WHY IS JAPANESE WORKING TIME SO LONG?: WAGE-WORKING TIME CONTRACT MODELS*

Wage-working time contract models are used to analyse factors which can account for the long working hours of Japanese males. Although there are many factors which affect working time, our simulation shows that the clear gender division of labour in Japanese households is the most important. The simulation also shows that the wage gap and working time gap between large and small companies are explained mainly by the difference in the company's monopoly power, the worker's ability and the union's bargaining power. Moreover, if working time is not a bargaining issue and is determined by employers, it is longer than the case where it is a bargaining issue.     

The impact of vertical integration on the wage bargain: new evidence

This paper considers the impact of vertical integration on the bargaining power relationship between employers and workers. We argue that vertical integration may have either a positive or a negative effect on the employer's position. The relationship between vertical integration of the firm and wages remains, therefore, an empirical question which this paper sets out to resolve. We do this using regression analysis and by employing a new measure of vertical integration. Our results suggest that contrary to the evidence of some previous studies, vertical integration can enhance employer bargaining power.     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.     

International Trade and Gender Wage Discrimination: Evidence from East Asia

The paper explores how competition from international trade affects gender wage discrimination in two open economies. According to neoclassical theory, if discrimination is costly, then increased industry competitiveness from international trade lessens the incentive for employers to discriminate against women. This effect should be stronger in concentrated sectors, where employers can use excess profits to cover the costs of discrimination. Alternatively, increased international trade may reduce women's bargaining power to achieve wage gains. Results for Taiwan and Korea indicate that, in contrast to neoclassical theory, competition from foreign trade in concentrated industries is positively associated with wage discrimination against women.     

Inter-industry wage premiums and industry-specific productivity in Taiwan

By using Taiwan's Manpower Utilization Survey data for the 1978–2000 period, different inter-industry wage premiums in Taiwan are observed and the impact of workers’ industry-specific productivity on the wage explored. The empirical results show that industry-specific skills result in industry stayers having higher wages than industry switchers through their reservation wages. It is also found that the pre-displacement industry affiliations that are associated with the post-displacement wages are explained by the workers’ unobserved abilities. Furthermore, by comparing the different residual means between industry switchers and stayers based on each industry's wage equation, it is found that the switchers are low-wage workers who tend to be located in the high-wage industries. The high-wage industry leavers are also found to have higher post-displacement wage residuals than the low-wage industry leavers. These results suggest that the differences in industry wage premiums may be explained by the industry-specific productivity.     

SUPPLIER INNOVATION IN THE PRESENCE OF BUYER POWER

This article analyzes the impact of retailer buyer power on a supplier's incentive to conduct innovation, with a focus on the supplier's investment in product variety and quality improvement. The analysis shows that an increase in buyer power, manifested through either a weakening of the supplier's bargaining position or a strengthening of a large retailer's bargaining power, leads to greater product variety and higher quality if the elasticity of demand is not too large. Increased buyer power, manifested through a strengthening of a large retailer's bargaining position, stimulates the supplier to invest more in quality improvement.     

NON‐RIGID WAGES AND MERGER PROFITABILITY REVERSAL UNDER CONVEX COSTS AND CENTRALIZED UNIONIZATION

Can a merger from duopoly to monopoly be detrimental for profits? This paper deals with this issue by focusing on the interaction between decreasing returns to labour (which imply firms’ convex costs) and centralized unionization. First, it is highlighted that a wage ‘non‐rigidity’ result applies: the post‐merger wage is higher than in the pre‐merger equilibrium. Second, it is shown that a ‘reversal result’ in relation to merger profitability actually realizes when the union is sufficiently oriented towards wages. Moreover, the higher the reservation wage, the degree of product differentiation, and the union's relative bargaining power, the higher the probability that a merger reduces profits.     

Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully characterize an optimal mechanism under general conditions. Surprisingly, in this optimal mechanism, the seller never allocates the object to the regular buyer regardless of his bargaining power in the resale market. The seller sells only to the publicly known buyer, and reveals no additional information to the resale market. The possibility of resale causes the seller to sometimes hold back the object, which under our setup is never optimal if resale is prohibited. We find that the seller?s revenue is increasing in the publicly known buyer?s bargaining power in the resale market. When the publicly known buyer has full bargaining power, Myerson?s optimal revenue is achieved; when the publicly known buyer has no bargaining power, a conditionally efficient mechanism prevails.     

