对我国银行业引进境外战略投资者的几点思考

银行业作为现代经济的核心,引进境外战略投资者的意义非同一般。国家一方面做出国有银行上市必须引进境外战略投资者的政策要求,另一方面积极出台系列措施,鼓励合格境外战略投资者参与国内银行的产权重组,从根本上改变产权结构的单一性,实现股权结构的多元化。只有在投资主体和利益主体多元化的基础上,国家财政才不可能再为商业银行的经营亏损去买单,从体制上消除道德风险。     

国有商业银行引进战略投资者利弊分析

国有企业进一步深化改革的目标,就是要实现投资主体的多元化,健全和完善公司治理制度,国有商业银行股份制改革归根到底是解决治理问题。国有商业银行在改革过程中通过引进战略投资者完成优化股权结构和实现上市,风险和收益共存。本文试图分析引进境外战略投资者对国有商业银行产生的利弊得失,进而阐明国有商业银行改革的效果,以及对此措施进行评述。     

国有商业银行引进战略投资者利弊分析

国有企业进一步深化改革的目标,就是要实现投资主体的多元化,健全和完善公司治理制度,国有商业银行股份制改革归根到底是解决治理问题。国有商业银行在改革过程中通过引进战略投资者完成优化股权结构和实现上市,风险和收益共存。本文试图分析引进境外战略投资者对国有商业银行产生的利弊得失,进而阐明国有商业银行改革的效果,以及对此措施进行评述。     

引进境外战略投资者对我国商业银行公司治理影响的实证研究

目前,我国银行领域出现了一个十分引人瞩目的现象：大中小商业银行通过出让部分股权,纷纷引进境外战略投资者,形成了商业银行引入战略投资者热潮。从理论上来说,商业银行积极引入境外战略投资者,不仅意在帮助实现股权结构的多样化,提高资本充足率,帮助银行境外募资上市,还在于可以促进我国中资商业银行改善公司治理结构、不断完善和促进中资商业银行风险管理和内部控制、提高商业银行业务和产品创新能力、促进中资银行国际化水平的提升、进一步强化国有商业银行的经营约束机制。境外战略投资者入股中资银行后是否能够帮助完善商业银行公司治理,这将成为本文的研究重点。     

中国银行业“引智”“淘金”

随着我国银行业改革推进和对外开放的步伐加快，很多商业银行都通过出让部分股权的方式，纷纷引进境外战略投资者。自1996年亚洲开发银行入股光大银行，首开国内银行吸收国际资本先河以来，已有多家中资商业银行通过股权方式引进了境外战略投资者，包括深发展、兴业银行、上海银行、南京商业银行、西安商业银行、上海浦东发展银行、民生银行等先后成功“引资”。2005年中国建设银行、中国银行、中国工商银行三家国有商业银行成功引进战略投资者掀起引资高潮。     

我国商业银行引进战略投资者述评

本文对我国商业银行引进战略投资者进程进行了回顾和总结,对战略投资者参股动机进行了分析,将战略投资者分为两种类型:财务投资者和战略投资者,进而从商业银行股份制改革的历史角度,分析国家推动商业银行引进战略投资者的真正动因,并就当前引入战略投资者引发的各类争议进行了评说。     

境外战略投资者参与中国银行业治理对银行绩效影响的差异化研究

引进境外战略投资者是近几年我国银行业改革的重大举措.截止到2006年底已有20余家中资银行引入了境外战略投资者.本文分析了我国银行业引进境外战略投资者的现状,并分别对不同类型商业银行进行比较,探讨不同类型银行引进境外战略投资者前后的经营绩效,以期对我国银行业改革提供一些参考建议.     

