ERODING MARKET IMPERFECTIONS,REINTERMEDIATION, AND DISINTERMEDIATION

In this paper a search model of a financial market, generalized to include costly contracting, is employed to demonstrate that: (i) relative cost efficiency for an intermediary is not sufficient to explain a role for intermediation services, and (ii) eroding market imperfections do not produce hypothesized effects on “reintermediation” from traditional depository-type intermediaries to brokerage-type intermediaries and on “disintermediation” from indirect financing to direct financing under a set of justifiable assumptions.     

Price Effects of Non-Traditionally Broker-Marketed Properties

This study investigates whether or not non-traditional marketing has an effect on the prices paid for residential real estate. Non-traditionally broker-marketed properties are defined as those properties that are sold with the aid of a real estate broker, but not marketed through a Multiple Listing Service (MLS). An analysis of properties that sold in this fashion offers further insight into the intermediation role of the real estate broker, as well as an opportunity to further investigate the efficiency of residential real estate markets. Specifically, we can assess whether MLS participation generates higher prices by determining whether like-kind properties price equivalently despite differences in their mode of marketing. The results show a significant and positive impact by non-traditionally broker-marketed properties on property price suggesting, for this sample, a premium of over 6% compared to like-kind properties marketed through the MLS. This premium may be a result of brokers intermediating a better matching of buyers and sellers. The observed premium also suggests a degree of market inefficiency.     

金融中介发展、企业家精神与区域经济增长——基于省级面板数据的实证研究

金融中介和企业是经济增长的动力,而企业家精神则是推动企业成长的灵魂.本文利用1999～2010年中国30个省市面板数据,对三者之间的关系进行了实证研究.实证结果显示：金融中介发展尤其是效率的提高,对经济增长有直接的推动作用,但其增长效应存在地区差异;企业家精神能够促进经济增长,但企业家创新精神的经济增长效应远低于创业精神的经济增长效应;金融中介发展主要通过支持企业家创业活动促进经济增长.     

On the Positive Role of Financial Intermediation in Allocation of Venture Capital in a Market with Imperfect Information

This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information. We consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions, about which the investors are imperfectly informed. It is shown that when all investors have positive search costs, the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects (“lemons” only), and the investors will not enter the venture capital market, but put their funds in other low return investments–an undesirable allocation of resources. Beginning with an initial undesirable situation, the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a Pareto-preferred allocation, leading the investors to a higher welfare state. We focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive. The distribution of returns on projects, the fees charged by intermediaries, and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium. It is shown that (i) there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings, and (ii) in other cases multiple equilibra may exist, but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a Pareto sense.     

Search Costs,Behavioral Biases,and Information Intermediary Effects

In many markets, buyers, sellers, and their agents have differential information about the quality of heterogeneous assets. We study negotiated transaction prices in the commercial real estate market, which is characterized by heterogeneous assets, illiquidity, and highly segmented local markets, all of which increase the importance of asymmetric information in negotiated pricing outcomes. Using 114,588 industrial, multi-family and office sale transactions that occurred during 1997–2011, we document that distant commercial real estate buyers pay, on average, premiums of 4 % to 15 % relative to local buyers, controlling for individual property characteristics as well as time fixed-effects. We also examine the extent to which the sources of these observed premiums are a product of higher search costs/information asymmetry problems associated with distance (search cost channel) or a result of reference-dependence preference/anchoring based on the price levels in the investors’ local market (behavioral biases channel). Our results suggest the observed price premiums are explained by distant investors who face higher search costs and are at an information disadvantage compared to investors located in closer proximity to the property. In contrast, anchoring plays a more muted role in explaining observed premiums. The use of an intermediary (broker) increases, on average, the acquisition prices of buyers and decreases the disposition prices of sellers by 3 % to 8 %. This result is consistent with the incentive real estate agents have to convince sellers to dispose of their properties too quickly and to convince buyers to search less and therefore pay higher prices.     