AN ULTIMATUM WAGE BARGAINING EXPERIMENT ON TRADE UNION EFFICIENCY

We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non‐binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.     

Wage-setting under Fordism: The rise of job evaluation and the ideology of equal pay

The use of job evaluation techniques during the Fordist period has been relatively neglected by political economists. Widely adopted in the 1940s by the large manufacturing firms that constituted the dynamic sector of industry, job evaluation helped to restructure relations between management and labor. As mass production replaced craft production, employers sought to pay their workers on the basis of 'deskilled' job content. Job evaluation was also a not-so-subtle repudiation of bargaining power, determining 'the rate for the job' on the basis of internal hierarchies and market wage surveys rather than collective negotiations. However, the practice of job evaluation also rested on a theory of wage determination that set wages according to the principle of equal pay for equal work. That is, wages were based on the attributes of the job rather than the individual incumbent. The process of reconciling equal pay as ideology with preexisting gender wage disparities resulted in a narrow definition of equal work.     

Wage bargaining and shock sensitivity of a small open economy

This paper analyzes the effects of centralized bargaining over a nominal wage (indexation) rule on a small open economy with fixed exchange rates. It is shown that the relative bargaining power of the confederation of employers and the union, respectively, affects not only the level of the endogenous variables but also their reaction to exogenous disturbances. If the union's power exceeds a critical value, positive aggregate demand shocks increase unemployment since the actual nominal wage rises more than the market clearing one. Moreover, if the union's power is sufficiently close to its upper bound, the overreaction of wages becomes so large that positive aggregate demand shocks even lead to a decrease in output and employment, i.e., the multipliers become negative.     

The Women's Movement Against Sexual Harassment,by Carrie N. Baker

This paper examines some of the effects of East and West German family policy on women's economic position by analyzing intrahousehold bargaining power, defined here as based on co-resident partners' relative fall-back positions, which in turn depend on the individuals' access to income in the event that the partnership ends. East German policy sought to integrate women into the labor force through programs such as free public child care and liberal maternity leave. West Germany based its family policy on the assumption of a stark gender division of labor, with one lifetime breadwinner per family and a second parent who temporarily leaves the labor force to raise children. On the basis of her findings and analysis, the author argues that while East German institutions increased women's bargaining power, gender-specific policies interfered with women's ability to use this power to bring about changes in the household division of labor. West German family policy did not assign gender roles, but it offered women less bargaining power with which to negotiate. The author maintains that society's refusal to address women's greater child-rearing costs is not based on an assessment of such costs and the costs of redistributive government programs, but on the assumption that women should absorb the risks and burdens of reproduction.     

Frictional wage dispersion with Bertrand competition: An assessment

I examine whether a version of the Cahuc et al. (2006) model can match the magnitude of wage dispersion, as measured by the ratio of the average and the lowest wage — the so-called mean-min ratio of Hornstein et al. (2011). I find that the workers? bargaining power is a crucial parameter: the mean-min ratio strictly decreases in the bargaining power up to a point near 1/2 and is essentially flat thereafter, generating the same amount of wage dispersion as the canonical wage ladder model, which is a special case of the CPVR model. Consequently, this model can yield large wage dispersion only for low bargaining power on the workers? side. I show that the share of job-to-job transitions with wage drops is decreasing in the bargaining power, calibrate the latter to the former, and demonstrate that the CPVR model generates an empirically plausible amount of wage dispersion. I also show that negative wages arise when workers have no bargaining power, and discuss the implications for the empirical findings of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b).     

The Effect of Labor's Bargaining Power on Wealth Inequality in the UK,USA, And France

This paper analyses the determinants of wealth inequality, measured as the share of wealth owned by the top 1 percent wealthiest individuals. We find that labor's bargaining power is a significant and important determinant of top wealth shares. Using a semi-structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model for the period 1970–2019, we estimate that shocks to labor's bargaining power explain 32 percent, 8 percent and 32 percent of the variation around the long-term trend in wealth inequality in the UK, USA and France, respectively.     

