The diffusion of computers and the distribution of wages

When the costs are decreasing workers adopt technology at the point where the costs equal the increased productivity. Output per worker increases immediately, while productivity benefits increase only gradually if costs continue to fall. As a result, workers in computer-adopting labor market groups experience an immediate fall in wages due to increased supply. On the other hand, adopting workers experience wage increases with some delay. This model explains why increased computer use does not immediately lead to higher wage inequality. More specifically, the results of the model are shown to be consistent with the question why within-group wage inequality among skilled workers as a result of computer technology adoption in the United States increased in the 1970s, while between-group wage inequality and within-group wage inequality among the unskilled did not start to increase until the 1980s. The model also predicts that the more compressed German wage structure leads to a lagged diffusion of computer technology along with smaller changes in wage inequality. Our empirical analysis suggests that this is consistent with the actual developments in Germany since the 1980s. Finally, the theoretical predictions seem to be of the right magnitude to explain the empirical quantities observed in the data.     

The Supply of Skilled Labour and Skill-biased Technological Progress

This paper presents a model in which the adoption of skill-biased or 'unskilled-biased' technologies is endogenous. In this model of endogenous technology choice, an increase in the supply of skilled labour leads to a temporary fall in the skill premium, followed by an expanding gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers as technologies adjust towards the more skill-intensive mix appropriate for the greater skill of the workforce. The adjustment in the technology mix results in slower output growth along the transition path.     

Immigration Policy,Self‐selection,and the Quality of Immigrants*

This paper investigates the effects of immigration quotas on the average quality of immigrants by developing a human capital migration model where efficiency in migration depends on skills and emigration rates are higher among skilled workers. Studying the joint determination of the domestic level of wages and immigrants' self‐selection, we find a negative relationship between the wage level and the percentage of educated workers among immigrants, which results in a nonstandard downward‐sloping labor supply. In our framework, a higher quota increases the skill mix of immigrants through its negative effect on wages and raises aggregate national income.     

Establishment Level Earnings,Technology And The Growth Of Inequality: Evidence From Britain

It is often argued that technical change is responsible for the increase in wage inequality in Britain and the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. In this paper we examine this argument using data from individuals and establishments. It is found that the presence of micro-electronic technologies in workplaces is associated with higher earnings, especially for skilled workers. Decompositions suggest that technical change could have been a cause of the increase in skills premium for highly skilled workers. Nevertheless, our view is that the correlation between wages and plant-level technology is mainly driven by the effect of high wages on the propensity to introduce new technologies rather than vice versa. This view is supported by simultaneous models of the wage-technology relationship.     

Skills,Tasks and the Scarcity of Talent in a Global Economy

The scarcity of talent is a tremendous challenge for firms in the globalized world. This paper investigates the role of labor market imperfection in open economies for the usage of talent in the production process of firms. For this purpose, I set up a heterogeneous firms model, where production consists of a continuum of tasks that differ in complexity. Firms hire low‐skilled and high‐skilled workers to perform these tasks. How firms assign workers to tasks depends on factor prices for the two skill types and the productivity advantage of high‐skilled workers in the performance of complex tasks. I study the firms’ assignment problem under two labor market regimes, which capture the polar cases of fully flexible wages and a binding minimum wage for low‐skilled workers. Since the minimum wage lowers the skill premium, it increases the range of tasks performed by high‐skilled workers, which enhances the stock of knowledge within firms to solve complex tasks and reduces the mass of active firms. In a setting with fully flexible wages trade does not affect the firm‐internal assignment of workers to tasks. On the contrary, if low‐skilled wages are fixed by a minimum wage, trade renders high‐skilled workers a scarce resource and reduces the range of tasks performed by this skill type with negative consequences for the human capital stock within firms. In this case, trade leads to higher per‐capita income for both skill types and thus to higher welfare in the open than in the closed economy, whereas – somewhat counter‐intuitive – inequality between the two skill types decreases, as more low‐skilled workers find employment in the production process.     

Wage inequality, technology, and trade

The recent widening of wage inequality has been attributed by some to skill-biased-technical-change and by others to trade liberalization. This paper examines the two explanations within a unified model and also presents a new modeling of skill-biased-technical-change, where skilled workers replace unskilled ones. As a result technology adoption is endogenous and does not occur in all countries. Hence, wages for both types of workers, trade patterns and also factor productivities in all countries are endogenously determined. The model sheds light on the relationship between technology and trade, on the reasons for global productivity differences and on the causes for the recent rise in wage inequality.     

