Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements as a network formation game. We consider an n‐country model in which international trade occurs between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets. In each country, the labor market is either unionized or non‐unionized. We show that, if all countries are non‐unionized, the global free trade network is both the unique pairwise stable network and the unique efficient network. If all countries are unionized, the global free trade network is pairwise stable and the unique efficient network among the class of symmetric networks. If some countries are unionized while others are non‐unionized, other networks apart from the global free trade network may be pairwise stable. However, the efficient network is still the global free trade network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur. Moreover, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continuously profitable deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network, even when global free trade is stable.     

Networks of knowledge among unionized firms

Abstract.  We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.     

International R&D Collaboration and Strategic Trade Policy

We study an international trade model with symmetric countries and symmetric firms, with countries making strategic trade policies, anticipating the decisions of firms on R&D collaboration at the subsequent stage. In general we should observe a conflict between the equilibrium outcome and the efficient one. We find that an asymmetric outcome where one country unilaterally liberalizes trade while the other does not is likely to occur. We also find that while banning international R&D collaboration may help to reach free trade equilibrium in certain situations, it provides little assistance in reaching the outcome that maximizes global welfare.     

Wage‐Setting Institutions and R&D Collaboration Networks

We analyse how union structures that differ in the degree of wage‐setting centralisation affect the pattern of R&D network formation. Within the context of a three‐firm industry, a central union that sets a uniform wage is shown to induce a partial R&D network that includes two firms but excludes the third. In contrast, we find that, under less centralised union structures, firms have incentives to form R&D networks with a larger number of alliances. This result is consistent with the stylised facts for industrialised countries: recent decades have seen an upsurge in R&D alliances along with labour market deregulation towards more flexible wage‐setting institutions.     

Regulatory Protection When Firms Decide First on Technical Collaboration and R&D

We investigate the imposition of a horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) in a symmetric, cross‐hauling duopoly. Tariffs and subsidies are ruled out, but, in the absence of a mutual recognition agreement, governments can impose HTBTs, so long as firms operate different technologies. With firms being first movers, this possibility may induce them to avoid technical collaboration, in order to tempt governments into creating national monopolies, unless spillovers in R&D are high. This exacerbates the costs of regulatory protection, compared to standard models without R&D or spillovers.     

STRATEGIC R&D AND NETWORK COMPATIBILITY

We analyse the effects of network externalities in strategic R&D competition. We present a model of two firms competing with R&D investments and prices in a differentiated consumer market. Buyers form firm-specific networks which can be compatible. A high degree of compatibility and large spillovers moderate price competition due to weak strategic value of firm-specific networks and R&D investments, respectively. Asymmetry in product qualities brings out network effects that cancel out in conventional symmetric settings. The lower quality firm increases R&D and decreases its price as spillovers or network compatibility is increased. This happens when R&D and firm-specific network size have high strategic value.     

Endogenous protection of R&D investments

Abstract .  We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R&D investments from spilling over to competitors. We show that, contrary to findings in most of the literature, the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R&D investments. Consequently, as long as the R&D spillovers are not too strong, firms decide to let their R&D knowledge flow. Since, as we show, welfare is higher when R&D spillovers are present, it follows that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge could be welfare-enhancing.     

Strategic R&D Commitment and the Gains from Trade

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects innovation, profits and welfare in a model of reciprocal markets when firms pre‐commit to research and development (R&D). We establish that the equilibrium is not always unique and show that, with trade, R&D commitment leads to higher levels of innovation, lower profits, higher consumer surplus and higher welfare than when R&D is chosen simultaneously to output levels. Furthermore, if the effectiveness of R&D is sufficiently high, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky, implying that R&D commitment may significantly enhance the welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

FREE TRADE NETWORKS WITH TRANSFERS*

We investigate the network of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a network formation game with transfers. In a previous paper we showed that without international transfers countries with different industrialization levels cannot sign an FTA, so that the global free trade network, in which every pair of countries signs an FTA, is not in general pairwise‐stable. In this paper we show that, even if the world consists of fairly asymmetric countries, the global free trade network is pairwise‐stable when transfers between FTA signatories are allowed. Moreover, it is a unique pairwise‐stable network unless industrial commodities are highly substitutable.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

海外研发、贸易摩擦与创新绩效：来自中国高科技上市公司的经验证据

海外研发被视为后发国家实现技术赶超的有效路径,现有文献基于经贸自由化的前置条件证实了海外研发提升创新绩效的反哺作用。然而在全球贸易保护主义抬头的背景下,资源要素的自由流动愈发困难,海外研发能否发挥应有的作用尚不得而知。为此,基于中国高科技上市公司的数据,本文探索了中美贸易摩擦如何影响中国企业的海外研发绩效。研究发现,中美贸易摩擦非但没有侵蚀中国企业的海外研发绩效,反而产生倒逼效应,推动中国企业提升投资效率并积累国际投资经验,继而增强了海外研发的反哺作用。通过区分海外研发目的地,本文进一步发现倒逼效应在赴非美国家的样本中更显著。赴美研发受到贸易摩擦的冲击更为直接,稀释了提升投资效率和积累国际化经验所带来的收益。研究结论深化了国际商务理论关于贸易保护和壁垒如何影响跨国企业投资绩效的相关研究,为中国企业在高度不确定的投资环境下如何充分释放海外研发的潜能提供启示。     

