Trade Barriers and Participation in the Global Value Chain: An Empirical Study Based on Anti‐dumping toward China

This paper investigates the effects of trade barriers on China's participation in the global value chain (GVC) using a thorough decomposition approach for trade volume, total exports, final exports and intermediate exports. Our econometric results indicate that anti‐dumping (AD) measures initiated by trade partners have restrained the process of China's participation in the GVC. From 2000 to 2014, AD measures reduced the foreign value‐added rate of total, final and intermediate exports by 4.5 to 28.7 percent, 3.4 to 17 percent and 1.2 to 8.5 percent, respectively. In addition, suffering the effects of AD measures, China's GVC position index declined by 8.2 percent to 28.6 percent during this period. Moreover, AD measures have increased industries' upstream index by 3.2 to 13.7 percent over the same period. These results imply that both the petition and approval of AD cases has had a negative influence on the extent and position of China's GVC participation.     

Estimating Chinese Trade Relationships with the Silk Road Countries

In this paper we discuss the extent to which countries in the former Silk Road regions are either reaching or failing to reach their trading potential with China. We estimate a gravity model of trade using a Poisson pseudo‐maximum likelihood estimator, and estimate trade potential using in‐sample, out‐of‐sample and counterfactual approaches. We compare trade potential using these three methods for Silk Road country trades with China. Next, we compare the estimated trade potential to actual trade, and find that most Silk Road countries are underperforming in their trade with China. However, trade performance against potential improved for most countries over the years 1990–2013. Our results suggest that China's former Silk Road trading partners have yet to realize the full potential benefits of China's economic growth but that the gap may be narrowing.     

Why Chinese Exports Face So Many Trade Remedy Actions: An Empirical Study Based on Multi‐country and Multi‐industry Data

This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the large number of trade remedy actions taken against China. Using a multi‐country and multi‐industry dataset, the present paper shows that the macroeconomic situation of China's partners has a great influence on the probability of trade frictions arising with China. Moreover, the more powerful the industry is, the more likely it is to take trade remedy actions against China. The empirical results reveal that China has been hurt under the operating mechanism of the WTO, and the number of free trade agreements is negatively related to the initiation and approval of trade remedy actions. Basically, the determinants for countervailing and double remedy measures are identical, while they are different from determinants of antidumping measures. Accordingly, strengthening communication with trade partners will alleviate friction between China and its trade partners. Meanwhile, making use of foreign lobbies' power, actively integrating into the international trading system and participating in regional trade agreements are effective ways for China to deal with the “new normal” of trade frictions.     

Reorganization of Intra‐ASEAN 5 Trade Flows: The ‘China Factor’*

There are claims that China's influence on ASEAN is direct in that she has encouraged more exports to flow into her huge markets and changed trade flows among member countries. Demand and supply are thus deemed to have become more China‐centered. This study therefore explores the plausibility of China as a ‘factor’ that influences bilateral intra‐ASEAN 5 trade flows through demand (exporting country) and supply (importing country). The results imply that China's integration in the region increases the size of the key ASEAN member economies export market. There is also no indication that import sourcing from China by ASEAN 5 countries reduces export expansion within the latter. The results accord with the fact that although China has become an important export destination and an import source for individual ASEAN 5 countries, this has not reduced intra‐ASEAN 5 trade.     

Remedy or Poison: Impacts of China's Outward Direct Investment on Its Exports

During the past decade, China's outward direct investment (ODI) and exports have experienced rapid growth, drawing increasing attention to the relationship between them. Using the gravity model based on panel data on China's ODI and trade to 174 countries and regions during 2003–2012, the present paper investigates the impacts of China's ODI on exports. We find that China's ODI to a host country significantly promotes China's trade with that economy: a 10‐percent increase in ODI stock can lead to a 2.14‐percent increase in exports, a 2.07‐percent increase in imports and a 2.87‐percent increase in net exports. The scale of the host country's economy, its infrastructure and its distance to China also have significant impacts on China's exports. Therefore, growth in ODI will facilitate China's trade and integration into the global economy, and enhance industrial upgrading in China by transferring the low‐end industries abroad.     

Impact of temporary trade barriers: Evidence from China

With a decrease in tariffs around the world, temporary trade barriers (TTBs) have increased dramatically to take their place. These TTBs are usually in the form of antidumping duties, countervailing duties and global safeguards. Recently, an increasing number of these TTBs have been targeted towards China. In this paper, I explore the impact of the US temporary trade barriers (TTBs) on Chinese exports. Using detailed product level data for the period 2002–2008, I find robust evidence of trade deflection i.e. the US trade barriers against China led to an increase in the growth of Chinese exports to other countries. However, I do not find any evidence of trade depression. The results are robust to a wide variety of specification and robustness tests. While I do not find any difference in the impact of TTBs across developed and developing countries, there is considerable heterogeneity in response to TTBs depending on the type of products involved. Specifically, I find that, while the US TTBs on non-steel products lead to an increase in Chinese exports of those products to third markets, there is a significant chilling effect in case of steel. Finally, most of the trade-deflection seems to be along the intensive margins i.e. an increase in exports to the existing third country markets rather than exports to new markets. If anything, the US TTBs on China seem to decrease Chinese exports to newer and more volatile markets.     