关于国有商业银行引进非国有股东的思考

国有商业银行引进非国有股产生了金融安全问题和战略投资者蜕变为财务投资者问题,导致这两大问题的根本原因在于私有资本的逐利本性,主要原因在于引资对象的偏失,因而解决问题的关键在于引进合格的非国有股东,并施以有效管控。针对这一问题,本文在对中国银行的战略引资行为进行案例分析和反思的基础上,明确了非国有股东的引进类型、选择标准以及引进方式,提出了引进非国有股的配套措施。     

中小城市商业银行引进战略投资者分析

一、我国城市商业银行引进战略投资者的基本情况关于商业银行引进战略投资者问题,最早出现在20世纪90年代,当时国际金融公司入股上海银行,持股比例为5%,后增持至7%。2003~2005年,五大国有银行进行股份制改革,确定的改革思路之一是引进海外战略投资者,从此,我国商业银行进入引进战略投资者的高峰期。据不完全统计,目前城市商业银行中引进战略投资者的银行大约15家左右。从战略投资者的类别看,主要是引进银行类外资金融机构,个别城市商业银行引进大型中资企业,比如龙江银行引进中粮集团、汉口银行引进联想集团。     

商业银行境外引资、股权结构与经营绩效——基于2007-2015年62家商业银行的经验证据

本文首次从横向比较的视角,检验了2007-2015年商业银行境外引资基本特征与银行绩效的关系,结果表明,是否境外引资与银行绩效负相关,外资持股比例及持股时间与银行绩效均呈倒U型关系。以此结论为量化分类标准,本文首次将外资股东区分为战略投资者与财务投机者,进一步分组检验了商业银行境外引资后的股权结构特征与银行绩效的关系,结果发现,战略投资者在帮助商业银行完善股权结构优化公司治理方面的作用明显大于财务投机者。本文的研究成果将为商业银行防止外资股东从名义上的战略投资者蜕变为实质上的财务投机者提供理论依据和经验支持。     

The IPO of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the ‘Chinese Model’ of privatizing large financial institutions

We examine the privatization process of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the largest bank in the world by market capitalization, and its dual initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock exchanges in 2006. The Chinese government retains majority equity ownership of ICBC while foreign institutional investors hold minority equity stakes. Other large financial institutions went through the same reform process and have similar, post-IPO ownership structures. The largest Chinese banks, as a group, outperformed their counterparts from other emerging and developed markets before and during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We argue that the ‘Chinese model’ of privatizing and managing large financial institutions can be advantageously used in other countries.     

Son of Enron: Investors Weigh the Risks of Chinese Variable Interest Entities

Investors are heading back to China after ending a buyers' strike in response to numerous accounting scandals and corporate governance failures. There have been several successful IPOs in recent months, and the market is awaiting the listing of the internet giant The Alibaba Group. The Alibaba IPO has focused investor attention on the use of the variable interest entity (or VIE) structure by other overseas listed Chinese companies as well as Alibaba. The VIE structure allows outside investors some measure of influence or control over Chinese operations that is exercised through contracts instead of actual equity ownership. By using such contracts, companies are able to circumvent Chinese laws that severely restrict ownership in many industries, including the internet sector. The contracts attempt to replicate the benefits of direct ownership, but do so imperfectly. The biggest concern over the VIE structure is the enforceability of the contracts. China has a law that invalidates contracts that attempt to do what is illegal through legal means. One court case involving a VIE‐like structure led China's Supreme Court to rule that the contracts were unenforceable, and arbitrators reached the same decision. The biggest nightmare of investors in Chinese VIE structures is that the Chinese owner of the operating company could choose to abrogate the contracts and take ownership of the VIE. The highest profile example of this took place in 2011, when Alipay faced increased regulatory scrutiny and Jack Ma responded by extracting it from the Alibaba Group. The fix for China's VIE problem has to come from Chinese regulators, and reforms to foreign investment rules that have been proposed may make the VIE structure obsolete. But until then, investors have to weigh the unusual risk of investing in companies that they do not own.     

Split Share Structure Reform,corporate governance,and the foreign share discount puzzle in China

We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.     

