银行房地产贷款的博弈分析

发放信用贷款是银行的一项主要业务,但银行经常会面临着客户到期不偿还贷款的风险,现对房地产开发企业在向银行申请贷款阶段以及贷款的偿还阶段进行分析,讨论在如今信息不对称情况下,银行如何有效规避或缩小信贷风险,为商业银行的风险管理提供有效的建议.     

贷款集中监管之国际比较与借鉴

贷款集中程度管制一般指监管当局对银行向单一借贷者发放的贷款做出限制.其实质在于限制银行贷款风险过度集中,使贷款风险得以合理分散.从广义上看,银行贷款的集中程度有多种评价角度或表现形式,如对单一客户.单一行业、单一地区、单一业务领域(如外汇)的过度贷款等等.一般来讲,各国或地区贷款集中程度管制主要指的是监管当局对银行向个别借款者发放的贷款做出限制.这也是本文关注的重点.之所以较少涉及其他方面,原因就在于明晰的     

助学贷款银行经办人员的结构性成本问题及对策

虽然目前财政和高校对中标的国家助学贷款经办银行支付学生在校期间的全部贷款利息和15%的风险补偿金,基本规避了银行因学生信用而产生的外部风险,但是由于单笔贷款金额较小而操作成本与大额贷款基本相同,进而限制了贷款的按约发放.笔者认为可以通过创建对银行具体经办人员的结构性外部激励制度以提高其积极性,达到完善贷款制度、实现按约发放的目的.     

化解中小企业贷款困局的对策分析

由于中小企业治理结构、生存模式和管理方式等方面的特点,导致商业银行经营中小企业贷款的审批发放、信息搜集和履约监督的成本以及坏账损失均高于大型企业贷款,从而缺乏贷款积极性。要化解这一困局,应正确认识商业银行贷款在中小企业融资中的地位,加大政策支持力度,调动商业银行贷款积极性,发挥银行各自优势,降低贷款成本和风险,加强金融体系建设,创新贷款保证方式。     

产品市场寿命周期理论在银行发放技术改造贷款中的应用

产品市场寿命周期理论在银行发放技术改造贷款中的应用任志华我国银行信贷体制的一项重要改革，就是彻底突破了银行不能发放固定资产贷款的禁区，开办了技术改造贷款，把银行信贷杠杆作用扩大到了发展经济、革新技术的新领域。但是，银行如何更好地管好和用活技术改造贷款...     

我国中小企业贷款信用保险研究

中小企业贷款信用保险不仅能够在一定程度上提高中小企业信用水平,缓解因资金缺乏引起的发展受限问题,同时,为作为贷款发放方的银行提供了保障,解决了银行因担心贷款不能及时偿还而引起的惜贷问题.因此,在我国开展中小企业贷款信用保险,对于我国经济的发展具有积极的作用.开展中小企业贷款信用保险要保证行业协会监督与国家强制保险政策相结合;积极发展信用服务中介行业;健全相关法律;完善信用体制等方面的健全.     

论我国贷款损失税收法律制度的完善

贷款损失是指商业银行在经营过程中由于各种原因导致发放的贷款收不回来而遭受的损失,贷款损失风险是银行面临的主要风险.贷款损失作为银行经营成本的一部分,理应在计算所得税应纳税额时子以扣除,但是我国现行的贷款损失税收制度还不完善,一定程度上阻碍了银行及时足额的计提准备金,不利于防范风险与维护金融稳定.     

