Price determinants of Aboriginal art, and its role as an alternative asset class

This paper analyzes auction results for over 4000 paintings by Australian Aboriginal artists to investigate determinants of prices in the Aboriginal art market. This is the first financial study of an indigenous art market, and hedonic, repeat sales and hybrid regression analyses find it shares price determinants with traditional art markets (with price premia attached to artist name, death, painting size, leading auction house, and winter sale). However, Aboriginal art’s unique features significantly affect prices, particularly works that use traditional Aboriginal media and those with reputation-affirming traits. An Aboriginal Art Index provides 6.6% annual return (standard deviation 17.9%), which is comparable to traditional asset classes and superior on a risk-adjusted basis. Returns to Aboriginal art are negatively correlated with returns from other assets, and so it adds value to a diversified investment portfolio.     

The collateral value of fine art

In this paper, we examine the effect of implicit seller reserves on the estimation of value-at-risk based on historical asset sales data. We direct our examination toward how and whether fine art might prove an appropriate form of loan collateral for banks and other financial institutions. Using a data set of French Impressionist paintings brought to auction from 1985 to 2001, we control for the effect of works that are bought in-house to construct a distribution of potential sale values that corrects for sample selection bias. It turns out that the downside risk surrounding deviations of auction prices from expert presale estimates depends critically on how buy-ins are incorporated. If downside risk is assessed solely on historical experience with successful auction sales, the data appear to support loan-to-value ratios between 50% and a 100% larger than loan-to-value ratios that countenance the existence of seller reserves. The auction process, however, is quantifiable and can reveal the necessary risk information required for loan consideration.     

The impact of auctions on residential property prices

This study assesses whether the sale method in residential real estate markets – auction versus private treaty – is a determinant of sale price. Utilising a larger and richer dataset than previous research, we test for a price effect in auction sales in Sydney and Christchurch. When self‐selection biases are corrected for, using two‐stage hedonic regression analysis and a matched sampling procedure, we find no significant difference between prices of properties sold at auction to those sold by private treaty. This conflicts with the conclusions of previous research in the Australian and New Zealand housing markets, which have documented a price premium associated with auction sales.     

Biased Auctioneers

We construct a neural network algorithm that generates price predictions for art at auction, relying on both visual and nonvisual object characteristics. We find that higher automated valuations relative to auction house presale estimates are associated with substantially higher price-to-estimate ratios and lower buy-in rates, pointing to estimates' informational inefficiency. The relative contribution of machine learning is higher for artists with less dispersed and lower average prices. Furthermore, we show that auctioneers' prediction errors are persistent both at the artist and at the auction house level, and hence directly predictable themselves using information on past errors.     

One size does not fit all: Selling firms to private equity versus strategic acquirers

This paper investigates the selling process of firms acquired by private equity versus strategic buyers. In a single regression setup we show that selling firms choose between formal auctions, controlled sales and private negotiations to fit their firm and deal characteristics including profitability, R&D, deal initiation and type of the eventual acquirer (private equity or strategic buyer). At the same time, a regression model determining the buyer type shows that private equity buyers pursue targets that have more tangible assets, lower market-to-book ratios and lower research and development expenses relative to targets bought by strategic buyers. To reflect possible interdependencies between these two choices and their impact on takeover premium, as a last step, we estimate a simultaneous model that includes the selling mechanism choice, buyer type and premium equations. Our results show that the primary decision within the whole selling process is the target firm's decision concerning whether to sell the firm in an auction, controlled sale or negotiation which then affects the buyer type. These two decisions seem to be optimal as then they do not impact premium.     

Corporate Real Estate Sale and Leaseback Effect: Empirical Evidence from Europe

Corporate real estate disposals have increased in Europe during the past few years. In this research paper, we study market reactions of publicly traded European companies' real estate sale and leaseback announcements during 1998–2004. This study is one of the first ones to study the sale and leaseback impact on corporate value with a pan‐European data. We find that the sale and leaseback announcements have on average positive impact to firm's value which is in line with the previous studies. However, we also find that the positive effect is mainly caused by the deals with high transaction value to company market value ratio. Smaller transactions do not create on average any abnormal returns. Our results support the hypothesis that the positive sale and leaseback announcement effect is a consequence of revealed hidden value of the company's assets. Thus, sale and leaseback can also be seen as a mechanism for revealing the hidden value of company's assets to the market.     

Vested Interest and Biased Price Estimates: Evidence from an Auction Market

This study employs a new data set from art auctions to examine the relationship between auctioneer presale price estimates and the long‐term performance of artworks. We find that the price estimates for expensive paintings have a consistent upward bias over a long period of 30 years. High estimates at the time of purchase are associated with adverse subsequent abnormal returns. Moreover, the estimation error for individual paintings tends to persist over time. These results are consistent with the view that auction house price estimates are affected by agency problems and that some investors are credulous.     