基于开发性金融的政策性银行转型——论中国农业发展银行的改革

随着我国金融体制改革的深化与国家解决三农问题力度的加大,中国农业发展银行进入了新的发展阶段,原有的职能定位与目前的运行状况已不能满足现实的经济需要和现代银行的标准,改革势在必行。本文基于开发性金融理论,着眼支持农业、农村的持续健康发展,研究中国农业发展银行的改革与发展问题,并从职能调整、业务拓展、资产整合、风险监管等方面提出现阶段农业发展银行进行改革的战略措施建议。     

Ownership,analyst coverage,and stock synchronicity in China

This study examines how ownership structure affects the information environment of publicly traded firms in China. We hypothesize that concentrated ownership and the associated separation of ultimate control and ownership rights create agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors leading controlling owners to withhold firm-specific information from the market. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the effect of ultimate ownership structure and analyst coverage on stock return synchronicity. We find that a greater separation of control and ownership rights increases the response coefficient of stock return synchronicity to analyst coverage. This result is robust to endogeneity, a series of robustness checks, and an alternative hypothesis based on noise trading. The incentive of controlling owners to limit firm transparency thus leads analysts to disseminate more market-wide information.     

银行业市净率问题研究——兼论国有商业银行股权转让价格问题

近一个时期,中国银行业改革出现重大突破,以交通银行和建设银行为代表的中国银行业掀起了一轮引进战略投资者和境外上市的高潮。本文以市净率这一价格指标为切入点,对境外银行业股权转让价格的一般规律进行了研究,并在此基础上对交通银行和建设银行引进战略投资者和上市的价格进行分析。     

中国保险业产权制度创新研究

本文从中国保险业产权制度变迁历史出发,运用制度经济学理论,在概括出中国保险产权制度变迁的特征和存在问题的基础上,提出引入战略投资者、化解产权变革与公共物品供需矛盾及设计投资者退出机制等中国保险产权制度创新构想。     

Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

Bank ownership structures and sustainable banking initiatives: The moderating effect of governance mechanism

Bank regulators in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region are increasingly focusing on effective bank ownership structures (BOS) as a key corporate governance (CG) mechanism to drive sustainable banking disclosures (SBD). However, it is unclear whether BOS can lead to an enhancement in SBD. Understanding these key associations can help policymakers and banks design sustainable strategies to promote SBD. In this study, we fill this gap by investigating the impact of BOS on SBD and determining the extent to which broad CG disclosure moderates this relationship. We conduct a dynamic two-step system generalized method of moments model over an extensive dataset. We demonstrate that the relationship between BOS and SBD is contingent on the quality of the CG mechanisms. Bank ownership by institutions and foreign investors (government) positively (negatively) impacts SBD. Also, there is a negative but insignificant relationship between director ownership and SBD. Finally, the relationship between BOS and SBD is positively moderated by the extent of CG disclosure. This moderating effect improves for banks with quality CG mechanisms. We identify CG disclosure as the possible channel through which BOS and SBD are interlinked. Our findings call for banks to adopt and implement good governance disclosures to improve SBD.     

Executive turnover in UK firms: the impact of Cadbury

This study examines whether the Cadbury Committee recommendations regarding board structure have increased the power of boards to replace poorly performing CEOs. It also looks at whether institutional investors have become more proactive in this regard post-Cadbury. The study employs a comprehensive sample of UK listed firms between 1990 and 1995. Firm performance, CEO ownership and institutional ownership are found to be significantly related to the probability of non-routine top executive turnover. It appears that the managerial labour market is disciplining managers more quickly after Cadbury. However, there is no evidence that this is because boards have become more likely to remove CEOs following poor performance. Neither is any evidence found to support the assertions of institutional investors who claim to be more proactive since Cadbury. It is concluded that neither the Cadbury board structure reforms, nor the professed change in behaviour of institutional investors, has reduced the agency problem of managerial entrenchment in large UK firms.