Diffusion and competitive relationship of mobile telephone service in Guatemala: An empirical analysis

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of diffusion process of mobile telephone service and the competitive relationships between mobile and fixed-line services in Guatemalan telecommunications market. We investigated the best-suited model to explain the diffusion process of mobile telephone in Guatemala by estimating diffusion curves using empirical data. Moreover, we explored affecting factors which characterize the diffusion pattern of mobile telephony in Guatemala through statistical analysis. Finally, in order to understand the effects of competition in the diffusion process of Guatemalan mobile phone service, we attempted to clarify the competitive relationship between mobile and fixed-line services using the Lotka-Volterra model. As a result, the logistic model was found to be the best model for describing the diffusion pattern. Moreover, investment in telecommunications, the subscribers of fixed-line services, and the number of operators in mobile market were found as significant determinants of mobile diffusion process. Results from the Lotka-Volterra model showed that the relationship between mobile and fixed-line services has changed from pure competition to amensalism.     

Demand for telecommunication services in developing countries

Living standards and economic growth in developing countries are invariably linked to the availability and use of telecom services. Effective policy decisions require the best estimates of the drivers of these services. In this paper, telecommunications demand is estimated in models for residential mainline and mobile telephone service for developing countries for the period 1996–2003. The paper tests for cross-price effects between mainline and mobile service and its findings have important policy implications. It finds residential monthly price elasticity to be insignificant for developing countries, but the connection elasticity is larger than generally found in the literature. Mobile monthly price elasticities are very large. A new and important empirical finding is that although wireline phones are substitutes in the mobile market, the contrary is not true—mobile phones are not substitutes in the wireline market, and in fact may be considered complements. This lack of symmetry has important implications for properly defining telecom markets. Universal service subsidies and competitive market initiatives should be reevaluated in light of the paper's elasticity estimates. Increased competition, income growth and enhanced education may be the ultimate universal service promoters.     

Bertrand equilibrium with differentiated products considering fixed costs: Korean price regulation in the mobile telephone industry

In some industries such as telecommunications and electricity, the fixed costs are so high that competition is not sustainable without considering the fixed cost in pricing. The sustainability of competition is as important as enhancing competition when an industry is in the transitional period from being a monopoly owned or managed by the government to a competitive market structure driven by the market. A price competition model with asymmetric firms and product differentiation is considered in which firms compete with a normal profit constraint. The constraint is related to the sustainability of competition and can be realized through price regulation. With this constraint, firms gain only normal profit in equilibrium despite the asymmetry, and consumer surplus is maximized. The equilibrium is meaningful in defining the industry performance intended through the regulation. Moreover, the price regulation of the Korean mobile telephone market is considered to discuss any implications of this equilibrium.     

Estimating consumer surplus in the mobile telecommunications market: The case of Korea

This paper estimates consumer surplus in the Korean mobile telephone services (MTS) market. The Korean mobile telecommunications market has grown rapidly since 1997 when competition was introduced and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology was commercialized. Because consumer surplus is relevant to the controversy over establishing an appropriate price level between consumers and service providers, the need for a robust measurement of benefit from MTS is increasing. The measured net consumer surplus estimated by means of elasticities of demand reached about US$48.8 billion in the period 1996–2004 and the changes amounted to about US$8.8 billion during the same period. In particular, after competition was introduced into the market with an accompanying price decrease and increase in the number of subscribers, consumers have benefited greatly. Therefore, it can be inferred that a facility-based competition policy and the reduction in price of access such as handset subsidies all played a positive role in the early diffusion of MTS in Korea. The estimated consumer surplus in this paper does not include network externality (option externality); if this were considered, the total social welfare of the consumer would be larger.     

