中央银行独立性、收入不平等与通货膨胀--来自中国的实证检验

本文就中国人民银行独立性、收入不平等对通货膨胀的影响机制进行了分析探讨.我们引入中央银行目标函数,对中央银行独立性、收入不平等与通货膨胀间的作用机制进行了模型推理分析.而后我们整合了转型国家中央银行独立性的测度方法,并用此方法对中国人民银行的独立性进行了详细测定.最后,通过计量分析检验了以下结论:收入不平等是引致通货膨胀的一个经验性因素;中央银行独立性越强,越能有效抑制收入不平等引起的通货膨胀.     

中央银行独立性、责任性与通货膨胀目标制

近年来不少学者提出,我国货币政策应转向通货膨胀目标制。我国现行的政策实际上正是一种隐性的通货膨胀目标制,20世纪90年代以来所发生的几次通货膨胀偏倚很大程度上是由于央行的独立性不够。鉴于通货膨胀目标制并不能解决当前我国货币政策调控中的问题并可能带来更多的问题,今后货币政策改革应坚持由直接调控向间接调控、由数量型调控向价格型调控的转变思路,在提高央行独立性的同时,增强其责任性并提高货币政策的透明度。     

中央银行的独立性与通货膨胀--基于货币政策时间非一致性的一个理论分析

基于对历史上中央银行独立性与通货膨胀之间关系的考察,在分析货币政策的时间非一致性基础上,认为中央银行的独立性跟通货膨胀之间没有必然联系;通货膨胀大小受中央银行对其偏好的影响。     

中央银行独立性与货币政策有效性

货币本位制的确立和二战后各国经济的发展,使得货币政策的重要性日益增强,相应地中央银行独立性问题也引起了广泛的争论。这是因为各国经济发展的实践表明,中央银行能否有效地制定和执行货币政策,保持货币稳定,在很大程度上取决于中央银行的独立性。     

论中央银行的独立性

中央银行是以实现整个经济为特定目标而非利润最大化的、负责货币政策的政府机构。中央银行的独立性可以表现为两种形式：形式上的独立性与实质上的独立性。美联储可以放弃形式上的独立性成为政府的一部分,但保留实质上的独立性,使其能够置身于党派政治之外。     

浅论我国中央银行独立性

在世界金融危机的大背景下,研究我国中央银行的独立性具有重要的现实意义.本文从中央银行独立性的基本理论出发,重点分析了我国中央银行独立性的现状,并对如何完善中央银行独立性提出了建议.     

关于我国中央银行独立性与宏观经济表现的实证分析

本文对1984年中国人民银行正式行使中央银行职能至今20年的分析,探讨在我国CBI与通货膨胀率和GDP增长率之间的关系。通过回归分析,发现我国的数据支持已有的结论:1995年人民银行规范之前,存在CBI过低与通货膨胀率过高的现象;而1995年之后,CBI提高对应着较低的通胀率;1984-2001年的经济增长并没有表现出与CBI之间的明显关系。历史数据显示,我国的中央银行独立性过度受到政府干预,造成物价和经济激烈波动;但是随着金融体制改革的深入,中央银行的独立性在逐步提高,货币政策的效力也在增强。     

Inequality, inflation, and central bank independence

What can account for the different contemporaneous inflation experiences of various countries, and of the same country over time? We present an analysis of the determination of inflation from a political economy perspective. We document a positive correlation between income inequality and inflation and then present a theory of the determination of inflation outcomes in democratic societies that illustrates how greater inequality leads to greater inflation, owing to a desire by voters for wealth redistribution. We conclude by showing that democracies with more independent central banks tend to have better inflation outcomes for a given degree of inequality. JEL Classification E5, H0 Inégalité, inflation et l'indépendance de la banque centrale. Quels sont les facteurs qui pourraient expliquer les expériences inflationnistes tellement différentes des divers pays dans le passé récent, et l'expérience tellement différente d'un pays donné dans le temps? Les auteurs analysent ce problème de la détermination du taux d'inflation dans une perspective d'économie politique. Ils déterminent qu'il y a une corrélation positive entre l'inégalité et l'inflation, et présentent une théorie de la détermination de l'inflation dans les sociétés démocratiques qui montre comment une inégalité plus grande entraîne une inflation plus grande à cause du désir des électeurs de demander une redistribution de la richesse. Le mémoire montre en terminant que les démocraties e´quipées de banques centrales plus indépendantes tendent à avoir de meilleurs résultats en terme d'inflation pour un degré d'inégalité donné.     

Reconsidering central bank independence

In this paper, we survey the case for central bank independence (CBI). We conclude that CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for monetary stability. CBI is just one potentially useful monetary policy design instrument among several, and CBI should not be treated as an exogenous variable. Instead, the question that should be addressed is why societies decide to make their central banks independent? The reasons why CBI is chosen are related to legal, political, and economic systems. A number of empirical studies find correlations between CBI and low inflation rates. Endogeneity of CBI suggests, however, that the correlation has no implications for causality.     

Formal targets, central bank independence and inflation dynamics in the UK: A Markov-Switching approach

We examine inflation and uncertainty in the UK with a version of the Markov Switching model, which allows for changes in the variance as well as in the mean and persistence of a series. We find that the UK’s attempts at exchange rate pegs in the form of shadowing the deutschmark and entering the ERM were ineffective, and in the latter case counterproductive in lowering inflation uncertainty. The 1981 budget, however, greatly lowered uncertainty, and the adoption of a formal inflation target also had a palpable, negative impact on inflation uncertainty. As a suggestive exercise, we examine inflation uncertainty in the US, and find that, over 2005–2008, in the absence of an inflation target, uncertainty rose in the US, while uncertainty remained low in the UK over this period of rising commodity prices and financial turmoil.     

Central bank independence,inflation and political instability in developing countries

We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.     

Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence

The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence. The results show that the optimal institutional design always requires some degree of central bank independence and that there is substitutability between central bank independence and conservatism. The results also show that partial central bank independence can be optimal and that there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the government to appoint a liberal central banker.     

Measuring central bank independence: a latent variables approach

We argue that central bank independence (CBI) is a latent variable of which the various existing quantifications are imperfect indicators. We show how factor analysis techniques can be employed to assess the quality of the various indicators, and how an optimal weighting of the indicators can be obtained that gives the best approximation of CBI. We also show how these results can be utilized in models in which CBI is an explanatory variable. In contrast to the well‐known study of Campillo and Miron (1997) , we find that our CBI indicator is significantly related to inflation, also when various control variables are included.     

我国通货膨胀率均值过程和波动过程中的双长记忆性度量与统计检验

This paper uses the ARFIMA-FIGARCH model to investigate the China’s monthly inflation rate from January 1983 to October 2005. It is found that both first moment and second moment of inflation have remarkable long memory, indicating the existence of long memory properties in both inflation level and inflation uncertainty. By the Granger-causality test on inflation rate and inflation uncertainty, it is shown that the inflation level affects the inflation uncertainty and so supports Friedman hypothesis. Therefore, as for policy maker, they should roundly concerns on long memory properties of inflation and inflation uncertainty, and their single-direction relationship between them. __________ Translated from Guanli shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2007, (7): 14–21     

The inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate of unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.