交叉持股对双渠道供应链定价和利润的影响

基于Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析占主导的制造商和传统零售商交叉持股对单一传统渠道、网上直销双渠道和网上分销双渠道三种渠道结构下供应链定价和渠道决策的影响。研究表明:制造商增加对传统零售商的持股份额有利于提升制造商和供应链收益,但会降低传统零售商收益,传统零售商增加对制造商的持股份额有利于提升自身收益,但并不影响供应链收益;当线下线上市场份额相差较大时,网上直销双渠道结构下制造商的利润高于网上分销双渠道高于单一传统渠道;传统零售商利润的高低主要受持股份额的影响,当传统零售商对制造商的持股份额较大时,网上直销双渠道结构下传统零售商的利润高于网上分销双渠道高于单一传统渠道。     

电子商务环境下零售商分销渠道的选择

针对电子商务环境下的产品分销渠道,研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中零售商分销渠道的选择问题。运用主从博弈和Hotelling模型,分别建立了单一线下渠道模型和在同价策略下的双渠道模型,通过对模型的分析,给出了零售商选择不同分销渠道的条件。研究表明:制造商会积极促使零售商选择线上线下双渠道;构建线上渠道的运营成本会影响零售商的渠道选择。研究结果对零售商的渠道选择有一定的指导意义。     

专利授权经销商再制造的双渠道闭环供应链协调研究

将专利授权经销商再制造纳入双渠道协调研究中,利用博弈论对一个制造商和一个经销商组成的双渠道闭环供应链模型进行了分析。研究发现非合作独立决策下,供应链系统未达到最优,为此设计了一个两部收费契约来有效协调双渠道闭环供应链。     

基于部分收益共享契约的双渠道供应链协调

构建了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链模型,其中制造商和零售商均拥有网络销售渠道,零售商为Stackelberg对策博弈的主方。分析、比较了集中式和分散式决策下双渠道供应链的最优均衡解,并从制造商与零售商合作的角度,对传统收益共享契约进行了改进,并论证了这种契约能够实现双渠道供应链的协调。最后通过算例分析,进一步验证了所改进的收益共享契约的有效性。     

双渠道供应链库存协调的回购策略

在双渠道供应链中,制造商既通过传统零售渠道又通过网络直销渠道将产品销售给最终消费者。因此,制造商既是零售商的供应商同时又是其直接竞争者,为了避免“渠道冲突”他们之间需要建立协调机制。考虑由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的双渠道供应链。在两个渠道都面临随机需求的条件下,对两渠道之间的库存协调和利益分配问题展开研究。结果表明,在仅由零售商做出集中库存决策的模式下,引入回购策略能够同时解决双渠道供应链的库存协调和利益分配问题。最后,通过数值分析进一步验证结论。     

基于双渠道闭环供应链的退役飞机回收决策分析

针对目前国内关于退役飞机回收与处理仍未形成完备体系的问题，从理论出发建立了由航材制造商、飞机制造商、第三方回收商构成的双渠道闭环供应链模型，通过博弈论研究分别由航材制造商、飞机制造商、第三方回收商主导以及集中决策下的供应链回收情况。研究结果表明，由于分散决策下处于领导地位的供应链决策者均以自身利益最大化为原则进行决策，导致供应链整体效益下降；而在集中决策下，供应链各参与方信息共享，共同决策，因此供应链系统可以在集中决策下达到经济效益与环境效益的双重优势。最后，利用数值分析探讨了不同权力结构与模型参数对双渠道闭环供应链模型的影响。     

供应链视角下的分销渠道冲突管理

市场竞争实质上是供应链之间的竞争,而分销渠道是供应链中从制造商到消费者的重要部分。制造商只有从分销渠道组织结构的创新、渠道成员关系的再造、渠道管理模式的选择和逆向分销渠道的构建,通过彼此的优势互补和资源共享才能解决分销渠道冲突。     

电子商务环境下供应链的最优销售渠道策略

在电子商务环境下,考虑了网络直销和传统零售两种销售渠道,建立了同时考虑价格和服务水平的双渠道供应链模型,研究了集中式和分散式供应链的最优销售渠道策略,探讨了双渠道供应链成员的销售价格和服务水平决策、制造商和零售商的利润分配以及销售渠道的选择等,并应用Stackelberg博弈理论,分析了占优制造商的最优销售渠道选择策略。     

基于渠道竞争的双渠道供应链低碳协调策略

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的双渠道供应链,将渠道竞争和产品的低碳性能引入消费者的非线性需求中,通过构建制造商为主导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析了分散决策和集中决策下的最优定价、碳排放水平和成员利润,并采用价格折扣-成本分摊契约实现了供应链的协调。研究结果表明:在分散决策和集中决策两种情况下,渠道竞争程度的增加均会造成碳排放水平、供应链利润和消费者效用的降低;集中决策下的直销价格大于分散决策下的直销价格,集中决策下的零售价格小于分散决策下的零售价格。最后通过算例验证了以上结论和协调机制的有效性。     

“互联网+”背景下双渠道供应链库存策略探讨北大核心

"互联网+"的提出使得研究双渠道供应链库存这一理论热点具有重要的意义。基于制造商双渠道和零售商双渠道的视角来研究双渠道供应链的库存策略问题,选择以报童模型为框架探讨两种类型的双渠道下集中和分散库存控制时的最优库存量,研究发现,集中库存下的制造商双渠道可以使得供应链系统达到最优,实现库存总量最低和供应链整体利润水平最高,且制造商和零售商实现了合理的利润分配。     

