A note on the equilibrium theory of economies with asymmetric information

In this note, we give an equilibrium existence theorem for exchange economies with asymmetric information and with an infinite dimensional commodity space. In our model, we assume that preferences are represented by well behaved utility functions, the positive cone has a non empty interior and the individual rational utility set is compact. Our result complements the corresponding one in Podczeck and Yannelis (2008), in the sense that is applicable to commodity spaces in which the order intervals are (possibly) not compact with respect to any Hausdorff linear topology.     

Existence of equilibria in economies with externalities and non-convexities in an infinite-dimensional commodity space

We prove an equilibrium existence theorem for economies with externalities, general types of non-convexities in the production sector, and infinitely many commodities. The consumption sets, the preferences of the consumers, and the production possibilities are represented by set-valued mappings to take into account the external effects. The firms set their prices according to general pricing rules which are supposed to have bounded losses and may depend upon the actions of the other economic agents. The commodity space is L_∞(M,M,μ), the space of all μ-essentially bounded M-measurable functions on M.As for our existence result, we consider the framework of Bewley (1972). However, there are four major problems in using this technique. To overcome two of these difficulties, we impose strong lower hemi-continuity assumptions upon the economies. The remaining problems are removed when the finite economies are large enough.Our model encompasses previous works on the existence of general equilibria when there are externalities and non-convexities but the commodity space is finite dimensional and those on general equilibria in non-convex economies with infinitely many commodities when no external effect is taken into account.     

A remark on the existence of equilibria in markets without ordered preferences and with a Riesz space of commodities

We show the existence of competitive equilibria in economies without ordered preferences and a Hausdorff locally convex solid Riesz space of commodities. Our principal assumptions are that the commodity space has a predual and that its positive cone has a non-empty interior.     

Equilibrium theory with a measure space of possibly satiated consumers

Walras equilibria may not exist when consumers’ preferences are possibly satiated. To overcome this difficulty, several extended notions of equilibria have been proposed and all reduce to Walras equilibria under nonsatiation and free disposal. This includes the notions of equilibria with slack (also called dividend equilibria) as by Drèze and Müller [J. Economic Theory 23 (1980) 131], Makarov [J. Mathematical Economics 8 (1981) 87], Aumann and Drèze [Econometrica 54 (1986) 1271], Mas-Colell [Equilibrium theory with possibly satiated preferences, in: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Proceedings of the Essays in Honour of David Gale on Equilibrium and Dynamics, Macmillan, London, pp. 201–213], monetary equilibria as by Kajii [J. Mathematical Economics 25 (1996) 75], or weak equilibria as by Polemarchakis and Siconolfi [J. Mathematical Economics 22 (1993) 85], which are all defined when there are finitely many consumers. This includes also the notion of free disposal equilibrium, when markets clear in a weak sense, allowing free disposal. Our paper considers an economy with a measure space of consumers and provides a general existence result of equilibria for the various existing notions. This result extends in particular the result by Hildenbrand [Econometrica 38 (1970) 608] on the existence of Walras equilibria.     

An adjustment process for nonconvex production economies

We prove the existence of a path of market conditions, i.e. combinations of market prices and production quantities, that links any arbitrarily chosen market condition with an equilibrium, in a general equilibrium model with possibly nonconvex production technologies based on Villar [Villar, A., 1994. Equilibrium with nonconvex production technologies. Economic Theory 4, 629–638] and Villar [Villar, A., 1999. Equilibrium and Efficiency in Production Economies, second ed., Springer Verlag, Berlin]. This existence theorem holds for any semi-algebraic version of the model and the adjustment of market conditions along the path can be given an economic interpretation as a tâtonnement process. Any such path can be approximated arbitrarily close by applying a simplicial algorithm. By restarting this algorithm in a different market condition, we may find more than one equilibrium.     

Core equivalence theorem: countably many types of agents and commodities in $\vec{L}^{1}(\mu)$

Abstract  We prove a core-Walras equivalence result for a finitely additive confederate economy with commodity space L¹(μ) and a measurable bounded map of extremely desirable commodities: when the map of extremely desirable commodities is simply bounded the properness of preferences is no longer equivalent to the existence of just one extremely desirable commodity as assumed in the countably additive model by Rustichini and Yannelis. Mathematics Subject Classification: 91B50, 91B54; 28B20, 46A22, 28A25 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D51; C02     

