Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity

We focus on a class of market entry games in which a newly emergent market opportunity may be fruitfully exploited by no more than a commonly known, exogenously determined number of firms. Our results show significant effects of the parameters manipulated in the study, namely, the market capacity, entry fee, and method of subject assignment to groups (fixed vs. random). In contrast to previous market entry games with linear payoff functions, we find no evidence of convergence to equilibrium play on the aggregate level. Shifting the focus of the analysis from the aggregate to the individual level, four clusters of subjects are identified. The patterns are: (1) choice of the same action that is independent of the parameters of the game or the outcome of previous presentations of the same game; (2) random choices with probabilities prescribed by the equilibrium solution for risk-neutral players; (3) random choices with probabilities equal to the individual observed overall proportion of entry; and (4) sequential dependencies that violate any model that assumes randomization. Subjects in the fourth and largest category are shown to adjust their choices in accordance with a simple principle of strategic reasoning.     

The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases welfare. If the input market is not very concentrated, entry in the final goods market may reduce welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient. Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable if (1) the input market is very concentrated or (2) the cost difference between the incumbents and the entrant is either very small or very large. It follows from our analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if their marginal costs are sufficiently lower than the entrant’s marginal cost.     

论创业型雇员的进入行为与竞争政策

本文试图把市场进入问题的研究从产品市场延伸到劳动力市场,分析了存在雇员经理人进入威胁情况下企业雇佣行为的变化及其特点。雇员所面临的进入壁垒的降低可能会引致企业不雇佣或者少雇佣创业型人才,或者雇佣低水平的经理人,因而传统理论中降低进入壁垒会实现福利增进的结论,在本文所给定的理论框架中未必能够成立。由此,市场进入对于竞争政策的正确含义,应该在区分本企业的雇员进入和现有企业之外的竞争者进入这两种情况下得出。     

Trade, Entry Barriers, and Home Market Effects

This paper re‐examines the relationship between entry barriers and home market effects and departs from recent work by using returns to scale as a direct measure of entry barriers as opposed to relying on the level of product differentiation as an indirect proxy for barriers to entry. In contrast to earlier work, results of this study do not indicate a significant relationship between home market effects and entry barriers. In addition, examination of trade costs reveals the importance of these costs in the numéraire sector. These two observations are consistent with the theoretical prediction that home market effects are insignificant in the presence of symmetric trade costs across sectors. Consequently, a more direct measure of barriers to entry and an explicit consideration of trade costs indicate that the link between home market effects and barriers to entry is not as strong as predicted by previous work.     

服务型企业国际市场进入模式及其影响因素探析

服务型企业国际市场进入模式选择是企业国际化战略的核心组成部分。服务型企业经营的内部环境因素和外部环境因素对企业选择国际市场进入模式有很大影响。通过企业国际市场进入模式决策的理论分析模型，我国服务型企业开拓国际市场要考虑诸多影响因素，同时要采取有针对性的有效策略和灵活的进入模式。     

On competition and endogenous firm efficiency

Summary. Conventional wisdom holds that product market competition disciplines firms into efficiency of operation. However, in a well known paper, Martin (1993) has shown that in a linear Cournot setting (with costs determined first and product market competition taking place in a second stage) the exact opposite obtains – a larger number of firms competing in the market implies lower firm efficiency. The note clarifies further the links between market structure and efficiency. Specifically, it argues why (and how) the result derived by Martin (1993) depends upon the assumptions made regarding the structure of demand and nature of conjectures held by firms as to their rivals' behavior. An illustrative counter-example (with Bertrand behavior and non-linear demand) in which entry increases efficiency is provided as well. Received: March 2, 2000; revised version: September 19, 2000     

Price collusion with free entry: the parasitic competition

The market equilibrium that is generated in the presence of both price collusion and free entry is analyzed taking under consideration the case of a homogeneous product and the case of differentiated products. The outcomes of this market regime are compared with those of other regimes, including competition (or monopolistic competition), monopoly, fixed price with collusive entry limitation. Some welfare implications of the market regime of price collusion with free entry are examined, with respect to the maximum social welfare allocation and the allocations of other market regimes, so to highlight the inefficiency of price collusion with free entry. The number of producers results to be the maximum number of firms that can produce without incurring into losses. Therefore, social distress is caused by a displacement from the price collusion equilibrium with free entry. Its defence can thus be considered in reference to the desirability of social goals that are in contradiction with economic efficiency.     

Trade Policies for Exporting Industries under Free Entry

This paper computes optimal export taxes and domestic production subsidies for exporting industries under free entry. We show that domestic welfare is not at maximum, as is typically believed, when the export price is a monopoly price, and the domestic price is a competitive price, because a market structure effect has to be taken into account. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax/subsidy formulas for an oligopoly coincide with those under perfect competition, if foreign and domestic demand functions are both linear. We also discuss optimal trade policies when only one instrument is available, and we run numerical simulations to determine and compare optimal trade taxes under endogenous and exogenous market structures.     

Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets

Conventionally, rent-seeking activities have been considered to deteriorate social welfare and to distort resource allocation. This paper examines whether rent-seeking behavior can improve social welfare by focusing on the welfare effects of firms’ competitive lobbying efforts when governments can impose market entry regulation against foreign firms. We demonstrate that competitive lobbying efforts can improve social welfare when such lobbying efforts are directed to reduce market entry barriers. In addition, social welfare can be maximized when the government shows the maximum sensitivity to the foreign firm's political contributions while maintaining competitive market structure. Moreover, it is shown that the dominant strategy for a domestic firm is to allocate more resources to R&D sectors while it is optimal for foreign firms is to exert more efforts in lobbying to reduce the market entry barriers when a government makes political economic approach in market entry regulations.     

