Dissertation abstract: The effect of involvement, time, and vividness on consumers’ value judgments: A test of prospect theory

The literature in psychology and behavioral economics offers abundant instances of anomalies to the rational choice paradigm. One of the most prominent works attempting to reconcile these is Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory. Its well-known S-shaped value function accounts for some of the anomalies such as reference dependence, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. Although Prospect Theory describes the manner in which individuals are loss averse, it does not explain why people show loss aversion. This dissertation investigates the factors that affect the cognitive processes behind loss aversion. We find an anomaly in the S-shaped value function. Specifically, the studies demonstrate that the degree of involvement affects the slope of the value curve both for atemporal and intertemporal choices. In addition, we also test the relationship between loss aversion and involvement with varying vividness of outcomes (i.e., when outcomes are related to more versus less vivid stimuli). Testing the vividness effects further extends and confirms our proposed relationship between involvement and loss aversion. The data from several experiments show that there is a difference in the slopes of the value function for low and high involvement decisions. For low involvement conditions, the value curve has roughly the same steepness for losses as for gains close to the neutral reference point (i.e., contrary to the diminishing sensitivity characteristic). By contrast, in the high involvement conditions this is not the case: there is a distinct difference in the slopes of the loss and gain curves. This leads us to propose that different value functions exist for people in the low and high involvement conditions. This important finding suggests that in cases where people are not highly involved with a product, they display significantly less loss aversion than predicted by Prospect Theory. Three experiments investigate the relationship of loss aversion to subjects’ level of involvement in atemporal choice, intertemporal choice, and differential vividness of stimuli situations, respectively. The first study uses a 2 (involvement: low and high) by 2 (outcome: gain and loss) between subjects design. The results show that loss aversion significantly attenuates in the low involvement condition for atemporal choice. Study two replicates the results of study one in the context of intertemporal choice, where timing of outcomes (now versus three months) is introduced as another factor. Finally, the third study manipulates the vividness of outcomes and finds an interaction effect of vividness and involvement on loss aversion. Dissertation Committee: Norman Frohlich (Co- Chair), I.H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba Edward Bruning (Co- Chair), I.H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba Namita Bhatnagar, I.H. Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba Wayne Simpson, Department of Economics, University of Manitoba Michael Hu, Department of Marketing, Kent State University     

Unique Implementation of the Full Surplus Extraction Outcome in Auctions with Correlated Types

In auctions with correlated types it is possible to design mechanisms such that full surplus extraction can be obtained as the outcome of an equilibrium in which agents use (weakly) dominant strategies. However, it is not assured that the outcome is unique. We present an example in which no mechanism can yield the full surplus extraction outcome as the unique Bayesian equilibrium outcome. Next we show that in the standard auction model the multiplicity problem can be fully resolved using sequential mechanisms, i.e., we show that it is possible to obtain the full surplus extraction outcome as the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44; D70.     

On the Non-Existence of Redundant Options

In a seminal paper, Ross (Q J Econ 90:75–89, 1976) shows that if security markets are resolving, then there exist (non-redundant) options that generate complete security markets. Complementing his work, Aliprantis and Tourky (2002) show that if security markets are strongly resolving and the number of primitive securities is less than half the number of states, then every option is non-redundant. Our paper extends Aliprantis and Tourky’s result to the case when their condition on the number of primitive securities is not imposed. Specifically, we show that if there exists no binary payoff vector in the asset span, then for each portfolio there exists a set of exercise prices of full measure such that any option on the portfolio with an exercise price in this set is non-redundant. Since the condition that there exists no binary payoff vector in the asset span holds generically, redundant options are thus rare. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. Research support from the School of Business at The George Washington University is gratefully acknowledged     

Auctions with costly information acquisition

We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms must induce the bidders to acquire information about their valuations and to reveal this information truthfully. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general “full extraction of the surplus” result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over the bidders’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special cases. For helpful comments we thank George Deltas, David Martimort, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants in Mannheim, Rutgers, Tel Aviv, Toulouse, the Society for Economic Design 2002 conference in New York, and the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Evanston, IL. Yossi Spiegel thanks the IIBR for financial assistance and Charles Zheng thanks the NSF for grant SES-0214471.     

Optimal search auctions

We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller's problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs. Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry.     

Pooling and endogenous market incompleteness

Summary. We study a financial market economy with a continuum of borrowers and pooling of borrowers promises. Under these conditions and in the absence of designing costs, utility-maximizing decisions of price-taking borrowers may lead to financial market incompleteness. Parametrizing equilibria through the borrowers no-arbitrage beliefs, we link expectations to the financial market structure. Markets are complete if and only if borrowers beliefs are homogeneous. Price-taking behavior causes a coordination problem which in turn yields indeterminacy and inefficiency of equilibrium allocations.Received: 29 May 2003, Revised: 13 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D50, D52.Correspondence to: Alessandro CitannaWe would like to thank David Cass, John Geanakoplos, Thorsten Hens, Atsushi Kajii, and an anonymous referee for their comments. The first author also thanks CERMSEM (Paris I) and Columbia University Graduate School of Business for the hospitality. A first version of this paper has appeared as GSIA Working Paper #1997-E137, Carnegie Mellon University, which itself revised Citanna and Villanacci (1995).     

