Cross-base tax elasticity of capital gains

This paper studies the cross-base tax elasticity of capital gains realizations to labour income taxes when capital gains are taxed at a separate proportional tax rate. Using a longitudinal panel of over 265 000 individuals in Sweden, this paper shows in a regression kink design that labour income taxes affect capital gains realizations in two ways. An increase in the marginal labour income tax rate increases the likelihood of realizing capital gains and the amount of realized capital gains. One implication of this result is that labour income taxes have a lock-out effect but that the magnitude of this effect is smaller than the lock-in effect of the actual capital gains tax.     

Some aspects of the taxation of capital gains

The analysis of the effects of capital gains taxation requires a careful modelling both of the details of the tax code and the imperfections in the capital market. Under the standard assumptions concerning perfect capital markets and under the standard idealizations of the tax code, there are several strategies by which rational investors can avoid note only all taxes on their capital income, but also all taxes on their wage income; these strategies leave individuals' consumption and bequests in each state of nature and at each date unchanged from what they would have been in the absence of taxes. Although certain detailed provisions of the tax code may limit the extent to which rational investors can avail themselves of these tax avoidance activities, there are ways, in a perfect capital market, by which the effects of these restrictions can be ameliorated. Accordingly, any analysis of the effects of capital taxation must focus on imperfect capital markets.If individuals face limitations on the amounts which they can borrow and/or if there are limitations on short sales, then under some circumstances there is a locked-in effect (individuals do not sell securities which they would have sold in the absence of taxation); but under other circumstances individuals are induced to sell securities that they otherwise would have held, in order to take advantage of the asymmetric treatment of short-term losses and long-term gains. A policy of realizing gains as soon as they become eligible for long term treatment dominates the policy of postponing the realization of capital gains, provided the gains are not too large.A simple general equilibrium model is constructed within which it is shown that the taxation of capital gains may increase the volatility of asset prices, and lead individuals not to trade when they otherwise would. While the analysis casts doubt on the significance of the welfare losses resulting from these exchange inefficiencies, there are circumstances in which the tax leads to production inefficiencies, e.g. terminating projects at other than the socially optimal date.Finally, we argue that the focus of some recent policy debates on the short-run revenue impact of a decrease in the tax rate on capital gains is misplaced: even when the short-run revenue impact is positive, consumption may increase (thus exacerbating inflationary pressures) and private savings may decrease (thus leading to a lower level of investment in the private sector). Moreover, there is some presumption that the long-run revenue impact is negative.Our analysis has some important implications for empirical research. In particular, it suggests that the impact of the tax is not adequately summarized by a single number, such as the ‘effective tax rate’ representing the average ratio of tax payments to capital gains. Moreover, the impact of the tax cannot be assessed by looking only at reported capital gains and losses.     

Capital gains taxation in an economy with an ‘Austrian sector’

This paper examines the effects of a proportional capital gains in an economy with an Austrian sector (with wine and trees) and an ordinary sector. We analyze the effect of capital gains taxation (on both an accrual and a realization basis) on the efficiency with which resources are used within the Austrian sector. Since time is the only input which can be varied in the Austrian sector, this amounts to looking at the effect of capital gains taxation on the harvesting time or selling time of assets. Accrual taxation decreases the selling time of Austrian assets. Realization taxation decreases the selling time of some Austrian assets and leaves it unchanged for others. Inflation further reduces the selling time of assets taxed on an accrual basis; often, but not always, inflation increases the selling time of Austrian assets taxed on a realization basis. We also examine the effect of the special tax treatment of capital gains at death and find that the current U.S. tax system, under which capital gains taxes are waived at death, encourages investors to hold assets longer.In contrast to these results — which suggest that the capital gains tax can reduce the holding period of an asset — we show that there is a sense in which such taxes (at least when levied on a realization basis) discourage transactions and increase holding periods. It is never profitable to change the ownership of an Austrian asset between the time of the original constraint and the ultimate harvesting of the asset for final use.Capital gains taxation diverts resources from the Austrian sector to the ordinary sector. The effects on the efficiency of the allocation of investment between sectors are complicated and not easy to summarize.     