基于信息共享的供应链定价策略及利润增值研究

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的供应链系统,在非线性市场需求的前提下,应用博弈理论对供应链系统的定价策略进行了分析,分别得出信息共享时的博弈均衡解和信息不共享时的博弈均衡解;进一步分析了信息共享程度的大小与批发价、零售价以及双方利润之间的关系,得出信息共享程度越高,制造商和零售商的利润越大,信息共享实现了帕累托改进。最后,通过实例对结论进行了验证。     

Pricing policy and coordination for a two-layer supply chain of duopolistic retailers and socially responsible manufacturer

This paper explores channel coordination and profit distribution in a two-layer socially responsible supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and two competitive retailers. In manufacturer-Stackelberg game setting, the manufacturer exhibits corporate social responsibility and the retailers play Cournot and Collusion games. Besides comparing the optimal decisions of the retailers two game behaviours, the paper analyses the effects of social responsibility on the optimal decisions. It is found that two-part tariff contract resolves channel conflict and provides win–win outcome for a specific range of the franchise fee and it is always possible to find a particular profit split using Nash bargaining product. With increasing social responsibility of the manufacturer, the coordinated wholesale prices of the manufacturer may be both decreasing or ‘U’ shaped and decreasing when the market potentials of the retailers are almost the same or significantly different. Also, at least one coordinated wholesale price is less than the manufacturer's marginal cost. The proposed model is illustrated by a numerical example.     

Retail pricing: Does channel length matter?

The number of intermediary levels between a manufacturer and the final market in a distribution channel varies from industry to industry. In some cases, none are used (i.e. the distribution function is vertically integrated), while several middleman levels are used in other cases (e.g. the use of a wholesaler, a jobber, and a retailer in the distribution of meat). In this paper we examine the effect of competition on the profit-maximizing length of the distribution channel. We find that the optimal number of middleman levels increases with the substitutability of products in the market, but that there are institutional limits on the maximum number of levels in a channel. The analysis also suggests that differences in the objectives of channel members (e.g. the maximization of total channel profit versus the maximization of each member's individual profit) affect optimal channel length: a goal of total channel profit maximization produces a channel at least as long as one of individual (non-co-operative) member profit maximization. The work thus complements existing research focusing on intra-channel (e.g. cost-based) explanations of channel length, using a framework similar to those investigating competitive incentives for vertical integration in distribution.     

The Profit‐Maximizing Case for Corporate Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly

We analyze a stylized distribution channel (bilateral monopoly) model where an upstream manufacturer sells output to a downstream retailer. In a two‐stage linear demand game setting, we show that a two‐part contract, consisting of a wholesale price and corporate social responsibility (CSR) component, can be utilized by the manufacturer to fully coordinate and control its retailer. Thus, a CSR contract can be used in place of the traditional two‐part tariff scheme (wholesale price and fixed franchise fee) to optimally coordinate the marketing channel. Our model provides a novel theoretical profit‐maximizing rationale for the strategic use of CSR. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

航空公司直销渠道竞合博弈与利益分配研究

各大航空公司纷纷结盟支付宝等第三方支付平台,实现航空公司官网机票直销业务,以期降低分销成本,提高收益;可以预见直销将逐步成为航空公司机票销售的主要渠道。论文首先引入航空公司直销渠道竞争与合作静态一次博弈模型,分析了博弈的结果,从而得到航空公司直销渠道合作与竞争的纳什均衡策略。航空公司之间的博弈是一种长期博弈,因此在静态一次性博弈基础上,建立航空公司直销渠道竞争与合作的动态重复博弈模型,博弈结果是要求航空公司应该采取长期合作策略。最后,分析航空公司之间利益分配问题以及长期合作可能存在的问题和解决建议。     

Postponement strategy for international transfer of products in a global supply chain: A system dynamics examination

This paper contributes to research on “postponement” strategy in the context of a global production–distribution system of an automobile manufacturer. It proposes a model that integrates multiple considerations germane to global supply chains. Postponement is important in this context because it is necessary to consider international transfers and tariffs, and it is important to appropriately account for the impact of postponement on total costs. Consideration of several key variables such as shipping point, customs tariff, and cost differences between countries is essential to derive full benefits from postponement strategy in global supply chains. International transfer of goods among countries in global automobile industry is complex and dynamic because of the multitude of factors that must be considered. The paper develops insights regarding postponement strategy in global supply chains via a system dynamics simulation model. The model draws on the experiences of a Korean automobile manufacturer with operations in developing and developed countries.     

中国电影序列发行物流的时间战略分析

通过对电影的序列发行窗口进行分析，借鉴国外分析模型．从发行商的角度对影院和音像制品两个序列发行窗口的利润进行计算，认为影片的序列发行时间战略不能一概而论，需要根据每部影片在不同发行窗口的利润预期进行选择。最后分析了中国电影提前开启后续窗口的原因，并对繁荣中国电影市场提出了相关建议。     

Retail market structure and the threat by the manufacturer to sell goods directly to the consumer

When a manufacturer and its retailers and consumers are spatially separated, the retailers’ market size may be limited by the manufacturer who provides consumers with an option to purchase goods directly from them. The manufacturer uses this tactic to increase profit when a few retailers dominate the market. The mill price of a manufacturer, that is, the price of the good at delivery from a manufacturer’s factory, is critical under these circumstances.If the manufacturer charges a franchise fee, thus absorbing the retailer’s profit, this fee is a function of the mill price. Mill price policy can be used to maximize profit on the sale of goods and collection of the franchise fee. The resulting retail market structure becomes preferable for the manufacturer and consumers since the manufacturer’s profit is larger, as is the quantity purchased, compared with a competitive equilibrium in which every firm entering the market area is assumed to move its location instantly without cost.