Fire sale acquisitions: Myth vs. reality

We provide empirical evidence on the conjecture that in economic crises, firms could be forced to sell at deep discounts, or fire sale prices. Using the conventional stock price near the announcement date, we find instead distressed firms in crisis periods receive a 30% higher offer premium than distressed firms in normal periods; they also receive a 34% higher premium than non-distressed firms in crisis periods. Acquirers also do not gain, at announcement and over the long-term. Acquirers, however, may perceive they realize fire sale discounts if the reference is the targets’ highest price in the previous 52 weeks.     

The earnings announcement premium around the globe

U.S. stocks have been shown to earn higher returns during earnings announcement months than during non-announcement months. We document that this earnings announcement premium exists across the globe. Moreover, it is not isolated to a few countries. Of the 20 countries with enough data to conduct a within-country analysis, nine exhibit a significantly positive premium. A cross-country analysis finds that the premium is strongest in countries with the greatest increase in idiosyncratic volatility around the time of their firms' earnings announcements, suggesting that uncertainty over the earnings information to be disclosed is a primary driver of the global announcement premium.     

Managers' Trading Around Stock Repurchases

We analyze personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tender offer. With the exception of Dutch auction offers, managers trade their firm's shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside information to outsiders. Prior to fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover-related events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of their firm's shares. Prior to repurchases that follow takeover-related events, only a decrease in selling is found. No abnormal trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers.     

Bidding into the Red: A Model of Post-Auction Bankruptcy

This paper investigates auctions where bidders have limited liability. First, we analyze bidding behavior under different auction formats, showing that the second‐price auction induces higher prices, higher bankruptcy rates, and lower utilities than the first‐price auction. Second, we show that the cost of bankruptcy critically affects the seller's preference over the choice of auction. If bankruptcy is very costly, the seller prefers the first‐price auction over the second‐price auction. Alternatively, if the bankrupt assets are resold among the losers of the initial auction, the seller prefers the second‐price auction.     

Dutch Auction Repurchases: An Analysis of Shareholder Heterogeneity

This paper documents that firms face upward-sloping supply curves when they repurchase shares in a Dutch auction, and it analyzes the market reaction to these offers. The announcement price increase is highly correlated with the ultimate repurchase premium. Prices decline at expiration only for pro-rated offers. The cumulative return is positive and highly correlated with the repurchase premium, excepting pro-rated offers. Much of this price increase is consistent with movement along an upward-sloping supply curve. Trading volume around the Dutch auction parallels fixed-price repurchases. Supply elasticity is larger for firms with large trading volume, firms included in the S&P 500 Index, and takeover targets.     

RULE CHANGES AND UNCERTAINTY IN DISCRIMINATORY AND UNIFORM PRICE AUCTIONS

The auction literature indicates that uncertainty about the value of auctioned goods increases underpricing in discriminatory price auctions. Such uncertainty has a smaller effect on uniform price auctions because the pricing rule aggregates bidders' information. We find that uncertainty resulting from inexperience with an auction mechanism has similar effects. Using initial public offering (IPO) data from Japan and Israel, we find that average underpricing increases temporarily in Japan's discriminatory price auctions after changes in the auction rules, which suggests that bidders reduce their bids in response to uncertainty. Underpricing in Israel's uniform price auctions is not affected by rule changes.     

Distribution of Ownership,Short Sale Constraints,and Market Efficiency: Evidence from Cross‐Listed Stocks

We investigate the interplay between the distribution of ownership, short sale constraints, and market efficiency. Using minute‐by‐minute data during the period surrounding the short sale ban of 2008, we demonstrate that short sale restrictions cause price disparities among cross‐listed stocks when ownership in the stocks is distributed unevenly across the two markets. The stocks tend to trade at a premium in the market where long sellers are relatively scarcer, which reduces the speed at which prices adjust to bad news. The premium is driven primarily by an increase on the ask side of the market where ownership is thinner, is only evident when prices are moving down, and disappears quickly.     

WHO WINS IN LARGE STOCK BUYBACKS – THOSE WHO SELL OR THOSE WHO HOLD?

