How national systems differ in their constraints on corporate executives: a study of CEO effects in three countries

Do CEOs matter more in some countries than in others? Based on a theoretical consideration of three fundamental national‐level institutions—national values, prevailing firm ownership structures, and board governance arrangements—we argue that CEOs in different countries face systematically different degrees of constraint on their latitudes of action, and hence they differ in how much effect they have on firm performance. To test these ideas, we apply a variance components analysis methodology to 15‐year matched samples of 100 U.S. firms, 100 German firms, and 100 Japanese firms. Results provide strong, robust evidence that the effect of CEOs on firm performance—for good and for ill—is substantially greater in U.S. firms than in German and Japanese firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Once an outsider,always an outsider? CEO origin,strategic change,and firm performance

In this study, we examine how the relationship between the level of strategic change in the pattern of resource allocation and firm performance differs between firms led by outside CEOs and those led by inside CEOs. Based on longitudinal data on the tenure histories of 193 CEOs who left office between 1993 and 1998, we find that the level of strategic change has an inverted U‐shaped relationship with firm performance. As the level of change increases from slight to moderate, performance increases; as the level of change increases from moderate to great, performance declines. Further, we find that this inverted U‐shaped relationship differs between firms led by outside CEOs and those led by inside CEOs. That is, both the positive effect of strategic change on firm performance when the level of change is relatively low and the negative effect of strategic change on firm performance when the level of change is relatively high are more pronounced for outside CEOs than for inside CEOs. Supplementary analyses also suggest that this difference between outside and inside CEOs exists in later years but not in the early years of CEO tenure. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The harder they fall,the faster they rise: Approach and avoidance focus in narcissistic CEOs

Drawing on theoretical underpinnings of approach‐avoidance motivation and CEO narcissism, we provide a framework examining stronger approach focus (motivation towards desirable outcomes) and weaker avoidance focus (motivation away from undesirable outcomes) in narcissistic CEOs using a quasi‐natural experimental setting—the economic crisis beginning in 2007. Because highly narcissistic CEOs possess lower avoidance motivation in the precrisis period, their firms face greater declines in the onset of the crisis. However, their greater tendency towards approach motivation enables narcissistic CEOs to increase firm performance in the postcrisis period. While narcissistic CEOs are less likely to protect against potential shocks, they are adept at helping firms recover from such shocks. Using a sample of 392 CEOs representing 2,352 CEO firm‐years, we find support for the proposed framework. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Above the glass ceiling: When are women and racial/ethnic minorities promoted to CEO?

Using a dataset of all CEO transitions in Fortune 500 companies over a 15‐year period, we analyze mechanisms that shape the promotion probabilities and leadership tenure of women and racial/ethnic minority CEOs. Consistent with the theory of the glass cliff, we find that occupational minorities—defined as white women and men and women of color—are more likely than white men to be promoted CEO of weakly performing firms. Though we find no significant differences in tenure length between occupational minorities and white men, we find that when firm performance declines during the tenure of occupational minority CEOs, these leaders are likely to be replaced by white men. We term this phenomenon the “savior effect.” © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: a study of supplemental retirement plans

Existing research on managerial compensation is based primarily on optimal contracting and managerial hegemony theories. Under the optimal contracting theory, observed compensation contracts are optimally determined, aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Under the managerial hegemony theory, observed compensation contracts deviate from the optimum because top managers with power over boards are able to influence their own pay. I argue that the impact of managerial power over boards on managerial pay, and hence the deviation of compensation contracts from the optimum, is contingent on the transparency of managerial compensation. Within this framework, I investigate the impact of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs)— historically the least transparent compensation component— on opportunistic decision making. An empirical analysis based on a time series sample of CEOs of S&P/TSX60 firms provides support of the compensation transparency theory. I find that SERP benefits are primarily driven by variables proxying for CEO power over the board, whereas more transparent compensation components are primarily driven by economic factors. The results also suggest that CEOs whose SERPs are contingent on firm performance appear to reduce firm R&D expenditures as they approach retirement. Both findings provide important contributions to existing research on the impact of managerial compensation on opportunistic decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Unbundling the effects of institutions on firm resources: The contingent value of being local in emerging economy private equity

How do host country institutions influence the value of a firm's local resources? Using a novel dataset on the performance of 47 private equity (PE) firms in 49 emerging economies, we show evidence that the answer depends on the type of institution. Focusing on conditions at the time of initial investment, we find that PE firms with local origins and foreign PE firms with local experience performed better when contract enforcement institutions were weak than when they were strong. Financial development, in contrast, may have undermined the value of PE firm local origins. These results help reconcile contrasting findings on how host country institutions influence performance and lead us to contend that unbundling institutions is necessary for continued development of the institutions‐based view. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial ties,firm resources,and performance of cluster firms

Previous research has documented the relationship among managerial ties, firm resources, and performance in emerging economies such as China. While managerial ties may be embedded in a particular location, some of these ties may be non-location-bound. Therefore, for firms located within one geographically concentrated cluster, how do managerial ties and firm resources affect performance? Using data from 163 firms in two Chinese clusters, we demonstrate that managerial ties and firm resources—independently and in combination—help firms improve market performance. Results support the view that both network-centered strategies (utilizing managerial ties) and market-centered strategies (leveraging firm resources) are critical determinants of firm performance.     

