Roaming and investments in the mobile internet market

This model discusses mobile network operators' (MNOs) incentives to invest in their network facilities such as new 4G networks under various regimes of data roaming charge regulation. Given an induced externality of investments (spillovers) due to the roaming agreements it will be shown that MNOs, competing on investments, widely set higher investments for below cost regulation of roaming charges. Otherwise, if MNOs are free to collaborate on investments, they set higher investment levels for above cost roaming charges. Both below and above cost charges may be preferred from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, the paper discusses effects of the roaming charge regulation on roaming quality and MNOs' coverage.     

Estimating the Effect of Crime Risk on Property Values and Time on Market: Evidence from Megan's Law in Virginia

We examine neighborhood externalities that arise from the perceived risk associated with the proximity of a registered sex offender's residence. We find large negative externality effects on a property's price and liquidity, employing empirical techniques that include a fixed‐effects OLS model, a correction for sample selection bias and censoring using a Heckman treatment, and a three‐stage least‐squares model to account for simultaneity bias in the joint determination of a home's sale price and liquidity. Additionally, we find amplified effects for homes with more bedrooms (a proxy for children) and if the nearby offender is designated by the state as “violent.”     

Incorporating Network Externalities into the Technology Acceptance Model*

Research on network externalities has identified a number of product categories in which the market performance of an innovation (e.g., unit sales and revenues) is an increasing function of that innovation's installed base and the availability of complementary products. Innovation scholars have attributed these findings to the positive impact of network externality variables on consumer perceptions of innovation attributes. This paper provides the first empirical examination of these perceptual linkages by extending the Technology Acceptance Model to include consumer perceptions of network externality variables. The authors hypothesize that, when direct and indirect network externalities exist, consumer purchase intentions and consumer perceptions of an innovation's usefulness and ease of use will positively reflect perceptions of installed base size and the availability of complementary products. To test this reasoning, the authors developed new measures of consumer perceptions of network externality variables. These measures were incorporated into a survey that explored the attitudes in Japan of potential adopters toward digital music (DM) players at an early stage in the product life cycle. Findings reveal a direct positive relationship between ease of use and the perceived availability of digital music. The authors also find positive and significant relationships between both purchase intention and perceived usefulness and (1) the perceived size of the DM player installed base and (2) the perceived availability of digital music. An application of the Baron‐Kenny test for mediating variables reveals that (1) ease of use partially mediates the relationship between the perceived availability of digital music and perceived usefulness and (2) perceived usefulness partially mediates the relationship between the perceived availability of digital music and purchase intention. The research has important implications for future research on new product adoption and for the management of innovations that involve network externalities. The conceptual model provides a framework for testing alternative explanations of observed variations in the impact of network externalities within and across product categories. The empirical analysis provides guidance for managers who wish to manage the impact of network externalities on adoption. In addition to stimulating the size of the installed base and the variety of complementary products, executives must also manage consumer awareness of network externality variables and consumer understanding of the relationship between those variables and innovation attributes. Finally, traditional adoption models link consumer adoption decisions to perceptions of innovation attributes. The findings provided here imply that predictive accuracy of these models can be improved by including consumer perceptions of network externality variables.     

Housing Regulation,Externalities and Residential Property Prices

This article examines the effects of quantity restrictions on residential property prices in the presence of neighborhood externalities. A Brigham Young University policy limiting students’ location choices provides a natural experiment for studying the externality and quantity restriction effects on property values. A flexible hedonic model is used to control for nonstudent population spatial sorting by type. The estimates show significant positive quantity restriction and student agglomeration effects on student housing prices. There are also significant differences in the negative student externality across nonstudent neighborhoods, with the quantity restriction reinforcing (offsetting) the student price premium (discount) at the boundary.     

Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Common Network Externalities

We study competition in two-sided markets with a common network externality rather those than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups benefit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satisfies a homogeneity condition then platforms’ profits and price structures have some specific properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to the other, according to the homogeneity degree. Prices are affected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers. In the specific but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platforms’ profits do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This result differs from those of the two-sided models, which deal with standard positive inter-group network externality.     

Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the U.K.

