Systemic risk network of Chinese financial institutions

The Chinese stock market crash in June 2015 has demonstrated necessary to improve understanding of systemic risk from the perspective of financial network. This study constructs a tail risk network to present overall systemic risk of Chinese financial institutions, given the macroeconomic and market externalities. Employing the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) method of high-dimensional models, our results show that firm's idiosyncratic risk can be affected by its connectedness with other institutions. The risk spillover effect from other companies is the main driving factor of firm-specific risk, comparing with macroeconomic state, firm characteristics and historical price movement. The number of connections between institutions significantly increases during June 2014 to June 2016. Moreover, we utilize the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic to test significance of systemic risk beta based on tail risk and further rank the systemic risk contribution. Finally, we test the determinants of systemic risk contribution in a forward-looking way. Regulators could detect those firms that are most threatening to the stability of system.     

Determinants of connectedness in financial institutions: Evidence from Taiwan

This study estimates the interconnectedness among financial holding companies (FHCs) in Taiwan to identify its determinants. Using the Diebold and Yilmaz's (2012) measure, we find that larger directional connectedness stems from state-owned FHCs, indicating their dominant role in transmitting systemic risk. In addition, we find that bank performance and monetary policy both play an important role in financial connectedness. Finally, we show that syndicated loans may affect interconnectedness because the arranger bank transmits systemic risk to other participating banks.     

Tail systemic risk and contagion: Evidence from the Brazilian and Latin America banking network

In this study the tail systemic risk of the Brazilian banking system is examined, using the conditional quantile as the risk measure. Multivariate conditional dependence between Brazilian banks is modelled with a vine copula hierarchical structure. The results demonstrate that Brazilian financial systemic risk increased drastically during the global financial crisis period. Our empirical findings show that Bradesco and Itaú are the origin of the larger systemic shocks from the banking system to the financial system network, the real economy, and the region. The results have implications for the capital regulation of financial institutions and for risk managers' decisions.     

Financial connectedness of BRICS and global sovereign bond markets

The paper examines the financial connectedness via return and volatility spillovers between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and three global bond market indices represented by the United States of America (USA), European Monetary Union (EMU) and Japan for the period 01 January 1997 to 27 July 2016 (weekly data). We find that Russia followed by South Africa is the net transmitter of shocks within BRICS, implying that the risk arising from these markets may have an adverse impact on others in BRICS. However, China and India exhibit weak connectedness, suggesting that these markets may be useful for hedging and diversification opportunities in BRICS. The networks of pairwise spillover results further confirm this. Among global indices, China appears as highly interconnected with the USA. USA is the strongest transmitter of shocks to BRICS bond indices. The panel data results further confirm the significant determinants of net directional spillover. Thus, we can conclude that BRICS is a heterogeneous asset class even in the case of the bond market. India and China are the markets to look for better risk management strategies.     

Does financial resource slack drive sustainability expenditure in developing economy small and medium-sized enterprises?

While firms continue to commit slack financial resources to sustainability causes, knowledge is lacking on how financial resource slack drives sustainability expenditure under varying conditions of market pressure and political connectedness in a developing-economy market. Using primary data from exporting small and medium sized enterprises in Nigeria, this study shows that increases in financial resource slack are associated with decreases in sustainability expenditure. Additionally, results indicate that the negative effect of financial resource slack on sustainability expenditure becomes positive when levels of market pressure are higher. However, the negative effect relationship is strengthened (i.e. becomes more negative) when levels of political connectedness are greater. We discuss theoretical and managerial implications of these findings.     

Sources of increasing systemic risk in international financial markets

In its annual report, published in June, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) warned of increasing systemic risk in international financial markets. Competitive pressures will intensify in the years to come and financial institutions and regulators around the world appear ill-prepared to cope with the resulting challenges. The pressures are expected to grow for three reasons above all: the prospective “Big Bang” of the Japanese financial system, a further erosion of the Glass-Steagall restrictions in the United States and the preparations of financial institutions in Europe to position themselves for the introduction of the euro.¹     

后危机时代构建宏观审慎监管的思考

金融监管不足是本次国际金融危机的重要推手,而产品创新过度源于微观审慎监管带来的监管套利,微观审慎监管的顺周期效应、影子银行体系及系统性重要银行监管的缺失则加剧了危机的深度。因此,宏观审慎监管的未来任务需要扩大监管范围,从总体上把握系统性风险,需要央行、金融机构、监管部门的整体配合,需要央行从源头控制流动性这一公共品,需要央行职能的重塑;然而宏观审慎监管的执行也面临一些不确定因素。     

How to reduce the default contagion risk of intercorporate credit guarantee networks? Evidence from China

This study uses data from 2011 to 2018 for Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises to construct a weighted directed network to investigate the topology of intercorporate credit guarantee networks. Moreover, based on the DebtRank algorithm, it develops a novel GuaranteeRank model that includes three factors to comprehensively examine default risk contagion and systemic risk in various scenarios. The results demonstrate that (1) credit guarantee network has the topological characteristics of “scale-free” and “small world”; (2) default contagion and systemic risk increase significantly when the macro-external shock and company's off-balance-sheet debt exceed certain threshold values, while continuous bank credit support can notably reduce the risk; (3) credit guarantee network is “robust yet fragile”, such that targeted shocks increase systemic risk much more than do random shocks; (4) in addition to the prevalent “too big to fail” and “too central to fail” phenomena, a “too connected with the central to fail” phenomenon is also identified for the first time. Therefore, this study provides an important reference for regulators and financial institutions to reduce the default contagion risk of intercorporate credit guarantee networks.     

