Are Islamic stock indexes exposed to systemic risk? Multivariate GARCH estimation of CoVaR

The main objective of this paper is to assess the exposure of Islamic stock indexes to systemic tail events. We use Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) and Delta CoVaR measures as developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and a sample of Islamic and conventional stock indexes, from various developed and emerging markets, during the period September 2005 to March 2015. The empirical results reveal that the systemic risk has a moderate adverse effect on Islamic indexes, with a lower level in Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC hereafter). The findings also show the Asian stock indexes can be considered as effective hedge assets, after the global financial crisis (GFC hereafter). Furthermore, the empirical reveal that portfolio including Islamic stock indexes performs better than a benchmark portfolio in turmoil periods. These findings have several implications in financial decisions including the strategy of stability and asset allocation.     

What is the systemic risk exposure of financial institutions?

I compare the performance of three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure — Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al., 2012). I modify Exposure CoVaR to allow for forecasting, and estimate the ability of each measure to forecast the performance of financial institutions during systemic crisis periods in 1998 (LTCM) and 2008 (Lehman Brothers). I find that Exposure CoVaR forecasts the within-crisis performance of financial institutions, and provides useful forecasts of future systemic risk exposures. Systemic expected shortfall and Granger causality do not forecast the performance of financial institutions reliably during crises. I also find, using cross-sectional regressions, that foreign equity exposure and securitization income determine systemic risk exposure during the 1998 and 2008 crises, respectively; financial institution size determines systemic risk exposure during both crisis periods; and executive compensation does not determine systemic risk exposure.     

Systemic risk contribution of banks and non-bank financial institutions across frequencies: The Australian experience

The Australian financial sector (AFS) is highly concentrated and interconnected. Besides, Australian banks' lending portfolios are dominated by residential mortgage loans, and 70% of insurance companies' revenues arise from non-policyholder sources. The AFS also performed relatively well during the global financial crisis (GFC). Given these distinctive features, in this paper, we examine the systemic risk contribution of Australian banks, insurance companies, and other financial services providers. We use a flexible copula-based delta conditional value-at-risk (ΔCoVaR) method across different frequencies. Further, we study the systemic risk determinants in a panel setting. We find that the major Australian banks are systemically more important than all other financial institutions. Systemic risk is typically higher after the GFC than in the pre-crisis period, despite the introduction of more stringent capital requirements. In addition, the short-term ΔCoVaR is significantly higher than the medium- and long-term ΔCoVaRs. Finally, institution-specific characteristics and market-wide variables explain the cross-sectional and time-series variation in systemic risk, and their explanatory power varies across frequencies.     

Determinants of risk in the banking sector during the European Financial Crisis

Risk assessment in the banking sector has been a prominent topic in the banking literature and has gained attention especially since the recent financial crises. In particular, the European crisis, which was the first since the formation of the Eurozone, underlined a number of significant problems and increased concerns on the tail or crash risk of banks. In the present study, we seek to examine whether information asymmetry, the importance of banks in the financial system and systemic risk play significant roles in the evolution of stock crashes in the banking sector. Information asymmetry is proxied by opacity, the importance of a bank in a financial network is proxied by network centrality, and systemic risk is proxied by clustering. The research framework considers a number of regulatory, reporting and financial market factors that have also been determined to relate to stock crashes and shows that all of the above factors are related to (idiosyncratic) stock crash risk under specific conditions.     

What drives the systemic banking crises in advanced economies?

This paper examines the drivers of post-war “systemic” banking crises in advanced economies. Using binary response models and a balanced panel of data, we show that persistently large departures from the long-run trend in housing and stock markets best predict the crises. Similar deviations in credit markets do not add to the explanatory power of the model that combines housing and stock market dynamics. Indicators capturing financial market risk perception also have high explanatory power. These findings indicate that extrapolative forecasts and neglect of tail risk drive asset market boom-bust cycles and systemic banking crises. Cycles in credit markets are driven by cycles in real-estate and stock markets before the crises. Additionally, capital inflow bonanzas fuel the stock and credit booms that spark systemic crises.     