Both fixed-price and dutch auction repurchases offer large premiums over current values to tendering shareholders. And, because announcements of such offers are generally accompanied by significant increases in stock prices, economists view selftender offers as mechanisms for signaling undervaluation. Using samples of fixed-price and dutch auction self-tender offers from the 1980s, this study attempts to answer the following questions: Are non-tendering shareholders fully compensated for the premium wealth transfer by the increase in the intrinsic value of their shares? Since fixed-price offers feature larger premiums, are they accompanied by larger increases in intrinsic value (or do insiders have a tendency to “overpay” in fixed-price offers)? Is the premium wealth transfer a big component of the returns to the two shareholder groups—and what percentage of firm value does the transfer represent? The findings of this study, unlike those reported by earlier research, suggest that the two types of offers generate roughly the same total returns (about 10–11%, on average, during the offering period) to shareholders who do not tender. Fixed-price offers involve considerably larger premiums (over the new, “full-information” price) and wealth transfers than dutch auctions. Reflecting the higher premiums, shareholders tendering into fixed-price offers receive higher returns than those tendering into dutch auctions (13.8% vs. 11.3% during the announcement period). But while fixed-price offers involve a considerably larger wealth transfer from non-tendering to tendering shareholders, fixed-price repurchases compensate the non-tendering shareholders for the larger wealth transfer with larger increases in “intrinsic value,” thus generating the same total return as dutch auctions. Moreover, despite the large premiums offered in both types of offers, the wealth transfer implicit in the premium represents a small cost (less than 1% in fixed-price offers, and less than 0.1% in dutch auctions) to non-tendering shareholders.     

The impact of term limits on municipal borrowing costs

Gubernatorial term limits constrain the number of terms that a governor can serve in office. In this regard, previous models (with imperfect information) indicate that governors tend to responsibly spend during the first term to build political capital, while the last term is associated with higher spending. In estimation with state fixed effects, we find that municipal bonds issued during a governor's last term are associated with higher yields. Such yields are related to spending in construction, highways, and pensions, with the effect mitigated when the governor runs for future political office. We also document that house term limits that constrain the terms of legislators are associated with higher bond yields.     

Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay

We show that pay is higher for chief executive officers (CEOs) with general managerial skills gathered during lifetime work experience. We use CEOs' résumés of Standard and Poor's 1,500 firms from 1993 through 2007 to construct an index of general skills that are transferable across firms and industries. We estimate an annual pay premium for generalist CEOs (those with an index value above the median) of 19% relative to specialist CEOs, which represents nearly a million dollars per year. This relation is robust to the inclusion of firm- and CEO-level controls, including fixed effects. CEO pay increases the most when firms externally hire a new CEO and switch from a specialist to a generalist CEO. Furthermore, the pay premium is higher when CEOs are hired to perform complex tasks such as restructurings and acquisitions. Our findings provide direct evidence of the increased importance of general managerial skills over firm-specific human capital in the market for CEOs in the last decades.     

Specification and negotiation in incomplete contracts

We investigate contractors' bargaining power and holdup on buyers in procurement auctions of incomplete contracts held by California Department of Transportation. Using a model where contractors bid competitively in response to a buyer's choice of initial contract design, we infer the contractors' costs and bargaining power from the bids and transfers negotiated after the auction. We find that the contract winners have substantial bargaining power in post‐auction negotiation. The average holdup on the buyer is about 20% of project costs. Counterfactual cost‐plus contracts would reduce the buyer's surplus in 72% of the projects, with an average reduction over $382,000.     

Buy or wait,that is the option: the buyer's option in sequential laboratory auctions

We report results from an experiment on two‐unit sequential auctions with and without a buyer's option (which allows the winner of the first auction to buy the second unit). The four main auction institutions are studied. Observed bidding behavior is close to Nash equilibrium bidding in the auctions for the second unit, but not in the auctions for the first unit. Despite these deviations, the buyer's option is correctly used in most cases. The revenue ranking of the four auctions is the same as in single‐unit experiments. Successive prices are declining when the buyer's option is available.     

The risk-return tradeoff: A COGARCH analysis of Merton's hypothesis

We analysed daily returns of the CRSP value weighted and equally weighted indices over 1953-2007 in order to test for Merton's theorised relationship between risk and return. Like some previous studies we used a GARCH stochastic volatility approach, employing not only traditional discrete time GARCH models but also using a COGARCH — a newly developed continuous-time GARCH model which allows for a rigorous analysis of unequally spaced data. When a risk-return relationship symmetric to positive or negative returns is postulated, a significant risk premium of the order of 7-8% p.a., consistent with previously published estimates, is obtained. When the model includes an asymmetry effect, the estimated risk premium, still around 7% p.a., becomes insignificant. These results are robust to the use of a value weighted or equally weighted index.The COGARCH model properly allows for unequally spaced time series data. As a sidelight, the model estimates that, during the period from 1953 to 2007, the weekend is equivalent, in volatility terms, to about 0.3-0.5 regular trading days.