When does Strategic Debt-service Matter?

Recent work in corporate finance has suggested that strategic debt-service by equity-holders works to lower debt values and raise yield spreads substantially. We show that this is not quite correct. With optimal cash management, defaults occassioned by deliberate underperformance (strategic defaults) and those forced by inadequate cash (liquidity defaults) work as substitutes: allowing for strategic debt-service leads to a decline in the equilibrium likelihood of liquidity defaults. In some cases, this decline is sufficiently sharp that equilibrium debt values actually increase and yield spreads decline. We provide an intuitive explanation for these results in terms of an interaction of optionalitiesExpanded versions of this paper were presented in conferences and seminars at the Scottish Institute for Research in Finance, European Finance Association, Western Finance Association, Financial Management Association, 10th Derivative Securities Conference, Santa Clara University, Virginia Tech, the Norwegian School of Management, the Norwegian School of Business and Economics, Duke University, and Carnegie-Mellon University. We benefitted greatly from the comments of participants at these seminars and would particularly like to thank Francesca Cornelli, Kose John, Pete Kyle, Sanjay Unni, and Raman Uppal in this context     

Tenures That Shook the World: Worker Turnover in Russia, Poland, and Britain

We study worker turnover to investigate to what extent the length of time a worker has been employed by a firm shapes the turnover process in a transition economy. Using survey data, we compare the pattern of turnover with a Western economy, Britain. We show that tenure-turnover rates are higher in Russia and lower in Poland than in Britain. The characteristics of workers hired in the state and private sectors do not look very different. State and private sector firms in Poland offer the same wages to new recruits, but new private sector jobs in Russia appear to offer wage premia relative to new state jobs. We argue that these observations are consistent with a framework in which the value of seniority in jobs begun under the old order may be small and the value of a continued job match unsure, offset, in Poland at least, by insider resistance to layoffs.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 639–664. Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, IZA, Bonn, The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, and EERC, Kiev; Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, IZA, Bonn, and The William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor.     

Optimal pricing and capacity choice for a public service under risk of interruption

We develop rules for pricing and capacity choice for an interruptible service that recognize the interdependence between consumers’ perceptions of system reliability and their market behavior. Consumers post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post supply capacity is sufficient. However, if supply is inadequate all ex ante demands are proportionally interrupted. Consumers’ expectations of aggregate demand are assumed to be rational. Under reasonable values for the consumer’s degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply reliability. We derive operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We show that the optimal price under uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that positively depends on the degrees of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also show that any reliability enhancing investment—though lowering the operating surplus of the public utility—is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment.     

The affectionate society: does competition for partners promote friendliness?

We study household formation in a model where collective consumption decisions of a household depend on the strategic choices of its members. The surplus of households is determined by individual choices of levels of friendliness to each other. A strategic conflict arises from a coupling condition that ceteris paribus, a person’s friendlier attitude reduces the individual’s influence in the household’s collective decision on how to divide the ensuing surplus. While partners in an isolated household choose the minimum level of friendliness, competition for partners tends to promote friendliness. We find that affluence does not buy affection, but can lead to withholding of affection by an affluent partner who can afford to do so. In general, the equilibrium degree of friendliness proves sensitive to the socio-economic composition of the population. We would like to thank Clive Bell, Edward Glaeser, Roger Lagunoff, Eva Terberger and seminar audiences in Berlin, Birmingham, Blacksburg, Exeter, Heidelberg, Manchester and at IHS in Vienna for helpful comments. We greatly appreciate the thoughtful comments of a referee.     

Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard

Equilibrium bidding strategies under most multi-unit auction rules cannot be obtained as closed form expressions. Research in multi-unit auctions has, therefore, depended on implicit characterization of equilibrium strategies using the first-order conditions of the bidders’ expected payoff maximization problem. In this paper we consider the pay-as-bid auction with diminishing marginal values for two units and show that any symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies has the necessary properties to allow such a characterization. Moreover, any increasing solution to the system of differential equations that is used to characterize the equilibrium strategies describes an equilibrium strategy.Generous suggestions and comments from Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Charles M. Kahn, and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

eBay’s proxy bidding: A license to shill

We introduce a bidding strategy which allows the seller to extract the full surplus of the high bidder in eBay auctions. We call this a “Discover-and-Stop” bidding strategy and estimate that 1.39 percent of all bids in eBay auctions are placed by sellers (or accomplices) who execute this strategy. We argue that this kind of shill bidding is unnecessarily effective due to eBay’s proxy system and the predictability of other bidders’ bids. We also model eBay auctions with shill bidding and find that, in equilibrium, eBay’s profits are higher with shilling than without it. Finally, to determine whether bidders have an incentive to bid on their own items, we mimic the bidding behavior of shill bidders in actual eBay auctions and find some evidence of the strategy’s success.     

