注册会计师审计合谋与制度建设

本文首先分析了审计合谋的定义及其表现形式．然后用数理分析从审计合谋的供给方注册会计师角度分析了审计合谋产生的原因及过程，由此讨论阻止注册会计师进行审计合谋的制度建设问题。     

注册会计师“审计合谋”问题探析

十几年来来,国内外资本市场频繁发生的财务报告舞弊案例,很多都牵涉到注册会计师的审计合谋问题,使投资者损失惨重,市场信心大降。审计合谋严重影响了注册会计师审计的独立性,造成了严重的经济社会后果。本文在阐明注册会计师审计合谋形成机理的基础上,结合我国实际剖析审计合谋的动因,并提出防范和治理审计合谋的对策。     

审计合谋成因分析及对策

审计合谋是审计中介机构(会计师事务所)或审计人员(注册会计师)与被审计单位经营者串通起来,通过出具虚假审计意见等不正当手段欺骗委托人(股东)、社会公众,从中渔利的一种社会行为。本文通过剖析审计合谋产生的原因,提出了治理审计合谋的对策,以期提高注册会计师的审计独立性。     

审计合谋与审计意见类型的关系思考

某市公司与注册会计师事务所的审计合谋使得广大投资者利用虚假的财务信息做出错误的投资决策，给他们带来了很大的损失，从而使得公众对注册会计师行业的信任度大大降低，并给注册会计师行业的健康发展带来了很大的障碍。审计合谋越来越多地引起了人们的关注，本文通过现实案例分析了审计合谋和审计意见类型之间的相关关系，希望能为财务报告信息使用者提出一定的警示。     

审计合谋的博弈分析

本文通过建立博弈模型,对管理者和注册会计师双方参与审计合谋的收益进行分析,从而得出审计合谋成功条件。     

注册会计师与被审计对象合谋的成因探析

注册会计师鉴证职能是建立健全资本市场的重要基石,而独立性则是鉴证职能的基本要求。但是在近年来发生的财务舞弊案件中,注册会计师大多没有坚守其应有的独立,反而与被审单位合谋造假,造成严重社会后果。审计合谋指注册会计师或会计师事务所在其独立审计过程中,为了自身利益,违反审计准则,丧失独立性,没有发现或披露被审单位财务报告舞弊行为,甚至串通被审计单位,出具虚假鉴证或做出虚伪陈述,造成会计信息失真的行为。本文从供需两方面和客观环境出发,提出了审计合谋的治理对策。     

中美审计合谋运行环境因子探究

审计合谋严重影响到公众投资者对会计信息、审计公信力乃至整个社会信用系统的信心,侵蚀着注册会计师行业的生存与发展。文章在对中美审计合谋运行的环境因子进行差异分析的基础上,提出我国在当前转型经济期审计合谋的治理策略。     

不同审计委托模式下审计合谋的博弈分析

本以不同审计委托模式下的审计关系为基础，从博弈论的角度对审计直接和间接委托模式下经营与注册会计师审计合谋的决策进行了分析。为找到审计合谋的根本原因，根治会计造假作了有益的探索。     

论注册会计师审计合谋与制度建设

当前,无论是在资本市场发达的美国,还是在资本市场刚刚起步的我国,注册会计师(CPA)被诉讼的案例时有发生,一方面是由于审计失败或"深口袋"责任背景的存在,另一方面是由于审计合谋引起的.研究表明,大多数注册会计师被诉讼都是由于其进行审计合谋引起的,这说明在当前世界资本市场中审计合谋有相当广泛的存在.     

寻租导致审计失败

审计失败是指注册会计师由于没有遵守公认审计准则而形成或提出了错误的审计意见。在导致审计失败的诸多原因中，尤为引人注目的是财务欺诈和审计合谋。从性质上看，财务欺诈和审计欺诈、审计合谋不同于一般的错误、过失等，它们是当事人(被审单位或注册会计师)有意地“创造”审计失败，涉及的是道德的沦丧和诚信的失效。     

Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement

This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted offers before the official opening. The agent may be corrupt, that is, willing to "sell" his decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agent's incentives to extract rents are closely linked with that of a cartel of bidders. First, collusive bidding conveys value to the agent's decision power. Second, self-interested abuse of discretion to extract rents (corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bidding can facilitate collusion. We also find that with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions where firms are small relative to the market. Our main message to auction designers, competition authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. Some other policy implications for the design of tender procedures are discussed.     