Welfare effects of the Telecommunication Reform in Mexico

The telecommunication sector in Mexico was highly concentrated until 2013. The sector was mostly composed by a dominant player, a rationed market (low density of services), a poor institutional design, high tariffs, and weak regulation agents. The Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index was 5333 for mobile telephone and 7,029 for fixed telephone services—among the highest scores in the world. In order to promote competition in the sector, Congress approved a reform in 2013 to establish a new regulator empowered to impose asymmetrical rules in the case of the predominance of a single firm. A declaration of preponderance of the dominant player was issued, promoting free interconnection rates and the mandatory sharing of its passive and active infrastructure with the rest of the firms in the industry. The new institutional design led to increased competition in the sector, decreasing the mobile and fixed telephone prices while increasing the coverage and penetration of these services. In this article, an applied general equilibrium model for the Mexican economy is employed to assess the impact of the Telecommunication Reform in Mexico in the telephone sector, consumer welfare, and income distribution. The model is static, encompassing 10 types of consumers (rural and urban and the five income quintiles) and 40 sectors (of which four are disaggregate telecommunications industries). It assumes fixed wages and capital rental prices as well as idle resources. The main results indicate that the effects of the reform are not minor; the drop in telephone prices would reduce the general consumer price index by almost 2%, and the value added would increase by more than 3%, benefiting mainly households in the highest income quantiles.     

Economic growth,telecommunications development and productivity growth of the telecommunications sector: Evidence around the world

This paper studies the relationships between economic growth, telecommunications development and productivity growth of the telecommunications sector in different countries and regions of the world. In particular, this study assesses the impact of mobile telecommunications on economic growth and telecommunications productivity. The results indicate that there is a bidirectional relationship between real gross domestic product (GDP) and telecommunications development (as measured by teledensity) for European and high-income countries. However, when the impact of mobile telecommunications development on economic growth is measured separately, the bi-directional relationship is no longer restricted to European and high-income countries. This study also finds that countries in the upper-middle income group have achieved a higher average total factor productivity (TFP) growth than other countries. Countries with competition and privatization in telecommunications have achieved a higher TFP growth than those without competition and privatization. The diffusion of mobile telecommunications services is found to be a significant factor that has improved the TFP growth of the telecommunications sector in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).     

The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

Estimating demand for cellular phone services in Japan

Since the 1990s, the telecommunications industry has changed dramatically with the wide diffusion of mobile telecommunications. In spite of this, the nature of the cellular phone market has not yet been explored sufficiently. This paper analyzes the demand for cellular phone services using data on the Japanese cellular phone market in the late 1990s. It finds that the market is highly product-differentiated and conventional network externalities are no longer decisive factors in choosing a mobile phone carrier. The evidence also shows that the demand for cellular phone services is quite price-elastic, with estimated elasticity from 1.30 to 2.43 in absolute value.     

Should telecoms liberalisation stop at call termination?

In recent years concerns about the degree of competition in the provision of telecommunications call termination services have emerged. While the general consensus is that call origination is becoming more and more competitive, regulatory attention to call termination has widened in scope beyond the incumbent public telephone operators, leading to direct regulation of mobile termination charges in some countries and a debate on whether regulation should also be extended to “non-dominant” networks. This paper assesses whether these concerns are justified, extending the analysis to review the economic literature on reciprocal setting of termination charges between network operators. We conclude that while ex ante regulation of call termination simplifies the work of regulators it does not appear justifiable in all circumstances.     

Mobile voice diffusion and service competition: A system dynamic analysis of regulatory policy

Dynamic behavior in mobile telecommunications markets is often the result of interactions between market actors. As the structure and dynamic complexity of such interactions tend to be difficult to identify, it is challenging for regulators to anticipate the effects of their policy decisions. This article uses system dynamics to evaluate the effect of technology harmonization and mobile number portability policies on mobile voice diffusion and service competition. This is realized by first modeling the endogenous feedback structure resulting in dynamic behavior in the mobile telecommunications market and then by configuring the model for retrospective simulations of the Finnish market. Based on the retrospective simulations, the effect of technology harmonization and mobile number portability policy decisions is analyzed and the usefulness of system dynamics is demonstrated.     

Technical innovation and 3.5 mobile phone generation: Lessons from Korea

In 1996, the Korean mobile communication market was the first in the world to commercialize the code division multiple access (CDMA). Since then, the voice-based mobile phone market has continued to grow and has now reached near saturation. Having recognized the potential of the mobile data service as a new source of profit, telecommunication operators are scrambling to evolve 3.5 generation (3.5G) technology in order to lead market competition. Recently, the Korean 3.5G mobile telecom market has faced stiff competition from CDMA-based EVDO Rev.A and global system for mobile telecommunications (GSM)-based high-speed downlink packet access (HSDPA). In addition, the world's first wireless LAN-based wireless broadband internet (WiBro) service was commercialized in June, 2006. This paper reviews the current status of the 3.5G technology and analyzes the service standardization strategies from the viewpoint of technological evolutions. This paper also suggests implications for Korea's specific circumstances where different mobile telecom technologies complement and compete with one another. Korea's experiences may serve as important lessons for other countries or operators who try to introduce the 3G and look beyond mobile telecom technologies.     