We develop a calibrated simulation model of the U.K. mobile telephony market and use it to analyze the effects of reducing mobile termination rates (MTR's) as recommended by the European Commission. We find that reducing MTR's is likely to increase both consumer surplus and networks' profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities (i.e., benefits to the recipient of a call), social welfare may increase by as much as £1 billion to £4.6 billion per year. We also use the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and T‐Mobile and find that the merger led to a substantial reduction in consumer surplus.     

Taking industry structuring seriously: A strategic perspective on product differentiation

Given legal impediments to consolidation and collusion, firms often resort to product differentiation to attain market power. This paper provides a formal analysis of product differentiation as a tool for such industry structuring at both the firm and industry level. We examine: how industry structure differs when firms collaborate on their differentiation decisions, and when the profitability of such collaboration is greatest; how an individual firm's differentiation decisions affect subsequent market outcomes under price competition, such as margin, market share, and profit; how mere differentiation differs from a ‘differentiation advantage’; and how changing a firm's differentiation affects its rivals through both positive externalities (by restraining rivalry) and negative externalities (by shifting competitive advantage). Our results have implications for empirical research, strategy theory, and pedagogy.     

The Impact of Market Structure and Learning on the Tradeoff between R&D Competition and Cooperation

This paper compares R&D competition and cooperation when firms can devote resources to a ‘safe’ investment or a risky R&D investment. When the discovery of a new product creates positive externalities on non‐discovering firms, equilibrium investment flow, ex ante investment, and welfare under R&D competition are less than or equal to what they are under research cooperation. With negative externalities, R&D cooperation results in the same or lower ex ante investment than under R&D competition, and social welfare may also be less. Our results have relevance for empirical studies of the impact of R&D cooperation on R&D outcomes.     

Technology adoption, learning spillovers, and the optimal duration of patent-based monopolies

The paper analyses an often overlooked aspect of the patent system, namely, that a monopoly franchise for production of a new good could lead to a second-best welfare optimum event when there was no future prospect of inventions being induced by the patent. It is shown that a paten may improve economic welfare relative to a regime of competitive supply when there are learning externalities or ‘spillovers’ from experience in the process of production. Comparative statics show that stronger learning effects at low levels of experience tend to strengthen the case for ex post grant of a monopoly franchise.     

Cloud computing and its impact on the Japanese macroeconomy–its oligopolistic market characteristics and social welfare

The cloud computing market is rapidly expanding and changing the nature of ICT across all sectors; cloud computing transforms ICT from a tool dependent upon investment and physical ownership to one that can easily make use of outside resources. On the other hand, cloud computing services are being provided not only for simple data storage, but for many purposes through several different service models, such as SaaS (Software as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service) and IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service). Due to, among other factors, the nature of its network externalities, the market seems to be gradually shifting to a market with oligopolistic characteristics in which the services are provided by a limited number of big-name firms. In this paper, the impact of the shift of the cloud computing market to a market with oligopolistic characteristics on utility-based social welfare is quantitatively estimated and analyzed utilizing DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) model-based simulation. The main objectives of the paper, rather than to ascertain the exact change of utility-based social welfare, are (1) to determine whether there is a (realistic) shifting path of macroeconomic variables in Japan’s case, under the shift and (2) to illustrate the dynamic interaction of the macroeconomic variables. Utility-based social welfare is chosen, because for the purpose of evaluating policy measures it would be more suitable than GDP. Also, several kinds of policy measures for the sound development of the cloud computing market that the industry and government can take are discussed in a sense related to a market with oligopolistic characteristics.     

