Disclosure and determinants studies: An extension using the Divisive Clustering Method (DIV)

Abstract

Past accounting research contains an extensive range of disclosure and determinants studies. But these studies have one major methodological drawback: the disclosure analysis is often restricted to determination of the disclosure index, that is, the sum of disclosed items, weighted or unweighted. The disclosure profile (which reflects the structure of published information) is generally not part of the research design. The objective of this paper is to introduce a divisive (descendant) clustering method, which splits the sample into homogeneous sub-groups corresponding to disclosure patterns (or profiles), for clearer determination of the financial characteristics of each group. This methodology is illustrated by a study of disclosure on provisions by large French firms. The results show that the disclosure pattern is related to provision intensity, size, leverage and market expectation, but not to profit, return and industry. This new research method is a valuable complementary tool for expanding on disclosure and determinants studies, moving from disclosure levels to disclosure patterns.     

Workplace bullying and employee outcomes: a moderated mediated model

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between workplace bullying and employee outcomes in a healthcare setting. Drawing on HR process theory, we investigate the mediating role of the perceived effectiveness of implementation of anti-bullying practices on employee outcomes and whether targeted line manager training was a moderator of that relationship. Our multi-level analysis (utilising responses from 1507 employees within 47 hospitals with matched HR Director interviews), finds that the relationship between workplace bullying and employee outcomes is partially mediated by employees’ perceived effective implementation of intended anti-bully practices. The mediated relationship is moderated by targeted line manager training in anti-bullying practices. The mediated moderation model illustrates that it is effective implementation of anti-bullying practices enhanced by targeted training that is required to reduce bullying probabilities and their associated negative employee outcomes. The paper contributes to resource based view of the firm, HR process and human capital theories. The implications for future research and practice are discussed.     

On the Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure,Earnings Smoothing and the Value-Relevance of Earnings: The Case of Switzerland

Abstract

This paper examines whether voluntary disclosure by Swiss firms constrains the use of discretionary accruals to smooth earnings, and explores the effect of voluntary disclosure on the value relevance of earnings. We focus on Swiss firms because Switzerland's financial reporting system provides managers with extensive discretion in corporate disclosure, and there are important variations in the level of information provided in their annual reports. We consider that managers can choose two different ways to voluntarily convey information, either through the quality and quantity of annual report disclosure or, through compliance with International Accounting Standards (IAS)/International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Relying on a simultaneous equations approach, our results suggest that Swiss firms use discretionary accruals to smooth earnings. However, this relation is reduced for firms that voluntarily disclose more information in their annual report or comply with IAS/IFRS or US GAAP. Moreover, we show that discretionary accruals of high disclosers or of firms voluntarily complying with IAS/IFRS or US GAAP receive a lower valuation weight.     

The endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-debt capital and corporate disclosure policy

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a discussion of the problems associated with endogeneity in empirical accounting research. We emphasize problems arising when endogeneity is caused by (1) unobservable firm-specific factors and (2) omitted variables, and discuss the merits and drawbacks of using panel data techniques to address these causes. Second, we investigate the magnitude of endogeneity bias in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of cost-of-debt capital on firm disclosure policy. We document how including a set of variables which theory suggests to be related with both cost-of-debt capital and disclosure and using fixed effects estimation in a panel data-set reduces the endogeneity bias and produces consistent results. This analysis reveals that the effect of disclosure policy on cost-of-debt capital is 200% higher than what is found in OLS estimation. Finally, we provide direct evidence that disclosure is impacted by unobservable firm-specific factors that are also correlated with cost of capital.     

Disclosure Regulation in Duopoly Markets: Proprietary Costs and Social Welfare

Abstract

The argument of proprietary costs is commonly used by firms to object against proposed disclosure regulations. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the welfare consequences of disclosure in duopoly markets and to identify market settings where proprietary costs are a viable argument for firms to remain silent. We, therefore, solve the optimal disclosure strategies and distinguish two different potentially costly effects of disclosing private information: the strategic information effect and the market information effect. We identify the market settings for which a regulator prefers to impose disclosure regulation so as to maximise consumer surplus or total surplus. Regulation may be necessary because (i) the increase in welfare outweighs proprietary costs to the firms, or (ii) firms are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma. The first primarily applies to Bertrand competition with demand uncertainty and, to a lesser extent, to Cournot competition. The second applies primarily to Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty.     