On the profitability of collusion in location games

In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable. The results have immediate implications for mergers in spatial markets.     

总分公司体制下保险公司合谋问题的激励研究

大型中资保险公司由于其庞大的总分公司结构，在总公司、内审部门与分公司间所形成的三层委托代理关系下常出现合谋现象。本文在利用多重委托代理模型的基础上，分析了合谋问题在大型保险公司的具体表现，以及不同状态下的激励水平。最终得出结论，大型保险公司中合谋问题存在并且严重，而最优激励水平应该是平衡报酬和惩罚。     

Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion

Using a dynamic overlapping‐generations model, we show that loyalty rewards robustly facilitate tacit collusion. We compare the sustainability of tacit collusion when uniform prices are used, when loyal customers are rewarded without using commitment, and when loyalty rewards are implemented by committing to offering customers either lower fixed repeat‐purchase prices or fixed repeat‐purchase discounts. We find that, relative to uniform prices, rewarding loyalty without using commitment on the equilibrium path makes tacit collusion easier to sustain, because a deviating firm is unable to steal one period of industry profit before losing all future profits. When loyalty rewards are offered by firms committing to repeat‐purchase prices, collusion is even easier to sustain, because a deviating firm cannot renege on its discounted price for repeat‐purchase customers. When firms commit to repeat‐purchase discounts, they also commit to lowering the price for their repeat‐purchase customers if they undercut the regular price, rendering tacit collusion to be even more readily sustainable. Our results hold whether products are homogeneous or horizontally differentiated as in a Hotelling model.     

Renegotiation and Collusion in Organizations

It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization may lead to inefficiencies and hence should be prevented in equilibrium. This paper shows that whenever the parties to an organization can renegotiate their incentive scheme after collusion, these inefficiencies can be greatly reduced. Moreover, it might not be possible to prevent collusion and renegotiation in equilibrium. Indeed, if collusion is observable but not verifiable, then the organization's optimal incentive scheme will always be renegotiated. If, instead, collusion is not observable to the principal, both collusion and renegotiation will occur in equilibrium with positive probability. The occurrence of collusion and renegotiation should therefore not be taken as evidence of the inefficiency of an organization.     

On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts

Illegal collusion is a widespread phenomenon all around the world. Yet, models of hierarchical agency relationships tend not to predict collusion. This paper demonstrates that a natural requirement of interim efficiency suffices for collusion to appear in equilibrium in a simple standard setting. The optimal extent of collusion depends on the efficacy of the legal system. When the transaction costs associated with illegal deals are small enough, inducing some illegal collusion between the agent and his supervisor increases the principal's payoff. Received: 9 December 1996 / Accepted: 11 April 1998     

合作策略性行为的产业组织分析

本文按信息条件将合作策略性行为分为默契合作策略性行为和明确合作策略性行为。首先介绍了默契合作策略性行为三种策略 ,然后分析了十种明确合作策略性行为的商业实践 ,最后是对合作策略性行为的公共政策评论。     

On the relationship between product substitutability and tacit collusion

This paper examines the effect of increased product substitutability on quantity‐setting firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in a market. It uses a general demand function and the trigger strategy of Friedman (Friedman JW. 1971. A non‐cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies 38: 1–12) to show that while increased product substitutability hinders sustainability of tacit collusion in the case of linear and concave demand functions, it may either hinder or facilitate firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in the case of convex demand functions. Thus, this paper adds to the growing view that one must use a case‐by‐case analysis in judging whether firms in more homogenous product markets find it easier or harder to tacitly collude. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

战储物资采购定价过程中合谋问题的博弈分析

战储物资采购定价过程的容易发生在军方和供应商之间的合谋问题可分成两情况:一种是信息不对称情况下合谋问题;另一种是存在第三方监管下合谋问题。运用博弈理论对这两种情况进行了探讨,在此基础上,得出解决此类合谋问题的最佳策略。     

Buyers' and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods

This paper analyzes the formation of cartels of buyers and sellers in a simple model of trade inspired by Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1990) bargaining model. When cartels are formed only on one side of the market, there is at most one stable cartel size. When cartels are formed sequentially on the two sides of the market, there is also at most one stable cartel configuration. Under bilateral collusion, buyers and sellers form cartels of equal sizes, and the cartels formed are smaller than under unilateral collusion. Both the buyers' and sellers' cartels choose to exclude only one trader from the market. This result suggests that there are limits to bilateral collusion, and that the threat of collusion on one side of the market does not lead to increased collusion on the other side.