilibrium outcomes, including wholesale price, retail price, market demand, retailer's and manufacturer's profits under different contract forms. We find that when the product cost is small relative to the perceived value of the store brand, the introduction of a store brand will benefit the retailer. The retailer is more likely to introduce store brands under the wholesale contract than under the agency contract. In addition, compared with the wholesale contract, the agency contract may increase both the manufacturer's and the retailer's profits and lead to Pareto improvement for them.     

Private Label Vendor Selection in a Supply Chain: Quality and Clientele Effects

We model a supply chain consisting of a national brand manufacturer and an independent manufacturer, both of whom are potential suppliers of store brand to a single retailer. The retailer serves two customer segments—a quality sensitive segment (high type) and a price sensitive (low type) segment. The retailer serves these two segments by targeting the national and store brands to the quality and price sensitive segments, respectively. When the national brand manufacturer supplies the store brand he internalizes the effect of store brand quality on the national brand's retail prices. This leads the national brand manufacturer to choose a lower store brand quality than the independent manufacturer. This decrease in store brand quality has the benefit of increased revenues from the high type customers along with an associated cost of decreased revenues from the low type customers. Thus, when the benefit outweighs the cost the retailer chooses the national brand manufacturer to supply the store brand. We show that the retailer will choose the national brand manufacturer to supply the store brand when (a) the size of the high type customer segment is large relative to the low type customer segment, (b) the valuations of the high type customer segment is large relative to the low type customer segment, and (c) the retailer's margin requirement on the store brand is not very high. Overall, these results suggest that retailers who serve a bigger sized quality (price) sensitive clientele would have the national brand (independent) manufacturer supply the store brand.     

Trust transfer from manufacturer to private label brand: The moderating role of grocery store format

Guided by the theory of trust transfer, the present study sheds new insights on the role of trust in manufacturer brand on trust in private label brand (PLB), perceived risk and willingness to buy (WTB). The moderating role of grocery store format between trust in manufacturer brand, trust in PLB and WTB is also examined. The empirical data were collected by means of a written survey instrument from consumers. The hypotheses were analyzed with maximum-likelihood estimation. The results revealed the positive influence of perceived manufacturer brand quality on trust in manufacturer brand and trust in PLB. The positive linkage between trust in manufacturer brand and trust in PLB is also supported. The negative influence of trust in manufacturer brand and trust in PLB on perceived risk was revealed and the positive impact of trust in manufacturer brand and trust in PLB on WTB was also confirmed. The findings provide support for the negative link between perceived risk and WTB. Additionally, perceived risk partially mediates the relationships between trust in manufacturer brand, trust in PLB and WTB. Furthermore, store format moderates the impact of trust in manufacturer brand and trust in PLB on WTB. Theoretical and managerial implications are presented based of the research findings.     

Bridge,Focus, Attack,or Stimulate: Retail Category Management Strategies with a Store Brand

We investigate a monopolist retailer's category management strategy where the main strategic decisions are how to horizontally position a store brand relative to the incumbent national brands and how to price the store and national brands for retail category profit maximization. We analyze a market composed of two consumer segments with differing tastes and heterogeneity with respect to willingness to pay and a product category consisting of two competing national brands and one store brand. We find that contrary to the existing literature, it is not always optimal for a retailer to position its store brand against the leading national brand; instead there are many situations where it is best to position the store brand close to the weaker national brand or to position it in the “middle” so it appeals to both national brands' target segments. In the process we identify four distinct category management strategies that a retailer can use with a store brand. In three of these the optimal store brand price is the brand's monopoly price, while in the remaining one strategy the price is lower. We also suggest an easy to implement means for a retailer to determine which strategy is best to use, depending on the particular competitive environment present before the introduction of the store brand and the relative quality of the store brand. We find that the store brand entry is most beneficial to the retailer when the national brands are moderately differentiated. Finally we show that introducing a store brand not only allows the retailer to garner a higher share of the channel profits through higher retail margins, but also often provides the retailer the benefit of increases in national brand unit sales as well as incremental sales from the store brand. JEL Classification: M310     

