Learning about Risk: Some Lessons from Insurance

This paper argues that in the fundamental subject of financialrisk analysis, some valuable lessons may be drawn from insurance.The probability of ruin, defined as a first passage time, carriesa dynamic element whose absence in Value at Risk is one liability,among others. Extreme value theory, which has been successfullyapplied to insurance shortly after it was introduced in probability,may offer a coherent framework for analyzing the extreme movessuch as the ones observed in recent foreign exchange and financialcrises. Lastly, we show that the genuine hazards generated byglobal capital markets and illustrated by the events of summer1998, generate a market incompleteness that existing modelsof defaultable bonds do not fully address. In contrast, thelong experience of risk premium analysis in the insurance andreinsurance industry, as well as the existence of historicaldata on natural disasters, render the valuation of catastrophebonds less perilous than that of defaultable bonds.     

Dynamic jump intensities and risk premiums: Evidence from S&P500 returns and options

We build a new class of discrete-time models that are relatively easy to estimate using returns and/or options. The distribution of returns is driven by two factors: dynamic volatility and dynamic jump intensity. Each factor has its own risk premium. The models significantly outperform standard models without jumps when estimated on S&P500 returns. We find very strong support for time-varying jump intensities. Compared to the risk premium on dynamic volatility, the risk premium on the dynamic jump intensity has a much larger impact on option prices. We confirm these findings using joint estimation on returns and large option samples.     

How accounting and auditing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safety-nets in banking: Some international evidence

This paper suggests that accounting and auditing systems can be effective devices to counteract tendencies for firm risk-taking associated with bank safety nets. Results are obtained from an international sample of publicly traded banks after controlling for other regulatory control devices for bank risk such as restrictions on banking activities, minimum regulatory capital requirements and official discipline. The efficacy of accounting and auditing systems in controlling bank risk diminishes with bank charter value and increases with moral hazard stemming from a country's deposit insurance. The results also indicate that accounting and auditing systems are complements for minimum capital requirements, but substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline.