共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 0 毫秒
1.
Graham Mallard 《Journal of economic surveys》2012,26(4):674-704
Abstract Since its origins in the 1950s, the notion of bounded rationality has been incorporated into economic theory using an array of methodological approaches. This paper presents a taxonomy by which these approaches can be categorized and understood, evaluating each approach against a range of important criteria. At a time when the foundations of economic theory are being re‐examined, this paper should be viewed as a first step towards an assessment of the appropriate role that this more realistic view of cognition should take in different areas of economic theory, and also of the desirable characteristics of models that incorporate it. 相似文献
2.
Sundar Sarukkai 《Journal of economic surveys》2011,25(3):464-480
Abstract Mathematics itself is a complex system. It exemplifies complexity at the level of structure, hierarchy and so on. There is also an interesting notion of complexity present in the meaning of mathematical ‘alphabets’. These are unique writing strategies of mathematics. Yet another marker of complexity lies in the process of applying mathematics to models. Using mathematics in modelling is a process of deciding what kinds of models to construct and what types of mathematics to use. Modelling can be seen as a decision‐making process where the scientists are the agents. However in choosing mathematical structures the scientist is not being optimally rational. In fact, fertile uses of mathematics in the sciences show a complicated use of mathematics that cannot be reduced to a method or to rational principles. This paper argues that the discourse of satisficing and bounded rationality well describes the process of choice and decision inherent in modelling. 相似文献
3.
We characterize the core and the competitive allocations of a continuum economy as strong Nash equilibria of an associated game with only two players. 相似文献
4.
The core and competitive equilibria of a large exchange economy on the commodity space ?∞ will be discussed. We define the economy as a measure on the space of consumers’ characteristics following Hart and Kohlberg (1974), and prove the existence of competitive equilibria and their equivalence with the core without assuming the convexity of preferences. 相似文献
5.
In the context of the two-stage threshold model of decision making, with the agent’s choices determined by the interaction of three “structural variables,” we study the restrictions on behavior that arise when one or more variables are exogenously known. Our results supply necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency with the model for all possible states of partial knowledge, and for both single- and multi-valued choice functions. 相似文献
6.
Population-wide health shocks, for example, pandemics, affect life insurance owners beyond their health impact. This paper considers joint impacts of their surrender behavior adaptions and mortality rise following a population-wide health shock on insurance pricing. We build a model that captures both more surrenders of contracts to meet unexpected liquidity needs and less financially beneficial surrenders to keep insurance protection after the shock. Unlike the systemic mortality rise impact that turns out to be negligible, we find that policyholders’ surrender behavior adaptions substantially devalue policies with increasing emergency surrenders being the main driver. Regulatory solvency protection partly restrains the devaluation. 相似文献
7.
We evaluate the relative performance of formal and informal sectors in India by looking into their productivity difference. Recognizing the intersectoral linkages in the economy, the competitive general equilibrium prices are computed; these signal the productivities. Our model synthesizes frontier analysis with the general equilibrium approach to generate shadow prices. The formal activities are found to be more productive than the informal. However, the informal services sector is as efficient as the formal one. There would be an overall productivity gain of 22% to the economy if factors were allocated to productive activities. The shadow prices from the model indicate that the formal capital and informal capital are scarce factors, while it has been the opposite for formal (regular) and informal (casual) labour. Formal labour is more productive than its informal counterpart; formal capital and informal capital are equally productive. 相似文献
9.
《管理科学学报（英文）》2023,8(3):369-385
Transshipment is an effective method for reducing mismatches between supply and demand among retailers. Consumers attempting to purchase out-of-stock items may wait for transshipment, purchase at another store, or choose not to buy. In this paper, the consumer behavioral heterogeneity is characterized using the transshipment request rate and consumer switching rate. It affects the replenishment and transshipment decisions, as well as the system profits. The inventory replenishment and transshipment decisions are studied in both centralized and decentralized two-location inventory systems with consumer behavioral heterogeneity. We characterize optimal replenishment decisions in a centralized system, prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in a decentralized system with a specific demand distribution, and determine the coordinating transshipment price for some decentralized systems. In numerical studies, the performance of various systems is analyzed for consumers with identical (symmetric) or differing (asymmetric) behavior between retailers. For scenarios with symmetric consumers, a higher transshipment request rate and consumer switching rate resulted in increased total profit in all systems. For scenarios with asymmetric consumers, the retailer with the higher consumer switching rate should reduce ordering in a centralized system but increase ordering in a decentralized system. Moreover, the retailer with the higher transshipment request rate reduces ordering to increase profit, whereas the other retailer increases order quantity yet earns less profit. 相似文献
10.
Herbert Dawid 《Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control》1999,23(9-10):1545-1567
We study the learning behavior of a population of buyers and a population of sellers whose members are repeatedly randomly matched to engage in a sealed bid double auction. The agents are assumed to be boundedly rational and choose their strategies by imitating successful behavior and adding innovations triggered by random errors or communication with other agents. This process is modelled by a two-population genetic algorithm. A general characterization of the equilibria in mixed population distributions is given and it is shown analytically that only one price equilibria are attractive for the GA dynamics. Simulation results confirm these findings and imply that in cases with random initialization with high probability the gain of trade is equally split between buyers and sellers. 相似文献
11.
Alaa El‐Shazly 《Managerial and Decision Economics》2012,33(1):29-38
This article analyses the strategic moves of governments and investors under privatization programs in a game‐theoretic context. In sequential‐move games of both perfect information and incomplete information, the best response of the strategic investors to observing a slow pace of privatization is to have a low participation in economic activity because of concerns over public policy credibility. This is true even if the government chooses to randomize its action to send mixed signals to the investors while adopting a slow pace of privatization for budgetary reasons. However, the outcome is Pareto inferior to a situation of phased but fast implementation of privatization programs and high private‐sector participation under plausible assumptions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
12.
