Buyer–seller networks with demand shocks and intermediation

We present a model in which buyers and sellers use links to trade with each other. Each seller produces a good which can be one of two types. Buyers are ex ante identical but receive specification or valuation shocks after the links are formed. We show that efficient networks are stable and that severing a link in an efficient network results in a higher price for the buyer but a lower price for the seller. We also examine network intermediation when sellers (buyers) form links sequentially. When sellers form links sequentially, the first seller becomes an intermediary and shares links with other sellers; this makes all sellers better off. However, when buyers form links sequentially, buyers may or may not share links. If links are shared multiple intermediaries result.     

Equilibrium price and advertisement distributions

We consider an economy where many sellers sell identical goods to many buyers. Each seller has a unit supply and each buyer has a unit demand. The only possible information flow about prices is through costly advertising. We show that in equilibrium the sellers use mixed strategies in pricing which leads to price and advertisement distributions. With convex advertising costs each seller sends only one advertisement in the market. We also delineate a class of advertising costs which ensures that sellers may send multiple advertisements in equilibrium. Higher prices are advertised more than lower prices.     

Raising the bar (7)

This editorial summarises the papers published in issue 13.1 so as to raise the bar in applied spatial economic research and highlight new trends. The first paper adopts a scale neutral approach to investigate the spatial mechanisms that cause regional innovation and growth. The second paper claims that population-weighting when calculating indices of regional inequality might lead to inconsistent outcomes. The third paper estimates the effect of distance between family residence and higher education institution on a student's academic performance, thereby accounting for endogenous regressors. The fourth paper shows an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic development at region of origin and the propensity to migrate using a multilevel approach. The fifth paper provides spatial econometric evidence of price competition between sellers of used books on Amazon.com. The last paper estimates a hedonic housing price equation and parameterizes the spatial weight matrix to determine how far back in time buyers, sellers and realtors are looking at the housing market.     

Seller Financing of Consumer Durables

Sellers of consumer durables often provide financing to customers. This paper shows that when customers desire consumption smoothing and when financial markets are imperfect, a seller can find it optimal to offer a menu of deferred-payment plans. A monopolist seller price discriminates among customers with different intertemporal income profiles by making such menu offers, and the interest rate on the seller credit can be significantly lower than the market borrowing rate. Seller financing can be an equilibrium outcome in a game where sellers and banks with market power choose payment plans and interest rates strategically.     

Managing competition on a two‐sided platform

On many two‐sided platforms, users on one side not only care about user participation and usage levels on the other side, but they also care about participation and usage of fellow users on the same side. Most prominent is the degree of seller competition on a platform catering to buyers and sellers. In this paper, we address how seller competition affects platform pricing, product variety, and the number of platforms that carry trade.     

Descending price multi-item auctions

We propose a simultaneous descending price auction mechanism to sell multiple heterogeneous items, each owned by a distinct seller, to a number of buyers. Each buyer has known private valuations on items, and wants at most one item. We show that if the sellers follow a descending price offer procedure and the buyers follow a greedy strategy for accepting the offers, the auction results in a nearly efficient allocation, and terminates close to a competitive equilibrium price vector. The descending price offer strategy of the sellers is close to a Nash equilibrium. However, we show that the buyers are better off waiting in our auction. There is a maximum limit (corresponding to the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector) till which they can wait without running into the risk of not winning any item. If the buyers wait within this limit, the prices can be brought arbitrarily close to a uniquely defined competitive equilibrium price vector.     

基于拍卖的垄断型产品供应链的博弈分析

论文研究了基于拍卖交易的垄断型产品供应链中卖方和买方的博弈问题,成交价格同时取决于卖方向拍卖市场的供货数量和买方向拍卖市场的竞拍数量。博弈结果显示,在垄断供应的情况下,博弈的纳什均衡将会是买卖双方都不通过拍卖渠道来进行交易,只有在非常极端的条件下可以达成供货和竞拍等量的均衡。最后,论文引入一个新卖方作为买方参与拍卖后的补货来源,得到的新均衡解能使原买卖双方的收益提高,从而说明单纯的拍卖并不总是最好的交易方式,多渠道的销售方式有时更能保障买卖双方的利益。     

Buyer information and the hedonic: The impact of a seller disclosure on the implicit price for airport noise

Revealed preference methods like the hedonic model generally assume economic agents have access to publicly available information and use it effectively. In the housing market, the recent proliferation of seller disclosure laws suggests that policymakers perceive buyers to be less than “fully informed,” presumably since they face higher information acquisition costs than sellers. The introduction of an airport noise disclosure in the residential housing market surrounding the Raleigh–Durham International Airport is used as a quasi-random experiment to analyze the impact of this type of information asymmetry between buyers and sellers on housing prices. The results from a regression analysis that controls for potential spatial and temporal confounders, suggest that the airport noise disclosure reduced the value of houses most heavily impacted by airport noise by 2.9 percent. This represents approximately a 37 percentage point increase in the implicit price of airport noise. The results provide evidence that publicly available information, such as that available for airport noise, may not be adequately considered by all buyers. They also suggest that the information environment should be carefully considered when using housing data and the hedonic model to value urban amenities and disamenities.     

