Accounting conservatism of cross-listing firms in the pre- and post-Sarbanes Oxley periods

This study investigates the level of accounting conservatism of a sample of cross-listed firms, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), during the pre- and post-Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) periods. After examining two proxies for accounting conservatism, Basu's [Basu, S. (1997). The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(1), 3-37.] conservatism measure and abnormal accruals, we find that the SOX-exposed Levels II and III ADRs become more conservative during the post-SOX period while the SOX-unexposed Level I ADRs have no increase in the level of accounting conservatism. Further, we investigate whether such an increase in accounting conservatism is associated with different levels of shareholder protection in ADRs' home countries, and find that only Levels II and III ADRs from code law (weak shareholder protection) countries become more conservative and Levels II and III ADRs from common law (strong shareholder protection) countries have no change in accounting conservatism. These results suggest that SOX-exposed cross-listing firms from weak shareholder protection countries are most greatly influenced by the stringent requirements in SOX, and hence respond by increasing conservatism in their financial reporting.     

投资者法律保护、股权集中度与大股东行为

在不同的法系和国家中,对投资者的法律保护存在很大的差异。作为对投资者法律保护的替代,在投资者法律保护薄弱的国家,股权结构相对集中。为了保护投资者的利益,我国应该完善对投资者的法律保护,提高执法质量和会计质量,促进股权的适度集中,限制控制股东的掠夺行为。     

Why does shareholder protection matter for abnormal returns after reported insider purchases and sales?

We use a unique data set of more than 240,000 reported insider transactions across 15 European countries and the USA to analyze the link between country-level shareholder protection and abnormal returns following insider trades. We show that abnormal returns after insider transactions are positively correlated with country-level shareholder protection against expropriation by corporate insiders, which supports the information-content hypothesis. Market reaction to insider purchases increases with shareholder protection because shareholder protection enhances the transparency and trustworthiness of insiders’ actions, and limits possibilities for direct profit diversion, so that more information is eventually reflected in stock prices. For insider sales, shareholder protection decreases their negative information content. We conjecture that this is due to the effect of greater transparency and trustworthiness strengthening the diversification and liquidity reasons for selling in better shareholder protection countries. We find limited support for the rent-extraction hypothesis that conjectures that shareholder protection is associated with insider trading dollar profits.     

Framing public governance in Malaysia: Rhetorical appeals through accrual accounting

In government, the challenges of governance and anti-corruption are exacerbated by accounting not being fit for purpose. In developing countries, many governments adopt accrual accounting as a panacea. Drawing on Goffman's frame analysis, and rhetorical appeals to logic, credibility and emotion, this paper examines the adoption of accrual accounting in Malaysia. It was found accrual accounting has potential for keying governance and anti-corruption. However, rhetorical appeals that attempt to legitimate neo-liberalism and engender public support in the name of progress were hindered by perceptions of endemic corruption and relatively weak democratic institutions of ‘good’ governance common to developing countries.     

Dividend clienteles: a global investigation

We compare the cross-sectional variation in the dividend payout policies of companies across 32 countries. Beyond the impact of firm-specific accounting and financial variables, this study investigates how the country level variations: shareholder demand due to demographic variations and consumption needs, agency problems manifested in the extent of minority shareholder protection and business disclosures, and market quality in terms of transparency and liquidity; affect the dividend payout policies. We find that firms have generous dividend payout policies when diverse shareholder demands are strong, extents of business disclosures and legal protections are weak, and the market qualities are poor. The empirical evidence supports the presence of strong dividend clienteles in a global setting.     

Impact of an accounting environment on cash flow prediction

This study investigates the impact of an accounting environment on the performance of cash flow prediction models. It is hypothesized that the cash flow model by Barth, Cram, and Nelson [Acc. Rev. 76 (2001) 27] performs well in countries where the accruals are used mainly to correct cash flows to better reflect current profitability of the firm, i.e., in countries with high information content of accruals. The results suggest that the model performs consistently across countries, except in Germany. As hypothesized, the impacts of the explanatory variables are similar in market-oriented countries with separated financial accounting and taxation, with strong shareholder protection and legislation based on common-law origin, i.e., in countries with high quality of accruals. By contrast, the impacts are different in countries with low quality of accruals. The results imply that the cash flow prediction model by Barth et al. [Acc. Rev. 76 (2001) 27] can be used in different kinds of accounting environments. However, the exact parameter values are dependent on the accounting environment.     

政府财务会计与预算会计的适度分离与协调:一种适合我国的改革路径

我国现有预算会计系统的局限性引发了理论界与实务界的改革诉求。理论研究者们希望通过引入西方国家的政府会计概念与企业会计中的应计制基础对我国现有预算会计系统进行改造,以便披露完整的政府财务状况与运营业绩等财务信息。然而,一味强调以政府会计取代预算会计,在政府会计系统中直接提高应计制运用的比重,又必将削弱会计系统的预算管理功能。本文借鉴了IPSAS第24号准则等规范的做法,分离并协调政府财务会计与预算会计系统,试图改变政府会计改革的两难局面。     

我国政府会计权责制改革初探

随着“新公共管理运动”的兴起,改革政府会计引入权责发生制逐渐成为世界上许多国家的共识.而我国经过30多年的改革开放,市场经济环境已经发生了巨大变化,尤其是政府职能的转换、公共财政体制的改革、政府绩效评价制度的建设等,均对反映政府经济活动的政府会计信息提出了更高的要求,实行政府会计改革、引入权责制的呼声也日益高涨.本文从...     