Corporate divestitures and family control

This paper investigates the relationship between divestitures and firm value in family firms. Using hand‐collected data on a sample of over 30,000 firm‐year observations, we find that family firms are less likely than non‐family firms to undertake divestitures, especially when these companies are managed by family rather than non‐family‐CEOs. However, we then establish that the divestitures undertaken by family firms, predominantly those run by family‐CEOs, are associated with higher post‐divestiture performance than their non‐family counterparts. These findings indicate that family firms may fail to fully exploit available economic opportunities, potentially because they pursue multiple objectives beyond the maximization of shareholder value. These results also elucidate how the characteristics of corporate owners and managers can influence the value that firms derive from their corporate strategies. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The diffusion of foreign divestment from Burma

We examine variation in the rate of divestment by multinational firms from Burma. We argue that in addition to a set of firm‐level characteristics known to impact divestment decisions, firms are also influenced by characteristics of their home country and the divestment patterns of others. Using data on firms operating in Burma during 1996–2002, we model these multiple influences on firms to divest. Our results show that beyond firm‐level concerns, firms divest in response to the political characteristics of their home country, including protest, the level of political freedom, and transparency of institutions. We also find that the centrality of their home country in the network of intergovernmental organizations impacts divestment patterns in interesting ways. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

CEO research orientation,organizational context,and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry

This study develops and tests a comprehensive framework that explains what, when, and how CEO characteristics influence firms’ innovation outcomes in R&D-intensive industries. Empirical evidence from 109 CEOs from 87 U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms over the period 2001–2013 reveals that research-oriented CEOs – those with ability and motivation for science and technology – increase their firms’ innovation outcomes. The results indicate that the CEO–innovation relationship strongly depends on the extent of CEOs’ managerial discretion, which is shaped by the organizational context. We contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of CEOs in firms´ innovation performance differentials.     

The Formation of Managerial Networks of Foreign Firms in China: The Effects of Strategic Orientations

This study investigates how firms' strategic orientations (i.e., market, technology, and entrepreneurship orientations) influence the formation of two types of managerial networks (top managers' ties with the business community and with government officials), as well as the impact of managerial networking on firm performance. On the basis of a survey of 181 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in China, we find that a market orientation fosters both types of network building. Technology-oriented firms are more likely to cultivate managerial ties with top managers at other firms but less likely to establish networks with government officials. In contrast, entrepreneurial firms tend to develop vertical networks with government officials but have no intention to deepen their horizontal networks with other firms. Competitive intensity moderates the relationships between strategic orientations and managerial ties. Finally, managerial networking has a positive impact on FIE performance.     

Shareholders and stakeholders: How do directors decide?

This study examines how directors make decisions that involve shareholders and other stakeholders. Using vignettes derived from seminal court cases, we construct an index of directors' shareholderism as a general orientation on this issue. In a survey of the entire population of directors and CEOs in public corporations in one country, we find that directors' personal values and roles play an important part in their decisions. Directors and CEOs are more pro‐shareholder the more they endorse entrepreneurial values—specifically, higher achievement, power, and self‐direction values and lower universalism values. While employee representative directors exhibit a lower baseline level of shareholder orientation, they nonetheless often side with shareholders. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When does guanxi bolster or damage firm profitability? The contingent effects of firm- and market-level characteristics

This paper advances that a nuanced approach is necessary to understand the effectiveness of managerial ties (guanxi) in improving firms' financial performance. We take a contingency approach to examine how the effects of managerial ties on performance may be moderated by firm-level factors (i.e., firm age and entrepreneurial orientation) and market-based forces (i.e., demand uncertainty and technological turbulence). Using a survey of 289 firms in China, we find that managerial ties are more salient with regard to enhancing performance for more entrepreneurial-oriented and younger firms. Managerial ties fail to provide performance benefits to firms when high demand uncertainty exists or when the level of technological turbulence is high, which suggests a performance limitation of established ties with government officials, buyers, suppliers, and competitors. The theoretical and managerial implications of the findings are further discussed.     