The Estimation of a Cusp Model to Describe the Adoption of Word for Windows*

This article revisits earlier work in this journal by Paul Herbig (1991) that proposed a catastrophe model of industrial product adoption under certain conditions. Catastrophe models are useful for modeling situations where organizations can exhibit both smooth and abrupt adoption behavior. It extends Herbig's work by focusing on organizations' adoption of new products when network externalities are an important part of the decision process, and it presents an empirical estimation of the model. Network externalities occur when firms do not want to adopt a new innovation or product unless other firms do. The reason is that they do not want to end up with an innovation that ends up not being a standard of some sort. Mistakes of this nature can be costly as the firm must invest twice and loses time relative to competitors who have not made such a mistake. However, when such externalities exist, for example with regard to technological adoptions, then normal diffusion gives way to sudden discontinuous shifts as all firms seemingly act together an move to a new technology. Since, technology is an area where the authors expect network externalities to exist, that is the focus of this article. The specific application is developed from two sets of panel data on the organizational adoptions of Microsoft's (MS) Word for Windows software by organizations that previously were using either Word for DOS or Word for Macintosh (Mac). The theoretical framework for the analysis is based on work in the economics literature on network externalities. However, the organization and new product development catastrophe model comes primarily from Herbig (1991) . The article focuses on an area of organizational adoption where relatively little empirical research has been done, namely organizational adoption “for use.” Longitudinal data provided by Techtel Corporation is used to develop the estimations. Results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical framework suggested in Herbig's article and in those found in economics and catastrophe theory literatures. This lends clear support to the idea that organizations will adopt a bandwagon‐type behavior when network externalities are present. It further suggests that in such markets, the standard S‐shaped diffusion curve is not an appropriate model for examining organizational behavior. From a managerial perspective, it means that buyers and sellers may face nonstandard diffusion curves. Instead of S‐shaped curves, the actual curves have a break or rift where sales end, and there is a sudden shift to a new product that is relatively high very early on. Clearly, for new product development (NPD), it suggest that organizations' “for‐use” purchases may be similar to regular consumers and may change rapidly from one product to another almost instantly, as in the case of the switch from vinyl records to compact discs (CDs). From an old product seller's viewpoint, the market is here today and gone tomorrow, while for the new seller it is a sudden deluge of sales requests. To put it in more everyday terms, sudden changes in adoption behavior are a September 11‐type experience for the market. It is the day the world changes.     

Perspectives on regional innovation policy – From new economic geography towards the IMP approach

The European Union has the aim of becoming the world's most competitive and knowledge-based economy, which entails investments in industry agglomeration. However, these investments have had limited impact. This conceptual paper problematizes the new economic geography terminology used in policy and, more specifically, the way that the key concepts of “industry agglomeration,” “social capital,” “knowledge,” and “innovation” are conceptualized. By adding the perspective of the industrial network or industrial marketing and purchasing (IMP) approach, this paper contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how to facilitate innovation within regional policy. Since the IMP approach offers an organizational-level perspective, including such a perspective will help make the EU's policies more practically applicable. We propose that regional policy should pay more attention to the socio-material resource interaction between the actors involved in the cluster initiatives. This would shift the focus away from creating spillover effects of knowledge towards viewing knowledge as a performative construct that is inseparable from the specific resource interaction in which it is embedded. Also, the definition of innovation within policy could benefit from being reconceptualized as the processual use within producer–user relationships.     

Network effects in mobile telecommunications markets: A comparative analysis of consumers' preferences in five Latin American countries

It has been shown that the presence of demand-side externalities can induce the market to benefit the largest firms in terms of market share, usually named as network effect by the theoretical literature. On the one hand, macro-level approach in the empirical literature of network effects commonly use the assumption that a network's overall size matters more to consumers' decisions (global network effects). On the other hand, micro-level studies have suggested that social networks are more relevant to consumers' choices than the overall network size (local network effects). Based on microdata from five Latin American countries, we compare the choice of a particular operator over choosing the largest operator by individual consumers. Our research shows that country-level network size is one among a set factors that determine consumers' choices of mobile operators, once individual and operators' country presence heterogeneity are considered. We find that consumers' local network decisions are important for the choice of operator in the majority of cases considered, and that this result is conditional on the chosen operator's market share. Furthermore, network characteristics and consumer preferences, such as coverage, tariffs, and network importance also affect the choice of mobile network for the Latin American context.     

Information Gathering Externalities for a Multi‐Attribute Good

Most goods and services vary in numerous dimensions. Customers choose to acquire information to assess some characteristics and not others. Their choices affect firms' incentives to invest in quality and so lead to indirect externalities in consumers' choices. We characterize a model in which a monopolist invests in the quality of a product with two characteristics, and consumers are heterogeneous ex‐ante. Consumers do not internalize their influence on the firm's investment incentives when choosing which information to acquire. Cheaper information affects consumers' information gathering and thereby firm investment. This can paradoxically reduce consumer surplus, profits, and welfare.     

