Do firms' political connections depress the union wage effect? Evidence from China

Our paper reconciles the debated literature on the role of the Chinese unions by exploring the heterogeneous effects of unionization on wages in firms with and without political connections. We utilize a survey of 1268 firms in 12 cities to verify our hypothesis that wages increase due to unionization, but this union wage effect is significantly depressed by firms' political connections. Through a detailed analysis of the mechanism behind the empirical results, we conclude that unions increase workers' wages by strengthening the bargaining power of workers, while this bargaining power can be weakened by firms' political connections. Our main conclusion is robust to a series of robustness checks. Moreover, the results from quantile regressions inform us that the union wage effect and the role of political connections may vary along with the firms' wage distribution. Our findings suggest that the solution to further increase wages for low-wage workers and reduce wage inequality is to make the labor union an independent organization which can freely bargain with firms in terms of workers' wages and benefits, rather than an agency subordinate to the government whose role can be affected by the government support and undermined largely by firms' political connections.     

Inducing political action by workers

A firm aiming to influence a governmental policy may benefit from political action by its stakeholders, such as workers. This article studies the behavior of such a firm, showing that workers will have a greater incentive to engage in costly political activity against the governmental policy the greater their number and the higher the wage. The firm may, therefore, profit from paying above‐market wages and from hiring what might appear to be an inefficiently large number of workers. And because unions may overcome free‐rider problems of uncoordinated political effort, a firm may favor unionization, or be less opposed to unionization than it would otherwise be. The results of this article can also explain why firms may little reduce wages in a recession, and why the higher wages paid by unionized firms do not reduce survival rates of these firms.     

Effect of Korean trade union on wage discrimination between regular and irregular workers

Whether the dual labor market structure implied by employment type and unionization causes wage discrimination is an intriguing and relevant policy question in the context of South Korea. This study examines the effect of trade unions on wage discrimination against irregular workers by extracting and comparing the ratios of the discriminatory wage gap by employment type between unionized and non-unionized workplaces. As per the analysis, all generalized decomposition frameworks show that the presence of trade unions expands discrimination regardless of the employment type. In addition, the effects of unionization on the degree of discrimination differ by factors characterized by the dual labor market. The effects are statistically significantly greater for women, youth, service industries, and white-collar jobs.     

Right-to-work legislation and the economic position of black workers

Recent empirical analysis of state right-to-work legislation indicates that a negative wage effect may result as a consequence of banning union shop contracts. It has been previously shown that industrial unionism tends to improve the relative wage position of black workers. Thus, it is hypothesized that if state right-to-work laws weaken the economic power of unions to raise wages, black workers will experience a disproportionate decline in their relative wage position. Black workers in right-to-work states would therefore experience a reduction in their relative economic position unless a strong positive relative employment effect occurs in response to the decline in wages. Using a cross-sectional regression model this article examines the relative employment effect due to right-to-work legislation. The results indicate that black workers experience a statistically significant decline in their relative employment rate within right-to-work states. When this finding is coupled with the hypothesized negative wage effect, it is concluded that right-to-work legislation results in a worsening of the net economic position of black workers.     

THE RISE OF LABOR MOVEMENTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDONESIAN SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY

This study analyzes a case of labor conflict at a garment company in West Java with particular reference to the rules and strategics among the parties involved. Using game theory, the study analyzes the formation of the critical point of labor conflict and examines the negotiations that led to the formation of stable industrial relations. At that point, the Nash equilibrium was at the company strategy of collaboration and at the workers' strategy of hostility, the company having assumed that the workers would mount a strong resistance to the company's hostile strategy. Under circumstances of weak law enforcement, the effective strategy for the workers was not only to obtain knowledge concerning the law but also to gain the support of the community, as well as solidarity among union members, and to pursue creative strategies. This study also shows that an important rule for stabilizing industrial relations is continual communication among the company, labor unions, and the members of the workers' organizations.     

A model of labour productivity and union density in British private sector unionised establishments

In this paper, a micro theoretic model of the simultaneous determinationof labour productivity and union density is developed and estimatedusing British establishment-level data from the 1990 WorkplaceEmployee Relations Survey. The main empirical finding is thathigher union bargaining power does not necessarily lower labourproductive in union firms, ceteris paribus. Separate bargainingby multiple unions has a negative effect, but productivity ishigher if management recommends union membership. There is alsoevidence that if unions can more effectively provide servicesto their members, and secure management support for union membership,union density may recover.     

IMPACT OF COMMUNIST PARTIES ON THE INDIVIDUAL DECISION TO JOIN A TRADE UNION: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

This paper analyzes the impact on individual decisions to unionize of several factors: the reach of communist parties, the degree of political activism, personal attributes of workers, and industrial characteristics. The workers examined are Indian nonagricultural regular workers, using micro-data from the 2004–5 Employment and Unemployment Survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation, linked to state-level factors. A notable result is that the reach of communist parties has considerable effect on unionization probability. Moreover, it seems that the mere existence of communist parties in a state also facilitates unionization to some extent. State-level political activism and unemployment rate also influence the individual decision to join a union. The paper concludes also that a worker's gender, marital status, ethnic background, employment status, experience, occupation, sector of employment, establishment size, and type of industry remain important in the determination of union membership.     

