Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence

Weakness of corporate governance and lack of transparency are often considered causes of or contributors to the Asian Financial Crisis. Publicly listed companies in Hong Kong, like other Asian firms, have concentrated director ownership. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong. We find that: (1) high (concentrated) board ownership explains the extent of low voluntary segment disclosure and this negative relationship is stronger when firm performance is very poor; (2) the contribution of non‐executive directors to enhance voluntary segment disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership but not for concentrated‐ownership firms. These results have implications for policy makers and regulators in the Asia‐Pacific region striving to improve governance and transparency.     

The Effect of Founding Family Influence on Firm Value and Corporate Governance

We examined a sample of 120 Norwegian, founding family controlled and non‐founding family controlled firms, to address two important research questions: (1) is founding family control associated with higher firm value; and (2) are there unique corporate governance conditions under which a founding family controlled firm can be more valuable? We find a positive association between founding family control and firm value for four alternative definitions of founding family control. We find that the association between founding family CEOs and firm value is stronger among younger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms with a single class of shares. However, the impact of founding family directors on firm value is not affected by corporate governance conditions such as firm age, board independence, and number of share classes. We also find that the relation between founding family ownership and firm value is greater among older firms, firms with larger boards, and particularly when these firms have multiple classes of shares. Our results imply that founding family controlled firms are more valuable and governed differently than firms without such influence. Furthermore, our results also suggest that founding family CEOs can enhance firm performance when family influence does not create shareholder entrenchment or when their cash flow rights are more aligned with their control rights.     

Corporate governance and firm performance relationship: Implications for risk‐adjusted return behavior

We examine the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and stock return behavior using panel data for Indian listed firms for 2006 to 2015. Our results suggest that corporate governance improves firm performance. However, corporate governance information fails to provide excess risk‐adjusted returns to investors, as governance information is well assimilated in prevailing stock prices. In addition to extending the scant literature focused on emerging markets, our findings will prove useful to investors, fund managers, and rating agencies in making investment decisions and regulators in assessing the impact of governance norms.     

Corporate Value, Managerial Stockholdings and Investments of Japanese Firms

We use a simultaneous equation model which treats firm value, investments and management ownership as endogenous to the firm. Our results show a feedback relation between corporate value and management ownership, i.e., corporate value is positively impacted by management ownership, which in turn is positively impacted by corporate value. Corporate value also affects investments made by the firm. We also find that the effect of the main bank on corporate value is positive but only up to a certain point; then, it turns negative. Supporting the argument that keiretsu firms have lower agency cost, we find that firms belonging to a keiretsu have higher valuations during the sample period. Finally, we find that management ownership increases as the ownership of the main bank, ownership of institutional holders and cross‐holdings decreases, suggesting a substitution effect among these monitoring forces. Our results indicate that ignoring the web of these relationships leads to incorrect inferences.     

OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS: A META‐ANALYSIS

The literature concerned with relations between ownership concentration and corporate performance in emerging markets presents conflicting theoretical predications and inconclusive empirical results. We use meta‐analytical techniques to integrate the diverse empirical findings and investigate factors contribute to the inconsistencies in the empirical evidence. Using 419 correlations collected from 42 primary studies of listed corporations in 18 emerging markets, heterogeneity tests show that only a small proportion of the variation in reported ownership concentration–performance relations can be attributed to sampling error. Our meta‐regressions reveal how population differences, researchers’ modeling choices, and inadequate treatment of endogeneity explain a large portion of the true heterogeneity. After adjusting for these effects, we find ownership concentration has negative relation with firm performance across countries. Our results emphasize the importance of model specification and methods of addressing endogeneity, and support further comparative study of the ownership concentration–corporate performance relation between countries with seemingly similar corporate governance environments.     

Ownership structure,information asymmetry and growth of the firm: Implications from nonfinancial firms listed in S&P500

This paper investigates the association between growth of the firm and ownership structure under conditions of information asymmetry. The objective is to show the effects of information asymmetry (favorable vs. adverse selection) on the choice of the ownership structure that helps firms grow. Our sample includes nonfinancial firms listed in the S&P500 over the period 2000 to 2016. The dependent variable is growth of the firm measured by growth in sales. The independent variables are proxies for changes in ownership structure, individual investors, investment managers, and brokerage firms. Observations are grouped according to level of information asymmetry (high or low) using three proxies for information asymmetry: beta of return on equity (ROE), probability of default of ROE, and q ratio. The results conclude that (a) changes in ownership structure affect growth of the firm positively and (b) the effect of ownership structure is more significant and consistent at low level of information asymmetry. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it extends the arguments of corporate governance by showing the impact of ownership structure on growth of the firm. Second, the paper offers robust evidence that growth of the firm is associated with low level of information asymmetry. Third, the paper shows that fundamental financial information can help lessen the level of information asymmetry and thus help firms grow.     