对格莱珉模式在中国西部震灾地区推行的思考——以格莱珉信托松潘复制项目为例

格莱珉银行是孟加拉国经济学家穆罕默德·尤努斯创立的一家乡村银行,它专门发放小额贷款,已经帮助数百万贷款者摆脱贫困。在分析格莱珉银行在中国西部的运行模式的现状之后,探讨格莱珉银行未来在中国西部震灾地区发展定位、贷款模式及信贷员选择、项目选址、政府关系等方面的启示。     

加拿大与中国住房抵押贷款之比较——生存年金式反转抵押贷款的借鉴

在加拿大,生存年金式反转抵押贷款是抵押贷款与寿险相结合的产物.发放的对象主要是拥有房产产权的老人.银行根据老人的年龄和性别确定贷款占被抵押房产价值的比例,从而确定贷款额度,一次性发放贷款.该贷款仅限于购买保险公司的生存年金.年金持续至借款人身故.借款人身故后,银行变卖抵押物,变卖所得首先用于偿还贷款,多余部分交还借款人的继承人,不足部分为银行的亏损.     

对我国房地产价格调控的若干建议

1.适度控制对房地产行业贷款规模。鉴于城市贷款规模对房地产均价的显著影响,对贷款规模的适度控制,可以有效地调控房地产价格。城市对房地产行业贷款主要来源于金融机构发放的贷款,主要包括政策性银行和商业性银行的贷款。金融机构调控贷款规模的主要工具有利率、贴现率和存款准备金率。     

Does branch network size influence positively the management performance of Japanese regional banks?

This article investigates whether branch network expansions by Japanese regional banks influence their management performances positively at a time when management environments surrounding regional financial institutions have become increasingly severe due to the population decreases and shrinkage of regional economies. Specifically, the effects of numbers of regional bank branches on their credit businesses and profits are empirically examined. The results indicated that regional banks with more branches can increase their loans and bills discounted as well as their small and mid-sized enterprises loans and bills discounted. Thus, establishing more branches is effective in increasing the total sum of loans and bills discounted by each bank because regional banks with many branches can make contact with more customers. On the other hand, return on assets and return on equity of regional banks with more branches were found to be lower. Therefore, regarding the cost performance of regional banks, establishing too many branches and maintaining branch networks that are too large can have negative effects on regional banks.     

Effects of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in transition economies

In transition countries, the real impact of banking crises has so far been rather moderate. We study the effect of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in a model where incumbent banks possess an informational advantage. We find that bank insolvency reduces the incentive to restructure for firms whose incumbent bank becomes insolvent. However, bank insolvency provides an additional incentive for firms that enter the credit market to develop new projects because it reduces asymmetric information between banks. Firms’ credit costs are thereby lowered. We also explain a path‐dependent development by demonstrating that the firms’ decision to develop new projects depends on the banks’ share of non‐performing loans.     

Financial institutions and the financial crisis in East Asia

This paper investigates institutional reasons for the soft-budget constraint problem; and how the soft-budget constraint problem creates conditions which may result in a financial crisis. As a consequence of soft-budget constraints, bad projects do not stop; bad loans accumulate; and banks and depositors do not receive bad news on time. Poorly informed depositors are then likely to herd to overinvest when there is no bankruptcy (`frenzy'); and they are likely to herd to panic when bankruptcy occurs (`crash'), which may be the result of excessive bad loans that are also a consequence of soft-budget constraints. In contrast, under hard-budget constraints information is disclosed quickly regarding liquidation. Better-informed investors are then less likely to herd wrongly.     

经济欠发达地区担保业发展中存在问题及政策建议

中小企业融资难问题的产生,一个重要原因就是中小企业抵押担保难,银行与企业之间缺少一个中介担保机构。担保机构在银行与企业之间发挥着桥梁作用,使中小企业有了稳定可靠的信用系统,又可以帮助银行按照贷款的"三性"经营管理原则实现经营总目标,使银行的贷款更为安全、有效。     

Performance of Thailand banks after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis

The performance of commercial banks and government-owned specialized banks in Thailand is estimated after the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. Commercial banks exhibit increasing returns to scale, whereas government-owned specialized banks exhibit decreasing returns to scale, implying further increases in bank size and market concentration in the commercial bank sector but not for government specialized banks. Cost inefficiency varies by bank and is a function of the ratio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to total loans, equity to total assets and liquid assets to total assets, as well as the number of branches. On average, banks with fewer NPLs, that are well capitalized and with adequate liquidity are efficient. Thus, stricter rules to regulate credit risk management and ensure capital and liquidity adequacy would enhance efficiency in the banking sector. Although estimated input substitutability appears to be low, labour and loanable fund are substitutes. However, labour and physical capital as well as physical and loanable funds are complements in commercial banks. All the three inputs of labour, physical capital and loanable funds are substitutes for the government specialized banks.     