INSTITUTIONAL WAGE EFFECTS: REVISITING UNION AND BARGAINING COUNCIL WAGE PREMIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

The literature on the union wage gap in South Africa is extensive, spanning a range of data sets and methodologies. There is, however, little consensus on the appropriate method to correct for the endogeneity of union membership or the size of the union wage gap. Furthermore, there are very few studies on the bargaining council wage premium in South Africa because of lack of data on the coverage of employees under these agreements. Our study, using 2005 Labour Force Survey data, firstly reconsiders the union wage gap controlling for both firm‐level and job characteristics. When correcting for the endogeneity of union status through a two‐stage selection model and including firm size, type of employment, and non‐wage benefits, we find a much lower union wage premium for African workers in the formal sector than premiums reported in some previous studies. Secondly, our study estimates bargaining council wage premiums for the private and public sectors. We find that extension procedures are present in both private and public bargaining council systems but that unions negotiate for additional gains for their members at the plant level. Furthermore, there is some evidence that unions negotiate for awards for their members in the private sector irrespective of bargaining council coverage.     

The determinants of immigration-policy preferences in advanced economies: A cross-country study

This paper employs survey data to examine the determinants of immigration-policy preferences among ten advanced economies. Ordered probit specifications suggest that skill level is a robust determinant of immigration-policy preferences and that less-skilled workers are more likely to express a preference for policies that restrict immigration. The results also suggest that older individuals, members of trade unions, and those who classify their political ideology as conservative are more likely to favor limiting immigration while non-citizens are less likely to favor such policies. Individual country-level regression results vary, in particular with regard to the influence of trade union member-ship, which is a robust determinant of immigration-policy preferences for both measures of skill in only a subset of nations.     

Union membership,union coverage and wage dispersion of rural migrants: Evidence from Suzhou industrial sector

Using the data from an original survey on rural migrant workers from Suzhou industrial sector in 2013, we estimate the wage effect of both union membership and union coverage across the wage distributions using decomposition approach based on unconditional quantile regression. The results show that union membership has a significant effect on the wage level of rural migrant workers across the wage distribution. The effect of coefficient differences which results from the different rewarding systems explains the majority wage differentials between union members and non-members in non-unionized firms. There is also significant union coverage effect at the lower part of the distribution when comparing the union-covered non-member to the nonunion-covered non-member, which is also mainly caused by the coefficient effect. By contrast, wage differentials between union members and non-members in unionized firms are attributed to significant composition effect, which reveals that union members are positively selected within unionized firms. As a result, the positive wage effect of union is limited to the more advantaged group among migrant workers.     

Dual Labour Market Intermediaries in Italy: How to Lay off “Lemons”—Thereby Creating a Problem of Adverse Selection

Using longitudinal data from the Bank of Italy that cover the period from 2004 to 2014, this paper investigates the wage- and career implications of temporary jobs across the entire wage profile via unconditional quantile regression models and dynamic panel probit models. Building on Autor’s contributions, we consider temporary jobs to be a Labour Market Intermediary that deals with job-matching problems, such as information asymmetries, search cost reductions, worker-side adverse selection, and pay-productivity gaps. Assuming that wage is a proxy for workers’ productivity, we examine the chances that temporary workers who are located in different quantiles of wage distribution have of making the transition towards a stable employment position in the primary labour market. Results clearly indicate that temporarily employed individuals suffer significant wage- and career penalties. Not only are these individuals overly concentrated in the lowest decile of wage distribution, but the career penalty associated with temporary jobs also remains stable independently of the wage/productivity quantile to which the workers belong. If firms use FTC or TWA at all, they do so to remove less productive workers, whose work contract is not renewed once expired. In light of this evidence, it is clear that the hypothesis—proposed in the economic literature—that temporary employment contracts might serve as a screening tool to identify the most productive workers who would then be offered a stable position in the primary labour market does not hold in the highly dualised labour market of Southern Europe.     

Enterprise unions and downsizing in Japan before and after 1997

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether enterprise unions in Japan have changed their attitude toward downsizing before and after 1997. Our empirical analysis reveals that the attitudes of enterprise unions toward downsizing have changed since 1997. Before 1997, firms with strong unions, i.e., those affiliated with the federation, were likely to maintain employment until firms experienced two consecutive years of losses/deficits. However, after 1997, these firms tended to implement downsizing actions before they suffered deficits. These results suggest that the changes in the stances of the unions brought about changes in employment adjustment behaviors. The change in unions’ attitudes after 1997 is interpreted as being caused by the “no-layoff policy,” which was strongly associated with priority on job security over profitability. Moreover, downsizing was implemented with the consent of union members, and the cooperative relationship between unions and the management was maintained.     

What Explains Wage Differences Between Union Members and Covered Nonmembers?