Employee recognition,meaningfulness and behavioural involvement: test of a moderated mediation model

Abstract

This study examines how and under what conditions recognition practices are related to employee behavioural involvement at work. Combining social cognitive theory, social information processing theory and self-concordance theory, we develop and test a moderated mediation model in which (a) manager recognition promotes behavioural involvement both directly and indirectly through the intervening role of meaningfulness and (b) coworker recognition strengthens the benefits of manager recognition to meaningfulness and subsequent behavioural involvement. The results of a study of 130 employees provided empirical support for our model. These findings help clarify how different sources of recognition can shape the effective behavioural involvement in the workplace; they also emphasize the role of meaningfulness as an important psychological mechanism that explains the recognition–behaviour relation. The implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets

Abstract

This paper investigates the interaction between firms' information acquisition decisions and disclosure of internally acquired information in a Cournot duopoly market under demand uncertainty. The main results are as follows. When the correlation between firms' demands is positive and sufficiently high, disclosure of information on demand uncertainty can enhance social welfare, given that the quality of firms' private information is constant. However, in the setting where firms' private information is endogenously determined, mandatory disclosure is not always desirable. This is because, when disclosure is mandated, firms acquire less precise information compared with the case where the acquired information is not disclosed; hence, their internal information environments are deteriorated. This can lead to unintended consequences such that disclosure regulation decreases social welfare.     

Giving a voice to managers: forging the desire line through the creation of informal employee voice channels and productive resistance

Abstract

Within the extensive body of employee voice literature, the voice of the ordinary shopfloor employee has resonated loudly. The important role that line managers play in encouraging or inhibiting that voice has also been well documented. However, within the voice literature there has been silence with respect to line managers themselves being considered as voicers. In this paper, these missing managerial voices are amplified through the presentation of a case study of front and middle line manager voice within a university setting. Within this hierarchical organisation subject to increased managerialism, semi-structured interviews with 26 participants were conducted and it was found that line managers’ voice was thwarted due to relational and structural blockages in their formal voice channels. In some cases, this led to suppressed voice and a sense that line managers had no one to voice to. However, some managers were able to be creative and their actions led to productive resistance. While for others, these blockages motivated line managers to use covert ‘underground channels’ where their voice was raised informally and their interests could be advanced. The paper extends our knowledge by considering the line manager as a voicer, and not merely a manager of voice.     

The Influence of the Keiretsu on Japanese Corporate Disclosure

This paper represents a contribution to testing whether the extent of disclosure in Japanese corporate annual reports varies according to group structure. Consideration is given to keiretsu (group interfirm networks) classification and the mechanism for monitoring by a main bank or main company. This topic is of interest because the Japanese system of corporate governance is fundamentally different from those prevailing in Anglo-Saxon countries and this distinction may impact on corporate disclosure policy. Attention is focused on the exclusionary theory of corporate disclosure in which information is disseminated within group members but specifically excludes others. Regression analysis is undertaken to assess the importance of group structure in explaining variability in the extent of disclosure after controlling for known factors such as size, stock market listing, industry, borrowings, and type of business. The results suggest that companies within a keiretsu with a main-bank or main-company monitor and which are therefore less subject to capital market discipline do not disclose less information than other companies in their annual reports. It appears that whatever type of corporate governance mechanism is adopted in Japan there exists a monitor that places approximately equal demands on information disclosure in corporate annual reports.     

Enforcement Releases,Firm Characteristics,and Earnings Quality: Insights from Germany's Two‐tiered Enforcement System

The implementation of a two‐tier external enforcement mechanism in Germany in 2004 permits the examination of the interrelationship of enforcement releases, firm characteristics, and earnings quality in a unique institutional framework. A total of 151 cases are examined where the announcement of errors in prior disclosed and audited financial statements was mandatorily ordered by the enforcement authority. Prior literature documents the correlation between underperformance in financial ratios and the probability of erroneous disclosure of financial statements. Evidence is provided of differences in characteristics between firms with enforcement releases and control firms as well as all German publicly listed firms. The research affirms the connection of financial ratios to earnings quality metrics. Overall, the results document the underperformance in important financial ratios as well as indicate an inferior earnings quality of firms subject to enforcement releases vis‐à‐vis the control groups. These results hold with regard to both different earnings quality specifications and different periods observed. This study adds to the earnings quality discussion and contributes to the development of a comprehensive picture of accounting quality in the unique institutional settings of Germany. The findings show that a conjoint two‐tier public and private enforcement system is effective and could be a model for consideration by other countries.     