Inefficiency of bilateral bargaining in interbank markets

Many countries have interbank markets that are over the counter (OTC) instead of exchange mediated. In OTC systems, bilateral bargaining takes place over the rate of interest on the (interbank) loan. This article characterizes such bilateral bargaining for loans between banks under asymmetric information and shows that bargaining outcomes maybe inefficient. The article suggests two sources of inefficiency. In a one-period model, bargaining between two banks may fail due to incomplete information even if gains to trade exist. Intertemporal issues examined in this article reveal that repeated interaction could create distorting effects through reciprocal contracts. Both cases are shown to require active liquidity management by the regulatory authority to restore the first best allocation.     

Earnings management behaviors under different economic environments: Evidence from Japanese banks

This paper investigates Japanese banks' earnings management behavior under three distinct economic environments: (1) high-growth with asset price bubble economy (1985–1990); (2) stagnant growth with financial distress economy (1991–1996); and (3) severe recession with credit crunch economy (1997–1999). Using bank balance sheet information of 78 Japanese banks, we find that earnings management behavior by Japanese banks differ considerably across the three periods. Our results indicate that banks used security gains as a means to manage earnings throughout all three periods. We also find that banks used loan loss provisions to manage earnings; however, this behavior is only prevalent during the first two periods. Due to the fact that banks faced record-high non-performing loans during the latter severe recession period, banks on average may have been restrained from using loan loss provisions to smooth income and/or to replenish regulatory capital. Consistent with previous studies, we find that the Japanese banks significantly lowered their lending with increased provisions.     

我国商业银行 X-效率研究

从我国商业银行效率角度出发分析了我国商业银行的规模效率、范围效率和X-效率,表明我国商业银行总体效率不高。以2005～2013年的数据为例,并运用数据包络分析方法（DEA）对我国商业银行的X-效率进行实证分析,考察了其间的差异。通过多元回归论述了影响我国商业银行X-效率的因素主要有银行产权结构、金融创新、资产配置、资产质量、资本充足率、人力资源配置。提出深化产权制度改革、提高人力资源管理水平、降低不良贷款率、促进技术创新的建议。     

Why do Banks Fail?

Banks advance loans in the absence of precise knowledge in relation to the outcome of borrowers' projects. Consequently, uncertainty in relation to loan repayment emerges. Thus, banks introduce the 'credit standard' as insurance against loans, so that should borrowers' projects fail, borrowers have an alternative means of honouring their debt obligations. It is argued in this paper that in the competitive atmosphere under which this sector operates, it is not possible to secure the entire loan portfolio by introducing the credit standard, and in recent years this difficulty has been further exacerbated by financial liberalisation, which may have caused bank failures.     

ARE LAC COOPERATIVE AND COMMERCIAL BANKS SO DIFFERENT IN THEIR MANAGEMENT OF NON‐PERFORMING LOANS?

This paper assesses technical efficiency in the management of non‐performing loans (NPLs) in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) banking industry. To that end, Data Envelopment Analysis techniques are employed with data from the years 2013 to 2016 on a sample of 307 LAC cooperative and commercial banks. Our main contribution to existing literature is that differences of efficiency between cooperative banks and commercial banks are assessed as the result of the different capacities of their managers – managerial efficiency – and the so‐called programme efficiency, which represents differences in the technology used by these two categories of entities. Our principal result suggests that the technology used by cooperative banks in the management of NPLs is more efficient than the technology of commercial banks.