我国失业保险制度存在的问题及其改进

我国的失业保险制度存在着覆盖面窄、统筹层次低、基金的支出结构不合理、失业保险水平的设计不适度、领取失业保险金的资格审查不规范等一系列问题，极大地限制了失业保险应有功能和作用的发挥。增强失业保险的反失业功能，是失业保险制度完善的方向。具体完善措施有：逐步地适当提高失业保险金水平、调整失业保险基金的用途、加强领取失业保险金的资格审查并细化资格审查条例、进一步完善劳动就业服务体系等等。     

再就业之路赵走越宽——吴泾街道再就业工作二、三事

去年四月，重新修订的《上海市失业保险办法》实施后，一时间，大批失业人员不断涌向户籍所在地的街道(乡镇)就业服务机构，申领失业保险金。据了解，由于新的失业保险办法提高了失业保险金的支付标准，因此，不少隐性失业或生活条件尚可、就业条件比较好、年纪又比较轻的失业人员也加入了申领失业保险金的行列，使得申领失业保险金的人数呈直线上升趋势。     

加强失业保险经办业务管理基础工作建设

确保失业人员的基本生活，是各级失业保险经办机构的首要任务。各级失业保险经办机构必须从讲政治的高度，充分认识失业保险金发放工作的严肃性和紧迫性，确保为符合条件的失业人员及时足额发放失业保险金，确保符合条件的下岗职工出中心解除劳动关系，顺利进入失业保险，按时足额领取失业保险金，并为他们求职、培训提供有效的支持。     

中国失业保险基金结余原因分析

本文通过对2000年以来中国失业保险的统计数据进行分析，发现我国失业保险的参保率、替代率等指标都呈现逐年下降的趋势，而失业保险基金的盈余规模却在不断扩大。在对其它国家的失业保险制度进行比较的基础上，文章认为我国失业率、失业保险金支付水平、失业保险参保结构是影响我国失业保险基金结余的重要因素。通过实证分析，进一步论证了其显著性。检验结果表明以上三个因素对失业保险金结余水平具有显著的影响，并得出如下结论：一是近年来我国失业率偏高与失业保险基金结拿这两者之间严重相悖，这与我国失业保险制度替代率逐年下降有关；二是我国较低的失业保险金支付水平是造成失业保险基金结余的另一个原因；三是我国目前的参保结构不合理，主要参保人群集中在国有企业及事业单位，这是又一个重要因素。最后，文章对此提出了具有针对性、可行性的政策建议。     

抓住重点 做好失业保险的基数核定

失业保险的基数核定工作是失业保险费征缴工作与失业保险金发放工作的重中之重。在失业保险费征缴与失业保险金发放的运作过程中，基数核定工作的好坏直接影响着失业保险工作的全局。     

浅析失业保险中的道德风险

自愿失业、延缓就业和隐性就业等道德风险问题在失业保险领域越发突出,为失业保险的长期发展埋下了隐患。因此,本文对失业保险中的道德风险进行了剖析,指出应建立更加完善的失业保险法律制度,建立失业保险储蓄账户,设立失业人员奖惩机制并且健全失业保险管理信息系统,从而为失业保险的长期稳定发展奠定坚实的基础。     

国外失业保险金给付管理方法及其启示

当前我国的失业保险制度特别是失业保险金给付制度还不完善,主要体现在给付范围、申领条件、给付标准、给付期的设置以及对失业人员的动态管理等方面。鉴于此,本文首先介绍和分析了国外失业保险金的给付情况,然后结合我国实际提出我国失业保险金给付制度的完善建议。     

国外失业保险金给付管理方法及其启示

当前我国的失业保险制度特别是失业保险金给付制度还不完善,主要体现在给付范围、申领条件、给付标准、给付期的设置以及对失业人员的动态管理等方面。鉴于此,本文首先介绍和分析了国外失业保险金的给付情况,然后结合我国实际提出我国失业保险金给付制度的完善建议。     

失业保险金申领发放办法

第一章　总　则第一条　为保证失业人员及时获得失业保险金及其他失业保险待遇 ,根据《失业保险条例》(以下简称《条例》) ,制定本办法。第二条　参加失业保险的城镇企业事业单位职工以及按照省级人民政府规定参加失业保险的其他单位人员失业后 (以下统称失业人员 ) ,申请领取失业保险金、享受其他失业保险待遇适用本办法 ;按照规定应参加而尚未参加失业保险的不适用本办法。第三条　劳动保障行政部门设立的经办失业保险业务的社会保险经办机构 (以下简称经办机构 )按照本办法规定受理失业人员领取失业保险金的申请 ,审核确认领取资格 ,核定…     

北京：三次无故拒绝工作停发失业保险金

北京市劳动和社会保障局就执行《北京市失业保险规定》中出现的问题,在其官方网站上表示,失业人员无正当理由三次不接受劳动保障部门指定的职业介绍服务机构介绍的工作,失业保险经办机构将停发其失业保险金和其他失业保险待遇,并取消其在本次失业期间再次申领失业保险金的资格。     

When should homeless families get subsidized apartments? A theoretical inquiry

How and when should operators of homeless shelters place families from these shelters into subsidized housing? I apply the tools of contract theory to this problem, especially some approaches that have been taken to optimal unemployment insurance. The problem combines moral hazard and adverse selection. When all families are drawn from the same distribution, placement should occur immediately. When families are heterogeneous, the optimal strategy creates a separating equilibrium. Good searchers self-select into a contract with high probability of immediate placement and no probability of later placement; poorer searchers self-select into a contract with a lower probability of immediate placement but a positive probability of later placement.     

Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the potential relationships between the unemployment insurance system and labour market turnover. This study assumes the incentives embedded in the unemployment insurance system have a heterogeneous impact, depending on the type of labour market transition (quits versus layoffs and recalls versus new job entrances) and on a worker's attachment to the labour market (gender and type of contract). The layoff hazard rate increases as workers qualify for unemployment benefits, whilst the quit hazard rate remains stable. Similarly, employment inflow increases sharply after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. The timing and importance of the exit differ between recalls and new job entry and depend on a worker's attachment to the labour market. The results show that unemployment benefits appear to favour job turnover and both firms' and workers' decisions seem to matter.     

Benefit shifting: The case of sickness insurance for the unemployed

This study describes the probability of transition from unemployment with unemployment insurance (UI) to sickness insurance (SI), using a proportional hazard duration model and a large register-based dataset. The combination of limited UI duration and the fact that SI rights do not depend on remaining UI, creates an incentive to use SI to effectively extend UI. The separate effects of elapsed unemployment duration and of UI duration on hazard rates are identified through a reform of the UI system. The estimated hazard rate for transition from unemployment to SI increases sharply the last months before UI exhaustion. The spikes are larger for diagnosis for mental illness, and vary across individuals, but are present for all groups and all diagnoses.     

Spell durations with long unemployment insurance periods

This paper uses data from a natural experiment to investigate the potential incentive effect of a fixed unemployment insurance period. We compare two large groups of Norwegian unemployed persons who registered as unemployed in 1990 and 1991. The last group was affected by a rule change that in practice extended the length of unemployment benefits to more than 3 years. Our data are taken from official records, and we construct unemployment durations by combining information from the unemployment registers with employers' records. We use a proportional hazard model with a flexible baseline. The results suggest that the main effect of benefits running out is to make people drop out of the unemployment register. We find neither clear evidence that the hazard into employment increased when the end of benefits approached in the pre-liberalisation group, nor that behaviour in this part of the spells changed after the reform. On the other hand, our results suggest that the reform had an all over negative effect on the employment hazard.     

供应链系统道德风险的熵度量研究

道德风险问题直接影响着供应链系统的稳定性和可靠性。本文首先介绍了引起供应链道德风险的因素，建立了基于节点企业与影响因素的风险度矩阵，并对其进行了熵权调整；在此基础上又建立了道德风险的熵度量模型，并对其进行了熵变分析；最后，本文结合外部环境因素的分析，提出了整个供应链系统道德风险的熵度量方法。     

Optimal insurance contract under VaR and CVaR constraints

This study endogenously develops an optimal insurance contractual form for maximizing insured expected utility under VaR and CVaR constraints. We find that CVaR constraint does not affect the contractual form, but may increase minimum insurance premium requirement. Additionally, when the VaR constraint is binding, the optimal contract is a double deductible insurance. However, if the contract is restricted to a regular form (both indemnity schedule and retained loss schedule are continuously nondecreasing) for avoiding moral hazard problem, the optimal contract is a piecewise linear deductible insurance. Finally, we provide intuitive comparison between this study result and relevant studies.     

Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care

If an illness is not contractible, then even partially insured consumers demand treatment for it when the benefit is less than the cost, a condition known as moral hazard. Traditional health insurance, which controls moral hazard with copayments (demand management), can result in either a deficient or an excessive provision of treatment relative to ideal insurance. In particular, treatment for a low-probability illness is deficient if illness per se has little effect on the consumer's marginal utility of income and if the consumer's price elasticity of expected demand for treatment is large relative to the risk-spreading distortion when these are evaluated at a copayment that brings forth the ideal provision of treatment. Managed care, which controls moral hazard with physician incentives, can either increase or decrease treatment delivery relative to traditional insurance, depending on whether demand management results in deficient or excessive treatment.     

信息不对称下保险信用缺失分析及防范

当前，保险信用缺失已成为制约保险市场进一步发展的瓶颈。文中从投保人、保险人的逆向选择及道德风险三个方面阐述了保险信用缺失的原因，同时提出了健全我国保险信用体系的对策。     

Replacement rates and labour market behaviour

This paper studies how the replacement rate, defined as the ratio of disposable income when unemployed to expected disposable income if beginning to work, affects individuals’ transition rate from unemployment. Linked register data, representing a local Finnish labour market in 1996, are analysed with piece-wise constant exponential hazard models. Results suggest that the effect of the replacement rate and, thus, of “unemployment traps”, is fairly modest. It does not seem to change with time spent unemployed. The impact on the transition rate into employment is lower than on the transition rate out of the labour force. Unemployment insurance recipients are found to be less sensitive to changes in the replacement rate than are unemployment assistance recipients.     

Deposit insurance subsidies,moral hazard,and bank regulation

The model developed in the paper separates deposit insurance subsidies into two components: a premium-linked subsidy which arises from an ex-ante mispricing of the deposit insurance premium, and an asset-linked subsidy which arises from a lack of ex-post monitoring of the bank's actions. The identification of these two subsidies provides important insight into the relation between deposit-insurance subsidies and bank risk. The asset-linked subsidy is higher for banks of average risk and lower for very-high and very-low risk banks. The premiumlinked subsidy behaves differently under risk-adjusted and fixed-rate premiums. The model also indicates that the implementation of a riskadjusted insurance-rate schedule alone would not be sufficient to eliminate the bank's excessive risk-taking behavior. Thus, some combination of risk-sensitive deposit-insurance pricing and regulatory control is necessary to reduce the moral hazard problem.