COSTS OF HOUSING CRISES: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

This paper analyses the costs of housing crises in terms of GDP growth and the economic conditions under which crises are particularly costly. Housing crises are often followed by recessions that are longer than other recessions. According to empirical estimates, a housing crisis reduces the GDP growth rate in the following year on average by two percentage points and has still a considerable negative impact in the second year. One important channel through which the effect of housing crises is passed on seems to be the banking sector. In addition, our results suggest that negative wealth effects possibly cause further reductions in GDP growth.     

CRISES AND GOVERNMENT: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

We examine a panel of 70 countries during 1966–2010 and utilize Reinhart and Rogoff crisis dates to estimate the effects of crises on the size and scope of government over both 5‐year and 10‐year horizons. We also estimate cross‐section regressions using 40‐year (1970–2010) changes in government variables. In general, the estimated effects of crises on government size/scope are statistically insignificant. We report reasonably robust evidence that inflation and currency crises lead to decreases in the extent of government regulations throughout an economy over a 10‐year horizon. Also, over the 40‐year period, countries that spent more years in crisis are associated with weaker legal systems and property rights. The size and scope of government appear to be persistent to the extent that even crisis episodes fail to leave a significant mark upon them. A notable exception may be that, over 40‐year periods, countries that spend more years in crisis are associated with weaker legal systems and property rights. (JEL E02, O11, O43)     

Estimates of output gaps in four Southeast Asian countries

The output gaps derived for four countries using a generalized Hamilton model are compared with conventional output gap estimates. Further research is needed to explain why the output gap identifies crisis episodes as slowdowns instead of recessions in some countries.     

Balance Sheet Effects, Growth, and Crises

This paper addresses two questions: are currency crises predicted by increases in a central bank’s external and contingent liabilities relative to assets, and do these “balance sheet effects” generate persistent output losses following a crisis? I find empirical evidence that the answer to both questions is yes. I use data on stocks of gross external assets and liabilities for 167 countries over 1973–2003, in an unbalanced panel probit regression to obtain robust estimates of the probability and determinants of a post‐crisis recession. Several single and simultaneous equation specifications support the idea that the output cost of a currency crisis depends on its transmission mechanism. Specifically, a recession is likely to be severe if it is preceded by a crisis that works its way through the financial sector. In addition, the results show that measures of contingent liabilities, capital flight, and lack of financial depth are significant predictors of costly crises.     

What determines the likelihood of structural reforms?

We use data for a panel of 60 countries over the period 1980–2005 to investigate the main drivers of the likelihood of structural reforms. We find that: (i) external debt crises are the main trigger of financial and banking reforms; (ii) inflation and banking crises are the key drivers of external capital account reforms; (iii) banking crises also hasten financial reforms; and (iv) economic recessions play an important role in promoting the necessary consensus for financial, capital, banking and trade reforms, especially in the group of OECD-countries. Additionally, we also observe that the degree of globalisation is relevant for financial reforms, in particular in the group of non-OECD countries. Moreover, an increase in the income gap accelerates the implementation of structural reforms, but increased political fragmentation does not seem to have a significant impact.     

Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Performance in Asian Countries*

We use a very general bivariate GARCH‐M model and quarterly data for five Asian countries to test for the impact of real and nominal macroeconomic uncertainty on inflation and output growth. We conclude the following. First, in the majority of countries uncertainty regarding the output growth rate is related negatively to the average growth rate. Secondly, contrary to expectations, inflation uncertainty in most cases does not harm the output growth performance of an economy. Thirdly, inflation and output uncertainty have a mixed effect on inflation. Consistent results are found using the VAR‐GARCH‐M approach to investigate the dynamic relationship between inflation and output growth using impulse response functions. This evidence implies that macroeconomic uncertainty may even improve macroeconomic performance, i.e. raise output growth and reduce inflation. Our empirical results highlight important differences with those for industrialized countries.     

The effect of financial liberalization on banking sector stability

Several studies indicate that financial liberalization increases likelihood of a financial crisis without distinguishing between a normal period, unstable period preceding the onset of banking panics and crisis/post period. We explain in this paper the relationship between financial liberalization and banking sector vulnerability. Then, we argue that banking sector turmoil is most likely to occur after an intermediate degree of liberalization. Using a recently updated dataset for financial reforms, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between liberalization and the likelihood of banking crisis for a sample of 49 countries between 1980 and 2010. We used a multinomial logit model in order to take into account what is called the ‘post crisis bias’. We ask whether the relationship remains when institutional characteristics of countries and dynamic effects of liberalization are considered. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between liberalization and banking sector stability depends strongly on the strength of capital regulation and supervision. With very weak regulation and supervision, the probability of banking crises is increasing with liberalization but this relationship is reversed as regulation and supervision become significant. The most important type of liberalization in relation to banking crises seems to be operational. A policy implication is that positive growth effects of liberalization can be achieved without increasing the risk of a banking fragility if appropriate institutions are developed.     

Asian Currency Crisis and the International Monetary Fund, 10 Years Later: Overview*

This paper is an overview of the Asian currency crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997–1998, with an emphasis on the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It provides a detailed account of the development of the crisis and analyses and evaluates the content of IMF advice and its consequences. The size of the IMF package for each of these three countries is judged to have been too small. This paper also has a comparative perspective; the Mexican crisis is reviewed as a precursor to the Asian crisis to see what the IMF learned, and how it prepared, for future crises. The causes of the crises and IMF conditionality for the post‐Asian crisis countries, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina, are also compared to the Asian crisis countries. By agreeing to maintain a fixed exchange rate, for example, the IMF is judged to have been “softer” in its approach to the post‐Asian crisis countries.     

Long COVID? Prospects for economic scarring from the pandemic

This paper examines the potential persistent effects (scarring) of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy and the channels through which they may occur. Our findings from a broad set of historical recessions confirm that recessions are associated with persistent output losses and that the greatest scarring has occurred following financial crises. The amount of scarring following pandemic and epidemic recessions in the sample is in between that of typical recessions and financial crises. Results on the channels show that the productivity channel is important, as all types of recessions have been followed by persistent losses to total factor productivity.     

Bank loan versus financial lease: how do traditional and innovative approaches within the banking sector influence economic growth? A comparative analysis between the US and China

ABSTRACT

The argument over the effects of financial structures on economic growth remains unsettled. This study, therefore, compares the dynamic correlation and lead–lag relationship between the different financial approaches within the banking sector (that is, traditional bank loans versus innovative financial leasing) and economic growth. We employ a continuous wavelet analysis using time-series data from 1982–2017 from the US (the world’s largest developed country) and China (the world’s largest developing country). The empirical results show that (1) episodes of significant correlation usually emerge during periods of reform, crisis or policy implementation; and (2) in China, traditional banking promotes economic growth in the long term, while the real economy only imputes the evolution of banks during critical economic reforms in the short term. Meanwhile, financial leasing could only promote the development of the real economy under suitable regulation; and (3) in the US, before the crises, the irrational growth of the real economy could increase bank assets, while during the crises, the traditional banking approach harms economic growth, and after the crises, financial leases play an important role in recovery. Therefore, we suggest that policymakers should establish adequate policies and regulations to solve the situation.     

BANKING CONCENTRATION AND FIRM GROWTH: THE ROLE OF SIZE,LOCATION AND FINANCIAL CRISIS

Using conditional quantile regressions for a panel of listed firms from euro‐area countries in the 2005–11 period, we explore the impact of banking concentration on firm growth between smaller and larger firms; core and periphery countries; in pre‐crisis and post‐crisis years. Our findings reveal that increasing banking concentration favours high‐growth larger‐sized firms located in periphery countries pre‐crisis. By contrast in post‐crisis years increasing banking concentration impacts negatively on low‐growth smaller firms irrespective of location, revealing their vulnerability.     

Growth miracles and failures in a Markov switching classification model of growth

In this paper economic growth is interpreted as a sequence of transitions between distinct growth regimes that countries visit with different frequencies. Countries featuring similar growth dynamics are endogenously grouped into three different clusters. The first cluster comprises successful countries that are characterized by lengthy periods of high or very high growth. Moderately successful countries in the second cluster experience both periods of reasonable growth and periods of stagnation, whereas failing countries in the third cluster suffer from highly volatile growth rates with frequent episodes of crisis. Successful countries are characterized by better initial conditions, policies and institutions compared to the other countries. Neither initial conditions nor institutions distinguish moderately successful from failing countries; what makes them different is policy in the form of investments into infrastructure and human capital, trade liberalization and limited policy volatility.     

Takeoffs

This paper identifies factors associated with takeoff—a sustained period of high growth following a period of stagnation. Countries that experience takeoffs average 2.3% annual growth following their stagnation episodes, while those that do not average 0%. Using probit, we find that de jure trade openness is positively and significantly associated with takeoffs. A one‐standard‐deviation increase in de jure trade openness is associated with a 55% increase in the probability of a takeoff in our default specification. Capital account openness encourages takeoff responses, but measures of de facto trade openness are found to be poor predictors of takeoffs. We also examine the determinants of nations achieving “sustained” takeoffs; i.e. those lasting eight years or longer. Takeoffs in countries with more commodity‐intensive output bundles are less likely to be sustained, suggesting that adverse terms‐of‐trade shocks may play a role in ending long‐term high growth episodes.     

