Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries

The growing importance of inter-network exchanges in infrastructure-based utilities influences regulatory choices and access pricing for downstream services using the networks. We analyze this problem in a setting where the infrastructure managers of two bordering countries are in charge of pricing the access to their networks for downstream transport firms that provide international services. Network costs can be financed through public funds and user charges.In this context, access prices are affected by the incomplete internalization of consumers' surplus and infrastructure costs; we analyze how this distortion at the access pricing level generates a distortion in the levels of public funds dedicated to infrastructure financing.Because of these distortions, it turns out that in a non-cooperative setting the second-best outcome might consist in the simultaneous adoption of a no-subsidy system. However, multiple equilibria typically exist and the second-best outcome is never a stable equilibrium. Other properties of the different possible equilibria are studied, as well as the impact of supra-national policies aimed at encouraging the development of international services. Finally, we show that the coordination problems deriving from the existence of multiple equilibria can, sometimes, be solved by separating the choice of a regulatory mode from the access pricing stage, thereby allowing the infrastructure managers to commit to use a specific financing system before setting the access price.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

Social welfare loss due to second-best pricing: an application to the Portuguese telecommunications

The telecommunications industry is usually characterized by low marginal costs and significant fixed costs which are the conditions for the inefficiency of marginal cost pricing. In such cases theory postulates that optimal pricing is obtained by maximizing welfare subject to a restriction of viability of the firm: the second-best pricing scheme. The possible welfare losses due to second-best pricing varies according to the values of marginal costs, prices and demand elasticities. This paper analyses to what extent the second-best pricing has been achieved in the Portuguese telecommunications firm CTT, over the period 1950#150;1984 as well as the magnitude of the price-cost margins and welfare losses created. We obtained empirical evidence of the presence of economies of scale, a welfare loss estimate of 1% of the telecommunications receipts and a result that price was 40% greater than marginal cost. We concluded that price regulation and public ownership of the firm did not seriously affect social welfare over the sample period (it should be noted that it is the non-digital and fixedwire infrastructure period). Therefore, it is important to study the impact of new digital and non-wire technologies and new services provided in the old regulatory scenery.     

Price distortions,financing constraints and second-best investment rules in the transportation industries

This paper analyzes the second-best pricing and investment rules to be followed in the transportation industries in the presence of intermodal competition, exogenous price distortions, and financing constraints, using both theoretical and simulation analysis. It shows that price distortions and financing constraints in one mode will not only affect the investment rules in that mode, but will also affect the pricing rules and investment decisions in all other modes. While the theoretical discussion indicates that the second-best pricing and investment rules are quite complex, the simulation analysis indicates that the benefit function is relatively flat, suggesting that the costs of using simpler first-best rules may be relatively small.     

Desperately Seeking θ's: Estimating the Distribution of Consumers Under Increasing Block Rates

This paper shows that increasing block rate pricing schedules usually applied by water utilities can reduce the efficiency and equity levels. To do this, we first present a two step method to estimate the demand and to recover the distribution of consumer tastes when increasing block rate pricing is used. We show that in this case the tariff induces a pooling equilibrium and customers with different taste parameters will be observed to choose the same consumption level. Second, we show that a two-part tariff that neither reduces the revenue for the firm nor increases the aggregate level of water consumption increases the welfare and equity levels in relation to an increasing block rates schedule.     

The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation

Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, marginal social damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the Pigouvian rate. Given these observations, the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first-best value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best environmental tax is lower than its first-best value, the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods.     

Second-best pricing for incomplete market segments: Application to electricity pricing

Due to technological, political, or practical considerations, most price mechanisms are not fully differentiated by time, location, and contingency of delivery. Rate or tax designers then face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of using more complex price schedules. This paper studies the second-best problem of designing, for a given market segment, a linear pricing schedule with a limited number of distinct prices while facing exogenous constraints within a large and practically relevant family. Interestingly, we find that second-best prices may be computed using simple machine learning techniques. As an illustration, we apply our framework to retail electricity pricing in California.     