The effect of corporate governance on credit ratings: Evidence from China's bond market

This paper examines the association between firms’ corporate governance and credit ratings (both bond ratings and issuer ratings) in China. In addition to considering the financial attributes of bond issuers, we ask to what extent do credit rating agencies consider the corporate governance attributes of issuers? In concept, bondholders are concerned with the financial effects of how corporate governance resolves the agency conflicts between bondholders and managers, majority and minority shareholders, and shareholders and bondholders. We find that corporate governance affects bond issuer credit ratings in China. After controlling for firms’ financial attributes, we find that issuer ratings are positively related to dual‐listing, whether the firm is a state‐owned enterprise, the ownership of the second to the tenth largest shareholder; and negatively related to the relative scale of audit fees. We attribute the positive association between dual‐listing and credit rating to higher quality and transparency of information reported by the dual‐listed firm. The value to bondholders of the implicit government guarantee of debt payments more than offsets the negative association between firm value and being an SOE. Bond rating agencies expect that the change in agency costs with a reduction in the ownership of the largest shareholder benefits bondholders. To credit rating agencies, the scale of audit fees (relative to total assets of the accounting firm) signals interest binding between the client firm and the accounting firm that threatens the independence of auditing and the quality of financial reporting. We also find that bond‐specific attributes: collateral and issue size, are positively related to bond credit ratings.     

Investment committees and corporate cash holdings

We investigate the association between the voluntary formation of a board investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings for a large sample of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) firms over the 2005–2013 period. We provide evidence that the existence of a specialized IC increases corporate cash holdings. We also find that several IC characteristics, i.e., member experience, independence, number of meetings, and committee size, are associated with an increase in firms’ cash holdings. Furthermore, the local and foreign institutional ownership of GCC firms moderates the IC-cash holdings relationship. These results remain robust to alternative specifications of cash holdings and endogeneity tests. We contribute to the literature on firms’ incentives to hold cash and to the literature on governance in emerging market contexts.     

To Thine Shareholders Be True? Linking Large Corporate Ownership to Firms’ Use of Commitment Human Resource Practices

Human resource practitioners and academics have increasingly realized the importance of corporate governance for firm human resource activities. This study investigates how one important form of corporate governance, namely, ownership within large, publicly traded firms, is associated with a firm's use of commitment human resource practices (CHRPs), specifically, the use of incentive compensation, profit sharing, and participative decision making. Our findings indicate that the types of large investor, namely, family and institutional, are differentially associated with the likelihood of the firm using these CHRPs. Specifically, family owners with their long‐term investment horizon, as well as their stakeholder orientation, increase the likelihood of the firm using these practices. In contrast, large institutional owners with their shorter‐term investment horizon, as well as their investor orientation, decrease the likelihood of the firm using these practices. Furthermore, among institutional investors, transient institutional investors are negatively associated with these practices, while dedicated institutional investors are not associated with these practices. Taken together, our results regarding the positive association of family ownership and this subset of CHRPs and the negative association of transient institutional investors and this set of practices, have important implications for human resource professionals who not only need to understand how ownership affects HR practices but also how to articulate the value of these investments in order to attract investors. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Private Equity Investments and Disclosure Policy

In the current study, we dynamically analyze unlisted firms' voluntary disclosure decisions around private equity (PE) participation. First, we disentangle the role of disclosure in attracting PE investments. In addition, we examine the extent to which a firm's disclosure policy is affected by the changing corporate setting and intensified corporate governance after having received PE. We find no evidence that firms would employ increased disclosure to signal their quality in the years preceding the PE financing. However, we document a significant switch to increased financial disclosure from the PE investment year onwards, consistent with the hypothesis that PE investor presence positively affects portfolio firms' disclosure decisions. Further, we show that the proportional PE ownership stake is positively related to increased disclosure, but only at very high ownership levels. We explain these results in that both internal and external information demands call for higher public disclosure in PE firms. We conclude that the changing information environment resulting from a PE investment stimulates increased public financial disclosure. Our results contribute to illustrate how an indisputable change in governance resulting from a PE investment affects inter-temporal corporate disclosure decisions in unlisted firms.     

