固定费用结构下基金经理管理费激励研究

基于经理的努力水平和风险规避程度是基金经理费设计的关键因素,构建固定费率结构下基金经理努力及风险选择的模型,结合我国基金样本数据进行了实证研究结果表明:管理费与基金业绩无显著正相关性,且低业绩的基金体现出较高的管理费率;管理费与基金风险具有显著的正相关关系。     

基金经理中心度对基金业绩的影响——基于基金交叉管理模式的实证研究

本文首次研究了基金在交叉管理模式下的表现.在这种模式下,基金经理通过管理的基金与其他经理形成了一种网络关联.本文利用复杂网络中心度来考察基金经理在经理网络中的特征,以此来研究对其管理的基金的影响.实证发现,基金经理参与管理越多的基金,其中心度数值就越高,其管理的基金的超额收益就越差.中心度高的经理,越倾向承担高风险,而...     

浅析基金经理特征对基金业绩的影响——来自股票型基金的实证研究

影响基金绩效的因素有很多,在相关研究中,基金经理对基金绩效影响的研究相对较少。但人力资本在基金运行中的作用是非常重要的,本文以股票型基金为例,结合基金经理的个人特征差异,简要分析基金经理对基金业绩的影响。     

相对业绩排序对我国开放式基金风险调整行为的影响

本文选取2004年-2007年共201只开放式股票型基金作为样本,分析了相对业绩排序对基金经理投资组合风险选择的影响.结果表明,前期业绩排序中成为赢家的基金经理后期倾向于降低投资组合的风险,而输家凋高了投资组合的风险水平;基金规模和成立时间长短对基金经理的风险选择影响显著,新基金和小规模基金的风险调整程度大于老基金和大规模基金;同时,研究发现牛市对基金的风险激励水平明显高于熊市.     

基金治理中的相对绩效激励

随着中国经济的飞速发展和资本市场改革的不断推进,证券投资基金作为一种专业理财工具,受到越来越多的社会公众投资者的青睐。然而,基金本身却存在着较为严重的治理问题。本文提出相对绩效激励制度,有利于解决基金治理中存在的问题,并用理论模型证明了上述观点。最后,本文还提出了一些相关的政策建议。     

相对业绩排序对我国开放式基金风险调整行为的影响

本文选取2004年-2007年共201只开放式股票型基金作为样本,分析了相对业绩排序对基金经理投资组合风险选择的影响。结果表明,前期业绩排序中成为赢家的基金经理后期倾向于降低投资组合的风险,而输家调高了投资组合的风险水平;基金规模和成立时间长短对基金经理的风险选择影响显著,新基金和小规模基金的风险调整程度大于老基金和大规模基金;同时,研究发现牛市对基金的风险激励水平明显高于熊市。     

基金过去的业绩会影响未来的风险选择吗

当基金的业绩表现较差时，基金经理是否会加大基金投资组合的风险呢？本文以Hsiu—lang Chen和George G．Pennacchi的基金经理组合投资模型为基础，分析我国基金业绩对基金投资组合风险的影响。从这一模型来看，基金过去的业绩排名并不一定会影响基金未来的风险选择，过去业绩表现较差的基金也不一定会倾向干增加基金投资组合的风险。另外，本文的实证结果也支持这一结论。随后本文又采用Logit模型来分析影响基金风险选择的因素，结果发现：基金经理从业年限越长、基金申购费和赎回费越低、基金资产净值越大以及基金成立时间越短，基金经理越倾向干在基金业绩表现不好时增加基金的投资组合风险。     

股权激励对公司风险承担影响的研究综述

股权激励作为一种长效激励机制,被认为是缓解委托代理问题的有效方式之一。管理者与股东在风险承担上的冲突是代理问题的表现之一,股权激励机制是否能发挥其激励效果,提高公司风险承担水平?目前已有文献中相关研究的结论不一,且有较大差异,本文对此进行了梳理,并据此提出未来的研究方向。     

基金经理初次任职时点、过度自信与基金业绩

基金经理初次任职时点所处的市场环境,如何影响基金后续的业绩表现?本文对我国2005-2018年开放式基金研究发现,初次任职时点处于牛市的基金经理,其基金业绩显著更差,且选股能力和回撤控制能力显著更低。原因在于,市场环境导致的自我归因偏差使他们更加过度自信,频繁换手且难以做出最优决策。当然,经历了完整的牛熊周期后,牛市初次任职的基金经理过度自信和基金业绩负效应得以减轻。最后,排除了牛市中基金经理晋升时能力选拔放松对结论的影响。     

基金经理——业绩的重要一环

在基金业绩具备持续性的诸多因素中,基金经理是不可或缺的一环.我们既应关注基金经理的资历深浅,也应同时关注基金经理在一只基金上的任职是否稳定.前者有助于我们对其投资能力进行判断,后者是业绩具备持续性的保证.毕竟,失去优秀掌舵者的巨轮会让我们对未来的航行多一份担忧.     

What do mutual fund managers’ private portfolios tell us about their skills?

