Vertical R&D Spillovers,Cooperation, Market Structure,and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three "competitive externalities" (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors decreases R&D when horizontal spillovers are low; the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers are sufficiently high, and/or when horizontal cooperation is combined with vertical cooperation.     

Exploring outward FDI and the choice of destination: evidence from Swedish firm-level data

Using Swedish firm-level data on all firms and their affiliates abroad, we investigate what observable firm and country characteristics affect the size of an affiliate in a particular destination. We employ the richness of the data to investigate the importance of destination country factors in explaining firm outward FDI activities and distinguish between the factors that affect such activities in manufacturing versus services firms as well as vertical versus horizontal investments. Our results lend support to existing theories of multinational activity of manufacturing but not services firms. We also find observable differences between vertical and horizontal manufacturing firms that are not always explained by theory.     

Global Value Chains,Horizontal Intra-Industry Trade and the Heterogeneous Firm

This paper examines global value chains at the level of the heterogeneous firm. The context is a world of horizontal intra-industry trade, characterized by imperfect competition and product differentiation at the firm level. Standard microeconomic tools are employed to assess the effects of inter-firm dissimilarities in both demand and supply on firms’ responses to changes in trade policy. In this set-up, dissimilarities in firm characteristics play roles similar to factor endowments and technology differences in traditional trade models. When cross-border production sharing (“fragmentation”) is introduced into this framework, those differences in firm characteristics determine the degree to which individual firms will enter into production networks. In this context, horizontal and vertical intra-industry trade elements interact in their effects on firm decisions. Traditional comparative advantage considerations still govern the choice of off-shored activities, while direct competition between imports and exports expands the range of possible outcomes. Finally, it is shown that cross-border production sharing reduces the sensitivity of firms to variations in exchange rates, matching a phenomenon that has been observed in traditional country-level models.     

Analysis of the equity preference influence in customer participation incentives

In this paper, equity preference is introduced into the customer participation (CP) incentive problem and new principal–agent models are built. The proposed models are different from the Holmstrom and Milgrom's models (1987) because of the consideration of equity preference, which emphasize the material utility and equitable distribution of customers. By assuming that the incentives that firms pay to customers have the same effect on monetary incentives, the optimal incentives are discussed, in which the equilibrium solutions are explored and the respective impact of horizontal equity preference and vertical equity preference on CP incentives are compared. The proposed models are validated by numerical experiments in the product enhancement project of a large software enterprise in Guangzhou. It can be demonstrated that 1) asymmetric information induces lazy behaviors of customers concerning vertical equity preference; 2) horizontal equity preference promotes the work enthusiasm of customers in CP more than self-interest does; and 3) it is more conducive to obtain a much bigger expected income when firms employ customers with horizontal equity preference to participate in innovation process.     

Hunting High and Low for Vertical FDI

Recently the horizontal and vertical models of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been synthesized into the knowledge‐capital (KK) model. Empirical tests, however, find that the horizontal model cannot be rejected in favor of the KK model. I suggest this is because the empirical specifications are too restrictive for vertical FDI to manifest itself. Using an alternative specification, I find evidence of vertical FDI. In particular, when I use the stock of FDI I can reject the horizontal model in favor of the knowledge‐capital model and identify countries for which FDI is dominated by vertical investment.     

Does distance matter in spillover?1

Our aim in this paper is twofold: to find whether FDI causes horizontal or vertical productivity spillovers to domestically‐owned Hungarian manufacturing firms, and to see if distance matters in spillovers. For this exercise we use a large panel of Hungarian firms and different panel models. Consistently with previous research, at the country level, we find positive vertical spillovers but no evidence of positive horizontal spillovers. By taking distance into consideration, however, we find positive horizontal spillovers for domestic firms close to foreign‐owned firms. By constructing spillover measures weighted by distance, we find similar patterns. Our results underline the importance of labour market rigidity and the local nature of knowledge in the case of horizontal spillovers.     