Dominant shareholders,corporate boards,and corporate value: A cross-country analysis

We investigate the relation between corporate value and the proportion of the board made up of independent directors in 799 firms with a dominant shareholder across 22 countries. We find a positive relation, especially in countries with weak legal protection for shareholders. The findings suggest that a dominant shareholder, were he so inclined, could offset, at least in part, the documented value discount associated with weak country-level shareholder protection by appointing an ‘independent’ board. The cost to the dominant shareholder of doing so is the loss in perquisites associated with being a dominant shareholder. Thus, not all dominant shareholders choose independent boards.     

An international study of shareholder protection in freeze-out M&A transactions

Freeze-out M&A transactions are those initiated by controlling shareholders to acquire minority shareholders' ownership in the firm. We compare international freeze-out mergers in 35 countries in merger premium, choice of payment, and completion probability. We find greater merger premium and probability of cash payment but lower deal completion rates in countries with stronger minority shareholder protection. Using detailed minority shareholder protection indexes, we find some evidence that the ex-post anti-self-dealing law enforcement is more important than the ex-ante anti-self-dealing law regulation in protecting minority shareholder value. Our study provides new evidence of minority shareholder protection in the setting of conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders.     

Does the Mandatory Bid Rule Add Value to Target Shareholders?

I investigate whether implementation of the mandatory bid rule—the rule that grants all shareholders the right to participate in a takeover transaction at equal terms—affects target announcement returns. I use a difference‐in‐differences approach and the staggered adoption of the rule across 15 European countries. I find that the rule change leads to higher target returns. In full transactions, better accounting standards and shareholder protection norms of the acquirer leads to higher target returns. In majority transactions, greater value transfer from acquirers with weak accounting standards leads to higher target returns. I find weak evidence of overpayment by acquirers.     

Large shareholders, board independence, and minority shareholder rights: Evidence from Europe

We examine the relation between minority shareholder protection laws, ownership concentration, and board independence. Minority shareholder rights is a country-level governance variable. Ownership structure and board composition represent firm-level governance variables. Prior research hypothesizes and documents a negative relation between countries' minority shareholder rights quality and firms' ownership concentration. We introduce the hypothesis that shareholder protection rights and firms' board independence are positively related. When a country's minority shareholder rights are strong, then minority shareholders should have the legal power to affect board composition. Using a sample of large firms from 14 European countries, we test both hypotheses and find that countries with stronger shareholder protection rights have firms with lower ownership concentrations and with more independent directors, consistent with both hypotheses. We also find evidence that ownership concentration and board independence are negatively related.     

International Mergers and Acquisitions Laws,the Market for Corporate Control,and Accounting Conservatism

Exploiting the staggered enactment of country‐level mergers and acquisitions (M&A) law as an exogenous increase in corporate takeover threat, this paper examines how a disciplinary market for corporate control affects accounting conservatism. Following M&A law adoption, we find increased accounting conservatism, with more pronounced effects in countries with weak shareholder protection and in those experiencing larger growth in takeover activity. Further analysis reveals that elevated takeover threats increase conservatism through changes in capital structure and investment decisions as well as improvements in board monitoring. Our findings highlight the importance of the market for corporate control in shaping financial‐reporting outcome.     

Investment–cash flow sensitivity and investor protection

We examine the role of country-level legal investor protection (i.e., shareholder and creditor protection) on firm investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). Using underexplored research data on investor protection across 21 countries and working with a conservative empirical design, we extend prior literature on the relation between investor protection and ICFS and provide new evidence on how these country-level attributes interact to explain a firm's ICFS. We find that either the strong legal protection of minority shareholders or the strong legal protection of creditors reduces the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. However, in countries with strong levels of both minority shareholder and creditor protection, ICFS increases. Our results remain robust after controlling for several alternative explanations. The results support the argument that overregulation arises when policymakers increase investor protection at levels that lead firms to avoid external sources of finance, hampering firm investment. Our findings suggest that countries face a regulatory trade-off such that increasing investor protection (either shareholder or creditors protection) enhances financial markets efficiency, but excessive regulation can indeed lead to financial markets inefficiencies.     

Governance and bank valuation

This paper assesses the impact of the ownership structure of banks and shareholder protection laws on bank valuations while controlling for differences in bank regulations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held. Rather, families or the State control banks. Furthermore, (i) larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boost valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on valuations. These results suggest that ownership structure is an important mechanism for governing banks.     

Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.     

The Value of Investor Protection: Firm Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers

International law prescribes that in a cross-border acquisitionof 100% of the target shares, the target firm becomes a nationalof the country of the acquiror, and consequently subject toits corporate governance system. Therefore, cross-border mergersprovide a natural experiment to analyze the effects of changesin corporate governance on firm value. We construct measuresof the change in investor protection in a sample of 506 acquisitionsfrom 39 countries. We find that the better the shareholder protectionand accounting standards in the acquiror's country, the higherthe merger premium in cross-border mergers relative to matchingdomestic acquisitions.     

我国政府会计体系改革研究

在发达国家,项目执行预算PPB（Program and Performance Budget）在政府会计中的应用已有很多年的历史。而在发展中国家关于项目执行预算（PPB）还处在探索阶段,本文的研究表明权责发生制的核算基础是政府会计的改革方向,而改革的基石必定是公认会计准则,这样才会使预算会计在各级政府活动中实现其真正的效能。     

Legal shareholder protection and corporate R&D investment

This paper investigates the effects of shareholder protection law on corporate R&D investment. I find that the institutional protection of shareholder benefits reduces both underinvestment and overinvestment in R&D projects. Legal shareholder rights significantly increase R&D investment for firms that may underinvest, but reduce R&D for firms that may overinvest. Shareholder protection further enhances the growth of firms in R&D intensive industries, and promotes the economic growth of innovative countries. The results consistently show that enforcing stronger legal shareholder protection can help firms achieve an overall more efficient capital allocation to productive R&D investment.