Who benefits most from property assessment taxes? Evidence from Los Angeles County

Assessment caps on property taxes are often assumed to benefit affluent homeowners the most with little gains for low-income households. Quantile regression results for Los Angeles County show that on average effective property tax rates decrease by $1994 per year due to length of ownership in the 50th percentile because of California’s Proposition 13 assessment cap. There is evidence of both horizontal and vertical inequity across the entire sample. Low-income households do benefit from California’s assessment cap as they are typically infrequent movers but their effective tax rates decrease over time. However, the most affluent households by market value do not gain the most and there is no evidence of horizontal inequity for these homeowners. There is also no evidence of horizontal inequity for middle-income households. Property tax savings vary between $18,000 and $40,000, depending on the assessed value decile and percentage quantile.     

Laffer strikes again: Dynamic scoring of capital taxes

We set up a neoclassical growth model extended by a corporate sector, an investment and finance decision of firms, and a set of taxes on capital income. We provide analytical dynamic scoring of taxes on corporate income, dividends, capital gains, other private capital income, and depreciation allowances and identify the intricate ways through which capital taxation affects tax revenue in general equilibrium. We then calibrate the model for the US and explore quantitatively the revenue effects from capital taxation. We take adjustment dynamics after a tax change explicitly into account and compare with steady-state effects. We find, among other results, a self-financing degree of corporate tax cuts of about 70–90% and a very flat Laffer curve for all capital taxes as well as for tax depreciation allowances. Results are strongest for the tax on capital gains. The model predicts for the US that total tax revenue increases by about 0.3–1.2% after abolishment of the tax.     

The asset price incidence of capital gains taxes: evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and publicly-traded real estate firms

We provide new evidence on the asset price incidence of corporate-level investment subsidies by examining the relative stock price performance of publicly traded companies in the real estate industry that should have been differentially affected by the capital gains tax rate reduction enacted in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. By comparing real estate firms that have an organizational structure that allows entities who sell property to it to defer capital gains taxes and that plan to use the structure to acquire property with those that do not, we isolate the effect of the tax cut from industry trends and firm-level heterogeneity. When we examine the time period surrounding the reduction in the capital gains tax rate, our results suggest the tax change was substantially capitalized into lower share prices for these firms and the benefit of the seller’s capital gains tax deferral accrued mainly to the buyer of an appreciated property.     

Corporate taxes, growth and welfare in a Schumpeterian economy

I take a new look at the long-run implications of taxation through the lens of modern Schumpeterian growth theory. I focus on the latest vintage of models that sterilize the scale effect through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce. I show that the following interventions raise welfare: (a) granting full expensibility of R&D to incorporated firms; (b) eliminating the corporate income tax and/or the capital gains tax; (c) reducing taxes on labor and/or consumption. What makes these results remarkable is that in all three cases the endogenous increase in the tax on dividends necessary to balance the budget has a positive effect on growth. A general implication of my analysis is that corporate taxation plays a special role in Schumpeterian economies and provides novel insights on how to design welfare-enhancing tax reforms.     

Corporate taxation and the efficiency gains of the 1986 Tax Reform Act

Summary The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) had little effect on the overall U. S. effective capital income tax rate. However, TRA significantly reduced differences in effective taxation of corporate and noncorporate capital for a number of U. S. industries. The Mutual Production Model developed in Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989) can be used to study the efficiency gains from the reduction in corporate tax wedges within industries. Unlike the Harberger Model, the Mutual Production Model permits both corporate and noncorporate firms to produce the same goods and, therefore, to coexist within a given industry.This paper develops an 11-industry-55-year dynamic life cycle version of the Mutual Production Model. We use this model to study the steady-state efficiency gains associated with the new law. While we do not simulate the economy's transition path, our steady-state welfare changes are those that arise from compensating transitional generations for the first-order redistribution of income associated with the Tax Reform.We find that the 1986 Tax Reform law reduces excess burden by 85 percent of our model's economy's present value of consumption. This efficiency gain reflects the Tax Reform's reduction in corporate-noncorporate tax wedges, particularly in those industries with significant noncorporate production. Measured as a flow the 1988 estimated efficiency gain from the Tax Reform Act is $31 billion.The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, Boston University, or The National Bureau of Economic Research. We are particularly grateful to Alan Auerbach, Oldrich Kyn, and an anonymous referee for very extensive and critical comments. We also thank Don Fullerton, Yolanda Henderson, Tom Woodward, and a referee for their very helpful suggestions.     

