Real Options, Product Market Competition, and Asset Returns

We study how competition in the product market affects the link between firms' real investment decisions and their asset return dynamics. In our model, assets in place and growth options have different sensitivities to market wide uncertainty. The strategic behavior of market participants influences the relative importance of these components of firm value. We show that the relationship between the degree of competition and assets' expected rates of return varies with product market demand. When demand is low, firms in more competitive industries earn higher returns, whereas when demand is high firms in more concentrated industries earn higher returns.     

产业政策、创新行为与企业加成率——基于战略性新兴产业政策的研究

本文基于1998-2013年中国工业企业数据和专利数据,采用双重差分方法评估战略性新兴产业政策对企业加成率的影响程度、作用机制和有效实施空间。研究发现:(1)对生产率和研发水平较高的行业实施战略性新兴产业政策,总体上显著增加了企业专利申请量,有效激发了创新主体活力。(2)由于影响企业生产率的成本效应大于影响产品质量的价格效应,导致战略性新兴产业政策一定程度上降低了企业加成率。(3)行业技术差距对战略性新兴产业政策的加成率效应具有显著负向调节作用,随着行业技术水平接近前沿,战略性新兴产业政策实施效果呈渐进式优化。(4)由于企业主体异质性,战略性新兴产业政策具有的“选择性”特征会引致“重数量轻质量”创新陷阱,这是造成企业加成率下降的重要原因。本文有助于更好理解产业政策对制造业高质量发展的推动作用,对产业政策实施效果的进一步优化具有一定参考价值。     

The impact of strategic interaction on earnings expectations associated with corporate product strategies

We examine how strategic interaction in an industry influences the earnings expectations of financial analysts with regard to new product strategies. We find that following announcement of new products, analysts revise earnings forecasts upward more for announcing firms competing in low-strategic interaction industries than for firms competing in high-strategic interaction industries. For value-enhancing (value-reducing) product strategies, earnings forecast revisions are more favorable for rivals competing under a high (low) degree of strategic interaction than for rivals competing under a low (high) degree of strategic interaction. Overall empirical evidence indicates that the nature of strategic competition within the industry is important in assessing the market expectations of earnings for new product announcers and their rivals.     

Correlation dynamics of global industry portfolios

This paper investigates the time series of realized correlations between global industries and the world market over the 1979–2008 period. The behavior of industry correlations is characterized by long-term swings, with a period of historically low correlations in the late 1990s. The Telecommunications and the Financials industries show a positive secular trend. Global industry correlations move countercyclically. Furthermore, there is evidence that industry correlations are higher for market downside moves than for upside moves.     

Charting your company's future

Few companies have a clear strategic vision. The problem, say the authors, stems from the strategic-planning process itself, which usually involves preparing a large document, culled from a mishmash of data provided by people with conflicting agendas. That kind of process almost guarantees an unfocused strategy. Instead, companies should design the strategic-planning process by drawing a picture: a strategy canvas. A strategy canvas shows the strategic profile of your industry by depicting the various factors that affect competition. And it shows the strategic profiles of your current and potential competitors as well as your own company's strategic profile--how it invests in the factors of competition and how it might in the future. The basic component of a strategy canvas--the value curve--is a tool the authors created in their consulting work and have written about in previous HBR articles. This article introduces a four-step process for actually drawing and discussing a strategy canvas. Readers will learn how one European financial services company used this process to create a distinct and easily communicable strategy. The process begins with a visual awakening. Managers compare their business's value curve with competitors' to discover where their strategy needs to change. In the next step--visual exploration--managers do field research on customers and alternative products. At the visual strategy fair, the third step, managers draw new strategic profiles based on field observations and get feedback from customers and peers about these new proposals. Once the best strategy is created from that feedback, it's time for the last step--visual communication. Executives distribute "before" and "after" strategic profiles to the whole company, and only projects that will help move the company closer to the "after" profile are supported.     

