What factors inspire the high entry flow in Taiwan's manufacturing industries–A count entry model approach

Why is the entry flow of the manufacturing sector extremely high in Taiwan, and does it contribute to the prevailing entrepreneurship? This article aims to explore what factors inspire potential entrants to go into an industry. Based on a theoretical formulation of the Poisson probability entry model, a count data model is employed to investigate the determinants of entry flows. The empirical results reveal that traditional entry barriers indeed lower the entry flow. The entry incentives, including price cost margin and industry growth, play a lesser role at attracting new firms, while alternatively the market size acts as a better proxy of an entry incentive in explaining entry flows. Incumbents’ responses to entry, R&;D and advertising intensity are found to be associated with a significant negative impact on entry flows. This article also finds that there is a higher bound of covariate of entry, about 10%, that can be attributed to the immeasurable personality of entrepreneurs–entrepreneurship.

Rather be the chicken's beak than be the cow's behind. 1 ¹?This proverb explains in terms the concept of choosing jobs as how one would like to be a leader of a small firm rather than an employee in a large enterprise.

The trade that might cause life hazard will be dealt, while the trade that might cause a loss will not be dealt.

Two traditional Chinese proverbs     

Do entry barriers reduce productivity? Evidence from a natural experiment

I study how entry barriers affect productivity by exploiting the collapse of the US sugar cartel as a natural experiment. Using difference-in-difference estimations, I find the eradication of entry barriers caused a 35% increase in productivity within the treatment group.     

Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy

We consider a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect competition. Firms are price takers in the input market and compete à la Cournot in some or all of the product markets and their technologies display constant returns to scale. We show that an increase in the number of firms in a given sector does not always improve welfare. We also provide a characterization in terms of mark-up rates of the sectors for which entry is welfare enhancing. Our results challenge the common idea that mergers with no cost synergy are not desirable for consumers.     

Should countries block foreign takeovers of R&D champions and promote greenfield entry?

Abstract In R&D intensive industries, governments promote greenfield foreign investments, while being sceptical towards foreign acquisitions of domestic high‐quality firms. We develop a theoretical model that shows that foreign acquisitions are conducive to high‐quality targets because of strategic effects on the sales price. However, foreign firms ‘cherry pick’ high‐quality targets to expand R&D rather than to downsize. Otherwise, rivals expand R&D, making the acquisition unprofitable. Thus, our model predicts that acquired affiliates invest more in R&D than greenfield affiliates. Using affiliate data, we find evidence that acquired affiliates have a higher level of sequential R&D intensity than greenfield affiliates.     

Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?

In this paper, we demonstrate that in contrast to the case with exogenous number of foreign private firms, partial privatization is always the best policy for the public firm in long-run equilibrium, which casts doubt on the robust result in Matsumura and Kanda (J Econ 84(1):27–48, 2005) who argued that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Critical cost gap determines that long-run degree of privatization is larger than the short-run one. In particular, regarding the scenario wherein one public firm competes with domestic private firms and foreign private firms, equilibrium price is lower than marginal cost of public firm instead of being equivalent to marginal cost of the public firm, and that public firm’s outputs, profit, and social welfare is the smallest in the concerned mixed oligopoly models.