Network effects and preference heterogeneity in the case of mobile telecommunications markets

This paper demonstrates how revealed- and stated-preference analyses can be used for modeling network effects in the field of mobile telecommunications. The aim of this study was to verify if network effects may still play a role in the Polish mobile telecommunications market, measure their strength, identify their sources and variability across consumers by accounting for consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity, evaluate their monetary value to consumers, and finally, to verify if the marginal utility associated with network effects is constant. The analysis of consumers' revealed choices (currently used mobile telephone operator) allowed the identification of major differences between customer bases of incumbent and new entrant operators, and insight into the business strategies adopted in the presence of asymmetric regulation of mobile termination rates. The second part of the study—the analysis of the consumers' stated choices (made in carefully prepared and designed hypothetical choice situations, known as the choice experiments) made it possible to directly model consumers' utility functions and, in this way, investigate the nature of network effects in mobile telecommunications markets. From the results, the presence of strong network effects, which are related to the ratio of consumers' social network group using the same operator, and to the magnitude of on-net price discounts, is confirmed. These network effects can be disaggregated to pecuniary and non-pecuniary effects. Through the utilization of the random parameters multinomial logit model, consumers' observable and unobservable preference heterogeneity can be accounted for, which proved a scientifically revealing and potentially policy-relevant approach. The results might be of a particular interest to other researchers aiming at modeling consumers' preferences as well as to mobile telephone operators and regulatory authorities—it is shown that capacity for vigorous price competition between mobile operators is limited by non-price factors, which affect subscriber's choices, especially in the presence of asymmetric mobile termination rates.     

The transformation of the mobile telecommunications industry in Pakistan: A developing country perspective

This paper offers a rare insight into the reality of the mobile telecommunications market transformation in Pakistan. Our analytical framework treats the mobile telecommunications market as a complex socio-technical system. Specifically, we define the telecommunications market as being composed of technology standards and three sets of social actors that include government institutions, network and service providers, and users. In the case of Pakistan, these social actors together determine the adoption of standards and services, and thus shape the trajectory of the market change. Our case study provides evidence that a pro-competition policy is imperative for mobile telecommunications development in developing countries, and an independent regulator is critical in promoting technological innovation.     

Are OTT messaging and mobile telecommunication an interrelated market? An empirical analysis

OTT messengers such as Facebook and WhatsApp have gained wide popularity among mobile users while the traffic of text messaging is in strong decline. As such, there is a debate over whether both services are interrelated and constitute a joint product market, which has important implications for the current wave of mergers in the mobile industry and regulation policy. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to provide an empirical analysis of how the consumption of OTT messengers affects demand for text messaging and mobile voice services. We make use of an innovative dataset which includes very detailed information on smartphone usage in Norway and consider a novel approach to address this question which is embedded in the complexity of two-sided markets. Interestingly, our findings suggest that OTT messengers complement demand for traditional mobile telecommunication services for this context. Consequently, both markets are interrelated but do not constitute a joint market from the perspective of competition policy in Norway. Moreover, we find an explanation for why reductions of text messaging usage have been so drastic in some countries and an analogous development for mobile voice is rather unlikely. Finally, our empirical results provide a new perspective on the modelling of consumer utility in communication networks in the theoretical literature.     

Managing and modeling the price reduction effect in mobile telecommunications traffic

As needs for telecommunications services diversify, an increasingly wide range of services is becoming available in the market. Service price reduction is one strategy used by service providers to retain existing subscribers. A price reduction for one service, however, can affect the individual-level usage for other services. Price reductions can also be imposed on a service provider by regulation. For these reasons, understanding how price reductions affect service usage is of growing importance to the telecommunications industry for purposes of pricing and tariff development. In this paper, an individual-level usage model for telecommunications services is developed and the effects on usage of a price reduction are analyzed. The model is applied to age-stratified aggregate traffic data for a Korean mobile telecommunication service provider. Finally, a 0-1 integer programming model is proposed for choosing which market segment should be targeted with a price reduction to minimize revenue loss. These models can be applied to market segmentation and price reduction strategy.     