Product market competition,competitive strategy,and analyst coverage

This paper examines how product market competition and strategic interactions among peer firms influence analyst coverage. First, we hypothesize that product market competition increases both the demand and supply of analyst coverage. Using three variations of industry concentration ratios and a firm specific measure of competition, we test and find a positive and significant effect of market competition on analyst coverage. Second, we explore an information transfer channel through which product market affects analyst coverage. We hypothesize that information flows more freely among firms selling similar products. Such information flows lowers analyst information collection and processing costs, which in turn increases analyst coverage. Using product similarity index developed by Hoberg and Phillips (J Polit Econ 124(5):1423–1465, 2016) to capture the effect of information transfer, we find that analyst coverage increases with product similarity. Third we examine the role of competitive strategy in analyst coverage. We split our sample into markets of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. We find that the effect of market competition and analyst coverage is more pronounced in markets where firms compete as strategic complements.     

Industry aspects of takeovers and divestitures: Evidence from the UK

This paper examines takeover and divestiture activity at the industry level for the population of UK firms over the period 1986–2000. Consistent with US research, takeovers in the UK cluster both across industries and over time. The evidence for divestitures indicates clustering across industries only. The paper further investigates whether broad and specific industry shocks (e.g., growth, free cash flow, concentration, deregulation, foreign competition, technology, stock market performance) explain takeover and divestiture clustering at the industry level. The results suggest that broad shocks increase (decrease) the likelihood of takeovers (divestitures), although not significantly for takeovers. Specific industry shocks that increase the likelihood of takeover activity include low growth, the threat of foreign competition and high stock market performance. For divestitures, high industry concentration and deregulation increase activity. Little evidence is found for deregulation as a significant factor in explaining takeover activity.     

First-mover advantage,time to finance,and cash holdings

We examine the strategic role of cash in a two-stage competition model featuring a first-mover advantage in product markets and time delays in outside financing. Due to the joint effect of the first-mover advantage, time to finance, market profitability, participation cost, and the arrival rate of investment opportunities, large cash holdings can arise in equilibrium in both concentrated and diffuse industries, leading to a rich relation between industry concentration and cash holdings. The model also reveals novel interactions of these drivers of cash holdings that are consistent with empirical evidence. Furthermore, despite that cash is held to enable fast responses to investment opportunities, the correlation between cash holdings and realized investment is low. Our model provides an explanation for the large variation in cash holdings across industries and over time, and the strong correlation between cash holdings and R&D.     

Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence

We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance-based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.     

Competitive environment and innovation intensity

We find a U-shaped relation between industry concentration and innovation. The relation is driven by neck-and-neck industries where firms operate with similar productivity. When industry concentration is low, innovation intensity decreases as concentration increases. However, when industry concentration is high, increased concentration causes industry firms to increase innovation intensity to escape competition. The U-shaped relation is more pronounced in industries where firms compete in strategic substitutes. Using tariff rate reductions as an exogenous shock to the competitive environment, firms in neck-and-neck industries and industries where firms compete in strategic substitutes respond to foreign competitive threats by increasing innovation intensity.     

The effect on competition of banking sector consolidation following the financial crisis of 2008

Consolidation of the Spanish banking sector after the financial crisis of 2008 raises concerns about potential negative effects on competition. I use structural econometric methods to examine these anti-competitive concerns in the Spanish mortgage market. I estimate a mixed-logit model of mortgage demand and recover bank-level cost information with a strategic model of price competition. Counterfactual experiments reveal that the observed increase in concentration is associated only with small variations in mortgage rates and market shares, staying far from collusive levels. This moderate change in industry conduct implies a small direct effect of consolidation on bank exposures to mortgage risk.     

Competition and the cost of debt

This paper empirically shows that the cost of bank debt is systematically higher for firms that operate in competitive product markets. Using various proxies for product market competition, and reductions of import tariff rates to capture exogenous changes to a firm's competitive environment, I find that competition has a significantly positive effect on the cost of bank debt. Moreover, the analysis reveals that the effect of competition is greater in industries in which small firms face financially strong rivals, in industries with intense strategic interactions between firms, and in illiquid industries. Overall, these findings suggest that banks price financial contracts by taking into account the risk that arises from product market competition.     