品牌权益影响下的双渠道供应链定价决策及协调研究

针对一个制造商开通直销渠道销售产品与零售商的价格竞争问题,文章基于制造商与零售商共享品牌权益的视角,研究在制造商双渠道供应链结构中,价格和品牌权益同时作用下的双渠道供应链定价决策,分别分析在集中决策下和分散决策下,品牌权益对两种渠道价格和利润的影响。研究发现：在集中决策下,两种渠道的价格、利润与品牌权益成正相关;在分散决策下,当品牌权益超过一定临界值时,其对制造商直销渠道的价格和制造商总利润的影响大于零售商。鉴于品牌权益对供应链定价决策的重要影响,文章建立制造商和零售商之间的品牌权益成本共担机制,并通过数值仿真分析发现,当实施品牌权益成本共担机制时,制造商和零售商的销售价格和利润均是最优的。因此,零售商应加强与制造商的互动,共同创造高品牌权益的同时,也应共同分享高品牌权益。     

Implementing online store for national brand competing against private label

We propose a game-theoretic model in three contexts. First, only the national brand (NB) is offered through a traditional retailer. Second, the private label (PL) is introduced by the traditional retailer. Finally, the NB's manufacturer opens an online store. We reassess the benefit of introducing the PL and investigate the profitability of implementing an online store. We found that the retailer is not always enjoying the PL's introduction. Also, the manufacturer could benefit from that strategy. The quality differential between the NB and the PL, the PL's potential and the cross-price competitions are all important factors to determine the result of PL's introduction. Hence, the manufacturer opens the online store either to counter the threat of such strategy or to expand his market.     

Shopping-centre selection modelling: a segmentation approach

This study seeks to develop an in-store brand-extension commitment (ISBEC) scale. To accomplish this goal, consumers were questioned about the efforts they are willing to undertake when confronted with critical moments in the store concerning their favourite brand extension. Using exploratory factor analysis, seven dimensions of ISBEC efforts were discovered. A higher order factor analysis revealed two factors: switching brand extensions within the same brand and the commitment behaviours in favour of brand extensions. In addition, based upon these seven ISBEC effort dimensions, six clusters of consumers were discovered. In an era of ECR, where the manufacturer and the retailer seek to develop economically responsible category systems, insights into what consumers will do for their preferred brand extensions might provide them with some strategic insights.     

Integrative effects of firms' price and endorsement strategies on consumers' loyalty intention

This research examines the effects of price and brand endorsement that are adopted by firms from a consumer-based viewpoint, and provides practical brand management discussions as a reference for both manufacturer brands and retail store brands. According to the findings, manufacturer brands support high prices and boost those vivid impressions which are helpful in engendering consumer loyalty intention. Without a careful evaluation process, a brand-endorsing strategy may prove detrimental to the manufacturer. Retail store brands follow distinct pricing policies and carry out brand-endorsed strategies. Price/endorsement stimuli influence consumer brand loyalty through the partial mediating effect of brand impression. Manufacturers and retailers could define appropriate price premiums on products with a potential for a manufacturer–retailer brand co-branding as identified by market research, thus increasing the sales of both.     

Effect of Store Brand Introduction on Channel Price Leadership: An Empirical Investigation

In this study, we conduct an empirical investigation of the impact of store brand introductions on the price leadership relations in a distribution channel between a retailer and national brand manufacturers. We analyze a multi-product category retail database from a major grocery chain, which captures both a period before and a period after the introduction of a store brand in each product category. By applying the time series approach to this data set, we show that store brand introductions frequently lead to price leadership changes, generally in a more favorable direction for the retailer than for the national brand manufacturer, evidenced by either the decay of the manufacturers’ price leadership or the rise of the retailer’s price leadership. However, such a change is not universal but tends to be concentrated among a certain quality tier of national brands, which is not always the low-tier, but sometimes the top-tier despite the low-price low-quality position of the store brand. The patterns detected in the data suggest that these changes are likely to reflect the retailer’s strategic effort to reshape the price leadership environment in a product category aided by the enhanced bargaining power and managerial sophistication that accompanied the store brand introductions.     