Taxation of Housing: Killing Several Birds with One Stone

High and sustained housing-price growth has been observed in many countries over recent decades. In Norway, real housing prices increased by 200 percent between 1990 and 2015, and many households have high debts. In addition, maintaining the welfare state as the population ages likely involves higher taxes in the coming years. Norway taxes housing leniently. Increased taxation of housing is a way of killing several birds with one stone: generating tax revenue, moderating housing prices, and increasing efficiency. In this paper, I use a microsimulation model to determine the effects on revenue and distribution of a hypothetical tax change where housing is taxed as other capital assets. I take into account the effect of taxation on housing demand, using a simple user-cost model. This housing tax would increase personal tax revenue by 11 percent and make the tax system more progressive. Housing prices would fall by 20 percent.     

Taxes,risk taking,and financial stability

After the global financial crisis, the use of taxes to enhance financial stability received new attention. This paper analyzes the corrective role of taxes in banking and compares two instruments, namely, an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which mitigates the debt bias in corporate taxation, and a Pigovian tax on bank debt (bank levy). We emphasize financial stability gains driven by lower bank asset risk and develop a principal-agent model, in which risk taking depends on the bank's capital structure and, by extension, on the tax treatment of debt and equity. We find that (i) the ACE unambiguously reduces risk taking, (ii) bank levies reduce risk taking if they are independent of bank performance but may be counterproductive otherwise, and (iii) taxes are especially effective if regulatory capital requirements are constrained to low levels.     

Replacing the U.S. income tax with a progressive consumption tax: A sequenced general equilibrium approach

This paper examines the welfare consequences of changing the current U.S. income tax system to a progressive consumption tax. We compute a sequence of single period equilibria in which savings decisions depend on the expected future return to capital. In the presence of existing income taxes, the U.S. economy is assumed to lie on a balanced growth path. With the change to a consumption tax, individuals save more and initially consume less. As the capital stock grows, consumption eventually overtakes that of the original path, and the economy approaches the new balanced growth path with higher consumption and a greater capital stock. Both the transition and the balanced growth paths enter our welfare evaluations. We find the discounted present value of the stream of net gains is approximately $650 billion in 1973 dollars, just over 1 percent of the discounted present value of national income. Larger gains occur if further reform of capital income taxation accompanies the change. We examine the sensitivity of the results, both to the design of the consumption tax and to the values of elasticity and other parameters. The paper also contains estimates of the time required to adjust from one growth path to the other.     

Environmental taxes with heterogeneous consumers: an application to energy consumption in France

This paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply, consumption of polluting (energy related) and non-polluting (non-energy) goods, and emissions. It quantifies the model for the French economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second-best tax regimes. We find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage. These goods may even require an outright subsidy if the society values equality ‘a lot’. Secondly, if environmental taxes that have an exclusively externality-correcting role, they benefit all types—although the gains are rather modest. The gains and losses become more substantial when environmental taxes have a redistributive role as well. Third, setting the environmental tax at its Pigouvian level, rather than its optimal externality-correcting-cum-redistributive level, benefits the high-income group at the expense of the low-income groups. Fourth, nonlinear taxation of polluting goods, and nonlinear commodity taxation in general, is a powerful redistributive mechanism. Fifth, introducing environmental taxes in the current French tax system, with its suboptimal income taxes, results in substantial welfare gains for the highest income group and a sizable loss for the least well-off persons.     

Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy

This paper develops a climate–economy model to study the joint design of optimal climate and fiscal policies in economies with overlapping generations (OLGs). I demonstrate how capital taxation, if optimal, drives a wedge between the market costs of carbon (the net present value of marginal damages using the market interest rate) and the Pigouvian tax (the net present value of marginal damages using the consumption discount rate of successive OLGs). In contrast to deterministic infinitely lived representative agent models, at the optimum, the capital income tax is positive, the carbon price equals the market costs of carbon but it falls short of the Pigouvian tax when (i) preferences are not separable over consumption and leisure; and (ii) labor income taxes cannot be age-dependent. I also show that restrictions on climate change policy provide a novel rationale for positive capital income taxes.     

Equilibrium capital taxation in open economies under commitment

This paper analyzes equilibrium capital taxation in open economies with strategic interaction in a neo-classical growth model. Under perfect commitment, I show that non-cooperative capital taxes are zero in the long run for a large open economy, thereby generalizing the result previously established only for the special cases of a closed and a small open economy. This does not represent a race to the bottom, though, since the result is independent of the degree of capital mobility, the number of countries, or a country׳s size relative to the rest of the world. Moreover, when countries cooperate, they still set capital taxes to zero in the long run. These outcomes are robust to different equilibrium specifications, the inclusion of endogenous government spending, and heterogeneous agents and non-linear labor income taxation. Governments find it optimal to implement the efficient capital allocation in the long run, both in a closed and an open economy; this trumps incentives to tax foreigners’ domestic capital holdings by raising capital taxes and attracting capital from abroad by lowering capital taxes.     