Common-value auction versus posted-price selling: an agent-based model approach

Previous theoretical work has compared a private-value auction and posted-price market, and an affiliated-value auction and a posted-price market to determine the selling method preferred by sellers. Much less, however, is known about the seller’s preferred selling method when the buyers have a common value of the item. Our objective is to determine if a first-price auction or a posted-price market provides a seller with the larger expected revenue when buyers have a common value of the item being sold. An agent-based posted-price market and an agent-based first-price common-value auction with a reserve price are developed to compare these selling methods. Holding the buyers’ uncertainty about the value of the item constant, the seller prefers the posted-price market when the seller has no uncertainty about the item’s value. When the seller has an equal level of uncertainty as the buyers, the seller’s expected revenue for each market is similar. As the seller’s uncertainty increases beyond the level of the buyers’ uncertainty, the auction with a reserve price eventually becomes the preferred choice.     

中国房地产交易真的是卖方市场吗？——基于双边随机边界模型的实证研究

科学测算房地产交易市场买卖双方议价能力对市场价格形成的影响作用，是当前政府制定“因地施策”宏观调控机制的重要前提。采用双边随机边界模型，考察房地产交易环节中买卖双方议价能力的差异,结果表明：（1）买卖双方讨价还价因素对商品房销售价格的最终形成存在显著影响；（2）从全国平均水平看，对于整体市场以及住宅、写字楼和商铺等细分市场，卖房者议价能力在双方讨价还价过程中占主导地位，但买方议价能力的影响作用也不容忽视；（3）从一线、新一线、二线和三线城市角度看，除了一线城市商铺市场以及三线城市总体城市、住宅市场和写字楼市场外，其他均处于卖方市场阶段。     

Spatial discrimination: Bertrand vs. Cournot with asymmetric demands

This paper develops a barbell model a la Hwang and Mai [Hwang, H., and C.C. Mai, 1990, Effects of spatial price discrimination on output, welfare, and location, American Economic Review 80, 567–575.] with homogeneous product and asymmetric demands to compare prices, aggregate profits and social welfare between Cournot and Bertrand competition, and to analyze the firms' equilibrium locations. It focuses on the impacts of the spatial barrier generated from transport costs, and the market size effect resulting from asymmetric demands. It shows that the market-size effect is crucial in determining firms' locations under Cournot competition, but insignificant under Bertrand competition. Moreover, the equilibrium price of the large market and the aggregate profits are lower but the social welfare is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition if one of the markets is sufficiently large and the transport cost is high.     

The Value of Online Seller Reputation: Evidence from a Price Comparison Site

This paper examines the value of seller reputation for e‐retailers trading via a price comparison site (PCS). E‐markets are widely held to accommodate sellers of differing service quality, including some who behave opportunistically. The paper uses a sample of offers on up to 295 digital cameras traded on a leading PCS, over a 134‐day period to estimate reputation's price impact. User‐generated reputation measures have a significant impact in the expected direction. However, their magnitude is small compared with variables capturing economy‐wide reputation. The strength of the reputation signal increased non‐monotonically with the number of reviews on which it was based. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

List price and sales prices of residential properties during booms and busts

This paper investigates the relationship between the list and sale price of residential properties over the housing cycle. In down or normal markets the list price generally exceeds the sales price; however, when the housing market is strong, homes sell for more than their list price. This observation is not consistent with the assumptions made in the standard model of home sellers’ search behavior. We consider alternative models. In one, sellers set list prices based on their expectations of future changes in sales prices and the arrival rate of buyers; however, demand shocks occur. This model partially explains our data from the Belfast, U.K. housing market, but it fails to predict the list to sales price ratio during a sustained housing boom. We next describe a model where sellers’ endogenously select their search mechanism depending on the strength of the housing market. We find support for the conjecture that sellers switch to an auction-like model during housing booms. There also is evidence that during a downturn in the market, sellers’ list prices are sticky.     

