The social loss from private monopoly and optimal antitrust enforcement

In this paper we argue that the welfare loss from monopoly equals deadweight loss plus expenditures by monopolists to defend and antitrust enforcers to attack their monopolies. A model of a profit-maximizing monopolist and a social loss-minimizing antitrust enforcer is developed. We find ambiguous effects of deadweight loss and the price of resources used by either party (in maintaining or attacking the monopoly) on the total welfare loss from monopoly. Monopoly profit has a positive but diminishing impact on monopoly welfare loss. Thus the entire monopoly profit will not be transformed into socially useless resource expenditure.     

Pricing strategy and moral hazard: Copay coupons in pharmaceuticals

Branded drug manufacturers issue copay coupons to compete with generics as their brands are coming off patent. To explore the impact of copay coupons on pricing and welfare, I estimate a model of demand and supply using data on sales, advertising, and copayment for cholesterol-lowering drugs and perform a counterfactual analysis to simulate equilibrium pricing with copay coupons used for price discrimination and moral hazard. Copay coupons issued for price discrimination make the drug with coupons affordable for more consumers and increase consumer welfare even when a small fraction of consumers receive a coupon. Coupons used for moral hazard significantly mitigate price competition and improve consumer welfare only when coupon penetration is sufficiently high.     

“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995

Prosecution of the lysine cartel signaled aresurgence in global price-fixingconspiracies in dozens of markets. It was the first to enter thevideo age and set new precedents for large criminal fines. Thispaper examines the sensitivity of overcharges generated by thecartel to several factors: time period, seasonality of demand,and the price absent collusion. Civil settlements in the federalclass action (including the interrelated citric acid conspiracy)were the fourth highest in legal history. Yet, overcharges of65 to65 to 134 million mean that buyers in the federal class receivedat most single damages. The opt-out firms got double damages.     

ABS树脂的国内外市场分析

世界市场对ＡＢＳ树脂的需求上升；支柱产业推动了ＡＢＳ树脂的发展和消费；亚洲地区ＡＢＳ树脂的发展和消费较快，近年来的亚洲市场价格走势先涨后跌，１９９７年低价状态仍将持续一段时间。     

Preventives Versus Treatments Redux: Tighter Bounds on Distortions in Innovation Incentives with an Application to the Global Demand for HIV Pharmaceuticals

Kremer and Snyder (Q J Econ 130:1167–1239, 2015) show that demand curves for a preventive and treatment may have different shapes though they target the same disease, biasing the pharmaceutical manufacturer toward developing the lucrative rather than the socially desirable product. This paper tightens the theoretical bounds on the potential deadweight loss from such biases. Using a calibration of the global demand for HIV pharmaceuticals, we demonstrate the dramatically sharper analysis achievable with the new bounds, allowing us to pinpoint potential deadweight loss at 62% of the global gain from curing HIV. We use the calibration to perform policy counterfactuals, assessing welfare effects of government policies such as a subsidy, reference pricing, and price-discrimination ban. The fit of our calibration is good: we find that a hypothetical drug monopolist would price an HIV drug so high that only 4% of the infected population worldwide would purchase, matching actual drug prices and quantities in the early 2000s before subsidies in low-income countries ramped up.     

Measuring the Efficiency Cost of Rent Control

This paper estimates the burden of lost producer surplus imposed on landlords by rent control. The approach employed measures the reduction in Marshallian quasi-rent from the side of the derived demand for factors rather than the short-run supply of housing.
A constant elasticity of substitution production function is employed to derive the input demand equation. The equation is estimated using post-war rent control data from five major New York State cities. It turns out that rent control reduced quasi-rent about 15%. The deadweight loss is estimated at 1.5% of gross rental payments or about 5% of net income before debt charges.     

Experimenting to Learn about Demand in Duopoly with Forward‐Looking Consumers

Using a two‐period model, I show that competition between two symmetric duopolists trying to learn about unknown features of demand results in an informationally suboptimal process. Because a firm’s marginal return to price experimentation equals zero if the rival’s price is matched in the first period, myopic symmetric pricing arises in equilibrium even though a firm’s expected second‐period profit attains a local minimum. Furthermore, forward‐looking consumers suffer from ratcheting because their first‐period purchase decisions partly reveal their preferences, which exacerbates the informational suboptimality of the firms’ experimentation process without affecting their pricing. The role of firm asymmetries is also analyzed.     