企业并购模式的动态选择

企业并购有横向、纵向、混合三种主要模式。横向并购浪潮促进了资本主义初期企业规模经济的形成与产业集中度提高;纵向并购浪潮促进了西方国家工业化中期企业资本进一步聚集与产业结构升级;混合并购浪潮一方面形成了一批多元化经营的巨型企业,另一方面,使规模小、实力弱的企业重新突出主业。本文将企业并购模式的选择与企业、产业生命周期联系起来考察,提出企业生命周期系数与产业生命周期系数的概念与计量方法;建立了企业、产业生命周期系数与经济周期指数三维坐标系,定量分析了企业、产业及宏观经济处于不同阶段时,如何动态选择并购模式,提高并购绩效。     

INNOVATION ACTIVITIES EXPLAINED BY FIRM ATTRIBUTES AND LOCATION

In this paper, innovation activities of a firm are observed as its R&D spending and participation in three categories of innovation systems. The various factors that can influence a firm's innovation efforts are divided into, (i) firm location reflecting the regional milieu and (ii) firm attributes such as corporate structure, nature of the knowledge production, type of industry and a set of specific firm characteristics. The study is based on information about 2094 individual firms, which may be non-affiliated or belong to a group (multi-firm enterprise). The empirical analysis applies a novel data set to examine the influence of location versus a vector of firm attributes. Among innovative firms, the location of a firm does not influence neither the R&D intensity nor the frequency of interaction in horizontal and vertical innovation systems, when controlling the skill composition, physical capital intensity, industry, firm size and market extension. The paper contributes to the literature by observing that innovative firms have similar characteristics irrespective of where they are located, although the share of innovative firms differs between regions.     

Market characteristics,intra-firm coordination,and the choice of human resource management systems: Theory and evidence

This paper begins by constructing a team-theoretical model of organizational adaptation and coordination with three distinct task coordination modes: vertical control, horizontal coordination, and hybrid coordination. The model is then used to provide fresh insights on complementarities involving team work organization, communication channels, training and hiring, and other human resource management practices, and illustrate how such choice of practices is affected by the firm's output market conditions. Our econometric analysis of new data from Japan which provide up-to-date information on the adoption of new team-based instruments for a horizontal coordination system (cross-functional problem solving project teams and Self-Managed Teams) yields results that are broadly consistent with the theory. First, new team-based instruments are more likely to be adopted by firms with well-established formal shop-floor-based communication channels (such as shopfloor committees), while they are much less likely to be adopted by firms with well-established information sharing institutions such as joint labor-management committees, which presumably enhance the efficiency of the vertical control system by minimizing labor-management communication errors. Finally, firms in more competitive markets and those with a higher concentration of sales among a small number of customers are more likely to adopt both types of team, whereas firms facing more erratic price movement tend not to adopt Self-Managed Teams.     

Trade and Location with Horizontal and Vertical Multi-region Firms

We analyse the effect on agglomeration tendencies of allowing multi-region firms in a standard trade and location model, the core–periphery (CP) model developed by Kurgman (1991). The introduction of horizontal multi-region firms mitigates the agglomeration effects found in the CP model by reducing the range of trade costs for which the core–periphery equilibrium occurs. The introduction of vertical multi-region firms that separate the location of headquarters and plants has two counteracting effects. While headquarters exhibit a strong tendency to concentrate, plants tend to spread out. The equilibrium is always asymmetric in spite of the underlying symmetry of the model.     

Price dispersion in the private health insurance industry: The case of Catalonia

This paper presents a vertical and horizontal product differentiation model that explains price dispersion among different kinds of health care insurance firms. Our model shows large insurance firms engaging in price competition with small mutual organizations that serve only a local area and charge lower premiums. We found that, although the market allows the entry of an excessive number of firms, the presence of local insurance companies increases social welfare by increasing the range of products available to consumers. Our conclusions are applicable to OECD countries in general although we rely on Catalonia's data.     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.     

Optimal Privatization and Economic Growth in a Schumpeterian Economy

This paper analyzes the growth and welfare effects of the privatization of public firms in a Schumpeterian growth model. Two alternative definitions of privatization are proposed in our model. The first is the ratio of mixed R&D firms’ equity shares owned by the household, which is dubbed vertical privatization. The second is the number of unmixed R&D firms, which is called horizontal privatization. We find that, under both definitions, privatization is beneficial to economic growth while the effect of privatization on social welfare is ambiguous. Accordingly, our analysis reveals that a partial privatization could be an optimal policy. Moreover, we also discuss how the extent of patent protection is related to optimal privatization.     