Age-differentiated minimum wages in developing countries

The fact that minimum wages seem especially binding for young workers has led some countries to adopt age-differentiated minimum wages. We develop a dynamic competitive two-sector labor market model where workers with heterogeneous initial skills gain productivity through experience. We compare two equally binding schemes of single and age-differentiated minimum wages, and find that although differentiated minimum wages result in a more equal distribution of income, such a scheme creates a more unequal distribution of wealth by forcing less skilled workers to remain longer in the uncovered sector. We also show that relaxing minimum wage solely for young workers reduces youth unemployment but harms the less skilled ones.     

Age-differentiated minimum wages in developing countries

The fact that minimum wages seem especially binding for young workers has led some countries to adopt age-differentiated minimum wages. We develop a dynamic competitive two-sector labor market model where workers with heterogeneous initial skills gain productivity through experience. We compare two equally binding schemes of single and age-differentiated minimum wages, and find that although differentiated minimum wages result in a more equal distribution of income, such a scheme creates a more unequal distribution of wealth by forcing less skilled workers to remain longer in the uncovered sector. We also show that relaxing minimum wage solely for young workers reduces youth unemployment but harms the less skilled ones.     

Why and How Education Affects Economic Growth

This paper suggests an additional channel through which education affects economic growth. If growth is driven by industrialization of production, where machines replace labor in a growing number of tasks, then operating these machines requires workers who are educated, namely literate and know arithmetic, whose human capital is less specific and more general. As a result, technology adoption depends negatively on wages of educated workers. Hence, economic growth depends negatively on the cost of education or on the barriers to acquire education. The model shows that if the cost of education is high, economic growth might be slow and even stop completely, creating a development trap.     

The economics of production systems: Segmentation and skill-biased change

In this paper, the concept of production systems is introduced. I assume a standard thick-market externality together with the idea that higher quality goods also require higher skills from workers. Firms face a trade-off between low-quality goods with low skill-requirements for which the potentially abundant labour force generates strong thick-market externalities and higher quality goods with higher skill-requirements. In equilibrium, the economy is partitioned into production systems, i.e., clusters of firms producing the same quality. The distribution of skills determines the boundaries of the production systems, which in turn determine the wages. In this framework an increase in the supply of skilled workers can induce first higher wages for all workers and then higher wages for the skilled but lower wages for the unskilled. This is consistent with the late 20th century evolution of the US labour market.     

Offshoring,immigration, and the native wage distribution

Abstract This paper presents a simple model that examines the impact of offshoring and immigration on wages and tests these predictions using U.S. state‐industry‐year panel data. According to the model, the productivity effect causes offshoring to have a more positive impact on low‐skilled wages than immigration, but this gap decreases with the workers’ skill level. The empirical results confirm both of these predictions and thus present direct evidence of the productivity effect. Furthermore, the results provide important insight into how specific components of offshoring and immigration affect the wages of particular types of native workers.     

Capital–skill complementarity and the immigration surplus

We build a neoclassical growth model with overlapping dynasties and capital–skill complementarities to evaluate changes in immigration policy. Calibrating the model using US data, we quantify the differential effects of skilled and unskilled immigration on factor returns and on the welfare of different sectors of the population. An influx of high-skilled immigrants lowers the wages of skilled workers, raises the wages of unskilled workers, and because of the relative complementarity between capital and skilled labor, substantially raises the rate of return to native-owned capital. By contrast, an influx of unskilled immigrants produces an opposite effect on wages, and has only a negligible effect on the return to capital. Because of capital–skill complementarity, an increase in the number of skilled immigrants generates an immigration surplus—the overall welfare benefit accruing to the native population—that is approximately ten times larger than the immigration surplus generated by an identical increase in the number of unskilled immigrants. This differential welfare effect is far higher than can be accounted for by the disparity between the productivities of each type of worker.     

Brain drain and factor complementarity

In this paper we develop an extended Solow growth model with emigration which aggregates different types of labor skills from strict complementarity to perfect substitution. The derivation of balanced growth paths shows that the most relevant cases for studying the impact of emigration are those where these paths can only be attained asymptotically. This requires and justifies the need for using transitional dynamics. We therefore derive a complete characterization of the transitional dynamics of output and wages in the sending country for all possible values taken by the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. The model then serves to qualitatively study the effect of brain drain on per capita income and wages of the sending country.     

