Is technology acquisition enough to improve China's product quality? Evidence from firm-level panel data

As developing countries open themselves up to trade, many industrial firms in these countries are finding it difficult to compete internationally due to poor product quality and low product variety. Although China has been the largest producer of crude steel since 1996, China's steel firms have produced an overabundance of low-quality steel while domestic purchasers of steel have increasingly demanded higher quality steel products. Many have argued that for Chinese steel firms to improve product quality they must adopt more advanced technologies. Employing firm-level panel data of steel firms in China, we econometrically test the relative importance of two possible sets of factors affecting a firm's ability to utilize technology to improve product quality: technology acquisition factors and technology absorptive capacity factors. We find that technology complements such as in-house R&D and foreign knowledge must be combined with technology for Chinese firms to improve product quality.     

Is attack the best form of defence? A competing risks analysis of acquisition activity in the UK

The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate whethercompanies can use acquisition as a strategy to reduce theirlikelihood of take-over. The determinants of making an acquisitionand being taken over are modelled for the first time withina competing risks framework using two large samples of UK manufacturingcompanies which together cover most of the post-World War IIperiod up to 1990. Our results indicate that, ceteris paribus,companies which make acquisitions can significantly reduce theirconditional probability of being taken over by around one-third,largely through the impact that acquisition has on corporatesize. In this sense, attack, through acquisition, is the bestform of defence against take-over.     

The impact of a conglomerate merger on its vendors and rivals – a case study of Google's acquisition of Motorola

This study explores the valuation effects of the conglomerate merger on an acquiring firm and its stakeholders. We examine Google's acquisition of Motorola and the impact that it had on Google's vendors and rivals. The empirical results suggest that the announcement of this deal led to positive market reaction among Android's vendors, primarily due to Google's ability to use Motorola's extensive patent portfolio to help protect Android's vendors from a potential patent infringement war in the future. Our results also find that when the Open Handset Alliance members obtain help from Motorola's patents or get new technology, an increase in shareholder wealth among Android's vendors and a decrease in shareholder wealth among Android's rivals are likely to occur.