We consider a general equilibrium model of pure exchange economies with endowment externalities. Consumers’ behaviors depend not only on their own consumption but also on the endowments of the other consumers. Applying the same method of analysis in Balasko (2015) about wealth concerns, we first show that almost all properties of equilibrium, including smooth equilibrium manifold and genericity of regular economies, can be directly extended to the economy where the demand function depends on the endowments of others and wealth of only one consumer. Next, we clarify the sufficient conditions under which those properties remain true in the economy with the most general form of endowment externalities. Finally, we generalize the above sufficient conditions to derive generic regularity results in the economy with both consumption and endowment externalities. 相似文献
13.
本文放宽一般博弈论中理性人的假设,运用混合建模方法构建了有限理性下的供应链合作博弈模型,模型将供应链企业的收益模糊化并扩展供应链合作博弈中局中人的策略空间,可以选择从“0”(完全不合作)到“1”(完全合作)连续区间内的任何合作程度,策略集是连续的区间.模拟结果表现为供应链合作策略的调整过程,能够提供更有效的决策支持.在此基础上,以二人合作博弈为例,用结合定性信息的定性模拟方法对博弈过程进行研究,得到结论:在供应链合作中,无论是平均分配还是按成员企业的资源投入分配,从模拟结果来看,定性模拟方法的使用,对一些不具备完备信息,无法建立精确数学模型的博弈过程也可以进行分析,并得出相对满意的结论. 相似文献
14.
We characterize the following choice procedure. The decision maker is endowed with two binary relations over alternatives, a preference and a similarity. In every choice problem she includes in her choice set all alternatives which are similar to the best feasible alternative. Hence she can, by mistake, choose an inferior option because it is similar to the best. We characterize this boundedly rational behavior by suitably weakening the rationalizability axiom of Arrow (1959). We also characterize a variation where the decision maker chooses alternatives on the basis of their similarities to attractive yet infeasible options. We show that similarity-based mistakes of either kind lead to cyclical behavior. Finally, we reinterpret our procedure as a method for choosing a bundle given a set of individual items, in which the decision maker combines the best feasible item with those that complement it. 相似文献
15.
Consider a multimarket oligopoly, where firms have a single license that allows them to supply exactly one market out of a given set of markets. How does the restriction to supply only one market influence the existence of equilibria in the game? To answer this question, we study a general class of aggregative location games where a strategy of a player is to choose simultaneously both a location out of a finite set and a non-negative quantity out of a compact interval. The utility of each player is assumed to depend solely on the chosen location, the chosen quantity, and the aggregated quantity of all other players on the chosen location. We show that each game in this class possesses a pure Nash equilibrium whenever the players’ utility functions satisfy the assumptions negative externality, decreasing marginal utility, continuity, and Location–Symmetry. We also provide examples exhibiting that, if one of the assumptions is violated, a pure Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. 相似文献
16.
I study how boundedly rational agents can learn a “good” solution to an infinite horizon optimal consumption problem under uncertainty and liquidity constraints. Using an empirically plausible theory of learning I propose a class of adaptive learning algorithms that agents might use to choose a consumption rule. I show that the algorithm always has a globally asymptotically stable consumption rule, which is optimal. Additionally, I present extensions of the model to finite horizon settings, where agents have finite lives and life-cycle income patterns. This provides a simple and parsimonious model of consumption for large agent based models. 相似文献
17.
利用博弈论,建立竞选村委会主任的博弈模型,分析指出:在完全信息正当拉票情况下,选出来的村委会主任素质比较好;在不完全信息的情况下,不正当和隐蔽拉票行为所选出来的村委会主任可能不能胜任。但是,一旦隐蔽的不正当拉票行为消失,竞选活动就趋于正当拉票的混合战略纳什均衡。所以,为了维护竞选活动的公开、公平和公正性,我国必须制定相关法律去界定和制止隐蔽的不正当拉票行为。 相似文献
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19.
We study general equilibrium theory of complete markets in an otherwise standard economy with each household having an additive perturbed utility function. Since this function represents a type of stochastic choice theory, the equilibrium of the corresponding economy is defined to be a price vector that makes its mean expected demand equal its mean endowment. We begin with a study of the economic meaning of this notion, by showing that at any given price vector, there always exists an economy with deterministic utilities whose mean demand is just the mean expected demand of our economy with additive perturbed utilities. We then show the existence of equilibrium, its Pareto inefficiency, and the upper hemi-continuity of the equilibrium set correspondence. Specializing to the case of regular economies, we finally demonstrate that almost every economy is regular and the equilibrium set correspondence in this regular case is continuous and locally constant. 相似文献
20.
This paper investigates an economy where all consumption goods are indivisible at the individual level, but perfectly divisible at the overall level of the economy. In order to facilitate trading of goods, we introduce a perfectly divisible parameter that does not enter into consumer preferences — fiat money. When consumption goods are indivisible, a Walras equilibrium does not necessarily exist. We introduce the rationing equilibrium concept and prove its existence. Unlike the standard Arrow–Debreu model, fiat money can always have a strictly positive price at the rationing equilibrium. In our set up, if the initial endowment of fiat money is dispersed, then a rationing equilibrium is a Walras equilibrium. This result implies the existence of a dividend equilibrium or a Walras equilibrium with slack. 相似文献