企业转移模式、本地化嵌入行为与知识转移绩效

产业转移作为产业生产系统与知识系统的共同转移,是承接地获取新知识、实现知识创造的重要途径。基于SCP（结构—行为—绩效）范式及复杂网络视角,研究了产业转移中转出方企业转移模式及承接地集群网络结构通过影响转移企业本地化嵌入行为,进而影响知识转移的机理,并通过构建知识转移动态仿真模型,比较分析了不同转移模式及集群网络结构下的知识转移绩效。结果表明：在不同转移模式及网络结构下,企业本地化嵌入行为及知识转移绩效存在显著差异;相比无核网络,有核网络对促进集群知识转移具有显著优势。此外,在无核网络中,合资企业对集群中合作企业的适度更新能促进承接地集群知识转移绩效提升;在有核网络中,组团式转移企业的“小社团”强度对知识转移绩效具有显著负向影响。该研究不仅有助于从微观层面理解产业转移中的企业行为,也对承接地选择适宜的招商策略和集群发展战略、促进企业知识转移、提升承接地创新能力具有重要意义。     

Efficient compromising

Two agents must select one of three alternatives. Their ordinal rankings are commonly known and diametrically opposed. Efficiency requires choosing the alternative the agents rank second whenever the weighted sum of their von Neumann Morgenstern utilities is higher than under either agent's favorite alternative. The agents' utilities of the middle-ranked alternative are i.i.d., privately observed random variables. In our setup, which is closely related to a public goods problem where agents face liquidity constraints but no participation constraints, decision rules that truthfully elicit utilities and implement efficient decisions do not exist. We provide analytical and numerical results on second-best rules.     

Capacity-contingent nonlinear pricing by regulated firms

Second-best Pareto optimal pricing by a regulated firm subject to demand and capacity shocks is examined. Nonlinear price schedules for the firm's customers are obtained that are contingent on capacity realizations. The second-best Pareto optimal mechanism also is implemented by an allocation mechanism based on the consumer's choice of a minimum demand or firm power level. The optimal mechanism is implemented as well by a general form of priority pricing.     

A term structure model with preferences for the timing of resolution of uncertainty

Summary In this paper we present a model of the term structure of interest rates with imperfect information and stochastic differential utility, a form of non-additive recursive utility. A principal feature of recursive utility, that distinguishes it from time-separable expected utility, is its dependence on the timing of resolution of uncertainty. In our model, we parametrize the nonlinearity of recursive utility in a way that corresponds to preferences for the timing of resolution. This way we show explicitly the dependence of prices on the rate of information, as a consequence of the nature of utilities. State prices and the term structure of interest rates are obtained in closed form, and are shown to have a form in which derivative asset pricing is tractable. Comparative statics relating to the dependence of the term structure on the rate of information are also discussed.We thank Bob Hodrick and Matt Jackson for their comments. Darrell Duffie is grateful for support from the National Science Foundation under NSF SBR-9409567. This paper presents the first model of an earlier, preliminary working paper titled: Two models of price dependence on the timing of resolution of uncertainty.     

Consumer Self-Generation and Monopoly Limit-Pricing under Timing Uncertainty of Deregulation in the Electricity Market

Due to uncertainty in the timing of deregulation for electric power generation, large and potentially self-generating consumers should consider a lost option value as part of the cost of any investment they consider. This paper uses a simple two-period model to analyze the role played by the timing anticipation of deregulation in the decision making of potential self-generators (PSGs) and for limit-contract pricing of local utilities. We develop an effective limit-pricing rule and conclude that a higher-probability of early deregulation will lead utilities to retain more consumers and to set higher limit prices before deregulation. A possible early deregulation might not harm utilities; it could even benefit utilities in finite lifetime periods. Finally, a simulation is provided which supports our main results and shows that the effects on utilities' expected profits of uncertainty about the coming deregulation will depend on the distribution of consumer types.     

Optimal taxation and cross-price effects on labor supply: Estimates of the optimal gas tax

This study estimates parameters necessary to calculate the optimal second-best gasoline tax, most notably the cross-price elasticity between gasoline and leisure. Prior theoretical work indicates the importance of this elasticity, but despite this, almost none of the prior studies of commodity taxation (and none of the studies on second-best environmental regulation) actually estimate it. Using household data, we find that gasoline is a relative complement to leisure, and thus that the optimal gasoline tax is significantly higher than marginal damages-the opposite of the result suggested by the bulk of the prior literature. Indeed, even if there were no externalities at all associated with gasoline, the optimal tax rate would still be almost equal to the average gas tax rate in the U.S. Following this approach to estimate cross-price elasticities with leisure could strongly influence estimates of optimal rates for other important commodity or pollution taxes.     

