韩国媒体报道中的中国国家形象分析及其相关对策——以韩国主流媒体对中国广州亚运会报道为例

随着全球化时代的来临,国家形象问题日益成为国际传播和国际关系领域里的研究热点．成为政府官员、专家学者和普通民众普遍关切的一个极富理论和实践意义的课题。本文首先介绍了韩国主流媒体对中国广州亚运会报道的整体情况,分析了韩国主流媒体报道中的中国国家形象,指出韩国媒体对中国和广州各个方面的报道比较全面、相对客观．只是在涉及到民主、人权、日本、朝鲜等问题时,才表现出负面。本文强调需要不断提升对外传播能力,通过提升国家公民的素质、建设和谐媒体．实施中国媒体“走出去”战略等手段重新塑造国家形象。     

高校对外宣传工作策略分析

在信息社会里,谁掌握了信息传播的主动权,谁就把握了世界的脉搏,谁就能在人才的争夺上抢夺制高点,掌握主动权.高校外宣工作对传播高校建设和发展信息,塑造高校对外形象,争取有利的舆论氛围起着重要作用.本文将重点分析高校外宣工作的策略,以期对高校外宣工作有所裨益.     

全媒体时代背景下会展品牌的塑造与传播策略

全媒体时代,是结合了新旧媒体等各个媒体形式为一体的新型传播形态.在现代科学技术快速发展的条件下,这种最新传播模式,以更加多样化的形式塑造更全方位、立体化的媒体模式,使群众能更为便捷的获取信息.会展也是全媒体时代下的重要传播模式之一,对于城市的发展建设而言,是快速提升其软实力的重要媒介之一.近年来,会展的发展势头极其猛烈,短时间内就有利的提升了国家的综合实力与竞争实力.会展想要保持自身的优势,则需要形成更具有代表性的品牌特征,并以此加大自身的塑造与传播,这就是品牌效应.本文将重点对全媒体时代下会展品牌的塑造与传播策略进行探讨.     

民营企业媒体形象管理现状及对策

本文对民营企业媒体形象管理现状进行了分析,提出塑造良好的媒体形象应对企业媒体形象管理进行系统性规划与建制.     

企业博弈及媒介传播负面影响扩延

企业与媒体形成的一方寻求传播媒介和另一方寻求传播信源的协作结构关系,点缀出企业与媒体关系的中国特色。寻求传播和寻求信源的关系,或是媒体单方传播目的的需要,企业被媒体链接在了公共关系的场城。媒体的博弈始于从社会公共关系中的传播,从这个角度看,媒体与企业存在隐性博弈的因素。有效走出企业博彝与负面传播影响扩延阴影的途经是坚持企业与媒体的利益均衡原则。     

创造21世纪中国的新形象

国家形象的建构是一个新课题,文章从国家形象的含义、国家形象的塑造者以及塑造国家形象的策略几个方面通过理论和实例两个方面来论述如何构建一个国家的形象。     

试论连云港城市旅游形象的塑造与传播

如今,城市旅游的发展已进入一个白热化的竞争年代。这种竞争既是实力的竞争,也是形象和知名度的竞争。要想吸引更多的旅游者,确保旅游市场优势,就必须加强城市个性形象的塑造和传播。文章在对连云港城市旅游形象的构成要素进行全面分析的基础上,论述了其城市旅游形象塑造和传播策略。     

浅析政府网络公关

政府网络公关指的是政府通过互联网所进行的政府公关,是政府以争取公众信任和支持为最终目标,通过运用网络沟通和传播手段发布信息,影响舆论,塑造良好政府形象的活动。因此,作为政府应主动建立有效的政府网络公关管理体制、加强人才队伍建设优化网络传播队伍、建立健全网络公共政策法律制度体系以及充分发挥各类媒体沟通传播职能,有效地发挥政府在网络公共关系中的作用,建立和谐统一的社会主义社会。     

基于地区形象塑造视角下的地方税收竞争规范

地区形象是一种生产力,税收竞争是地方政府行为的一个重要方面,对地区形象的塑造有着很大的影响。通过囚徒困境、Bertrand、智猪博弈等模型分析表明,无序的地方政府间税收竞争虽然暂时存在比较利益,但其边际效益是完全递减的,对地区形象的塑造带来很大的负面影响。因此,有必要通过立法规范、中央协调、负所得税机制、政府效能调整、"3R"外在约束等方面来规范和引导地方政府间的税收竞争问题,以期塑造良好的地区形象。     

山西美好形象传播策略研究

调查显示,国内山西域外民众对山西形象的认知,主要表现为:“煤炭资源”“经济落后”“封闭保守”“人才吸引力弱”“人居环境一般”等;山西的区域形象在国内主流网络媒体中的存在感弱,负面新闻和评论比例偏高.要通过强化政府传播的主体策略、节事传播策略、域内外媒体联动传播策略等手段,重塑和传播山西美好形象.     

Competition Among National Football Leagues. Does It Exist? Should We Regulate?

It is often supposed that the stakeholders of a national football league draw more satisfaction from their sport if the league is balanced, that is, if a large number of clubs have a reasonable chance of winning. This is the so‐called Competitive balance hypothesis. This hypothesis can be challenged, however, in the context of international competition like the European champions league. It could be that the utility of national leagues' stakeholders would be higher if the probability of victory for their nation's club at the international level were higher. If this were the case, a league's governing body intending to maximize the quality of the national league by making use of redistributive schemes would face a trade‐off between national competitive balance and international performance of the national representative club. We propose a simple microeconomic framework to model this trade‐off. If a non‐cooperative game exists among the national league governing bodies, whether it is a Nash or a Stackelberg one, this game would result in inefficient redistributive policies. We find ‘soft’ empirical evidence of such a competition among the big 5 football leagues in Europe. This result supports the idea of the creation of an international regulatory body. We derive the conditions under which the international regulatory body should ensure that the leagues' governing bodies implement redistributive schemes guaranteeing the respect of the national competitive balance. We also emphasize the risk of experiencing a drop in the quality of leagues if one of them becomes too big relatively to the others, what we call the tragedy of the wealthy.     