Can corporate financing through the stock market create systemic risk? Evidence from the BRVM securities market

This paper investigates the systemic risk in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) stock exchange (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières - BRVM). It examines the extent to which growing activities in this stock market generate systemic risk. We find strong linkages across all economic sectors of listed firms, with the financial and industrial sectors being the center of the system around which the other sectors revolve. Financial institutions are not the only source of systemic risk in the WAEMU region, even though they play an important role in the system. Finally, using panel regressions, we find that big, high-growth and profitable firms contribute more to systemic risk than others. Overall, we find that the determinants of systemic risk depend on the indicator used to assess it and the sectors in which companies operate.     

The impact of banks and non-bank financial institutions on economic growth

Empirical studies examining the relationship between financial sector development and economic growth without including non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) will likely generate biased empirical results. This study provides evidence that NBFIs can have a statistically significant negative impact on economic growth using cross-country data for both emerging and advanced countries. This finding suggests that these non-bank institutions, often loosely regulated, may introduce an excessive level of risk into the financial sector and the general economy. It is consistent with the current global financial crises where NBFIs, such as investment banks and insurance companies, introduced an excessive level of risk into the global economy. Hence, policy-makers may need to consider more timely and effective regulation of NBFIs and insure that adequate transparency and disclosure is provided to all financial markets participants.     

A Credible Path for Ending Too Big to Fail

The high degree of concentration in the U.S. financial system has been intensified in the wake of the 2007–09 financial crisis. Implicit government support of banks that are deemed “too big to fail” has resulted in excessive risk taking and a focus on short-term rewards rather than long-term performance. This paper proposes a three-step plan to limit the federal safety net to commercial depository institutions and to restructure institutions so that no one institution poses systemic risk in the event of failure and that the largest banks face the same kind of risks of closure and market risk as the smallest.     

信用衍生品CDO对金融市场稳定性的影响研究

文章主要研究欧洲信用衍生产品CDO(Collateralized Debt Obligation,担保债务凭证)的发行对金融市场稳定性的影响.文章对CDO的发行量、市场波动率及欧洲6月期无风险利率与金融市场稳定性的关系采用联合极值的方法,建立泊松计数模型,并做实证分析,结果显示:金融中介之间的联动效应会增加金融市场的系统性风险;CDO发行量仅与负的联合极值显著正相关,表明CDO发行量越大对金融稳定性冲击越大.CDO发行量与正的联合极值不相关,说明CDO对银行进行风险管理的积极作用有限.此外,信息不对称程度及无风险利率也会对金融市场的稳定性产生影响.     

Makroprudenzielle Politik

The aim of macroprudential policy is to oversee financial stability and to safeguard the stability of the financial system. Systemic risk arises if distressed financial institutions put the stability of the entire financial system at risk, thus impairing its functioning and the provisioning of services to the real economy, with negative implications for economic growth. Macroprudential policy aims at increasing the overall resilience of the financial system by monitoring the allocation of risk in the financial system and by preventing the build-up of excessive risks. In the aftermath of the crisis, new institutions were established and macroprudential instruments were created. Responsibility for macroprudential policy is located mostly at the national level. Due to its international dimension it is embedded into a network of international institutions     

Friend or foe: The divergent effects of FinTech on financial stability

Whether FinTech causes the fragility of financial institutions is a controversial issue. Using a panel sample of listed banks from 84 countries, we exploit the introduction of FinTech regulatory sandboxes as an exogenous shock and examine the heterogeneous effect of FinTech on the fragility of financial institutions. We find that (i) a shock to FinTech innovations has no net effect on the fragility of financial institutions when we ignore market characteristics, (ii) promoting FinTech decreases (increases) the fragility of financial institutions in emerging (developed) financial markets, and (iii) FinTech affects the fragility of financial institutions through the channel of profitability.     

Bailouts,Monitoring, and Penalties: An Integrated Framework of Government Policies to Manage the Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Problem

This paper discusses optimal government bailout policy where the costs of systemic failures and moral hazard problems are considered. We find that a three‐tiered bailout policy that includes an ex post monitoring and bailout scheme for financial institutions with large systemic impacts (‘too big to fail’) is optimal. The optimal policy also requires a randomized bailout for medium‐impact institutions (‘Constructive Ambiguity’), and no bailout for institutions that have only minimal systemic consequences (‘too small to save’). However, in a volatile, innovative market environment where individual institutions may know more than the government regulator, monitoring error could contribute to risk taking, leaving the government regulator to always play a ‘catch‐up’ role in revising policy. Moreover, the optimal bailout policy may not be time‐consistent: institutions not deemed ‘too big to fail’ may still have an incentive to take excessive risks and expect to be bailed out in case of insolvency, primarily due to the short‐term orientation of the government. Finally, because an institution's systemic cost affects the probability of a bailout, we show that the boundary of an institution may be extended by the government subsidy.     