An individual covered by a collective bargaining agreement but who is not a union member is estimated to earn about 13% lower wages than a union member. Sectors with relatively few covered nonmembers are associated with a large coverage differential, while sectors with high proportions of covered nonmembers are associated with small differentials. This suggests freeriders either weaken the bargaining position of the union or weak bargaining positions increase the incentive to freeride. Only a modest amount of this differential is accounted for by unmeasured ability, the probationary period associated with newly hired union workers, or union status misclassification.     

Fiscal policy in monetary unions: Implications for Europe

This paper analyzes how the feasible mix of government expenditure and financing arrangements may change with the establishment of a monetary union such as that planned by members of the European Community. We find that a monetary union reduces the feasible divergence across countries in their present discounted levels of fiscal spending. Wide differences across countries in their present and future time patterns of spending are still possible, however. Examination of the empirical evidence suggests that the movement toward greater exchange rate fixity associated with the EMS and participation in quasi monetary unions havenot been accompanied by significant fiscal convergence. The experience of member states of several existing monetary unions, however, suggests that a more effective constraint to budgetary discipline arises within full-fledged unions in operation over long periods, even in the absence of binding central rules on government deficit and debt positions.     

Right-to-Work Laws: New Evidence from the Stock Market

This article is an empirical examination of whether or not stockholder wealth rises in response to passage of a right-to-work law—a state law banning union security clauses from collective bargaining agreements. Stockholder wealth rose when Louisiana passed such a law in 1976 and when Idaho did so in 1985-1986. Presumably this occurred because investors anticipated higher future profits with weaker labor unions or a lower probability of future organization. This is new evidence that such laws are more than symbolic: They hamper labor unions.     

Unionization,market structure,and economic growth

This article investigates the macroeconomic effects of unionization in a Schumpeterian growth model with an endogenous product market structure and a unionized labor market. The endogeneity of the market structure and the trade unionism of the labor market interact and jointly determine the equilibrium unemployment, firm size, number of firms, economic growth, and distribution of income between workers and firms. We show that unionization governs the distribution of income between workers and firms and the unemployment rate, but it does not give rise to any growth effect on the economy. In addition, unionization discourages potential entrants and hence decreases the equilibrium number of firms. These results echo the empirical observation in the sense that unionization raises unemployment and alters the distribution of income between workers and firms, but it does not give rise to a significant, real impact on the firms’ investment and the economy‐wide growth.     

The European monetary system: Crisis and future

This paper examines the immediate and the fundamental causes of the crsis that hit the European Monetary System in September 1992 and August 1993 and the obstacles that European countries face in trying to achieve their ultimate goal of full monetary union, including a single currency and a union-wide central bank by the end of this decade. The conclusion that follows from the paper is that achieving full monetary union in Europe by the end of this decade is certainly possible but not certain. A major recession or other shock affecting asymmetrically more than one large member nation could derail or at least delay the process of monetary union. Although major benefits are expected to flow from monetary union in Europe, even more important are the political benefits that such a union would provide to its members.     

Lessons from historical monetary unions - is the European monetary union making the same mistakes?

This article examines three historical monetary unions: the Latin Monetary Union (LMU), the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU), and the Austro-Hungarian Monetary Union (AHMU) in an attempt to derive possible lessons for the European Monetary Union (EMU). The term ‘monetary union’ can be defined either narrowly or broadly depending on how closely it conforms to Mundell’s notion of ‘Optimal Currency Area’. After examining each of the historical monetary unions from this perspective, the article concludes that none of them ever truly conformed to Mundell’s concept, nor does the EMU. Nevertheless, the article argues that some lessons may be learned from these historical experiences. First, it is necessary that there exist robust institutions such as a common central bank and a unified fiscal policy in order to withstand external shocks. The three early unions could not withstand the shock of WWI. Another important lesson is that continuing national rivalries can undermine any monetary union.     

Labour unions and wage inequality among African men in South Africa

One Achilles' heel of post-Apartheid South Africa is the growing intra-racial income inequality, particularly among Africans. This paper examines the role of labour unions in explaining this phenomenon among African men given that labour markets are at the core of income inequality in South Africa. Using cross-sectional data drawn from Labour Force Surveys for 2001–10, we find a monotonically declining union wage premium. Further, our results indicate that unions have both compressionary and disequalising effects on wages. The disequalising effect dominates the compressionary effect, suggesting that unions have a net effect of increasing wage inequality among African men in South Africa. This finding implies that there is scope for unions to reduce inequality through initiatives that promote wage compression.     

The effect of unemployment among union members on union wage contracts

Conclusions In this paper a simple modification of union behavior has been suggested. This modification endogenized union preferences by making them depend on the level of unemployment among union members. When placed in the context of a two-sector economy, with a unionized and nonunionized sector and stochastic demand conditions, the model generated realistic patterns of wage and employment outcomes. These outcomes were shown to be critically sensitive to the union's concern with employment versus high wages. To the extent that such concerns are established through organizations, labor market outcomes in economies with a high degree of unionization will depend on the pattern of institutional arrangements as well as underlying economic influences, such as the level of productivity, the level of aggregate demand, and the composition of aggregate demand.