Financial contagion effects of major crises in African stock markets

This study examines financial contagion effects in African stock markets during major crises over the period 2005 to 2020. We investigate contagion effects in individual stock markets and from a regional perspective using dynamic conditional correlations during the global financial crisis, European debt crisis, Brexit, and COVID-19. The empirical evidence confirms contagion effects in some individual markets. However, significant evidence of contagion is found only during the global financial crisis from the regional perspective. Our findings suggest that the regional impacts of crises differ due to the nature of those crises. We also find financial contagion increases in the country-level risk, market capitalization and export to GDP and decreases in corruption.     

Global systemic risk measures and their forecasting power for systemic events

Since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, many market-based systemic risk measures have been proposed. Prominent examples are MES, SRISK or ΔCoVaR. Based on a simulation study in an extended banking network model that incorporates several sources of systemic risk, we analyze how well these systemic risk measures perform in indicating the risk of a systemic event. For this analysis, the systemic risk measures of the banks that default and whose default is followed by a systemic event are compared with the systemic risk measures of those defaulting banks for which no subsequent systemic event can be observed. Within the simulation study, we find that many bank-individual systemic risk measures are statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of a systemic event after a bank’s default. However, the economic significance of the bank-individual systemic risk measures is relatively low.     

Modeling systemic risk and dependence structure between oil and stock markets using a variational mode decomposition-based copula method

This study combines the variational mode decomposition (VMD) method and static and time-varying symmetric and asymmetric copula functions to examine the dependence structure between crude oil prices and major regional developed stock markets (S&P500, stoxx600, DJPI and TSX indexes) during bear, normal and bull markets under different investment horizons. Furthermore, it analyzes the upside and downside short- and long-run risk spillovers between oil and stock markets by quantifying three market risk measures, namely the value at risk (VaR), conditional VaR (CoVaR) and the delta CoVaR (∆CoVaR). The results show that there is a tail dependence between oil and all stock markets for the raw return series. By considering time horizons, we show that there is an average dependence between the considered markets for the short-run horizons. However, the tail dependence is also found for the long-run horizons between the oil and stock markets, with the exception of the S&P500 index which exhibits average dependence with the oil market. Moreover, we find strong evidence of up and down risk asymmetric spillovers from oil to stock markets and vice versa in the short-and long run horizons. Finally, the market risk spillovers are asymmetric over the time and investment horizons.     

全球股票市场系统性风险传递网络研究

本文采用系统性风险度量新指标LASSO-ΔCoVaR,构建全样本时期及各极端时期全球股票市场系统性风险传递网络,考察全球股票市场系统性风险传递水平及结构特征,并着重对极端状态下的风险传递进行分析。研究发现:第一,无论风险输入水平还是风险输出水平,不同股市的动态变化趋势大体一致,但波动幅度迥然不同,且单个股市风险输出水平的波动幅度远大于风险输入水平;第二,成熟经济体经济基本面恶化往往会增强其股市的系统性风险贡献,而新兴经济体则不同;第三,法国、荷兰、中国香港、德国和英国股市的风险溢出水平较高,同其他股市间的风险传递途径较多,是系统性风险传递网络中的核心节点;第四,我国股市与全球股市间的风险关联较弱,但我国股市潜在风险来源面广,同区域股市及金砖国家股市在我国股市与全球股市间的风险传递发挥重要作用。     

基于动态因子Copula模型的我国银行系统性风险度量

本文基于2007年至2019年我国14家上市银行的股票收益率,构建偏态t-分布动态因子Copula模型,利用时变荷载因子刻画单家银行与整个系统的相关性,计算联合风险概率作为系统性风险整体水平的度量,基于关联性视角提出了新的单家机构系统脆弱性和系统重要性度量指标——系统脆弱性程度和系统重要性程度。该方法充分考虑了银行个体差异性和系统的内在关联性以及收益率的厚尾性和非对称性,从而能够捕捉到更多的信息且兼具时效性。研究表明:银行机构在风险聚集时期相关程度更大,联合风险概率能够准确识别出系统性风险事件且在我国推行宏观审慎评估体系以后有明显降低;整体而言,大型商业银行系统重要性水平最高,同时风险抗压能力也最强;本文使用的度量方法降低了数据获取成本且更具时效性,有助于为宏观审慎差异化监管工作提供借鉴和参考。     