Should Sales Taxes Be Imposed on E‐Commerce?

We study the impact of E‐commerce across state lines in the United States on tax revenue, public good provision, and real income. In particular, in light of the unenforceable nature of interstate taxation, we evaluate the potential gains from coordinating sales and income state taxes among sovereign jurisdictions. We find that the revenue at risk is small and that the welfare gains or losses of any countervailing policy measures, in particular those associated with the Streamlined Sales Tax Project, are even smaller.     

Taxing the Financially Integrated Multinational Firm

This paper develops a theoretical model of corporate taxation in the presence of financially integrated multinational firms. Under the assumption that multinational firms use some measure of internal loans to finance foreign investment, we find that the optimal corporate tax rate is positive from the perspective of a small, open economy. This finding contrasts the standard result that the optimal‐source‐based capital tax is zero. Intuitively, when multinational firms finance investment in one country with loans from affiliates in another country, the burden of the corporate taxes levied in the latter country partly falls on investment and thus workers in the former country. This tax exporting mechanism introduces a scope for corporate taxes, which is not present in standard models of international taxation. Accounting for the internal capital markets of multinational firms thus helps resolve the tension between standard theory predicting zero capital taxes and the casual observation that countries tend to employ corporate taxes at fairly high rates.     

Scale-dependent and risky returns to savings: Consequences for optimal capital taxation

I present a model of optimal capital taxation where agents with heterogeneous labor productivity randomly draw their rate of return to savings. Because of scale dependence, the distribution of rates of returns can depend on the amount saved. Uncertainty in returns to savings yields an insurance rationale for taxing capital on top of labor income. I first show that, because of scale dependence, agents making the same saving decision should access the same rate of return at the optimum. I then constrain the information set of the government and show that, as soon as return are uncertain, positive capital income taxation is needed at the optimum. The optimal linear tax on capital income trades off insurance with distortions to both savings and to the rate of return in a context of scale dependence. Eventually, I argue that scale dependence in and of itself is not sufficient to justify capital taxation on top of labor income taxes. These results are still valid when agents can optimize between a risk-free and a risky-asset that can both exhibit scale dependence.     

Taxation of capital income in overlapping generations economies

Whether capital income should be taxed in overlapping generations economies is vividly discussed. It is shown that intergenerational lump‐sum taxes cannot implement the Golden Rule allocation when agents have private information on their earnings potential. Hence, the seminal Atkinson–Stiglitz result that optimal income taxation pre‐empts any role for indirect taxation cannot be interpreted to imply that capital income taxation (affecting intertemporal relative prices) should not be taxed. Specifically, capital income should unambiguously be taxed in small open economies, and the optimal tax rate depends inversely on the elasticity of total savings to disposable income and the after‐tax rate of return.     

The effect of death tax on the labour supply of donors: evidence from TRA97

Exploiting estate tax cuts from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), this paper estimates the effect of death tax on the labour supply of living potential donors. To this end, difference-in-difference with multiple imputation approach is applied to micro-level panel data. This paper finds that the estate tax cuts makes no difference in labour force participation or working hours of potential donors in a statistically meaningful way, although the TRA97 reduces marginal estate tax rates by 37.51% on average. This finding suggests that the death tax causes no meaningful distortion of living potential-donors’ labour supplies at either extensive or intensive margin.     

地方税收效率及公平性实证研究

在现行经济及税收制度下,增值税和行为税收入比重提升会提高资本要素的产出效率;营业税和企业所得税比重的增加在提高资本要素产出效率的同时,却会降低劳动要素的产出效率;个人所得税和财产税比重提高有助于提升劳动要素的产出效率,而后者同时会降低资本产出效率;资源税类收入比重提高将会降低资本要素产出效率;流转税、所得税、行为税和财产税占税收收入比重的增加都会引起经济的总体产出的减少;我国地方税收收入具有显著的公平效应,其中所得税和财产税的公平效应相对更强,资源税及增值税也具有明显的公平收入分配的作用。