A Search Model Where Consumers Choose Quantity Based on Expected Price

I describe a price game in which consumers face search costs and base their quantity decision on the expected price. Because of search costs, the choice of the firm they will buy from is described by a random process. I show that the expected equilibrium price is above the monopoly price. This result does not change if demand comes from a small share of perfectly informed consumers with zero search costs.     

Welfare Changes in the Cournot Setting with an Empirical Application to the Telecommunications Industry

I characterize the efficiency of the Cournot equilibrium and provide bounds for the loss in consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare when the number of firms in the market changes. I only assume that demand is decreasing in price and costs increasing in the quantity produced as long as equilibrium exists. I show how price, demand and average cost, before and after the number of firms in the market changes, can be used to compute these bounds. I apply these bounds to the Portuguese wireline market and conclude that welfare increased significantly when the monopolist was split in 2007.     

Understanding pastoralists’ dynamic insurance uptake decisions: Evidence from four-year panel data in Ethiopia

Despite the demonstrated benefits of index insurance, its adoption rate remains low in many developing countries. While a growing literature explores the factors associated with insurance uptake, we still know little about its dynamic patterns. Using a unique data set covering four years and six semi-annual sales periods of an index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product in southern Ethiopia, we examine the dynamics of pastoralists’ demand for IBLI. We find that reduced insurance premiums induce households to purchase IBLI. While a one-shot subsidy can create a price reference point that may reduce the subsequent uptake, we do not find such price-anchoring effects. We also find that overall uptake decision is positively correlated intertemporally, although there is no strong evidence for learning by doing or learning from others. Finally, we show that pastoralists are more likely to purchase IBLI when drought risk is high, consistent with the existence of spatiotemporal adverse selection. We discuss the potential of distributing discount coupons to trigger initial uptake and adjusting premium rates dynamically to avoid spatiotemporal adverse selection as effective policy tools toward sustainable livestock insurance. Overall, our study signifies the importance of an empirical analysis that considers the dynamic demand structure.     

Estimating demand elasticities using nonlinear pricing

Nonlinear pricing is prevalent in industries such as health care, public utilities, and telecommunications. However, this pricing scheme introduces bias into estimating elasticities for welfare analysis or policy changes. I develop a local elasticity estimation method that uses nonlinear price schedules to isolate consumers' expenditure choices from selection and simultaneity biases. This method improves over previous approaches by using commonly-available observational data and requiring only a single general monotonicity assumption. Using claims-level data on health insurance with two nonlinearities, I am able to measure two separate elasticities, and find that elasticity declines from − 0.26 to− 0.09 by the second nonlinearity. These estimates are then used to calculate moral hazard deadweight loss. This method enables estimation of many policies with nonlinear pricing which previous tools could not address.     

Contigent Price Contracts and the Efficiency of Housing Markets

Frequently, the response of housing markets to a large negative demand shock is a period during which the liquidity of housing declines, but the price at which transactions take place changes little. In this paper we show that a decline in liquidity can result from the inabilities of sellers and buyers to insure against post-shock price uncertainty. We conclude, that the introduction of a risk-sharing contingent price contract may increase the post-shock liquidity of housing by providing insurance against post-shock price uncertainty. Finally, we show that a mutually agreeable contingent price contract will always exist, even when sellers are excessively optimistic.     

Personalized prices and uncertainty in monopsony

We analyze personalized pricing by a monopsonist facing a finite number of ex ante identical, capacity constrained suppliers with privately known costs. When the distribution of costs is sufficiently smooth and regular, the buyer chooses to make the same offer to all suppliers, leading to a posted price. When demand is sufficiently concave (convex) this price is lower (higher) than the classical monopsony price. In the limit as the seller capacities tend to zero, we obtain the classical monopsony price. Therefore, our model provides a decentralized micro-foundation for monopsony.     

Joint pricing and procurement of fashion products in the existence of clearance markets

This paper focuses on the joint pricing and procurement of fashion products in the existence of clearance markets. It is assumed that the expected regular season demand is a linear decreasing function of the price and the end of period excess inventory is sold at a known discounted price in a clearance market where the demand is a random variable that follows a general distribution. It is shown that the expected profit function is unimodal and the optimal procurement quantity and price can be found from the first order conditions. Existence of a clearance market increases the profit, price, and the procurement quantity. In order to prove this, the optimal procurement and pricing policy of a price-setting retailer who does not have a clearance market is provided. As opposed to the literature, it is shown that the expected profit function of this problem is unimodal as well. A numerical study demonstrating the magnitude of the increase in profit, procurement quantity, and price is reported.     

