Analyzing the Impact of Promotions on Manufacturer and Retailer Performance

Abstract

Promotional strategies used by manufacturers (or retailers) influence not only their own outcomes, but also the outcomes of retailers (or manufacturers). As cooperation of both the parties is needed for successful implementation of promotional strategies, the promotions used by either party should provide outcomes that are positive for the other party. The authors propose a framework for examining (1) the effect of promotional strategies on both manufacturer and retailer profitability and (2) which of two promotional strategies (retail price cut or coupon promotion) yields greater total profitability to achieve an exogenously given sales level. The proposed framework also helps in identifying conditions when conflict is likely to occur between manufacturer and retailer, and suggests a cooperative strategy to resolve the conflict.     

Decomposing the effect of advertising: What happens in the retail channel?

The diverging interests of manufacturers and retailers famously give rise to the double marginalization problem but have consequences far beyond pricing. Advertising is another marketing instrument that is under the control of the manufacturer but its ultimate effect on consumer demand also depends on retailers’ pricing decisions. We decompose the effect of advertising in the channel and highlight an additional route through which advertising affects sales, namely via the changes in the retail price that a strategic retailer makes in response to changes in demand following manufacturer advertising. The total demand effect of advertising thus comprises the direct effects of advertising on market shares, and the indirect effects coming through adjustments that the retailer makes to the in-store prices of all the brands in a given product category in response to the shifted demand due to advertising. We match advertising data for four different categories (both food and non-food) to store-level scanner panel data, which also include information on wholesale prices. Controlling for wholesale prices, we establish in a reduced-form model that the retailer reacts to manufacturer advertising by changing retail prices instead of simply imposing a constant markup on the wholesale price. To further explore the role of the strategic response of the retailer in a systematic fashion and quantify the effects derived in the decomposition, we estimate a discrete-choice model of demand and determine the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. We find that the indirect effect of advertising through retailer prices is about half the size of the direct effect, and thus substantively affects advertising effectiveness.     

Why would a big retailer refuse to collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs?

Big retailers that carry a large assortment of products rely on knowledgeable salespeople to provide purchase advice to customers and match customers with suitable products. Interestingly, big retailers vary in their policies regarding whether to allow their salespeople to receive manufacturer SPIFF (Sales Person Incentive Funding Formula) payments, which motivate salespeople advising at no cost of the retailer. In this study, we investigate a big retailer’s incentive to block manufacturer SPIFF programs, which has the consequence of demotivating salespeople from advising customers, from the perspective of vertical channel interactions. We scrutinize a big retailer’s decision to maximize its profit through managing its channel interactions with upstream manufacturers offering horizontally differentiated products, customers uncertain about true fits with competing products, and its salesperson who can match customers with suitable products through offering purchase advice. Our analysis shows that motivating the salesperson to advise customers is profitable for the retailer only if the such advising has moderate effectiveness in matching consumers and suitable products, and only in this case would the retailer collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs. Otherwise, salesperson advising hurts retailer profit and the big retailer benefits from blocking manufacturer SPIFF programs. Our study reveals the interesting theoretical insight that the incentives of a big retailer and upstream manufacturers to motivate sales advising reside in their incentives to battle for a more favorable channel status.     

An integrative framework of cooperative advertising: Should manufacturers continuously support retailer advertising?

A two-period game is developed in a bilateral monopoly where, besides pricing decisions, the retailer and manufacturer can set their advertising and cooperative advertising support rates for each period. It is demonstrated that, in addition to the established continuous cooperative advertising programs, in which the retailer advertises and the manufacturer supports retailer advertising in each period, two other advertising schedules are possible. First, the retailer advertises in each period, while the manufacturer only supports the second-period advertising. Second, whether or not the manufacturer provides a cooperative advertising program in the first period, the retailer only advertises in the second period and receives advertising support. The conditions under which each of these advertising arrangements is implemented are identified. In a continuous cooperative advertising schedule, the manufacturer may change his advertising support over time depending on the nature of the long-term effects of retailer advertising. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Consumer and Retailer Promotions: Who is Better Off?

The long-term effects of promotions on sales are increasingly linked to the supposed shift of economic power within channels from manufacturers to retailers. However, formal knowledge about how they influence channel decisions under different promotional arrangements and the distribution of channel profits remains very sparse. In this paper, I develop two 2-period models to investigate the impact on channel decisions and profits of manufacturer-controlled and retailer-controlled promotions targeted at consumers. My findings indicate that retailers always invest in retailer promotions, while manufacturers may find it optimal to not invest in consumer promotions. Economic power shifts from manufacturers to retailers when consumer promotions significantly expand the baseline demand in the long-term. Otherwise, manufacturers remain more powerful. Trade promotions or other profit-transfer mechanisms may be indispensable in easing conflicts over who should undertake promotions, especially when these promotions substantially increase future sales.     