经济学中一般均衡存在性问题理论述评

本文对经济学中一般均衡理论进行了概述。文中主要介绍了Arrow—Debreu经济模型、均衡存在性定理、存在性涸题在无穷维商品空间上的扩展以及相关工作。     

The Aubin private core of differential information economies

Abstract We establish characterizations of Radner equilibrium allocations via private core notions in the framework of differential information economies with a finite number of states of nature and a measure space of agents that may have atoms. The commodity space is an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone admits an interior point. We introduce the notion of Aubin private core and prove that it provides a characterization of Radner equilibrium allocations. We show that the Aubin private core is equivalent to Edgeworth private equilibria and to privately non-dominated allocations of suitable associated economies. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B50, 91B44 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D51, D82, D11     

Nonlinear supporting prices : The superadditive case

Assumptions on allocations and preferences sufficient to allow superadditive price support are considered for an exchange economy with a finite number of traders when the commodity space is an ordered topological vector space. The main requirements are a uniformmonotonicity assumption on preferences and that no permutation of the allocation among agents yields a Pareto improvement. No convexity assumption on preferences is used, the positive orthant need not have interior, while the proof is constructive. Applications to finite and infinite dimensional commodity spaces are discussed.     

Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences

We extend a theorem of G. Debreu on the existence of equilibrium in a generalized N-person game (‘A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem’). Applying standard techniques the result can be used to prove the existence of equilibrium in economies with interdependent preferences, price-dependent preferences and preferences which may be both non-transitive and non-complete. This generalizes a recent theorem of A. Mas-Colell.     

Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences and with a measure space of agents

We report a generalization of Aumann's (1966) existence theorem to economies without ordered preferences and with externalities in consumption. Our work can alternatively be viewed as a generalization of the Shafer–Sonnenschein (1975) theorem to economies with a continuum of agents.     

Equilibria in vector lattices without ordered preferences or uniform properness

This paper extends a result by Mas-Colell and Richard (Journal of Economic Theory, 1991, 53, 1–11) on the existence of an equilibrium for exchange economies over a vector lattice to cover non-ordered preferences. Moreover, it is shown that the uniformity requirement in the properness assumption made by these authors can be weakened. Furthermore, it is shown that, as a consequence of properness, an equilibrium allocation which is supported by a discontinuous prices can also be supported by continuous prices.     

Theorems on the core of an economy with infinitely many commodities and consumers

It is known that the classical theorems of Grodal [Grodal, B., 1972. A second remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 581–583] and Schmeidler [Schmeidler, D., 1972. A remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 579–580] on the veto power of small coalitions in finite dimensional, atomless economies can be extended (with some minor modifications) to include the case of countably many commodities. This paper presents a further extension of these results to include the case of uncountably many commodities. We also extend Vind’s [Vind, K., 1972. A third remark on the core of an atomless economy. Econometrica 40, 585–586] classical theorem on the veto power of big coalitions in finite dimensional, atomless economies to include the case of an arbitrary number of commodities. In another result, we show that in the coalitional economy defined by an atomless individualistic model, core–Walras equivalence holds even if the commodity space is non-separable. The above-mentioned results are also valid for a differential information economy with a finite state space. We also extend Kannai’s [Kannai, Y., 1970. Continuity properties of the core of a market. Econometrica 38, 791–815] theorem on the continuity of the core of a finite dimensional, large economy to include the case of an arbitrary number of commodities. All of our results are applications of a lemma, that we prove here, about the set of aggregate alternatives available to a coalition. Throughout the paper, the commodity space is assumed to be an ordered Banach space which has an interior point in its positive cone.     

Equilibria in a large production economy with an infinite dimensional commodity space and price dependent preferences

We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a production economy with infinitely many commodities and a measure space of agents whose preferences are price dependent. We employ a saturated measure space for the set of agents and apply recent results for an infinite dimensional separable Banach space such as Lyapunov’s convexity theorem and an exact Fatou’s lemma to obtain the result.     

Credit market segmentation,essentiality of commodities,and supermodularity

We consider incomplete market economies where agents are subject to price-dependent trading constraints compatible with credit market segmentation. Equilibrium existence is guaranteed when either commodities are essential, i.e, indifference curves through individuals’ endowments do not intersect the boundary of the consumption set, or utility functions are concave and supermodular. The smoothness of mappings representing preferences, financial promises, or trading constraints is not required. Hence, we may include in our framework economies where ambiguity is allowed and agents maximize the minimum expected utility over a set of priors, or where markets include non-recourse collateralized loans.     