A theorem on interest rate differentials,risk and anticipated inflation

This paper develops a theorem to the effect that the difference in nominal interest rates between two securities of the same maturity but different risk is an increasing linear function of the anticipated rate of inflation. Even when society's inflationary. A preliminary attempt is made to estimate the real risk premiums that finance paper, bankers's, acceptances, commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and Eurodollar deposits command over treasury bills. It is found, for example, that the real risk premium commanded by bankers’ acceptances over treasury bills is five basis points. This means that in a non-inflationary environment, bankers' acceptances would yeild five basis points more than treasury bills. This estimate and the other estimates obtained are not implausiable, but they are probably minimum estimates because of bias in the estimate of inflationary expectations.     

STRATEGIC WITHHOLDING OF FIRM‐SPECIFIC SKILLS IN WAGE BARGAINING

The bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker who possesses firm‐specific human capital is examined. It is shown that the worker's ability to withhold his/her skills strategically increases his/her bargaining power. Multiple efficient as well as inefficient equilibria involving delays in negotiation are characterized. When the firm has outside options, the range of both efficient and inefficient equilibria shrinks; moreover, delays are shortened in inefficient equilibria. The model predicts that wages are procyclical.     

BARGAINING AMONG FARMERS,GOODWILL, AND THE SUCCESS OF COOPERATIVES

A model of concessional bargaining among farmers explains the success (or lack thereof) of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings in the developing regions. Concessional bargaining in day‐to‐day interactions generates goodwill, which helps smoothen future dealings amongst farmers as well as with outside agents. In particular, we model the existence of goodwill amongst farmers as enhancing their ability to collectively bargain with an outside dealer that buys their farm produce. Results suggest that when dealing with each other, farmers offer higher concessions when the risk of loss or reversal in bargaining power is high; however, the level of concession is also influenced by the degree of reciprocity and parameters that affect bargaining surplus. Findings provide further insights over the success of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings where inter‐farmer goodwill dynamics determines the cooperative's bargaining outcomes. Specifically, when farmers generously reciprocate each other's goodwill gestures, it leads to better outcomes through increasing their cooperative reservation price. In contrast, when the degree of reciprocity is lower, or when the risk of bargaining power switching is higher, farmers extract more surplus from other farmers, and this also lowers the cooperative's bargaining outcomes and makes the cooperative arrangement unviable in the long term.     

The invoicing currency choice model of export enterprises assuming joint utility maximization and analysis of the factors influencing selection

Based on the assumption of joint utility maximization, an exporting currency unit pricing model was established, which consists of the local currency, producer's currency, and vehicle currency. Furthermore, Monte Carlo simulation and partial least squares (PLS) regression were used to analyze currency weights. Results suggest that when a producer's currency is devalued relative to a local currency, if the demand elasticity of the importer is large, the local currency will primarily be used; if the bargaining power of the importer is strong, the producer's currency will primarily be used. Among these factors, the bargaining power of the exporter has the greatest influence, followed by the demand elasticity of the importer and the exporting country's exchange rate.     

Does intrahousehold bargaining power enhance women's marital satisfaction? A perspective from two competing forces in China

In the context of two competing forces (i.e., socioeconomic transformation vs. traditional cultural norms) influencing Chinese family and its members, the paper uses the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) to empirically examine the causal relation between intrahousehold bargaining power and women's marital satisfaction. By employing an instrumental variable approach, the paper finds that intrahousehold bargaining power negatively affects women's marital satisfaction. This conclusion remains valid after performing various robustness checks. However, there are some heterogeneous effects found that the negative effect is particularly significant among those women of higher age and constrained by external traditional norms. These women are more conservative in their own thoughts and thus tend to support the traditional gender belief of “men being the masters of the family.”     

GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION IN A SEARCH MODEL WITH MATCHING AND BARGAINING*

This article develops a search model of the labor market with matching, bargaining, and employers' taste discrimination in which—under necessary but standard distributional assumption—it is possible to separately identify gender discrimination and unobserved productivity differences. The equilibrium shows that both prejudiced and unprejudiced employers wage discriminate. Maximum likelihood estimates on CPS data indicate that half of the employers are prejudiced, average female productivity is 6.5% lower, and two‐third of the gender earning differential may be explained by prejudice. An affirmative action policy is implemented resulting in a redistribution of welfare from men to women at no cost for employers' welfare.