The Long-run Growth Effects of Rent-extracting Contingent Tariffs

This paper examines the effects of rent-extracting contingent tariffs in a two-country model of R&D-driven growth without scale effects where firms engage in both horizontal and vertical R&D activities. Unlike a semi-endogenous growth model as Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), government policies can have long-run growth effects. Indeed, a permanent increase in the contingent tariff rate permanently increases or decreases the long-run rate of economic growth. Our main results show that a weak form of tariff imposition comparing to Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) sufficiently retards the whole technological progress in the existing industries in the world. The results derived in this paper also parallel to and complement Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999).     

GOVERNANCE AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN TEAM SPORTS

Antitrust law distinguishes vertical and horizontal restraints. A horizontal restraint is one which exists between competing firms supplying rival products in a market, and a vertical restraint is one which exists between firms that jointly contribute to supplying a particular product in a market. Horizontal agreements receive much closer antitrust scrutiny because they often enable firms to limit competition at the expense of consumers, while vertical restraints may be legal or illegal depending on whether they tend to enhance or reduce competition or the exploitation of market power. This paper argues that there are important vertical restraints that operate in sports leagues which have been mostly neglected in the literature but have a significant impact. We focus on intraleague restraints, where member clubs of a league agree to control the organization of league competition, and interleague restraints, where horizontal agreement such as the Reserve Clause relies on agreements not to compete for players competing in senior or junior leagues. ( JEL L83, L42, L44)     

On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition

This paper considers a theoretical model where firms reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities in a collusive market and where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels other than that of the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) reduces the incentive to innovate when innovation is made non‐cooperatively. The reason is that non‐cooperative R&D introduces a negative externality where firms overinvest beyond the effort required to minimize the cost in order to extract profits from the rival firm, and a reduction in product competition helps internalize the externality. In a research joint venture the absence of R&D rivalry leads to contrary results. The main implication is that the validity of the Schumpeterian hypotheses depends on the extent of cooperation at the R&D stage.     

Beyond natural resources: horizontal and vertical FDI diversification in Sub-Saharan Africa

This article uses firm-level data to analyse the drivers of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the manufacturing and services sectors of 30 Sub-Saharan African countries. It shows that improving the investment climate helps to attract aggregate FDI. By analysing disaggregate FDI data, the article establishes that there is considerable contrast in behaviour between vertical FDI (foreign firms producing for export) and horizontal FDI (foreign firms producing for local markets). In particular, the latter firms are attracted to areas with higher trade regulations, highlighting their interest in protected markets. Furthermore, horizontal FDI is more affected by financing and human capital constraints and less affected by infrastructure and institutional constraints than vertical FDI is.     

Intersectoral wage linkages: the case of Sweden

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether wage-setting in certain sectors of the Swedish economy affects wage-setting in other sectors. The theoretical background is the Scandinavian model of inflation, which states that wage-setting in the sectors exposed to international competition lead wage-setting in the sheltered sectors of the economy. The Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration approach is applied to quarterly data on Swedish sector wages for the period 1980:1–2002:2. Different vector error correction (VEC) models are created, based on assumptions as to which sectors are exposed to international competition and which are not. Granger causality tests are then carried out in the different restricted/unrestricted VEC models to test for sector wage leadership. The Granger causality tests provide strong evidence for the presence of intersectoral wage causality, but no evidence of a wage-leading role for the internationally exposed manufacturing sector.      

(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements

In this paper, we extend the concept of stability to vertical collusive agreements involving downstream and upstream firms, using a setup of successive Cournot oligopolies. We show that a stable vertical agreement, the unanimous vertical agreement involving all downstream and upstream firms, always exists. Thus, stable vertical collusive agreements exist even for market structures in which horizontal cartels would be unstable. We also show that there are economies for which the unanimous agreement is not the only stable one. Furthermore, the Stigler statement according to which the only ones who benefit from a collusive agreement are the outsiders need not be valid in vertical agreements.     

供应链与同业联系对企业创新类型的影响

商业联系是企业获取创新资源、市场信息，实现技术知识更新的有效路径。针对现有研究在商业联系细分、作用机理复杂性及不同创新作用潜在差异性方面存在的不足，构建了多维度商业联系、探索式创新和应用式创新的概念模型，运用274份企业调研数据进行实证检验。结果显示，供应链联系与应用式创新呈正U型关系，但与探索式创新呈倒U型关系；同业联系与探索式创新呈正U型关系，但与应用式创新呈倒U型关系。