Collusion between two-sided platforms

We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.     

Estimating consumer surplus in the mobile telecommunications market: The case of Korea

This paper estimates consumer surplus in the Korean mobile telephone services (MTS) market. The Korean mobile telecommunications market has grown rapidly since 1997 when competition was introduced and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology was commercialized. Because consumer surplus is relevant to the controversy over establishing an appropriate price level between consumers and service providers, the need for a robust measurement of benefit from MTS is increasing. The measured net consumer surplus estimated by means of elasticities of demand reached about US$48.8 billion in the period 1996–2004 and the changes amounted to about US$8.8 billion during the same period. In particular, after competition was introduced into the market with an accompanying price decrease and increase in the number of subscribers, consumers have benefited greatly. Therefore, it can be inferred that a facility-based competition policy and the reduction in price of access such as handset subsidies all played a positive role in the early diffusion of MTS in Korea. The estimated consumer surplus in this paper does not include network externality (option externality); if this were considered, the total social welfare of the consumer would be larger.     

供应商技术研发决策行为的演化博弈分析——基于技术外部性的视角

供应商在面向多制造商时研发共性技术还是研发专用技术？以此问题为基点，本文运用演化博弈论，在共性技术外部性、外部性引发价格战及政府干预治理情形下对供应商技术研发决策行为进行分析。研究发现：共性技术外部性的存在使得博弈演化稳定于由选择不同技术研发策略的供应商共存的均衡；在外部性引发价格战情形下，当外部性较强时，零部件降价幅度越大，供应商越倾向于选择研发专用技术，反之，当外部性较弱时供应商越倾向于选择研发共性技术；当考虑外部干预治理时，政府价格干预效果依该行为所引致的市场额外需求降低状况，而政府补偿干预有效引导着供应商选择共性技术研发策略。     

Multi-sided platforms in B2B contexts: The role of affiliation costs and interdependencies in adoption decisions

Multi-sided platforms, enabling interactions between different user sides, hold an important place in the contemporary economy. Current literature, focusing on established and successful platforms, has neglected to study B2B multi-sided platform adoption mechanisms. In this article, we analyze these mechanisms by investigating the case of dematerialization platforms for B2B transactions between the multiple actors involved in public works contracts. Various qualitative materials, including 28 semi-structured interviews, were gathered over a thirty-month period. Adopting a business user perspective, this study contributes to the literature on multi-sided platforms in various ways. We show that platform adoption, in project-based B2B contexts, is mainly constrained by a high level of affiliation costs and the existence of tight-interdependencies between users' activities at project level. Thus, a consecutive adoption path would result in negative cross-group network externalities and undermine the platform's attractiveness. Conversely, a concurrent adoption path would activate positive network externalities and encourage platform adoption decisions.     

Firm‐specific human capital investments as a signal of general value: Revisiting assumptions about human capital and how it is managed

Research summary : Prior scholarship has assumed that firm‐specific and general human capital can be analyzed separately. This article argues that, in some settings, this is not the case because prior firm‐specific human capital investments can be a market signal of an individual's willingness and ability to make such investments in the future. As such, the willingness and ability to make firm‐specific investments is a type of general human capital that links firm‐specific and general human capital in important ways. The article develops theory about these investments, market signals, and value appropriation. Then, the article examines implications for human resource management and several important questions in the field of strategic management, including theories of the firm and microfoundations of competitive advantage. Managerial summary : While managers don't often use the terms firm‐specific and general skills, they certainly recognize that investments employees make in their skill sets are more or less relevant to a specific firm. For instance, investing in specific relationships within a firm or learning a firm's proprietary software would be considered firm‐specific investments. While such skills may seem relevant only to the particular firm in which they were invested, these investments may also send valuable signals to competing firms that such employees are willing and able to make similar investments elsewhere. Hence, managers should be interested in determining if a potential hire has made prior firm‐specific investments to help them know whether that person might be likely to make such investments in his or her future place of employment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.