The Behaviour of Banking Stocks During the Financial Crisis and Recessions. Evidence from Changes‐in‐Changes Panel Data Estimations

This paper examines the impact of the financial crisis and economic recessions on bank shares compared to the overall stock market index for 18 OECD countries from 1993 to 2015. The empirical methodology utilizes the changes‐in‐changes approach. We compare and contrast the returns of the banking stock price index (treatment group) in each country with their general stock price index (control group), which experiences smaller changes. Our results suggest that bank returns on average perform significantly worse than that of the general stock price index during recessions. In addition, we also find significantly greater volatility in bank share returns.     

Asymmetry and Duration Dependence in Australian GDP and Unemployment

The periodic structure of business cycles suggests that significant asymmetries are present over different phases of the cycle. This paper uses markov regime-switching models with fixed and duration dependent trasition probabilities to directly model expansions, contractions and durations in Australian GDP growth and unemployment growth. Evidence is found of significant asymmetry in growth rates across expansions and contractions for both series. GDP contractions exhibit duration dependence implying that as output recessions age the likelihood of switching into an expansion phase increases. Unemployment growth does not exhibit duration dependence in either phase. Evidence is also presented that non-linearities in unemployment growth are well explained by the asymmetries in the GDP growth cycle. The analysis suggests that recessions are periods of rapid and intense job destruction, that Australian unemployment tends to ratchet up in recessionary periods and, in contrast to US and UK studies, that shocks to Australian unemployment growth are more persistent in recessions than expansions.     

Liberalization and the Changing Inter‐industry Wage Structure of the Organized Manufacturing Sector in India, 1973/74–2003/04

This paper examines the inter‐industry wage structure of the organized manufacturing sector in India for the period 1973/74–2003/04 by estimating the growth of average real wages for production workers by industry. Using wage data on 51 three‐digit industries, our estimation procedure obtains estimates of growth of real wages per worker that are wholly deterministic in nature by accounting for any potential structural break(s) associated with the reforms. Our paper identifies three distinct regimes—pre‐reform, first phase reforms and second phase reforms, over which real wages have grown at varying rates for each industry. Our findings suggest that the inter‐industry wage differences have become more pronounced in the post‐reform periods. The paper provides new evidence from India on the need to consider seriously the hypothesis that industry affiliation is potentially an important determinant of wages when studying any relationship between reforms and wages.     

Crises and exchange rate regimes: time to break down the bipolar view?

We revisit the link between crises and exchange rate regimes (ERR). Using a wide panel of 90 developed and developing countries over the period 1980–2009, we find that corner ERR are not more prone to crises compared to intermediate ERR. This finding holds for different types of crises (banking, currency and debt), and is robust to a wide set of alternative specifications. Consequently, we clearly break down the traditional bipolar view: countries that aim at preventing crisis episodes should focus less on the choice of the ERR, and instead implement sound structural macroeconomic policies.     

The effects of financial crisis on fiscal positions

The recent financial crisis was characterized by the sizeable fiscal cost of banking sector bail out operations and the significant automatic and discretionary fiscal policy response to shrinking output, which have put increased pressure on public finances in many industrialized countries. This paper tries to evaluate the impact of financial crisis episodes on debt developments. The findings indicate that severe financial crisis episodes increase the stock of debt by 2.7%–4.0% of GDP, on average in the 20 OECD countries examined. Ιn countries with big financial sectors it ranges from 4.2%–5.3% of GDP and in countries with smaller financial sectors it is about 1.4%–1.7% of GDP. The primary balance and the cyclically adjusted fiscal policy stance ease by about 2.6% of GDP and 1.6% of potential GDP, respectively, in the event of a severe financial market crash. Expansionary fiscal interventions are more pronounced in countries with sizable financial sectors. I find significant evidence that a financial market collapse paves the way for a subsequent deterioration in debt ratios.     

Financial crises and sudden stops: Was the European monetary union crisis different?

We estimate a two-region model of the Euro area, with the purpose of identifying the shocks that caused the 2008–2009 recession and the subsequent 2010 sovereign bond crisis. One striking result is that both crises were demand-driven in the core Euro area countries, whereas region-specific permanent technology shocks explain most of the output growth slowdown in the peripheral countries. Adverse technology shocks became particularly important during the sovereign bond crisis. This is in line with cross-country evidence on the effects of sudden stops.     

Exchange Rate Regimes and Currency Crises: an Evaluation using Extreme Value Theory*

We test whether the exchange regime in place has an impact on the vulnerability of countries to currency crises. Our paper is distinguishable from others (i) in its use of extreme value theory to identify currency crisis periods and (ii) in using two separate designations for the exchange regime in place. The first is the self‐reported or announced exchange rate system. The second classification scheme, by Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger, is based on the relative movements of international reserves and exchange rates. The Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger procedure is intended to reveal the actual as distinct from the “legal” exchange arrangement. We find, interestingly, that the announced exchange regime has an impact on the likelihood of currency crises, while the “true” or observed regime does not. Announced pegged exchange regimes increase the risk of currency crisis even if, in reality, the exchange rate system in place is not pegged.