Dynamic cooperative promotion in the presence of consumer reference effect with competing retailers

This paper studies the cooperative promotion problem in the presence of the promotion reference effect. We consider retailer price-reduction promotion activities that enhance their sales but may impair brand image for the manufacturer. Moreover, because frequently used promotion induces a promotion reference effect on customers, we investigate how the promotion reference effect influences cooperative control strategies. We do so by examining the context in a supply chain with one leading manufacturer and two competing retailers, where the manufacturer implements a cooperative promotion program for the retailers. We use differential game models vis-a-vis dynamic promotion control strategies and cooperative promotion strategies under the scenario of existence and non-existence of the reference effect. Findings show that the presence of a promotion reference effect increases profit for the manufacturer but generates reduced profit for the retailers. We also find that the manufacturer augments the level of national brand advertising when incorporating the reference effect, and retailers raise (lower) their degree of promotion when the negative effect is low (high).     

An evolutionary game theoretic model for analyzing retailers’ behavior when introducing economy and premium private labels

The significant growth of Private Labels (PLs) has led to a growing competition between National Brand (NB) manufacturers, on the one hand, and retailers, on the other; while manufacturers strive to achieve enhanced customer loyalty through such measures as innovation and advertising, retailers focus their efforts on offering high-quality products. This paper considers for the first time a supply chain consisting of one NB manufacturer and a population of retailers under two scenarios. In the first, each retailer sells NB and chooses either to introduce an Economy Private Label (EPL) or not. In the second scenario, each retailer chooses either to introduce a Premium Private Label (PPL) or not. To solve the problem, an evolutionary game is introduced and the retailers’ behavior is analyzed. Using two numerical examples, parametric analysis and managerial insights are also provided. It is found that the entire population chooses the strategy of introducing a private label (EPL or PPL) and that this strategy yields greater profits for both the manufacturer and the retailers than other strategy profiles might do. In addition, it is shown that both the retailers and the manufacturer gain more profits by introducing a PPL rather than an EPL.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

Retailer service acceptance: simply adding a service to the offer portfolio or committing to marketing it

By virtue of their significant influence on customers’ decisions, retailers’ acceptance of a service plays a significant role in the success of that service. Therefore, retailers’ acceptance of the service and commitment to selling the service must be ensured. However, this issue has attracted limited attention in acceptance research, which tends to focus on goods, technologies and consumers. Based on a survey of consumer durables retailers in three countries, this study focuses on retailer acceptance of a complimentary use-guarantee service, which is meant to maintain customer’s ability to use a semi-durable consumer product. The results of this study link retailers’ perceived usefulness, and commitment & effort to their service acceptance. Manufacturer support was found to moderate the relationship between ease of use and acceptance. Further, nationality, retailer’s own use of the service as a consumer and the importance of the manufacturer’s business for retailers were important for retailer acceptance. Thus, manufacturers need to focus as strongly on retailer acceptance as on the end customer acceptance to ensure service success. They also need to ensure the usefulness of the service for retailer, give retailers a reason to commit to the service sales and provide enough support to make retailers comfortable in selling the service.     

The Power of Innovativeness in Manufacturer–Retailer Relationships

ABSTRACT

Purpose: Retailers often challenge manufacturers through aggressive store brand policies and severe listing constraints. This study investigates manufacturer innovativeness as a managerial lever to shift the power balance between manufacturers and retailers.

Methodology/approach: Using data from 277 senior managers of Swiss and German consumer goods manufacturers and analyzing these data with structural equation modelling, the authors test hypotheses about the impact of manufacturer innovativeness on manufacturer–retailer relationship characteristics (i.e., retailer dependency, store brand aggressiveness, and listing constraints).

Findings: The study demonstrates that manufacturer innovativeness enhances retailer dependency, which in turn positively affects overall manufacturer performance. This relationship can be explained further: By increasing retailer dependency, manufacturers suppress retailers’ store brand aggressiveness and attenuate retailers’ listing constraints. Store brand aggressiveness affects overall manufacturer performance through listing constraints.

Research implications: Identifying levers such as innovativeness that assist manufacturers in fostering their power over retailers provides a new mode for understanding how manufacturers can influence the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers. The study provides support for the approach/inhibition theory of power on the inter-organizational level. Organizations with increased power are assumed to have approach-related tendencies and act in goal-consistent manner, whereas organizations with reduced power are assumed to develop the tendency to pursue inhibition-related actions, e.g., attending to threats. Furthermore, this study identifies channel relationship characteristics such as retailer dependency as a mediating path between manufacturer innovativeness and performance.