基于动态因子Copula模型的我国银行系统性风险度量

本文基于2007年至2019年我国14家上市银行的股票收益率,构建偏态t-分布动态因子Copula模型,利用时变荷载因子刻画单家银行与整个系统的相关性,计算联合风险概率作为系统性风险整体水平的度量,基于关联性视角提出了新的单家机构系统脆弱性和系统重要性度量指标——系统脆弱性程度和系统重要性程度。该方法充分考虑了银行个体差异性和系统的内在关联性以及收益率的厚尾性和非对称性,从而能够捕捉到更多的信息且兼具时效性。研究表明:银行机构在风险聚集时期相关程度更大,联合风险概率能够准确识别出系统性风险事件且在我国推行宏观审慎评估体系以后有明显降低;整体而言,大型商业银行系统重要性水平最高,同时风险抗压能力也最强;本文使用的度量方法降低了数据获取成本且更具时效性,有助于为宏观审慎差异化监管工作提供借鉴和参考。     

Systemic risk measurement: Multivariate GARCH estimation of CoVaR

We modify Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2011) CoVaR, the VaR of the financial system conditional on an institution being in financial distress. We change the definition of financial distress from an institution being exactly at its VaR to being at most at its VaR. This change allows us to consider more severe distress events, to backtest CoVaR, and to improve its consistency (monotonicity) with respect to the dependence parameter. We define the systemic risk contribution of an institution as the change from its CoVaR in its benchmark state (defined as a one-standard deviation event) to its CoVaR under financial distress. We estimate the systemic risk contributions of four financial industry groups consisting of a large number of institutions for the sample period June 2000 to February 2008 and the 12 months prior to the beginning of the crisis. We also investigate the link between institutions’ contributions to systemic risk and their characteristics.     

The flight from maturity

Why did the failure of Lehman Brothers make the financial crisis dramatically worse? Our answer is that the financial crisis was a process of a build-up of risk during the crisis prior to the Lehman failure. During the crisis market participants tried to preserve an option to withdraw by shortening maturities — the “flight from maturity”. We show that the flight from maturity was manifested in a steepening of the term structures of spreads in money markets. With increasingly short maturities, lenders created the possibility of fast exit. The failure of Lehman Brothers was the tipping point of this build-up of systemic fragility. A crisis is a dynamic process in which “tail risk” is endogenous.     

Financial crisis,structure and reform

In this study, we examine the relationship between the structure of financial systems and financial crises. Using cross-country data on financial structures and crises, we find that there is a significant short-term reversal in development of the banking sector and the stock market during both bank crises and market crashes, with the corporate bond market moving in the same direction as bank credit. However, the results are significant for countries with market-based financial systems but not for countries with bank-based financial systems. Emerging markets have mainly bank-based financial systems, which may explain why these markets require more time to recover from economic downturns after a financial crisis. Therefore, we argue that governments should emphasize a balanced financial system structure as it helps countries to recover from financial crises more quickly compared with countries that lack such balanced structures.     

This Time Is the Same: Using Bank Performance in 1998 to Explain Bank Performance during the Recent Financial Crisis

Are some banks prone to perform poorly during crises? If yes, why? In this paper, we show that a bank's stock return performance during the 1998 crisis predicts its stock return performance and probability of failure during the recent financial crisis. This effect is economically large. Our findings are consistent with persistence in a bank's risk culture and/or aspects of its business model that make its performance sensitive to crises. Banks that relied more on short‐term funding, had more leverage, and grew more are more likely to be banks that performed poorly in both crises.     