Core equivalence with differentiated commodities

This paper presents improved core equivalence results for atomless economies with differentiated commodities in the framework of Ostroy and Zame (1994). Commodity bundles are elements of the space $M\left(K\right)$ of signed Borel measures on a compact space $K$ of commodity characteristics. Ostroy and Zame provide two sufficient conditions for core equivalence: It is sufficient that markets are “physically thick”, so that there are many suppliers of every commodity, or that markets are “economically thick”, so that consumers are sufficiently willing to substitute commodities with a similar composition for each other. The sufficient conditions in Ostroy and Zame (1994) all imply that there are “many more agents than commodities”, an idea of Aumann that was formalized and discussed in Tourky and Yannelis (2001) and Greinecker and Podczeck (2016). We generalize the framework in Ostroy and Zame (1994) and weaken their sufficient conditions to not imply the presence of “many more agents than commodities”. In particular, we drop the requirement that $K$ is metrizable from the basic model, the requirement of an uniform bound on endowments from the condition of “physically thick markets”, and the requirement that preferences are weak${}^1$-continuous from the condition of “economically thick markets”. Core equivalence still holds, showing that “many more agents than commodities” are not needed for core equivalence in models of commodity differentiation.     

On Vind’s theorem for an economy with atoms and infinitely many commodities

We extend Vind’s classical theorem on the measure of blocking coalitions valid in finite dimensional atomless economies (see Vind (1972)), to include the possibility of infinitely many commodities as well as the presence of atoms. The commodity space is assumed to be an ordered Banach space which has possibly the empty positive cone. The lack of interior points is compensated by an additional assumption of a cone of arbitrage that allows us to use Lyapunov’s convexity theorem in its weak form. The measure space of agents involves both negligible and non negligible traders. The extension is proved in the general class of Aubin coalitions for which a suitable version of Grodal’s result (Grodal (1972)) is also formulated. Our results wish to point out the relevance of cone conditions dealing with blocking coalitions of arbitrary measure or weight.     

Inconsequential arbitrage

We introduce the concept of inconsequential arbitrage and, in the context of a model allowing short-sales and half-lines in indifference surfaces, prove that inconsequential arbitrage is sufficient for existence of equilibrium. Moreover, with a slightly stronger condition of nonsatiation than that required for existence of equilibrium and with a mild uniformity condition on arbitrage opportunities, we show that inconsequential arbitrage, the existence of a Pareto optimal allocation, and compactness of the set of utility possibilities are equivalent. Thus, when all equilibria are Pareto optimal — for example, when local nonsatiation holds — inconsequential arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for existence of an equilibrium. By further strengthening our nonsatiation condition, we obtain a second welfare theorem for exchange economies allowing short sales.Finally, we compare inconsequential arbitrage to the conditions limiting arbitrage of Hart [Hart, O.D., 1974. J. Econ. Theory 9, 293–311], Werner [Werner, J., 1987. Econometrica 55, abs1403–1418], Dana et al. [Dana, R.A., Le Van, C., Magnien, F., 1999. J. Econ. Theory 87, 169–193] and Allouch [Allouch, N., 1999. Equilibrium and no market arbitrage. CERMSEM, Universite de Paris I]. For example, we show that the condition of Hart (translated to a general equilibrium setting) and the condition of werner are equivalent. We then show that the Hart/Werner conditions imply inconsequential arbitrage. To highlight the extent to which we extend Hart and Werner, we construct an example of an exchange economy in which inconsequential arbitrage holds (and is necessary and sufficient for existence), while the Hart/Werner conditions do not hold.     

Arbitrage and equilibrium in economies with infinitely many commodities

An ‘arbitrage opportunity’ for a class of agents is a commodity bundle that will increase the utility of any of the agents and that has non-positive price. The non-existence of ‘arbitrage opportunities’ is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an economic equilibrium. A bundle is ‘priced by arbitrage’ if there is a unique price that it can command without causing an ‘arbitrage opportunity’ to exist. For economies that have infinitely many commodities, appropriate notions of ‘arbitrage opportunities’ and ‘bundles priced by arbitrage’ depend on the continuity of agents’ preferences. This paper develops these notions, thereby providing a foundation for recent work in financial theory concerning arbitrage in continuous-time models of securities markets.     

Unique induced preference representations

Machina [Machina, M.J., 1984. Temporal risk and the nature of induced preferences. Journal of Economic Theory 33, 199–231] considers an individual who has to choose from a set of alternative temporal uncertain prospects, and must take an action before the uncertainty is resolved, seeking to maximize the expected value of an (action determined) von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index. It is natural to ask if the set of underlying von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices can be uniquely recovered solely on the basis of the thus induced (ordinal) preferences over temporal prospects. Machina’s conclusion is that “ordinal preferences alone will not suffice.” However, we show that it is possible to recover the action–utility set inducing the preferences uniquely if we restrict attention to action–utility sets for which no two actions induce the same preference relation on the space of temporal prospects, no action is redundant, and no action leads to a risk free outcome.