我国保险业的行业竞争结构研究——基于战略群组的分析

本研究尝试将战略群组研究应用于我国保险行业的竞争结构分析中,努力将其转化为企业可实际操作的竞争分析工具。在确定关键战略与资源变量的基础上,首先采用阶层式聚类方法,将行业内具有相同战略与资源的企业划分为战略群组;进而利用最优尺度变化的多维尺度分析与空间计量方法创建行业战略地图,将行业内的市场竞争格局显性化,帮助研究者与管理者更加直观和有效地进行动态环境分析和竞争战略制定。     

Does the Momentum Strategy Work at the Industry Level? Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market

This article examines the effectiveness of momentum strategy at the industry level in the Chinese stock market. We find that the intermediate-horizon momentum effect is stronger in industries with higher competition. This effect is consistent with the hypothesis that information contained in firms from highly competitive industries is vague and hence leaves more space for behavioral biases, which leads to the momentum effect. Alternatively, the measure of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index potentially captures the size effect in explaining this phenomenon. Moreover, concentrated industries experience a pronounced lead-lag effect of big firms on small firms, which is a potential explanation for the contrarian strategy. We do find that the short-horizon contrarian effect is pronounced in highly concentrated industries.     

Real and Financial Industry Booms and Busts

We examine how product market competition affects firm cash flows and stock returns in industry booms and busts. Our results show how real and financial factors interact in industry business cycles. In competitive industries, we find that high industry-level stock market valuation, investment, and financing are followed by sharply lower operating cash flows and abnormal stock returns. Analyst estimates are positively biased and returns comove more. In concentrated industries these relations are weak and generally insignificant. Our results are consistent with participants in competitive industries not fully internalizing the negative externality of industry competition on cash flows and stock returns.     

Competition and stability in the credit industry: Banking vs. factoring industries

Over the last decade, most credit-industries registered a decline in lending volumes, while factoring industries instead registered a substantial growth in terms of turnover. Surprisingly, only a handful of papers so far investigate factoring companies. Do factoring firms display the same stability levels of banks? Is the competition similar in factoring and banking industries? Is the relationship between competition and stability the same in these industries? Focusing on Italy (one of the largest factoring and banking markets in Europe) and using a unique dataset, we show three main results: factoring companies are (on average) more stable than banks; 2) the stability of factoring companies increase when competition declines (competition-fragility view); 3) the competition-fragility view is weaker in the factoring industry than in the banking industry. Our findings indicate that competition in the Italian credit industry was greater in factoring than in banking.     

Product market competition and conditional conservatism

Based on pooled cross-sectional analysis, we find a robust positive relation between product market competition and conditional accounting conservatism. We also find evidence of an inter-temporal increase in conditional conservatism following industry deregulation and increased antitrust case filings. Distinguishing further between two dimensions of competition, we find conditional conservatism is greater when there is a higher threat of new entrants as well as stiff existing competition. Moreover, we find these results largely hold for industry followers as opposed to industry leaders, suggesting that strategic considerations shape the extent to which product market competition affects conditional conservatism.     

Competition,Financial Intermediation,and Riskiness of Banks: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Region

From a sample of commercial banks in the Asia-Pacific region over the 1994–2009 period, this study highlights that banks in less competitive markets exhibit lower loan growth and higher instability. Such instability is further followed by a decline in deposit growth, suggesting that Asian banks are also subject to indirect market discipline mechanisms through bank competition. This study therefore sheds light on the importance of enhancing bank competition to overcome bank risk and strengthen financial intermediation. Likewise, this study advocates the importance of strengthening market discipline to reduce bank riskiness regardless of the degree of competition in the banking industry.     

关于金融支持战略性新兴产业问题的调查与思考

战略性新兴产业对提升产业水平和市场竞争力,拉动经济长期可持续增长意义重大,金融作为现代经济的核心,对战略性新兴产业做大做强更具有催化效应。通过对吉林省金融支持战略性新兴产业情况进行深入调研,我们发现：吉林省金融支持战略性新兴产业的力度在不断加大,金融产品和服务创新步伐在不断加快,但制约金融支持的内外部因素仍需多方合力予以破解。     

Product market competition and analyst forecasting activity: International evidence

In this study, we investigate how product market competition affects the extent of analyst following and the properties of analyst forecasts. Using a broad sample of firms from 37 countries over the 1990–2008 period, we find that firms that operate in more concentrated industries and with stronger pricing power are associated with greater analyst following, higher forecast accuracy, and lower forecast dispersion. Moreover, the effect of product market power on analyst following and forecast properties is more pronounced in countries with less effective competition laws and higher entry costs. These findings suggest that high industry concentration and a dominant market position enhance the earnings predictability of firms and lower their information uncertainty, and that country-level institutions that promote competition effectively constrain the power in product markets.