I study a registry-based dataset of Swedish mutual fund managers’ personal portfolios. The majority of managers do not invest personal wealth into the very same funds they professionally manage. The managers who do invest personal money into their funds subsequently outperform the managers who do not. The results suggest that fund managers, in contrast to regular investors, are certain about their ability to generate an abnormal return, or lack thereof, and invest their personal wealth accordingly.     

基金业绩排名与基金经理的冒险行为

本文利用2005-2010年间开放式股票型和混合型基金的数据,研究年度基金业绩排名对基金经理冒险行为的影响。与相对业绩排名激励机制会导致基金经理过度冒险的假设相一致,本文发现,年中业绩排名靠后的基金经理(输家)在下半年提高所持有资产组合的风险的程度要大于年中业绩排名靠前的基金经理(赢家)。进一步研究发现,基金经理提高下半年所持有资产组合的风险并不能显著提高下半年基金的业绩。特别是在熊市中,提高下半年所持有资产组合的风险反而显著降低了基金下半年的业绩。     

Implied measures of relative fund performance

We evaluate the relative performance of funds by conditioning their returns on the cross-section of portfolio characteristics across fund managers. Our implied procedure circumvents the need to specify benchmark returns or peer funds. Instead, fund-specific benchmarks for measuring selection and market timing ability are constructed. This technique is robust to herding as well as window dressing and mitigates survivorship bias. Empirically, the conditional information contained in portfolio weights defined by industry sectors, assets, and geographical regions is important to the assessment of fund management. For each set of portfolio characteristics, we identify funds with success at either selecting securities or timing-the-market.

开放式基金与证券市场健康发展

开放式基金是世界基金业中的主流品种 ,与封闭式基金相比具有很多优势。中国在2000年10月推出了开放式基金试点办法 ,可以预见 ,随着开放式基金发展壮大 ,我国证券市场将会发生深刻变化。为使开放式基金成功运作 ,必须重点关注其流动性风险 ,加强流动性风险管理。     

论基金管理人的股东化转型

在传统的基金治理结构中,基金管理人大多采用经理型模式,基金管理人的道德风险的发生难以避免。对基民与基金管理人的委托—代理合同进行优化,重激励、轻约束,不能从根本上消除基金管理人的道德风险。要消除基金管理人的道德风险,必须实现基金管理人从经理型向股东型的彻底转变,将基民与基金管理人的关系由传统的基金运行模式中的股东与经理的关系改造为优先股东与普通股东的关系。基金管理人的股东化转型,相对于经理型基金管理人而言,至少有两大功能:对基金管理人的机会主义行为的矫治功能;对基金管理人能力的甄别功能。     

The impact of prior performance on the risk-taking of mutual fund managers

We analyze the impact of prior performance on the risk-taking behavior of mutual fund managers. We contribute to the existing literature by using different measures of risks, a larger data set, and an econometric approach capturing non-linear effects and assigning exact probabilities to the mutual fund managers’ adjustment of behavior. We find that prior performance in the first half of the year has, in general, a positive impact on the choice of the risk level in the second half of the year. Successful fund managers increase the volatility, the beta, and assign a higher proportion of their portfolio to value stocks, small firms, and momentum stocks in comparison to unsuccessful fund managers. Unsuccessful fund manager increase, on average, only the tracking error. We thank an anonymous referee, Bernd Brommundt, Alexander Ising, Stephan Kessler, Axel Kind, Angelika Noll, Jennifer Noll, Ralf Seiz, Stephan Süss, Rico von Wyss, and Andreas Zingg for valuable comments. We acknowledge helpful comments of the participants from the Joint Research Workshop of the University of St. Gallen and the University of Ulm in 2005.     

Tax incentives for inefficient executive pay and reward for luck

I study the economic consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts. The analysis is based on an agency model in which the firm’s cash flow is a function of the agent’s effort and an observable random factor beyond the agent’s control. According to my analysis, limiting the tax deductibility of fixed wages has two consequences. The principal rewards the agent on the basis of the observable random factor and adjusts the amount of performance-based pay in the optimal incentive contract. The new contract can have weaker or stronger work incentives than without the tax. The theoretical findings have implications for empirical compensation research. First, the analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to recent tax law changes, whereas earlier empirical literature has attributed this phenomenon to managerial entrenchment. Second, I demonstrate that a simple regression analysis that fails to control for separable measures of luck is likely to find an increased pay for performance sensitivity as a response to the introduction of tax deductibility limits on salaries even if the pay for performance sensitivity has actually declined.     

Peer firms in relative performance evaluation

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation provides insurance against external shocks and yields a more informative measure of CEO actions. I argue that empirical evidence on the use of RPE is mixed because previous studies rely on a misspecified peer group. External shocks and flexibility in responding to the shocks are functions of, for example, the firm's technology, the complexity of the organization, and the ability to access external credit, which depend on firm size. When peers are composed of similar industry-size firms, evidence is consistent with the use of RPE in CEO compensation.