Critical factors for the expansion of broadband in developing countries: The case of Peru

Many studies have been made on the diffusion and development of broadband, however there are few published studies on the critical factors for advancing broadband services in developing countries. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to understand and identify the critical success factors for the development of broadband services in a developing country context, using the case of Peru. In this regard, this study uses data collected from interviews with Peruvian telecommunications professionals, policy makers and regional telecommunication experts, which is supplemented by official reports and statistical data to determine the critical success factors for broadband in this country. The four factors derived are; (i) expand the availability of infrastructure, (ii) define a national broadband policy that aligns the interests of stakeholders, (iii) develop effective competition in the broadband market, and (iv) stimulate the demand for broadband services. Through a MACTOR analysis the authors found that the objectives of sharing infrastructure, the further deployment of infrastructure and the development of competition in the market for broadband services are those that generate the most divergence between actors. Additionally, the MACTOR analysis determined that no disagreement existed for the objectives related to demand stimulation. Thus, four proposals are offered for the development of Peruvian broadband. The results are relevant for academics and policy makers interested broadband development in developing countries and for rural areas of developed countries.     

Paradoxical impact of asymmetric regulation in Taiwan's telecommunications industry: Restriction and rent seeking

The mobile penetration rate in Taiwan has climbed from 6.86 to 112.15. Mobile phone accounts per 100 capita in the first 6 years of market competition, during this time the state-owned incumbent Chunghua Telecom has been dethroned by a new entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp. This paper addresses the cause of Taiwan's unprecedented mobile growth, and provides policy solutions for countries that strive to improve their telecommunications sectors in a short time scale. The authors highlight the fundamental role of asymmetric regulation, rather than pure liberalization, in the creation of the deregulated telecommunications industry in Taiwan. The asymmetric regulation in Taiwan is manifested in a twofold framework: the dominant carrier vs. competitors, and the fixed-line carrier vs. mobile companies. Econometric analysis concludes that dualistic asymmetric regulation leads to higher growth for mobile competitors and raises the total mobile penetration rate. However, the authors warn against the paradoxical consequences of dualistic asymmetric regulation. The regulatory benefits which mobile entrants received evolved into rents when they successfully lobbied to end the follow-me call service, the pricing scheme of which contradicts the asymmetric revenue-sharing constraint. The paper calls for a sunset clause for dualistic asymmetric regulation in order to take full advantage of its strengths, while at the same time preventing rent seeking by the firms, which benefit.     

Rollout and regulation of Fibre-To-The-Premises networks. Insights from the Spanish case

In 2017, the coverage of Fibre-to-the-Premises (FTTP) infrastructure reached 71% of households in Spain, surpassing most of the other Member States of the European Union (EU) and only outweighed by Portugal, Latvia and Lithuania. This article analyses the factors that have contributed to the deployment of these fibre networks by both the incumbent and the alternative operators that previously relied on the Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) of copper cables. An investment-friendly regulatory framework, which did not mandate access to the optical loops, and a telecommunications market comprised of dissimilar actors in the fixed and mobile segments, have been key to the deployment of FTTP networks in Spain. Additionally, based on historical coverage data, we test retrospectively, the sensitivity of geographic market segmentation to the time of the analysis and criteria for potential NGA competition. As per the analysis, the unregulated area where facility-based competition may be expected range between 23% and 61% of the premises upon the case. We discuss the implications of having mandated a Virtual Unbundled Local Access (VULA) to New Generation Access (NGA) infrastructure in 2013, examining the most likely operators' strategies. We conclude that, in the Spanish market, an earlier regulation would have reinforced inter-platform NGA competition at the expense of more limited coverage. The analysis can provide policy-makers with useful insights about the trade-off between coverage and infrastructure competition.     

Reducing the level of switching costs in mobile communications: The case of Mobile Number Portability

Switching costs are one of the most important economic forces that affect market competition in mobile communications. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that switching costs reduce market competition leading to higher prices, lower product and service quality, and lower customer welfare. Given their negative consequences, national regulatory authorities have designed policies aimed at reducing switching costs and fostering competition. One of the most important of these, in the mobile communications industry, is mobile number portability (MNP). The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of MNP on switching costs in mobile phone services. First, a hierarchical Bayes model is proposed to measure switching costs at the customer level and to investigate the impact of MNP on them. Second, this study examines the drivers of MNP adoption by customers using a binary logit specification. The results reveal that this regulatory policy has significantly reduced the cost of switching and that MNP adoption partially depends on customer-related variables.