Why do intermediaries divert search?

We analyze the incentives to divert search for an information intermediary who enables buyers (consumers) to search affiliated sellers (stores). We identify two original motives for diverting search (i.e., inducing consumers to search more than they would like): (i) trading off higher total consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) influencing stores’ choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). We characterize the conditions under which there would be no role for search diversion as a strategic instrument for the intermediary, thereby showing that it occurs even when the contracting space is significantly enriched. We then discuss several applications related to online and brick‐and‐mortar intermediaries.     

Monopoly with resale

We examine the intricacies associated with the design of revenue‐maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and interbidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results show that the revenue‐maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to sell to a particular buyer.     

Valuation,Capital Structure,and Shareholder Unanimity for Depository Financial Intermediaries

The theory of corporate finance is not directly applicable to financial intermediary decision-making. The lack of applicability stems largely from the particular conditions that distinguish intermediary operations from those of the nonfinancial firm. First, when intermediaries accept deposit financing, they must produce services such as liquidity and convenience at considerable expense for real resources. Second, the introduction of intermediation is likely to be accompanied by incomplete markets so that shareholder unanimity is not in general valid. In this paper, a model with incomplete markets is developed and a shareholder approved rule for intermediary capital structure decisions is derived.     

Pricing forward contracts in power markets by the certainty equivalence principle: Explaining the sign of the market risk premium

In this paper we provide a framework that explains how the market risk premium, defined as the difference between forward prices and spot forecasts, depends on the risk preferences of market players and the interaction between buyers and sellers. In commodities markets this premium is an important indicator of the behavior of buyers and sellers and their views on the market spanning between short-term and long-term horizons. We show that under certain assumptions it is possible to derive explicit solutions that link levels of risk aversion and market power with market prices of risk and the market risk premium. We apply our model to the German electricity market and show that the market risk premium exhibits a term structure which can be explained by the combination of two factors. Firstly, the levels of risk aversion of buyers and sellers, and secondly, how the market power of producers, relative to that of buyers, affects forward prices with different delivery periods.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

The anatomy of buyer–seller dynamics in decentralized markets

In this paper I investigate the nexus between buyer–seller dynamics, financial frictions and market efficiency in decentralized markets. To do so, I introduce financial frictions in a dynamic market with heterogeneous traders. Heterogeneously constrained buyers sequentially enter the market to acquire units of a generic good from heterogeneously endowed sellers. I characterize two closely related classes of equilibria, respectively called homogeneous equilibrium with no entry (HEWNE) and homogeneous equilibrium with entry (HEWE). Both equilibria prescribe a market where only the efficiently endowed type of seller exists in the limit. However, the two equilibria diverge in the specification of agents’ behavior subsequent to trade. In HEWNE, sellers and buyers exit the market upon successful trading. In HEWE, like in supply chains, in every period certain types of buyers replace exiting sellers, thus becoming potential sellers for subsequent waves of buyers. First, I identify the critical role of frictions in steering the complex evolution of market heterogeneity for both classes of equilibria. Secondly, I operationalize the combined study of HEWNE and HEWE to obtain sharp predictions on market efficiency for a range of empirically-relevant situations in which buyer–seller dynamics are decoupled, for example when entry of new sellers is delayed or stopped. Third, I test the theoretical findings against a simulated artificial market.     

Buying a house and the decision to use a real estate broker

This study examines the factors that affect the decision by home buyers to use real estate brokers and the subsequent effect this decision has on home prices. Buyers with high opportunity costs and the least amount of information about local market conditions are the most likely to use brokers; a finding consistent with the role of the real estate broker as a market intermediary. Not surprisingly, these were some of the same factors that also have a positive impact on selling price. An important finding of this study is that when selection bias is adequately controlled, the real estate broker has no appreciable, independent impact on selling price. This, in turn, suggests a nonsegmented, highly competitive housing market.     