零售商品牌资产管理策略体系构建——基于多维理论视角的探讨

零售商品牌资产的管理和创建是零售企业获取持续竞争优势的关键,但关于零售商品牌资产管理策略的理论指导并不系统和丰富。因此,本文从零售商品牌营销管理、顾客情绪管理、顾客体验管理、顾客关系管理、顾客忠诚管理5个多维理论视角,对零售商品牌资产管理的策略体系进行了构建,以期为零售商品牌资产的创建过程和途径提供丰富的管理视野与思路。     

Inducing Downstream Selling Effort with Market Share Discounts

Loyalty discounts and rebates are pricing schemes that offer incentives to buyers for reaching or exceeding certain sales thresholds. In the case of market share discounts, thresholds are expressed as a percentage of the buyer’s total purchase requirements. Although market share discounts may have exclusionary effects under certain circumstances when a seller has significant market power, there are plausible non‐exclusionary reasons for offering them as well. Two such reasons – rent extraction and inducing downstream selling effort – are explored in this paper. The paper considers the case of a manufacturer who sells a differentiated good through a network of heterogeneous, non‐exclusive retailers. The manufacturer offers market share discounts to induce non‐contractible selling effort such as brand‐specific information or customer service from those retailers who possess certain unobservable characteristics. In some instances, market share discounts induce increased selling effort and improve market performance as compared to linear pricing. In other instances, they have no effect on aggregate benefits, but merely shift the rents created by induced selling effort upstream to the manufacturer. In no instance, as long as the producers of substitute goods retain sufficient sales to remain viable, do market share discounts impair market performance.     

By-Brand or By-Category? The Effect of Display Format on Brand Extension Evaluation

Although consumers often encounter brand extensions for the first time during a store visit, most research on brand extensions does not take into consideration how product display in retail environments might affect evaluation of a brand extension. We explore the effect of two distinct display formats on brand extension evaluations: by-brand display, where a brand extension is presented in the context of other products made by the same parent brand (e.g., Nike razors displayed with Nike sneakers, Nike sportswear, etc.), and by-category display, where a brand extension is presented in the context of competing brands within the extension category (e.g., Nike razors displayed with Philips razors, Gillette razors, etc.). Three studies demonstrate that low fit extensions of high quality brands are evaluated more favorably when displayed by-category than by-brand, whereas high fit extensions of low quality brands are evaluated more favorably when displayed by-brand than by-category. In support of the proposed underlying mechanism, we show that display format influences consumers’ evaluations of brand extensions by changing the weight of importance given to parent brand quality and brand-extension fit information. Finally, we demonstrate that display format not only influences evaluation of the extension, but also has downstream consequences for the consumption experience with the extension.     

Does store image influence demand for organic store brands?

This research examines the effects of store image on the demand for store brand organic brands. We conduct an empirical study using a unique dataset that combines households' organic product purchases and their ratings of the same stores' images. We find that the type of images consumers develop about a store influences the demand for organic products from that store. In addition, the influence of store image on the demand for store-brand organic products depends on the store brand branding strategy. Although own brands are accepted in stores with quality produce and with quality store brands, they are less likely to be adopted in stores with varied selections. Furthermore, the own-brand strategy (the use of the retailer's own name) is not always an effective branding strategy for organic products, except in some stores.     

The Impact of Brand Delisting on Store Switching and Brand Switching Intentions

A tool retailers often use to improve their negotiating position with brand manufacturers is to delist - or threaten to delist - the manufacturers’ brand. Because brand manufacturers rely mainly on retailers to sell their products to consumers, a brand delisting will cause a sales loss for the brand manufacturer. Therefore, many brand manufacturers feel enormous pressure to give in and improve buying conditions to favor the retailer. The question thus emerges: Can a brand manufacturer resist a retailer's threat to delist its brand(s)? If a brand delisting severely hurts retail sales, it is easier for a brand manufacturer to resist. The authors study the impact of brand delistings on store switching and brand switching using a controlled online experiment and in-store shopper survey. They develop and test a conceptual model with several antecedents of consumers’ reactions to a brand delisting and conclude that brand equity, market share, and the products’ hedonic level drive store and brand switching.