Systemic risk,Islamic banks,and the COVID-19 pandemic: An empirical investigation

While operating side-by-side with conventional banks, in a dual-banking system, the systemic risk profile of Islamic banks can be different due to their unique business model. The objective of this study is to understand the evolution of systemic risk in dual-banking systems and determine whether there are any differences in the systemic risk profiles of conventional and Islamic banks during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study also identifies the determinants of systemic importance (measured using spillover indices) of financial institutions. The sample includes ten countries where the Islamic banking sector is considered systemically important and covers the period from November 2015 to November 2020. The empirical results indicate a significant increase in systemic risk, in the sample countries, during the first half which is followed by a recovery in the second half of 2020. Comparative analysis shows that Islamic banks have similar systemic vulnerabilities to systematic and idiosyncratic factors during the exogenously induced real economic shock of the COVID-19. However, Islamic banks pose significantly less spillover to others relative to conventional banks while earning abnormal returns. The results are robust to the inclusion of macroeconomic factors and alternate estimation methodologies. The findings of this study provide valuable insights for the regulators of dual-banking systems.     

供应链管理视角下的企业预付款融资采纳研究

文章结合供应链管理理论及营运资金管理理论,从供应链管理运作管理的视角出发,深入分析影响企业采纳预付款融资的因素。基于来自全国717个企业的供应链金融调查数据,文章利用对二分类因变量进行回归建模的Logistic回归模型,对企业采纳预付款融资的发生概率进行拟合。研究结果表明,从融资企业资金需求的角度,供应商提供原材料的平均交付周期越长、企业所采购物料的价格波动越大,越倾向于采纳预付款融资来解决资金问题,维持企业正常运营。结合金融机构信用风险控制的考虑,相对于原材料价格波动小的企业,所在供应链信息化程度高对帮助原材料价格波动大的企业获得金融机构授信的作用更显著。同时,文章认为出于确保还款资金来源的考虑,金融机构更倾向于向原材料库存平均周转天数短的企业授信;由于融资企业引入外部金融机构资金带来了额外的融资成本,会激励企业更努力做好其原材料库存管理,缩短原材料库存平均周转天数,尽早预付款融资,降低融资成本。     

Tail-event driven NETwork dependence in emerging markets

This paper employs the Tail Event NETwork (TENET) to identify financial markets with greater potential risk, and simultaneously investigate the interdependence between them. We find strong time-varying connectedness across 23 emerging markets during the main crisis episodes, including the most recent COVID-19 pandemic, using data from January 1995 to May 2021. The network analysis revealed that emerging European markets are top risk transmitters, whereas emerging Asian markets are top risk receivers. China showed disconnection from the network, reflecting its diversification potential for investors. Our findings offer several policy and regulatory implications.     

Spillover Effects among European,the US and Moroccan Stock Markets before and after the Global Financial Crisis

ABSTRACT

This paper assesses return and volatility spillovers among stock markets in Morocco, the US, UK, France and Germany represented respectively by MASI, S&P 500, FTSE 100, CAC 40 and DAX 30 indices, both before and after the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008. The daily frequency data cover the period from January 2nd, 2002 to June 30th, 2016. Using the Diebold and Yilmaz approach, the results show varying financial connectedness between the Moroccan and the above mentioned developed stock markets. In fact, the significant increase of spillover index during the post-financial crisis period demonstrates that the US and European stock markets were the most affected. On the other hand, despite a relative increase of spillover effects coming from the US and German equity markets, our results show decline in the total net spillovers experienced by the Moroccan market after the recent financial crisis. These findings may provide some useful information to support decision-making and trading strategies for international investors.     

The 2007–2009 Financial Crisis: An Erosion of Ethics: A Case Study

This case study examines five dimensions of the 2007–2009 financial crisis in the United States: (1) the devastating effects of the financial crisis on the U.S. economy, including unparalleled unemployment, massive declines in gross domestic product (GDP), and the prolonged mortgage foreclosure crisis; (2) the multiple causes of the financial crisis and panic, such as the housing and bond bubbles, excessive leverage, lax financial regulation, disgraceful banking practices, and abysmal rating agency performance; (3) the extraordinary efforts of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Department of the Treasury to stem the financial freefall triggered by the crisis and resuscitate financial institutions, (4) the ethical implications of the unprecedented actions by government institutions to rescue financial institutions and drag the country back from the brink of global financial collapse, and the conduct of the various parties contributing to the financial crisis, such as the shoddy behavior of mortgage brokers, the massive securitization of mortgages into overly complex bonds, the excessive leverage of financial institutions, the disgraceful work of bond rating firms, the abysmal risk management systems employed by financial institutions, and the massive operations of the shadow banking and over-the-counter derivatives markets; and (5) the major provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into law to in response to the financial crisis and for the purpose of correcting the egregious conduct of major financial institutions.