Corporate governance and firm efficiency: evidence from China's publicly listed firms

This paper applies a two‐stage, double bootstrapping data envelope analysis approach to investigate whether and to what extent various distinctive corporate governance practices affect productive efficiency in a sample of 461 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2002. We find that firm efficiency is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U‐shaped, indicating the presence of tunneling activities by the largest shareholder. Among three types of controlling shareholder, state exerts the most negative impact on firm efficiency, followed by state‐owned legal entities. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. It shows that the proportion of outside directors and the number of board meetings are positively associated with firm efficiency, suggesting that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, our findings illustrate that restructuring state‐owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership structure, corporate governance and productive efficiency in China

This paper investigates whether and to what extent ownership structure and corporate governance affect productive efficiency in a sample of 744 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2006. The paper finds that firm efficiency, as estimated using stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis, is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped, indicating that the largest shareholder may engage in tunneling activities. As the identity of the largest shareholder changes from government, government-controlled legal entity to other types of legal entity, firm efficiency significantly improves. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. Moreover, firms with more independent board are more efficient, supporting the argument that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, the findings illustrate that restructuring state-owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China.     

Returnee Talent and Corporate Investment: Evidence from China

We manually collected a dataset comprising the overseas experiences of management teams of listed Chinese firms and investigated the effects of returnee talent on firm investment efficiency (InvEff). The results show that (1) returnees improve InvEff significantly, especially for firms that experience overinvestment; (2) the central-government-controlled state-owned enterprises benefit the most from overseas returnees; and (3) foreign experience in countries with effective governance and low corruption levels have significantly marginal effects on the improvement in InvEff. This study highlights a new channel of international knowledge spillover and practically guides the introduction of talent policy in emerging markets.     

Corporate Governance in China: A Meta‐Analysis

How has the impact of ‘good corporate governance’ principles on firm performance changed over time in China? Amassing a database of 84 studies, 684 effect sizes, and 547,622 firm observations, we explore this important question by conducting a meta‐analysis on the corporate governance literature on China. The weight of evidence demonstrates that two major ‘good corporate governance’ principles advocating board independence and managerial incentives are indeed associated with better firm performance. However, we cannot find strong support for the criticisms against CEO duality. In addition, we go beyond a static perspective (such as certain governance mechanisms are effective or ineffective) by investigating the temporal hypotheses. We reveal that over time, with the improvement in the quality of market institutions and development of financial markets, the monitoring mechanisms of the board and state ownership become more strongly related to firm performance, whereas the incentive mechanisms lose their significance. Overall, our findings advance a dynamic institution‐based view by substantiating the case that institutional transitions matter for the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance in the second largest economy in the world.     

Social trust environment and firm tax avoidance: Evidence from China

We examine the impact of the social trust environment in which a firm is located on its tax avoidance in China and paying attention to the moderating effect of corporate governance and state-ownership. Drawing from theoretical and empirical work on firm tax avoidance and manager–shareholder agency conflict, we hypothesize that social trust can lower firm tax avoidance. It is because a high social trust environment can reduce agency conflict so that tax avoidance is less. Our findings are consistent with our hypothesis, and robust to a battery of robustness tests. Furthermore, we document that the association between social trust and firm tax avoidance is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance and state-owned. Moreover, we find that firms in more trustworthy provinces present less general and administrative expenses and higher asset turnover, corroborating our theoretical foundations with respect to agency cost in our hypothesis. Our findings suggest that social trust and its interactions with corporate governance and state ownership are important internal and external determinants on the variations in tax avoidance.     

Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Foreign Share Ownership on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange

We investigate the association of foreign share ownership with firm‐level disclosure and corporate governance structures in Zimbabwe, a developing country in Southern Africa. Our motivation for the study derives from the literature, which suggests that foreign investors: (1) generally have a preference for companies in which they are well informed and where their investments are more likely to be protected, and (2) avoid companies in developing countries because of weak corporate governance structures and low disclosure. Using data drawn from companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, we examine the effect of disclosure and corporate governance on foreign share ownership. We find that disclosure, proportion of non‐executive directors, institutional share ownership and audit committee independence are all positively and significantly associated with foreign share ownership. Our results also demonstrate that market capitalization, return on equity and liquidity ratios are significantly associated with foreign share ownership. These results are consistent with the notion that foreign investors have a preference for companies with effective corporate governance structures, companies with less information asymmetry, as well as companies with healthy cash positions. The results have implications for policy‐makers in developing countries in their endeavour to improve liquidity on stock markets through the participation of foreign investors. The results are also useful to managers in developing countries who are keen to increase the market value of their company, thereby reducing their cost of capital.     

Ownership structure and firm performance in emerging markets: A comparative meta-analysis of East European EU member states,Russia and China

Using a total of 4425 estimates collected from 204 previous studies, this paper presents a meta-analysis performed to compare East European EU member states, Russia and China in terms of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. The results indicate that, as the standard theory predicts, state ownership negatively influences the performance of firms the state invests in, while the presence of domestic outside investors and foreign investors as company owners positively affects firm performance irrespective of the difference in country/region. Furthermore, we also found that ownership of managers tends to exert a positive impact on the performance of their owned firms. Overall, however, the linkage between corporate ownership and performance is weak. This finding implies that, in comparison with advanced economies, management discipline by investors is less sufficient in emerging markets.     

Determinants and Valuation Implications of Compulsory Stock Option Disclosures in a Weak Regulatory Setting—The Case of France

Using a sample of listed French firms in 2005, the year of mandatory IFRS adoption in the European Union (EU), we investigate the determinants of disclosure compliance of stock option expenses under IFRS 2, Share‐based Payment. Stock options are a popular means of executive compensation in France relative to other EU countries. Prior to 2005, French accounting standards and corporate governance regulations did not require recognition of option expense amounts and required minimal supplementary disclosures. There was also a perception that enforcement was imperfect, in particular with respect to IFRS 2. Given this setting, we explore what factors influence the willingness of firms to follow compulsory IFRS requirements in a weak regulatory setting. We find that overall compliance with IFRS 2 disclosure requirements increases with U.S. and U.K. institutional ownership, U.S. cross‐listing, provision of English language statements, and decreases with CEO and family ownership of the firm. We also investigate how stock market prices are affected by the recognition and disclosure of stock option expenses according to IFRS 2 in this regulatory setting and find that investors value option expenses positively, particularly when accompanied by high‐disclosure compliance. Our findings have implications for other jurisdictions in the process of adopting or converging to IFRS.     

Determinants of board size in an emerging market

Drawing largely upon the selective adaptation paradigm, the resource dependence literature, and the capture argument, we examine determinants of board size using panel data set of Korean‐listed companies that have experienced dramatic changes in their governance system following the 1997 Asian crisis and regulatory reforms. Observing that the firm's compliance with statutory requirements reflects a strategic choice, our results also investigate the idea that the determinants of board size differ between firms actively and passively adapting to regulatory reforms. For actively adaptive firms, board size increases along with firm complexity but it varies inversely with the power of controlling shareholders (CSHs). In contrast, the roles of complexity and CSHs are not significant but seniority‐based promotion is an important factor to increase the size for the passive firms. Our results suggest that determinants of board size differ depending on corporate strategies to comply with statutory requirements in an emerging market where family business is dominant and corporate governance system has substantially changed.     

Market Risk Disclosures and Investment Efficiency: International Evidence from the Gulf Cooperation Council Financial Firms

This study examines the association between market risk disclosures (MRDs) and the investment efficiency of financial firms from six emerging markets in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Based on a sample of 553 firm‐year observations over the 2007–2011 period, we find that MRDs are significantly and negatively associated with both under‐investment and over‐investment and that this association is more pronounced for larger firms. We also find that the association between MRDs and under‐investment is moderated during periods of economic distress such as the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and that the association between MRDs and over‐investment is magnified during periods of reduced financial distress. Our results are consistent with the idea that MRDs reduce information asymmetry, which ultimately improves investment efficiency. We contribute to the literature in an emerging market context by providing empirical evidence on the association between MRDs and investment efficiency across six emerging GCC capital markets. This study also fills a gap in the literature by providing evidence on the factors affecting the investment efficiency of financial firms.