A commentary on issues relating to the enforcement of International Financial Reporting Standards in the EU

Abstract

The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is supported in many countries because it may improve the quality and international comparability of financial reporting. However, these goals are less likely to be achieved without regulatory oversight that promotes rigorous and consistent use of IFRS. Consequently the European Union (EU) is requiring all member states to introduce enforcement bodies by 2005, the date of IFRS adoption in the consolidated financial statements of all EU listed companies. We review ongoing activities in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in setting up and modifying enforcement bodies before 2005. We test current developments against the Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE) (2002 April 2002. “Discussion paper on enforcement of IFRS within Europe”. In Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE) April, Available at: www.fee.be/publications/main.htm [Google Scholar]) recommendations and against the principles for effective enforcement proposed in CESR Standard No. 1 on Financial Information. We present the views of people involved in financial reporting standard setting and enforcement from these countries, as well as the IASB, FEE and EFRAG, about the challenges of achieving effective uniform enforcement. Our paper will be of interest to people developing or participating in enforcement bodies, and to capital market participants who will be subject to the various regulatory regimes.     

Corporate Compliance with Non-Mandatory Statements of Best Practice: The Case of the ASB Statement on Interim Reports

ABSTRACT

This paper contributes to our understanding of compliance with non-mandatory statements of best practice. Specifically, we examine the efficacy of agency-related mechanisms on the degree of disclosure compliance with the ASB Statement on interim reports. Using data drawn from a sample of 259 UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, we show that although overall disclosure compliance is high (74.5% of the items of information being disclosed), companies do not fully comply with the ASB Statement on interim reports. We employ an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model to establish whether selected company-specific and corporate governance characteristics (proxying for agency-related mechanisms) are related to the degree of disclosure compliance. Our results indicate that multiple listing, company size, interim dividend and new share issuance are positively associated with the degree of compliance. We also find that the degree of disclosure compliance is positively associated with auditor involvement, audit committee independence and audit committee financial expertise. These results have important implications for policy because they suggest that whilst agency-related mechanisms may motivate compliance with best practice non-mandatory statements, full compliance may be unattainable without regulations.     

Can stable environmental protection officials’ tenure reduce illegal emissions?

Based on the day-night PM_2.5 difference of the nearest atmospheric monitoring points to measure whether there is illegal emission, this paper explores the impact of environmental protection officials' tenure (EPLT) on illegal emissions. The results show that there is a positive correlation between EPLT and illegal emissions. Stable EPLT can reduce illegal emissions by increasing environmental information disclosure and environmental subsidies. It can increase illegal emissions by weakening public pollution reporting and media supervision, environmental law enforcement and promoting corruption. In addition, EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT is less than 3.55 years, while EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT exceeds 6.21 years. Further, when mayor's tenure and EPLT are both stable, the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emission is stronger. Stable company director's tenure can also aggravate the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emissions.     

Contracting on the Stock Price and Forward-Looking Performance Measures

Abstract

We examine the use of earnings, forward-looking performance measures and stock prices in managerial compensation. When the firm's owner and its manager have identical time preferences, the stock price is not useful for motivating the manager, as it is a noisy aggregation of a forward-looking measure and future earnings. In contrast, when the owner and the manager have conflicting time preferences, the noisy stock price is useful for contracting. If the manager has no access to banking and cannot trade the firm's shares, the timeliness of the stock price dominates the extra risk imposed by its noise. At the same time, forward-looking performance measures (such as customer satisfaction) can induce a desirable allocation of management effort between the short term and long term more efficiently than the stock price can. Forward-looking performance measures and the stock price are thus not direct substitutes in rewarding farsighted effort.     

The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and Independent Directors in the Presence of a Dominant Shareholder

Abstract

Differently from prior studies that examine the role of stand-alone control systems within the relationship between owners and managers, our study investigates the correlation between two control mechanisms – voluntary disclosure and independent directors – in companies characterized by the presence of a dominant shareholder that is supposed to mitigate the classical agency problem. Based on agency theory, we hypothesize that the two mechanisms tend to coexist, since the presence of either one reduces the costs of introducing the other. Two further effects – the reputation and the domino effect – contribute to determine a positive relationship between the two mechanisms. We carried out the empirical analysis on 175 non-financial Italian listed companies, all controlled by a dominant shareholder. Voluntary disclosure is measured through three alternative disclosure indexes. Independent directors are identified not only according to a formal/legal definition, but also through stricter criteria. The empirical test is based on a multivariate analysis controlling for size, residual ownership diffusion, leverage, profitability and labour pressure. Results support our hypothesis and are robust to alternative criteria to identify dominant shareholders. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the relationship between different control mechanisms in particular agency settings.     