Practical implications: Managers need to strengthen the firm’s innovative capacity to enhance the performance of their companies. By developing the capability to provide radical innovations, manufacturers are able to enhance their performance not only directly but also indirectly by strengthening the manufacturer’s position with regard to retailers. This study underscores the relevance of innovativeness for strengthening the manufacturer’s position in its relationship with retailers that avoids problems with aggressive store brands and constrained listing conditions.

Originality/value/contribution: This study proposes manufacturer innovativeness as a managerial lever to shift the power balance between manufacturers and retailers.     

Optimal generic and brand advertising efforts in a decentralized supply chain considering customer surplus

While the previous researches of advertising efforts decisions focus on only the firms' profit target, no literature introduces corporation social responsibility target into advertising efforts decisions of a supply chain (SC). To fill this gap, we consider a two-stage SC with a manufacturer and a retailer where the SC members consider the customer surplus. Both the retailer and the manufacturer can invest in generic advertising efforts to influence and increase the products' sales volumes. This paper investigates the following four scenarios: (1) The retailer cares the customer surplus (Model I); (2) The manufacturer cares the customer surplus (Model II); (3) Both the retailer and the manufacturer care the customer surplus (Model III); (4) We then extend the model III to the case that the manufacturer invests in both the generic and brand advertising efforts (Model IV). The objective of this paper is to determine the optimal retail price, the optimal advertising efforts, and the optimal profits of SC members, and find the influence of customer concern level on the SC performance. Finally, numerical examples are conducted to investigate the influence of the customer concern levels of the retailer or the manufacturer on the profits of the SC members and the entire SC. We also study the joint impacts of the customer concern levels of the retailer and the manufacturer on the SC performance. We find that the SC obtains the highest profits when the retailer's customer concern level and the manufacturer's customer concern level are relatively high, and the best cooperative strategy for the retailer and the manufacturer is that they improve customer concern level simultaneously.     

How does the added new online channel impact the supporting advertising expenditure?

This research addresses the strategic effect of a newly added online channel on a manufacturer’s supportive advertising expenditure once a manufacturer opts to open an online channel to compete with its retailer. We first study the manufacturer–traditional retailer supply chain and consider three different scenarios: (1) product is less compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (2) product is more compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (3) product has the same compatibility with the online channel as with the traditional channel. Our results show that the added online channel significantly impacts the manufacturer’s investment in supportive advertising. Depending on the different product categories, the impact of the newly added online channel on the supportive advertising expenditure also will be different. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the manufacturer–online retailer supply chain and investigate the effect of that added online channel on the manufacturer’s supportive advertising to the online retailer. Based on our results, the manufacturer can utilize our findings to improve its decision-making when it plans to open an online channel to improve its product distribution.     

Do channel members value the multiple-cooperation strategy?

When the manufacturer distributes his products through online and traditional channels, what type of innovative marketing strategy can be utilized to solve the channel conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating a triple cooperative strategy for channel members to employ in a manufacturer – retailer dual-channel supply chain. Our results show that when the product is less compatible with online channel than with traditional channel, channel members can utilize a triple cooperative strategy to improve channel coordination and their individual performances effectively and efficiently. First, the manufacturer can utilize supportive retail sales effort as a valuable coordination mechanism to improve the performances of all channel members in the dual-channel distribution. Second, a channel coordinative price strategy can be utilized to further improve the performance of whole channel. Finally, a profit sharing mechanism is needed to create a Pareto result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the value of triple cooperative strategy in a manufacturer – two competitive retailers supply chain and derive the optimum marketing strategy.     

信息共享下双渠道制造商与零售商协调研究

随着internet的应用越来越广泛,许多制造商不仅使用传统的销售商渠道销售产品,而且通过网上直销的方式进行产品销售,双渠道增加了渠道之间的竞争。零售商为了在渠道竞争中获得优势,可以通过花费一定的成本增加零售产品价值。通过建立博弈模型分析强势制造商在对零售商信息完全、信息不完全情况下的定价策略,分析得出制造商获得零售商信息的价值,以及零售商愿意向制造商分享成本信息时的临界收益,旨在提出参考建议。     

The Impact of Brand Delisting on Store Switching and Brand Switching Intentions

A tool retailers often use to improve their negotiating position with brand manufacturers is to delist - or threaten to delist - the manufacturers’ brand. Because brand manufacturers rely mainly on retailers to sell their products to consumers, a brand delisting will cause a sales loss for the brand manufacturer. Therefore, many brand manufacturers feel enormous pressure to give in and improve buying conditions to favor the retailer. The question thus emerges: Can a brand manufacturer resist a retailer's threat to delist its brand(s)? If a brand delisting severely hurts retail sales, it is easier for a brand manufacturer to resist. The authors study the impact of brand delistings on store switching and brand switching using a controlled online experiment and in-store shopper survey. They develop and test a conceptual model with several antecedents of consumers’ reactions to a brand delisting and conclude that brand equity, market share, and the products’ hedonic level drive store and brand switching.     

Consistency and commonality in advertising content: Helping or Hurting?

Scholars and practitioners widely argue that strong, successful brands are built on consistent and unique positioning, which should be reflected in the brands’ advertising. Surprisingly, however, little empirical evidence supports this claim, especially with regard to advertising content. The authors investigate whether and to what extent brands’ advertising content consistency—the similarity in the firm’s own advertising content over time—and commonality—the similarity between the firm’s and competitors’ advertising content—affect brands’ sales. Insights emerge from the analysis of the impact on sales of the content of 247 television ads aired by 33 brands in six consumer packaged goods categories over a four-year period. Results indicate that more than advertising spending, both consistency and commonality in advertising content affect sales, especially with respect to long-term cumulative sales. However, brands differ considerably regarding the direction of the effects. While small brands tend to benefit from increased consistency and commonality in advertising content, large brands tend to suffer from increased consistency. Thus, whether consistency and commonality in advertising content will help or hurt depends on the size of the brand.     

Developing a framework to improve retail category management through category captain arrangements

Manufacturers and retailers have divergent profit objectives. A manufacturer wants to maximize the profits of its own brands. The retailer, on the other hand, wants to maximize the profit of the entire product category. In spite of these apparently diverging profit objectives, both manufacturers and retailers are increasingly realizing that profit margins of both can be increased through cooperation rather than confrontation. Category management is one such cooperative strategy that often involves the appointment of a leading manufacturer as the “category captain”. A category captain advises the retailer on the best way to price, display, and promote products in a category, including those of the competitors. This arrangement, therefore, ensures retail efficiency but raises doubt about possible misuse of power by the category captain to circumvent fair competition. In this paper, we outline the antitrust concerns about this arrangement, and provide a framework that effectively addresses these concerns.     

Competitive advertising within store flyers: A win–win strategy?

This study investigates the effect of competitive advertising within store flyers on both manufacturers and retailers. Prior research implies that competitive advertising may be detrimental for manufacturers and beneficial for retailers. Findings from an intersubject experiment that uses various familiar and unfamiliar competing brands confirm that store flyers’ competitive advertising improves consumers’ perceptions of the variety of the retailer’s assortment, which has a positive impact on intentions to visit the store and buy. However, increasing the number of competing brands does not harm manufacturers; rather, it enhances recognition of brands, especially for well-known brands. This article concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings for the design of store flyers.     

品牌权益影响下的双渠道供应链定价决策及协调研究

针对一个制造商开通直销渠道销售产品与零售商的价格竞争问题,文章基于制造商与零售商共享品牌权益的视角,研究在制造商双渠道供应链结构中,价格和品牌权益同时作用下的双渠道供应链定价决策,分别分析在集中决策下和分散决策下,品牌权益对两种渠道价格和利润的影响。研究发现：在集中决策下,两种渠道的价格、利润与品牌权益成正相关;在分散决策下,当品牌权益超过一定临界值时,其对制造商直销渠道的价格和制造商总利润的影响大于零售商。鉴于品牌权益对供应链定价决策的重要影响,文章建立制造商和零售商之间的品牌权益成本共担机制,并通过数值仿真分析发现,当实施品牌权益成本共担机制时,制造商和零售商的销售价格和利润均是最优的。因此,零售商应加强与制造商的互动,共同创造高品牌权益的同时,也应共同分享高品牌权益。     

Attack and defend: the role of targeting in a distribution channel

This paper studies the role of targeting in a distribution channel composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. In channel interactions, the manufacturer can deploy targeted advertising while the retailer can initiate targeted pricing. Using a game-theoretic framework, we find the following results: (1) Targeted advertising increases the manufacturers profit at the expense of the retailer; (2) The retailer may be worse off using targeted pricing; (3) Targeted pricing discourages the manufacturer from launching targeted advertising which is a more severe threat to the retailer. Therefore, the retailer may optimally use targeted pricing, even when it hurts profit, to defend against the attack of targeted advertising by the manufacturer.