Do board chairs matter? The influence of board chairs on firm performance

Research summary : We use a variance decomposition methodology to assess the degree to which board chairs may influence their companies' performance. To isolate the board chair effect, we focus on firms in which the CEO and board chair positions are separated. Using a U.S. sample of 6,290 firm‐year observations representing 1,828 board chairs in 308 different industries, our results indicate that the board chair effect is substantial at about nine percent. Drawing on resource dependency theory, we also theorize and show how this board chair effect is contingent on the task environment in which firms operate. Our results add to the literature examining the role and influence of board chairs and the context in which chairs may have a greater impact on performance. Managerial summary : Following institutional and regulatory changes, more firms are separating the CEO and board chair positions. With an increasing number of individuals separate from the CEO serving as board chairs, a critical question becomes: What influence do these separate board chairs have on firm performance? Prior research suggests that separate board chairs can provide important resources—including advice and counsel, legitimacy, information linkages, and preferential access to external commitments and support—to their CEOs, other top managers, and overall firms. In turn, who the board chair is and the individual's ability (or lack thereof) to provide these resources may have a significant impact on firm performance. Offering support for this perspective, we find that separate board chairs explain nine percent of the variance in firm performance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Outside CEOs and innovation

Research Summary: Innovation is the principle driver of firm and economic growth. Thus, one disturbing trend that may explain stagnant growth is a 65% decline in firms’ R&D productivity. We propose that the rise of outside Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) may be partially responsible for the decline because those CEOs are more likely to lack technological domain expertise necessary to manage R&D effectively. While this proposition was motivated by interviews with Chief Technology Officers (CTOs), we test it at large scale. We find that firm R&D productivity decays during the tenure of outside CEOs relative to that of inside CEOs. We further find this effect is more pronounced for firms with high R&D intensity and for firms employing outside CEOs with more remote experience, lending circumstantial support for the underlying assumption regarding lack of expertise. Note that this is not a call for boards to avoid outside CEOs, rather it is recommendation to consider the implications for innovation. Managerial Summary: While outside CEOs offer advantages over internal candidates, we argue one unintended consequence is weaker innovation. This argument was prompted by two coincident trends: a 65% decline in companies’ R&D productivity and a doubling of outside Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). The argument was reinforced by interviews with Chief Technology Officers (CTOs), who recounted shifts in orientation from R&D as an investment to R&D as an expense that occurred shortly in response to a new CEO. We felt this shift was more likely with outside CEOs because they may lack technological domain expertise necessary to effectively manage R&D. Our results are consistent with the argument—company R&D productivity decreases under outside CEOs. Note, however, that we don’t advocate avoiding outside CEOs, rather we recommend R&D firms consider technological domain expertise during CEO hiring.     

Big Data for Creating and Capturing Value in the Digitalized Environment: Unpacking the Effects of Volume,Variety, and Veracity on Firm Performance*

Despite significant academic and managerial interest in big data, there is a dearth of research on how big data impacts the long‐term firm performance. Reasons for this gap include a lack of objective indices to measure big data availability and its impact, and the tendency of studies to ignore the costs associated with collecting and analyzing big data, assuming that big data automatically delivers benefits to firms. Focusing on how firms create and capture value from big data about customers, we use the resource‐based view and three dimensions of big data (i.e., volume, variety, and veracity) to understand when the benefits outweigh the costs. Relying on the number of downloads of mobile device applications, we find that volume of big data has a negative effect on firm performance. This result suggests that the “bigness” of big data alone does not ensure value creation for a firm, and could even constitute a “dark side” of big data. Because big data variety—measured as the number of types of information taken per each application—moderates the negative effects of big data volume, simultaneous high values of volume and variety allow firms to create value that positively affects their performance. In addition, high levels of veracity (i.e., a high percentage of employees devoted to big data analysis), are linked to firms benefiting from big data via value capture. These findings shed light on the circumstances in which big data can be beneficial for firms, contributing to a better theoretical understanding of the opportunities and challenges and providing useful indications to managers.     

Strategy,human capital investments,business‐domain capabilities,and performance: a study in the global software services industry

Research summary : In knowledge‐based industries, continuous human capital investments are essential for firms to enhance capabilities and sustain competitive advantage. However, such investments present a dilemma for firms, because human resources are mobile. Using detailed project‐level operational, financial, and human capital data from a leading multinational firm in the global IT services industry, this study finds that deliberate investments in improving general human capital can help firms develop superior capabilities and maintain high profits. This paper identifies two types of capabilities essential for success in this industry—technological and business‐domain capabilities—and provides empirical evidence justifying such investments. Theoretical and practical implications of capability‐seeking general human capital investments are discussed. Managerial summary : The primary managerial implication of this research is that capability‐seeking investments in developing general human capital through strategic learning (training and internal certifications) can enhance firm performance. Although investing in general human capital is risky, the firm considered this a strategic necessity in order to thrive in the fast paced IT services industry. By leveraging general technological skills in combination with business‐domain knowledge to address customer's business problems firms can earn and sustain higher profits. Our study also demonstrates how a developing‐country firm responded to strong competitive challenge from global rivals possessing superior capabilities by upgrading the capabilities of its employees through internal development. In doing so the firm was able to narrow the capability gap vis‐à‐vis its foreign peers and expand its business globally. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.