中国通货膨胀的福利成本研究

Inflation is always an important indicator to measure whether economy is stable and healthy. This paper provides a substantive survey of the research on the welfare cost of inflation, and uses the methods of consumer’s surplus and neo-classical general equilibrium models respectively to estimate the welfare cost of inflation in China. The results show that high inflation will cause huge welfare cost in China, so keeping low inflation is beneficial to the entire economic welfare of China. __________ Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2007, (4): 30–42, 159     

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.     

Intangible capital,corporate valuation and asset pricing

Recent studies have found unmeasured intangible capital to be large and important. In this paper we observe that by nature intangible capital is also very different from physical capital. We find it plausible to argue that the accumulation process for intangible capital differs significantly from the process by which physical capital accumulates. We study the implications of this hypothesis for rational firm valuation and asset pricing using a two-sector general equilibrium model. Our main finding is that the properties of firm valuation and stock prices are very dependent on the assumed accumulation process for intangible capital. If one entertains the possibility that intangible investments translates into capital stochastically, we find that plausible levels of macroeconomic volatility are compatible with highly variable corporate valuations, P/E ratios and stock returns. We thank Ellen McGrattan, Edward Prescott, Rene Stulz and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments as well as workshop participants at FAME, the 5th Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, the European Central Bank, Columbia Business School Finance Free Lunch and the University of Zürich. This research has benefited from financial support from the National Center for Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and Risk Management”. The National Centers of Competence in Research are managed by the Swiss National Science Foundation on behalf of the Federal Authorities.     

Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction

If valuations are interdependent and agents observe their own allocation payoffs, then two-stage revelation mechanisms expand the set of implementable decision functions. In a two-stage revelation mechanism agents report twice. In the first stage - before the allocation is decided - they report their private signals. In the second stage - after the allocation has been made, but before final transfers are decided - they report their payoffs from the allocation. Conditions are provided under which an uninformed seller can extract (or virtually extract) the full surplus from a sale to privately informed buyers, in spite of the buyers’ signals being independent random variables. This research was started when I was visiting the Department of Applied Mathematics of the University of Venice, and continued while visiting the European University Institute in Florence. Their financial support is gratefully acknowledged.     

A new approach to modeling co-movement of international equity markets: evidence of unconditional copula-based simulation of tail dependence

Analyzing equity market co-movements is important for risk diversification of an international portfolio. Copulas have several advantages compared to the linear correlation measure in modeling co-movement. This paper introduces a copula ARMA-GARCH model for analyzing the co-movement of international equity markets. The model is implemented with an ARMA-GARCH model for the marginal distributions and a copula for the joint distribution. After goodness of fit testing, we find that the Student’s t copula ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model with fractional Gaussian noise is superior to alternative models investigated in our study where we model the simultaneous co-movement of nine international equity market indexes. This model is also suitable for capturing the long-range dependence and tail dependence observed in international equity markets. Rachev’s research was supported by grants from Division of Mathematical, Life and Physical Science, College of Letters and Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, and the Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). Sun’s research was supported by grants from the Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and Chinese Government Award for Outstanding Ph.D Students Abroad 2006, No. 2006-180. Kalev’s research was supported with a NCG grant from the Faculty of Business and Economics, Monash University. Data are supplied by Securities Industry Research Center of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) on behalf of Reuters. The constructive comments of two anonymous referees, the Associate Editor, A.S. Wirjanto, and the Editor-in-charge, Baldev Raj, are gratefully acknowledged. The reviewers and editors are not responsible for any residual errors and omissions.     

Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion

In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’ surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.      

An Economic Definition of the Middle Class

The concept of a middle class is prevalent in both common parlance and the social sciences; concern is frequently expressed that the middle class is shrinking, and politicians often position themselves as champions of the middle class. Yet the phrase “middle class” is extremely ambiguous; no consensus exists on either the upper bound or the lower bound separating the middle class from other classes. The present paper employs the government’s official poverty line as the demarcation between the poor and the middle class, and develops an equivalent distinction to separate the middle class from the wealthy. Based on the new definition, the paper provides some rough empirical estimates of the size of the American middle class over the 1989–2004 period.

Information acquisition and full surplus extraction

It is well known that when agents' types are correlated, the mechanism designer can extract the entire surplus. This creates an incentive for agents to acquire information about other agents' types. Robust lotteries (are payment schemes that) support full extraction and partially robust lotteries support efficient implementation in the presence of information acquisition opportunities. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of robust and partially robust lotteries are derived. If an agent's information signal spans other agents' types then robust lotteries do not exist. However, if all agents report their signal realizations then robust lotteries exist in an extended type space.