Competitive and Harmonized R&D Policies for International R&D Alliances involving Asymmetric Firms

We examine R&D policies when a national firm forms an R&D alliance with a foreign competitor. Firms differ in R&D capabilities, select among three forms of R&D alliance and adopt a profit‐sharing rule if they coordinate their R&D decisions. When firms coordinate their R&D decisions and governments choose R&D policies independently, R&D taxes are chosen, but if governments harmonize their policies, they decide not to intervene. These policy outcomes affect the types of R&D alliance chosen. Agreements to share R&D information can outperform those with both coordination and sharing as a result of the R&D tax that coordination attracts.     

The spatial component of R&D networks

We study the role of geography in R&D networks by means of a quantitative, micro-geographic approach. Using a large database that covers international R&D collaborations from 1984 to 2009, we localize each actor precisely in space through its latitude and longitude. This allows us to analyze the R&D network at all geographic scales simultaneously. Our empirical results show that despite the high importance of the city level, transnational R&D collaborations at large distances are much more frequent than expected from similar networks. This provides evidence for the ambiguity of distance in economic collaboration which is also suggested by the existing literature. In addition we test whether the hypothesis of local buzz and global pipelines applies to the observed R&D network by calculating well-defined metrics from network theory.     

Governance structures in R&D networks: An analysis in the European context

This paper analyses governance structures used to organize partnerships in R&D networks using two approaches: transaction costs theory and social capital theory. We argue that these theories are complementary; this explains forms of governance through the degrees of administrative (structural and safeguard mechanism) and social factors (cohesion and openness) they embody. Data was obtained from European R&D networks created through Framework Programmes which include a great number of universities, non profit institutions and firms. Findings show the variables that characterize and explain the governance forms based on the applicability of R&D networks. This study not only provides a theoretical model for analysing governance structures of these networks, but is also useful for both improving the management of networks and for fostering collaboration at an international level.     

Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth

This paper presents a trade model with firm‐level productivity differences and R&D‐driven growth. Trade liberalization causes the least productive firms to exit but also slows the development of new products. The overall effect on productivity growth depends on the size of intertemporal knowledge spillovers in R&D. When these spillovers are relatively weak, then trade liberalization promotes productivity growth in the short run and makes consumers better off in the long run. However, when these spillovers are relatively strong, then trade liberalization retards productivity growth in the short run and makes consumers worse off in the long run.     

R&D networks and absorptive capacity in a Salop model

The paper investigates the incentives of Salop-type oligopolistic firms to cooperate and the architecture of the resulting collaboration networks. We find that when spillovers are exogenous, firm profits are not affected by the network structure. On the contrary, with endogenous spillovers (absorptive capacity) firms tend to form less dense networks. We also seek out the architecture of socially efficient networks, showing that social welfare is maximised in the complete network. Also, given the network structure we conclude that a Salop industry could be characterized by a general tendency to under-connection.     

Green Technology and Optimal Emissions Taxation

Unless an active environmental policy exists, firms have no incentive to engage in abatement or environmental R&D so policy design is of paramount importance. This design heavily depends on the way R&D spillovers operate. There are two distinct types of R&D spillover: output spillover and input spillover. An input spillover operates on the expenditure toward pollution reduction, whereas an output spillover manifests as the achieved abatement. Under optimal emissions taxation, significant differences arise due to this distinction, in particular, when the spillover operates on R&D inputs. In an oligopolistic setting, the result is higher R&D expenditure, but also higher aggregate emissions and, consequently, higher emissions taxes. By contrast, when spillovers occur in R&D output, there is a U‐shaped relationship between the optimal tax and the spillover, showing a trade‐off between the optimal tax rate and spillovers when these are low. In terms of the relative effectiveness of different R&D organization setups, combining emissions taxes with R&D cooperation, this paper shows that under low levels of R&D spillover R&D cooperation gives higher emissions reductions, whereas when spillovers are high this is not the case.     

Upstream and downstream horizontal R&D networks

The existing literature on R&D networks has focused on networks among firms who compete in the product market (downstream networks). This article develops the literature by casting the analysis in the context of a vertically related industry, where both downstream firms and their upstream suppliers can form horizontal R&D networks.     

Antidumping protection and R&D competition

Abstract.  In recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D‐intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two‐stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade. JEL classification: F12, F13     

Multi-market interaction and decentralization of R&D decisions

In this paper, we analyse under what conditions it is profitable for a multi-divisional firm to encourage divisions to perform independent R&D, and when it is better to centralize R&D so that the level be chosen co-operatively. Under Bertrand competition, firms always centralize R&D decisions. Under Cournot competition, however, with divisions of the same firm producing substitute products, the strategic advantage of decentralizing R&D compensates the co-ordination loss when the degree of substitutability among the products is not too high; in all other cases (when products are very good substitutes or when divisions of the same firm produce complement goods) the pay-off to co-ordination is greater than the strategic advantage of decentralization. Social welfare is maximized when firms centralize R&D.