Equipment Investment and the Relative Demand for Skilled Labor: International Evidence

The effects of equipment investment on relative wages and employment of skilled labor are estimated. The basic hypothesis is that such effects are positive, because of the presence of either equipment–skill complementarity or skill advantage in technology adoption. Using a panel data set for a wide range of countries, the relative wage and relative employment of skilled workers are regressed on lagged investment in machinery and other relevant variables. The results indicate a positive and strong effect of machinery investment on the relative demand for skilled labor, with the relative wage responding much sooner and for a much shorter time than relative employment. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: E24.     

What explains skill upgrading in less developed countries?

Although many developing countries have experienced growing income inequality and an increase in the relative demand for skilled workers during the 1980s, the sources of this trend remain a puzzle. This paper examines whether investment and adoption of skill-biased technology have contributed to within-industry skill upgrading in Chilean plants. Using semiparametric and parametric approaches, I investigate whether plant-level measures of capital and investment, the use of imported materials, foreign technical assistance, and patented technology affect the relative demand for skilled workers. I find that some of the increased relative demand for skilled workers can be attributed to capital deepening. However, the relationship between skill upgrading and the three technology measures disappears once I control for unobserved plant characteristics. These results suggest that plant adoption of foreign technology is not associated with plant skill upgrading.     

Exporting firms and the demand for skilled tasks

This paper explores the link between exports and the demand for skilled tasks. Using the Chilean Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA), an annual census of manufacturing firms, we first show that Chilean exporters utilize more skills than Chilean non‐exporters. More importantly, we establish a distinct pattern of task differentiation among exporters both within skilled and unskilled tasks. Exporting firms demand the services of skilled specialized workers (engineers) as opposed to skilled administrative workers and managers. In addition, exporters demand less unskilled labour, especially blue‐collar operatives. This suggests that exporters substitute skilled engineers for unskilled blue‐collar workers to perform export‐related tasks.     

We Can Work It Out: The Impact of Technological Change on the Demand for Low-Skill Workers

There is little doubt that technology has had the most profound effect on altering the tasks that we humans do in our jobs. Economists have long speculated on how technical change affects both the absolute demand for labour as a whole and the relative demands for different types of labour. In recent years, the idea of skill‐biased technical change has become the consensus view about the current impact of technology on labour demand, namely that technical change leads to an increase in the demand for skilled relative to unskilled labour painting a bleak future for the employment prospects of less‐skilled workers. But, drawing on a recent paper by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) about the impact of technology on the demand for different types of skills, this paper argues that the demand in the least‐skilled jobs may be growing. But, it is argued that employment of the less‐skilled is increasingly dependent on physical proximity to the more‐skilled and may also be vulnerable in the long‐run to further technological developments.     

Second‐Best Taxation of Incomes and Non‐Labor Inputs in a Model with Endogenous Wages

This paper considers a Mirrleesian optimal income tax model wherein labor inputs are not perfect substitutes and their wages are determined endogenously. It shows: (i) If skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth complements, skilled workers will necessarily face a marginal subsidy and unskilled workers a marginal tax on their incomes (these may not be the case if skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth substitutes); and (ii) redistributive concerns call for taxation of those inputs whose elasticity of complementarity with skilled labor is larger than with unskilled labor, and subsidization of those whose elasticity of complementarity is smaller.     

Two Tales on the Returns to Education: The Impact of Trade on Wages

This paper uses micro data from the Current Population Survey combined with data from the US International Trade Commission and Bureau of Economic Analysis to evaluate the impacts of international trade (import penetration and export intensiveness) on wages with a special focus on the returns to education. Consistent with the literature, our empirical analysis provides evidence that the wage rates of similarly skilled workers differ across net‐exporting, net‐importing, and nontradable industries. Our results add to the literature by showing that the wage gap usually found across importing and exporting industries vanishes for highly skilled workers (workers with college degree and beyond) when we control for the cross‐effect between international trade and education, but the wage gap due to international trade still persists for low‐skilled workers. This finding supports the view that education serves as an equalizer and counterbalances the adverse impact from import penetration on wages of highly skilled workers.     

Computer adoption and returns in transition

Across nine transition economies, it is the young, educated, English‐speaking workers with the best access to local telecommunications infrastructures who work with computers. These workers earn about 25 percent more than do workers of comparable observable skills who do not use computers. Controlling for likely simultaneity between computer use at work and labour market earnings makes the apparent returns to computer use disappear. These results are corroborated using Russian longitudinal data on earnings and computer use on the job. High costs of computer use in transition economies suppress wages that firms can pay to their workers who use computers.