How Analysts Process Information: Technical and Financial Disclosures in the Microprocessor Industry

Abstract

Following Bradshaw (‘Analyst information processing, financial regulation, and academic research’ [2009], and Analysts' forecasts: What do we know after decades of work? [2011]), this paper examines how analysts process information, particularly in an information environment characterised by multiple and potentially complementary information sources. The setting is the microprocessor industry, one in which technical information is particularly significant and complex to digest. Based on 3837 analyst earnings-forecast revisions, issued by 134 analysts, we examine quantitatively the speed, magnitude, and information content of the reactions of individual analysts and subgroups of analysts to both periodic and timely technical disclosures, and as a complement to periodic financial disclosure. We find that analysts are much slower to react to timely technical disclosures than they are to periodic financial disclosures. We find also that technical and financial disclosures complement each other. Furthermore, we find that there is a ‘hierarchy’ of analysts in this particular industry, as evidenced through the strength of reaction to timely technical disclosures. Finally, we find that lower speed in reacting to timely technical disclosures and a higher intensity in the use of timely technical disclosure (in conjunction with periodic financial disclosure) result in greater accuracy, and that more experienced analysts tend to be less accurate. We suggest that the findings may have implications for other industries such as Bio-Tech Pharma.     

Litigation Risk and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Two Quasi-Natural Experiments

Abstract

We examine the effect of litigation risk on corporate voluntary disclosure using two quasi-natural experiments, which have substantial and opposing impacts on the litigation risk of firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. We find that firms in the Ninth Circuit decrease (increase) the quantity and quality of their voluntary disclosure, relative to control firms, when their litigation risk is lowered (elevated). The pre-treatment test shows an indistinguishable trend between treatment and control firms. A battery of robustness checks indicates that our results are not driven by alternative explanations. We hypothesize and find that the impact of litigation risk is more pronounced when firms have bad news and that firms are more likely to preempt bad news through voluntary disclosures when litigation risk is elevated. Overall, results from both experiments suggest that litigation risk causally increases corporate voluntary disclosure.     

The Role of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Executive Compensation

Abstract

Although defined benefit (DB) pension plans constitute a significant portion of both annual compensation and firm-related wealth for many CEOs, prior studies of CEO compensation contracts generally exclude these plans from their analyses due to lack of data. Taking advantage of recently increased disclosure requirements, we analyse the role of DB pension plans in these contracts. We find that firms with CEO DB pension plans grant the CEO annual compensation that is larger than predicted by economic determinants. We also find that more powerful CEOs, identified by their extraordinary pension benefits, receive higher total pay in addition to the pension benefits. We find no evidence that CEO pension benefits contribute to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of the annual pay.     

Hard,soft or ambidextrous? Which influence style promotes managers’ task performance and the role of political skill

Abstract

Ambidexterity at the manager level focuses on the crucial, but underexplored, role of managers’ knowledge, skills, and behaviors to address competing demands and promote organizational ambidexterity. As such, to successfully complete their assigned duties, managers need to employ the appropriate interpersonal style and calibrate their behavior to different contextual demands. This study highlights the role of the individual in the ambidexterity process by introducing the concept of influence tactic ambidexterity, to denote the frequent use of both hard and soft influence and investigating its role on task performance. Drawing on the literature on ambidexterity and HRM, we analyze data from a sample of 172 middle managers and their corresponding 68 supervisors working for multinational organizations, and provide evidence that influence tactic ambidexterity relates to higher levels and less variation in managers’ task performance compared to the sole use of either hard or soft tactics. Our findings also show that political skill positively moderates the relationship between influence tactic ambidexterity and a manager’s task performance. Therefore, this study suggests that influence tactic ambidexterity and political skill can be considered valuable HR assets for managers.     

The Association between Board Composition and Different Types of Voluntary Disclosure

Abstract

This study examines the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure in annual reports. In particular, it addresses the incentives within the agency theory framework for both inside and independent directors to disclosure additional information voluntarily. Further, it provides evidence on the relation between the overall total voluntary disclosure and the components of voluntary disclosure, such as forward looking, strategic, non-financial and historical financial disclosures and board composition. Our sample is based on 181 Australian companies. We have developed and hand-collected 67 items from annual reports to develop the total voluntary disclosure index and the sub-indices of voluntary disclosure. Using two-stage multivariate analyses, our results provide some important insights. First, we find that there is a positive association between board composition and the voluntary disclosure of information in annual reports. Second, we also find that independent boards provide more voluntary disclosure of forward looking information and strategic information. However, board structure has no bearing on the voluntary disclosure of non-financial and historical financial information. Our findings are enhanced by different empirical specifications and sensitivity tests.