Buyer brokerage: Experimental evidence

This paper offers an experimental investigation of two commission structures for buyer brokerage. One commission structure is the currently used structure in the industry where both the seller’s broker and the buyer’s broker each receive a percentage of the sales price as their compensation from the seller. In an alternative commission structure, while the seller’s broker still receives a percentage of the sales price from the seller, the buyer’s broker is compensated by the buyer and the compensation is inversely related to the sales price. We find that how the buyer’s broker gets compensated has significant implications. While both commission structures yield a similar probability of reaching an agreement, the alternative commission structure yields a lower price and a longer time to reach an agreement. Furthermore, the alternative commission structure achieves a better alignment of the interests of the buyer and the buyer’s broker without affecting the earnings of the players in the transaction. We also find that the improvement in the alignment of interests is more significant for female buyers than for male buyers. Furthermore, a higher listing price by the seller and a higher initial bid price by the buyer each lead to a significant increase in the negotiated price.     

The effects of barriers to entry on monopolistic intermediary online services: The case of a digital library

Online intermediaries (OIs) are becoming increasingly important market institutions. They have low marginal costs and display the indirect network effect, which suggests that the benefit of an intermediary to sellers (buyers) increases with the number of buyers (sellers) connected to that intermediary. OIs may be further characterized by the levels of barriers to entry they face and the direct network effect, i.e., the benefit to a seller decreases with the number of sellers connected to the intermediary. This paper models a digital library where creators sell their works to information users. It is found that a monopolistic digital library with the above characteristics over-serves its creators, which leads them to over-invest in creation, and over-supply information products to consumers. Furthermore, the over-investment is more severe when the barriers to entry in the digital library sector are lower. A counter-intuitive policy implication is that removing barriers to entry in monopolistic markets with the above characteristics does not improve, but rather worsens, social welfare.     

Can the Timing of Negotiations Impact the Consequences of Mergers?

This paper uses a theoretical model to examine whether variation in the timing of negotiations between buyers and sellers can alter the effects of mergers between sellers. The model shows that mergers between horizontally overlapping firms lead to price increases regardless of how negotiations take place. In contrast, mergers between firms in different markets can only lead to higher compensation for the combined firm when negotiations occur sequentially. However, any price effects from out‐of‐market mergers stem from a mechanical redistribution of existing market power and not from a loss in competition. Published 2014. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.     

Non‐Neutral and Asymmetric Effects of Neutral Ratings: Evidence From eBay

Seller ratings help overcome adverse selection problems in online transactions between strangers. Using eBay data, we find that auction outcomes are sensitive toward not only positive and negative seller ratings but also neutral ratings. We find that (1) buyers utilize neutral ratings to sort among otherwise identical sellers and value their products and (2) contrary to eBay's opinion, depending on whether a seller is top‐notch or not, neutral ratings can be detrimental or beneficial; for sellers with higher proportions of positive ratings, an increase in neutral ratings decreases sales. For sellers with higher proportion of negative ratings, an increase in neutral ratings increases both sales and revenue. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. It turns out that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games. However, when considering an assignment game as a (communication) graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph where buyers (sellers) are connected with sellers (buyers) only, we show that Myerson’s component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket, where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount.     

Group Buying Commitment and Sellers’ Competitive Advantages

This paper examines a model of duopoly firms selling to an exogenously formed buyer group consisting of members with heterogeneous preferences. Two research questions are addressed: (1) when is it optimal for a buyer group to commit to exclusive purchase from a single seller, and (2) how does the presence of group buying and the exclusive purchase commitment associated with it affect firms’ incentives to invest in quality improvement? We find that, even though exclusive purchase commitment benefits buyers when the competing products provide similar quality, it may lower buyer surplus if one product is significantly advantaged and/or the competing products are not highly differentiated horizontally. This result is robust even if the buyer group is formed endogenously. In addition, contingent on the similarity between the competing sellers’ investment costs, the sellers’ incentives to improve quality may be positively or negatively affected by the presence of group buying.     

Endogenous search,price dispersion,and welfare

This paper studies the welfare cost of inflation in a frictional monetary economy with endogenous consumer search. Equilibrium entails price dispersion, where sellers compete for buyers by posting prices. We identify three channels through which inflation affects welfare. The real balance channel is the source of welfare loss. Its interaction with the price posting channel generates a welfare cost larger than Lucas (2000). The search channel reduces the welfare cost by more than one half through general equilibrium effect. The aggregate effect of these three channels on welfare is non-monotonic. Additionally, the welfare cost of inflation fluctuations is negligible.