Research on stock volatility risk and investor sentiment contagion from the perspective of multi-layer dynamic network

In the post-epidemic period, the international economic structure has been readjusted, with risks contagious across financial and economic systems. This paper primarily uses the high-frequency TENET network and the Granger-causality network to describe the interconnectedness between the tail risk of stock volatility and investor sentiment, then the two-layer network is constructed by the generalized variance decomposition method to examine the inter-layer connectedness. Based on the two-layer network, the heterogeneity frequency response of network connectedness and dynamic network structure are further analyzed from the perspective of frequency domain. The study found that the tail risk of high-frequency stock volatility displays industry heterogeneity and time-varying property, and investor sentiment contagion network provides information transmission medium for stock risk. The double-layer network study found that stock volatility in consumer goods industry exhibits higher risk spillover to investor sentiment. The diversified financial industry, real estate industry and energy industry in the two-layer network are systemically important industries. In addition, the study of the frequency domain dynamic network found that the connectedness volatility in the short-term risk network of stock volatility was significantly higher than that of the investor sentiment network, and the short-term risk spillover effect of the network played a leading role in the total risk spillover. The research conclusions provide reference for preventing systemic risks from the perspective of systemically important industries and cyclical fluctuations.     

A comprehensive approach to measuring the relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market.     

波动溢出网络视角的金融风险传染研究

当前各类经济风险交叉关联,金融系统的风险溢出效应备受关注,为刻画我国金融系统性风险传染的路径特征,本文从波动溢出网络的视角分析金融系统内部的风险传染机制。首先使用广义动态因子模型对收益波动的共同波动率成分和特质性波动率成分进行区分。然后,根据货币市场、资本市场、大宗商品交易市场、外汇市场、房地产市场和黄金市场之间的特质性波动溢出效应,利用基于TVP-VAR模型的方差分解溢出指数分析金融系统波动溢出的动态联动性和风险传递机制。在分析方向性波动溢出效应的基础上,采用方差分解网络方法构建起信息溢出复杂网络,从网络视角分析金融系统内部的风险传染特征。实证研究发现,房地产市场和外汇市场的净溢出效应绝对值相较于其他市场更大,其受其他市场风险冲击的影响强于对外风险溢出效应,而股票市场的单向对外风险溢出效应强度最大。在波动溢出的基础上,进一步考虑股市波动率指数与其他市场波动率指数进行投资组合的资产配置权重,计算了波动率指数投资组合的最优组合权重和对冲策略。研究结论有助于更好地理解我国金融系统的风险传染机制,对监管机构加强宏观审慎监管、投资者规避投资风险具有重要意义。     

Tail dependence and indicators of systemic risk for large US depositories

In this study, we investigate the extreme loss tail dependence between stock returns of large US depository institutions. We find that stock returns exhibit strong loss dependence even in their limiting joint extremes. Motivated by this result, we derive extremal dependence-based systemic risk indicators. The proposed systemic risk indicators reflect downturns in the US financial industry very well. We also develop a set of firm-level average extremal dependence measures. We show that these firm-level measures could have been used to identify the firms that were more vulnerable to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Additionally, we explore the performance of selected systemic risk indicators in predicting the crisis performance of large US depository institutions and find that the average stock return correlations are also good predictors of crisis period returns. Finally, we identify factors predictive of extremal dependence for the US depository institutions in a panel regression setting. Strength of extremal dependence increases with asset size and similarity of financial fundamentals. On the other hand, strength of extremal dependence decreases with capitalization, liquidity, funding stability and asset quality. We believe the proposed indicators have the potential to inform the prudential supervision of systemic risk.     

What Is Systemic Risk?

The traditional view of risk in a financial system is that it is the summation of individual risks within the system. However, the financial crisis that started in 2007 has driven home that this view of risk is inadequate. It is the interactions of financial institutions and markets that determine the systemic risks that drive financial crises. We identify four types of systemic risk. These are (i) panics—banking crises due to multiple equilibria; (ii) banking crises due to asset price falls; (iii) contagion; and (iv) foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system.