OPERATING SYSTEM PRICES IN THE HOME PC MARKET*

Because the demand for OS is a derived demand revealed through the demand for PCs and because its elasticity is relatively small, the profit‐maximizing price of DOS/WIN that would result from a static equilibrium is much higher than the observed price. We investigate this assertion empirically by fitting a differentiated‐products model of the home PC market to panel data of all PC brands sold in the G7 countries over the period 1995–1999. The results confirm that the low value of the aggregate elasticity of demand for PCs is the result of differentiation and substitution among PCs.     

The dynamic provision of product diversity under duopoly

This paper builds a dynamic duopoly model to examine the provision of new varieties over time. Consumers experience temporary satiation, and hence higher consumption of the current variety lowers demand for future varieties. The equilibrium can be characterized by a combination of monopolistic pricing and nearly zero profits (competitive timing). In particular, if the cost of producing a new variety is not too low then firms tend to avoid head-to-head competition and set the short-run profit maximizing price. However, firms tend to introduce new varieties as soon as demand has grown sufficiently to cover costs. From a second best perspective, the equilibrium may exhibit excessive product diversity. However, if firms coordinate their frequency of new product introductions, then consumers are likely to be harmed. It is also shown that equilibrium prices are moderated by two factors. First, consumers’ option value of waiting reduces their willingness to pay. Second, competition reduces firms’ incentives to engage in intertemporal price discrimination.     

电力市场效率评估与碳市场价格设计——基于电碳市场关联视角下的传导率估计

厘清并量化电力市场与碳市场间的关联关系,是深化电力市场改革与实现"双碳"目标的重要抓手。本文基于2006—2018年中国100个地级及以上城市的面板数据,使用似不相关回归模型评估了电力市场效率,在此基础上研究了电、碳市场关联条件下碳价对电价的传导率,并对不同场景下全国碳市场的碳价进行了优化设计。研究发现:(1)与非试点地区相比,碳市场试点地区中电力市场的无谓损失率更低,并且市场效率的提高具有更高的碳减排作用。(2)电、碳市场关联条件下,碳价对电力市场中居民电价的传导率高于对工业电价的传导率,但均远低于完全竞争条件下的传导率水平。(3)传导率的提升能够缓解"降电价"与"碳减排"之间的矛盾。当前传导率下电力市场效率目标与碳减排目标的协同实现需要碳价的大幅提升,而在完全传导的理想情况下最优碳价约为40元/吨。(4)长期而言,当前传导率下碳排放总量下降场景、经济增速放缓场景对应的最优碳价分别为255.05元/吨、173.63元/吨,而人口老龄化场景并未对最优碳价的设置形成约束。本文的研究不仅为电力市场与碳市场之间的关联奠定了理论基础,也为全国碳市场价格机制的优化设计提供了政策参考。     

Looking at the Cost Side of “Monopoly”

Welfare loss under oligopoly is defined as that part of consumer surplus which is lost and not regained by higher profits. In a model with asymmetric firms, this implies that the total welfare loss consists of the deadweight loss triangle plus a cost side inefficiency effect, due to the fact that in imperfect markets not all firms utilize the lowest cost technique. Using a flexible CV-model we calculate these effects empirically for two relatively homogeneous industries (pulp/paper and cement). The deadweight loss triangles are shown to be smaller than the cost difference effect (“the staircase”) for these industries.     

Cost and benefits from infrastructure competition. Estimating welfare effects from broadband access competition

Competition between parallel infrastructures incorporates opposing welfare effects. The gain from reduced deadweight loss might be outweighed by the inefficient duplication of an existing infrastructure. Using data from broadband Internet access for western Europe 2000–04, this paper investigates which effect prevails empirically. Infrastructure competition between DSL and cable TV had a significant and positive impact on the broadband penetration. However, comparing the additional social surplus attributable to cable competition with the cable investments, it can be concluded that, in the absence of significant positive externalities, infrastructure competition has probably not been welfare enhancing.     

BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING‐BID AUCTIONS*

The possibility, even if arbitrarily small, of binding budget constraints in simultaneous ascending bid auctions induces strategic demand reduction and generates significant inefficiencies. Under mild conditions on the distributions of the bidders' values, unconstrained bidders behave as if they were liquidity constrained, even as the probability that bidders are budget constrained goes to zero.