Entry and industry evolution: the UK car industry, 1958—83

This paper models entry and the subsequent changes in market structure in three segments of the UK car industry, 1958–83. The entry equation emerges from a dynamic optimization model which allows for the costs of acquiring market share. The model is used to explore the hypothesis that the market penetration of entrants in this industry was facilitated by a post-entry advertising war which the incumbent firms lost. The basic hypothesis under examination is that advertising both facilitates and restricts entry, but that it does so in a way that varies systematically over time. The data are consistent with this view, showing that high advertising shares readily translate into high market shares, but that the escalation of industry advertising caused by entry can make high advertising entry strategies increasingly costly over time.     

国际市场进入：并购投资模式研究——以上海汽车集团股份有限公司为例

国际市场进入模式一直是国际商务研究领域的热点问题.在企业国际化发展过程中,国际市场进入模式的选择往往在一定程度上决定了企业拓展国际市场、参与全球资源配置的成败.上海汽车集团股份有限公司的案例为并购投资进入模式提供了启示:明确企业在选择并购投资时的优势和目标,了解目标市场的环境,积极进行并购后的整合.得出并购投资进入模式在实际运用中的重要启示.     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Market Entry

We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.     

Entry,market turbulence and industry employment growth

This paper investigates the relationship between industrial dynamics in terms of firm entry, market turbulence and employment growth. Do entry of firms, the composition of industry dynamics (net entry) and market turbulence (entry and exit) influence industrial employment growth? This paper provides an empirical investigation, using unique data for 42 disaggregated Swedish industrial sectors during the period 1997–2001. It is hypothesised that the importance of entering firms, net entry and market turbulence may differ significantly across industries. A quantile regression method is used in order to detect industrial differences in the response to industrial employment growth. The empirical evidence shows that, on the one hand, firm entry and market turbulence have a positive effect on employment for fast growing industries and that the effect is larger for high growth industries. On the other hand, the composition of industry dynamics in terms of net entry rates has a more dispersed effect across all industries, even though the effect of net entry is larger for high growth industries.     

Entry costs and stock market participation over the life cycle

Several explanations for the observed limited stock market participation have been offered in the literature. One of the most promising is the presence of market frictions mostly in the form of fixed entry and/or transaction costs. Empirical studies point to a significant structural (state) dependence in the stock market entry decision, which is consistent with costs of this type. However, the magnitude of these costs is not yet known. This paper focuses on fixed stock market entry costs. I set up a structural estimation procedure which involves solving and simulating a life cycle intertemporal portfolio choice model augmented with a fixed stock market entry cost. Important features of household portfolio data (from the PSID) are matched to their simulated counterparts. Utilizing a Simulated Minimum Distance estimator, I estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the discount factor and the stock market entry cost. Given the equity premium and the calibrated income process, I estimate a one-time entry cost of approximately two percent of the permanent component of the annual labor income. My estimated model matches the zero median holding as well as the hump-shaped age–participation profile observed in the data.     

产业进入时机研究述评

进入时机选择是现实企业在市场进入战略中一种至关重要的决策,而作为跨研究领域的热点论题,产业进入时机的研究也日趋成熟。基于文献回顾,梳理了产业进入主题的研究发展脉络和重要观点,从进入次序效应的内在作用机制和影响因素出发,强调企业在产业进入决策中关于进入时机和竞争策略选择的应用性研究,以使理论探讨更加切合实际。     

Advertising and search engines. A model of leadership in search advertising

We analyze the role of leadership in a multi-sided market as search advertising, assuming quantity competition and different entry conditions (with barriers to entry or endogenous entry). The model can be microfounded taking into account network effects, multi-homing on the advertising side and scale in search. If there are barriers to entry and the network effects are strong, there is an incentive for the leader to exploit them and attract more consumers to monopolize advertising. Under barriers to entry, the leading platform has also a strategic incentive to exploit scale in search, to manipulate search results to divert search traffic from other platforms, and to introduce limits to multi-homing, with the aim of expanding its market share and deny scale to competitors.     

Credit mismatch and breakdown

This paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships. Our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by (i) borrowers' endogenous market entry and exit decision (entry frictions) and (ii) time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities (search frictions). A key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions (in the form of moral hazard) with entry and search frictions. We find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate incentive-based equilibrium credit rationing. More generally, entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing and credit mismatch, while search and incentive frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown.     

中国跨国公司在企业国际化过程中的外国市场选择与进入模式

基于中国跨国公司的崛起，它们如何在外国市场选择与进入模式方面作出决策需要系统研究。通过对中国制造企业的调查，我们发现它们的外国市场选择及进入模式战略在不同的对外，直接投资（FDI）的经营模式中存在着显著差异。发达经济体及发展中国家都是中国企业出口的重要市场，同时这些企业更倾向于在发达经济体中投资于营销、生产及研发领域。本研究结论对理解新兴市场跨国公司的海外市场选择和进入模式有重要启示。     

Seller competition by mechanism design

This paper analyzes a market game in which sellers offer trading mechanisms to buyers and buyers decide which seller to go to depending on the trading mechanisms offered. In a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market. As the size of the market increases, the entry fee decreases and converges to zero in the limit. We study how the surplus of buyers and sellers depends on the number of agents on each side of the market in this decentralized trading environment.