Dynamic Games of Environmental Policy in a Global Economy: Taxes versus Quotas

The effects of environmental policy on the global environment as an international public good with a stock externality and national welfare are examined in a model with trade in a polluting commodity. The welfare effects of environmental policy, decomposed into terms of trade, abatement cost, and environmental damage effects, induce governments to adopt a strategic use of their policy measures. In the absence of international cooperation on environmental policy, it is demonstrated that the emission tax game brings about larger strategic distortions than the emission quota game.     

The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration

In his 1960 seminal contribution to game theory and its applications, The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas Schelling suggested that in international negotiations, strong international opposition may be an asset rather than a liability. Rather than constraining it, the opposition would enlarge the opportunity set thus making it easier to successfully conclude international negotiations. This property, which is also known as the Schelling-conjecture, shares some aspects with constitutional economics, namely the two-level approach suggesting that it might be beneficial for all parties to give up some power by tying one??s hands. In this paper we examine by means of a simulation study how far we can take this notion in the politics of trade integration. In explicitly marrying Schelling??s 1960 idea with the 1988 two-level approach by Putnam and embedding the result into the political economy of trade we find that the threat of a domestic opposition or national institution having a veto power frequently but not always delivers a more favorable outcome for the respective trade representative at the international table. Whether the Schelling-conjecture applies or not actually depends on the subtle interplay of a ??bully effect?? and a ??serenity effect??.     

External economies as a mechanism of agglomeration in EU manufacturing

Productive externalities are significant determinants of agglomeration, not deeply studied at the industry and international level. We analyse the impact on productivity growth of technological externalities, both inter- and intraindustry, national or international, at the industry level for the EU countries and the period 1995–2002. The results confirm the advisability of considering international externalities when countries are taken as regions, whose omission underestimates national spillovers. Together with national endowments and a central geographical position, the growth of productivity is encouraged by national and international specialization as a general result; moreover, it is fuelled by stronger interindustry spillovers and productive diversification, a result more evident for high technology industries, while lower technology industries are more sensitive to the omission of international externalities. Economic integration seems to be relevant, because supranational regions with less friction for goods and factor movements are more likely to take advantage of external economies as a mechanism of productivity growth and agglomeration.     

外部掠夺下的国防开支与经济增长

本文建立了一个国际冲突环境中的一国经济长期增长模型。模型假定国际环境为霍布斯状态,一国不得不时刻面临外部掠夺,而阻止外部掠夺的唯一途径是投资国防。掠夺者、政府和家庭的动态博弈均衡决定了长期增长路径。分析表明,国际和国内因素两个层次的均衡决定了长期均衡增长路径;均衡增长路径可分为屈服均衡、容忍均衡和完全防卫均衡三个阶段;政府不同的国防战略会导致不同的增长图景,经济持续增长将导致国防战略的内生调整。     

The Maas-Rhine Euroregion: A Laboratory for European Integration?

The transborder and trilingual Maas–Rhine Euroregion is often presented as a laboratory for European integration. The authorities in the region promote the image of a region that has ‘always’ been a unity, but which is divided by artificial boundaries – ‘scars of history’ – as a result of power politics. In this essay this image is confronted with the reality of the cross-border interactions and identities of the people involved. This confrontation leads to the conclusion that although there is political, economic and cultural cooperation in the region, the region is not at all politically, economically and culturally integrated. The national border as a physical barrier may have been removed, but the economic, social, juridical and cultural barriers are still there. The unification and integration of the citizens living in the region is being impeded by conflicting national systems of law and regulations, by communication and information media focused on national issues, by nationally oriented infrastructure, and especially by strongly different national cultures and identities. The consequences for European integration in general are analysed by comparing this regional integration with the national integration and nation-building policies of the past.     

DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES UNDER INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY

This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in the absence of explicit trade policies when both governments and firms act strategically. We demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady‐state equilibrium in a dynamic environmental tax game is lower than that in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the beginning of policy competition, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax. This implies that it is important to set cooperative environmental taxes in the beginning of policy competition because non‐cooperative environmental taxes in the dynamic game result in the race‐to‐the‐bottom, which does not lead to environmental improvement.     

The Economics of International Policy Coordination*

One aspect of reforming the world monetary system is the issue of designing a set of ‘rules of the game’ within which countries can pursue their own national objectives and yet which still leads to some form of global coordination of macroeconomic policies. The issue of strategic interactions between countries has recently received some analytical insights with the application of game theory to the economics literature on interdependence between countries. The purpose of this paper is to survey these recent applications of static and dynamic game theory to the question of international policy coordination. It also surveys the results of the few empirical attempts to measure the potential gains to coordination.     

OWNERSHIP VERSUS TIMING OF THE GAME

This study examines the impact of timing of the game on the welfare gains of privatisation in the presence of strategic trade policy. We argue that only if the public enterprise acts as a Cournot player will it generate an additional distortion that could outweigh the distortion caused by the oligopolistic behaviour of private firms. But with a first-mover advantage it can serve as an effective regulatory device comparable with a production subsidy. We further show that, in the presence of strategic trade policy, Cournot assumptions are inconsistent with the firms' preferences over the timing of the game. As public Stackelberg leadership is a subgame Nash equilibrium of the extended game with endogenous order of moves, we conclude that it is the timing of the game rather than firms' ownership structure which is responsible for the inefficiency of an international mixed market found by earlier studies.