Darstellung und Abgrenzung des deutschen Versicherungsvermittlungsmarktes

Insurance intermediation is mostly known as a distribution entity of insurance companies. Therefore only limited research has focused on German insurance intermediaries as an independent market. The business of insurance intermediaries can not only be limited on selling policies, they also offer other services to policyholders. The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we explain the structure as well as the legal and the fiscal characteristics within the insurance intermediation market. Second, we describe the business of German intermediaries. Third, we show that this market can be defined as an independent market.     

More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets

This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1987) model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency, and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates if and only if middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein–Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.     

Capital Structure Equilibrium under Market Imperfections and Incompleteness

This paper generalizes Miller's supply-side equilibrium argument to other forms of capital market imperfections and incompleteness. If corporations possess a comparative advantage in dealing with these imperfections, they have an incentive to act as financial intermediaries. Corporations' attempts to profit from these intermediation activities dictate an optimal capital structure for the corporate sector as a whole, but in equilibrium the capital structure of any single firm is a matter of indifference. In addition, the positive role that corporate finance plays in completing the market restores standard perfect market results on asset pricing and the associated portfolio separation properties.     

Optimal certification policy,entry, and investment in the presence of public signals

We explore the optimal disclosure policy of a certification intermediary where (i) the seller decides on entry and investment in product quality, and (ii) the buyers observe an additional public signal on quality. The optimal policy maximizes rent extraction from the seller by trading off incentives for entry and investment. We identify conditions under which full, partial or no disclosure can be optimal. The intermediary's report becomes noisier as the public signal gets more precise, but if the public signal is sufficiently precise, the intermediary resorts to full disclosure. However, the social welfare may reduce when the public signal becomes more informative.     

Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational,Governance, and Financial Engineering

Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.     

Does competition aggravate moral hazard? A Multi-Principal-Agent experiment

We conduct an experiment to determine whether market structure affects financial intermediary behavior. The intermediaries (Agents) are perfectly informed regarding project types and can recommend that their clients (Principals) either proceed or discontinue a project. Intermediaries earn revenues only when they recommend proceeding with the transaction. Thus, our design captures some of the incentives faced by financial advisers in commercial banks, where compensation depends on sales performance, and also by money-managers, whose income depends on the size of their portfolios. We find that a monopolist intermediary protects the interest of clients better than when intermediaries compete. Our results are robust to a significant fee increase and provide additional evidence on the impact of market structure on individual incentives and equilibrium outcomes.     

Inefficient sales delays by a durable‐good monopoly facing a finite number of buyers

This article offers a new explanation for unscheduled price cuts and slow adoption of durable goods. We study a standard durable‐good monopoly model with a finite number of buyers and show that this game can have multiple subgame perfect equilibria in addition to the Pacman outcome—including the Coase conjecture. Of particular interest is a class of equilibria where the seller first charges a high price and only lowers that price once some—but not all—high‐valuation buyers purchase. This price structure creates a war of attrition between those buyers, which delays market clearing and rationalizes unscheduled purchase and price cut dates.     

Mortgage Prepayment and Default Behavior with Embedded Forward Contract Risks in China’s Housing Market

Most condominiums in China are sold forward on a pre-sale market, where purchasers and developers transact on an underlying property that is not yet completed. During the pre-sale period home buyers face a significant forward contract risk. However, home buyers can borrow mortgages from banks so that they can effectively share the forward contract risk with banks. This explains the phenomenon of irregularly high early-stage default and prepayment rates observed in residential mortgage lending in China, where there are few, if any, financial incentives for mortgage borrowers to exercise either put or call options. Mortgages collateralized by forward housing assets are riskier than are those with underlying assets traded on the spot market. However, currently Chinese mortgage banks charge the same rate to all mortgage borrowers. This inefficiency in risk sharing between mortgage borrowers’ groups in the forward and spot housing markets leads to mispricing in secondary mortgage sales and mortgage-backed security trading.