Optimal taxation and discount rate for public investment in a growth setting

This paper studies the optimal policy of a government which maximizes intertemporal social welfare using such instruments as taxes on interest income and wages, and debt in conjunction with public investment. In doing so, it has to face a decentralized economy where in each generation individuals and firms are free to maximize their own objectives subject to their own private constraints. The welfare function is a sum of discounted generational utilities and its maximization is handled by using dynamic programming. From the first order conditions so derived, it appears that an optimal policy of taxation and public capital accumulation is that which sets the tax rates according to Ramsey's optimal taxation structure and which equates the rate of return on public investment to the rate of social time preference.     

Envy and pricing of quality in adverse selection

The paper analyzes the optimal pricing of quality when consumers feel envious of other purchase deals. The influence of envy on the optimal pricing of quality varies depending on whether consumers are concerned about envy in payments or in rents. If consumers compare their payments with those of other consumers, the firm has an incentive to produce lower quality than the first-best level for the high valuation consumer and higher quality than the second-best level for the low valuation consumer. Conversely, when consumers’ disutility from envy arises from envy in rents, the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction becomes more serious than in the situation where there is no envy.     

Pricing and Management of Recreational Activities Which Use Natural Resources

This paper analyses the economic efficiency ofmanagement regimes for the recreational use of anatural resource. Management must determine the useand development of the natural resource. Thefirst-best policy uses price to offset theexternalities of crowding and deterioration. This iscontrasted with two second-best polices which do notuse pricing: unrestricted access and quotas. Acondition under which a relaxation of quota levelincreases efficiency is derived. Under iso-elasticfunctional forms quotas are less efficient thanunrestricted access.     

Uniform and Non-Uniform Second-Best Input Taxes

We investigate second-best, input-based taxes foragricultural nonpoint pollution control when marketprices are endogenous and production isheterogeneous. Theoretically, we derive the optimalforms of taxes which take account of heterogeneity(non-uniform taxes) and a tax which does not (auniform tax). Empirically, we use a multi-factor,market-equilibrium simulation model to determineoptimal tax rates and associated equity effects,particularly differences in landowner gains/lossesacross a heterogeneous region. When market prices areendogenous, second-best tax policies result inpecuniary externalities that affect existingenvironmental externalities. In particular, thepecuniary externalities amplify the effect of producerheterogeneity on determination of sub-regionaldifferences in tax rates and returns to land,particularly for the uniform policy. With endogenousprices, the uniform tax rate is considerably higherthan any of the non-uniform rates and, ironically, thenon-uniform taxes result in less dispersion oflandowner gains across sub-regions than the uniformtax.     

Some recent developments in capital market theory: A survey

This paper surveys some recent developments in the theory of capital markets. Particular emphasis is given to two strands of the literature. The first covers some recent and fundamental extensions to the theory of risk aversion and the demand for risky assets. These papers are concerned with the effect of non-hedgeable background risk on risk attitudes. The important implications for finance are for the size of the risk premium (the equity premium puzzle) and for the demand for and pricing of contingent claims. For example, background risk may help to explain the apparent over-pricing of options on equity indices. The second topic is interest rate term structure models. Stochastic term structure models try to capture the possible future shapes of the term structure of interest rates. This is relevant for the pricing of contingent claims, in particular for the pricing of interest rate derivatives such as American-style swaptions. The paper will survey the most important recent models in the literature, each of which satisfies the fundamental no-arbitrage property. It will discuss the implications of the models for the pricing of both European-style and American-style options.     

Nonlinear Pricing in General Equilibrium Models with Joint Production

This paper considers general equilibrium models of public utilities which produce either public goods or private goods. In the models, cases of increasing returns are not a priori excluded. The products of the public utilities and their costs are allocated to the consumers according to a rule that is dependent on information communicated to the public utilities. We show that if the public utilities follow a nonlinear pricing rule, the equilibrium allocations are always Pareto-optimal. Moreover, the message space is of finite dimensions.
JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D60, H41, H42.