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information

Trade liberalization under GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection, possibly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping. This article investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework, in which the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. We show that by designing a tariff schedule contingent on firms' cost reports and accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeed in implementing the full‐information, governmental welfare‐maximizing duty. The antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may thus not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.     

Trade,Investment and Economic Interdependence between South Korea and China*

The Korean economy has been significantly affected by the emergence of China. It is now the largest market for Korean exports and a major supplier of its low‐cost imports but has at the same time become a serious challenger to Korea in the world markets for manufacturing exports. This paper investigates changes in China's export structure and its effect on Korea, and bilateral trade between the two. It also examines the motives for Korean investment in China and its effect on bilateral trade and cross‐border production networks.     

Empirical Analysis of the Structure of Sino-US Agricultural Trade

This paper empirically analyzes the structure of agricultural trade between China and the USA from 1996 to 2005, using different trade indexes such as the Grubel—Lloyd Index, the Revealed Comparative Advantage Index, the Finger—Kreinin Similitude Index and the Export Diversification Index, with a focus on the issues impeding Sino‐US agricultural trade. We found that over the period of 1996 to 2005, inter‐industry trade outweighed intra‐industry trade in Sino‐US agricultural trade, and that bilateral trade was more complementary than competitive. At the same time, China's agricultural exports were more diversified than USA exports, but China's degree of diversification steadily declined during the sample period. The findings indicate that there exists great potential for further development of agricultural trade between China and the USA, and that positive and effective trade policies will result in maximization of potential agricultural trade development and will bring forth mutual benefits to both countries.     

New Insights on US Aggregate and State Level Trade with the China Region

Aggregate trade data with breakdown into related and non‐related party components show that US multinational enterprises use different trading strategies in the China region relative to other countries. US trade with the China region in 2002–2007 is characterized by arm's‐length transactions. State‐level trade data show great variability in state engagement with the region through trade: exports to the region range from 1 to 28 percent of state exports. In addition, compared to exports to other countries, exports to the region are highly concentrated. At the extreme, for some states, 96–98 percent of exports to the region are computer and electronic products. Finally, gravity regressions show that state exports to Hong Kong are positively associated with the relative size of the Hong Kong‐born population in the states. There is no evidence that stricter labor regimes lead to lower state exports.     

Measuring the Competitiveness of China's Processed Exports

China's surplus in processing trade remains large. Processed exports are final goods produced using parts and components that are imported duty free. Because much of the value‐added of these exports comes from East Asia, exchange rates throughout the region should affect their foreign currency prices. This paper presents data on value‐added exchange rates for processed exports over the 1993–2013 period and reports that they significantly affect exports. While the renminbi appreciated 36 percent between the beginning of 2005 and the end of 2013, exchange rates in supply chain countries depreciated. This has mitigated the effect of the RMB appreciation on the price competitiveness of processed exports.     

Effects of China's Structural Change on the Exports of East Asian Economies

The Chinese economy is slowing down and is in the midst of a structural transformation from export‐led and investment‐led growth to domestic demand‐led and consumption‐led growth. While there are widespread concerns among China's trading partners about the effect of the slowdown in China's growth on their exports, China's structural changes are also likely to have a significant impact: for example, China will import fewer machines and more cosmetics. The central objective of the present paper is to empirically examine the effect of China's structural transformation on the exports of East Asian economies, which have close trade linkages with China. We find that economies that have failed to increase the share of consumption goods in their exports to China have suffered larger declines in their quantities of exports to China. In addition, economies that have suffered losses in their shares of China's parts and components imports have faced reductions in their shares in China's total imports.     

Are Antidumping Duties for Sale? Case‐Level Evidence on the Grossman‐Helpman Protection for Sale Model

Do contributions to politicians affect trade policy? To examine this question, we have compiled a new, unique database containing information on political donations by the specific firms and labor organizations that have petitioned for antidumping protection from imports, as well as data on the outcomes of their requests. Using an empirical framework based on the 1994 “protection for sale” model, we examine the relationship between antidumping decisions and political activism. Our results indicate that money does matter. We find that politically active petitioners are more likely to receive protection and that antidumping duty rates tend to be higher for that group. In addition, the relationship between the import penetration ratio and duties imposed depends on whether or not petitioners are politically active—antidumping duties are positively correlated with the import penetration ratio for politically inactive petitioners but negatively correlated for politically active petitioners, consistent with the Grossman‐Helpman model's predictions.     

EU Anti‐dumping Measures against ASEAN Countries: Impact on Trade Flows*

In the present paper, anti‐dumping (AD) duties levied by the European Commission against products from ASEAN countries in the period 1991–2001 have been considered. The ASEAN countries were among the countries most targeted by AD measures imposed by the EU in the 1990s. A panel regression has been applied to estimate the impact of AD duties on trade in some 12 products that have been subject to AD duties targeting ASEAN countries in the period considered. A significant negative impact of AD duties is found, on both the value and the quantity of imports from ASEAN countries. Our estimation provides some (although not overwhelming) indications of trade diversion in favor of EU countries, but no evidence of trade diversion in favor of non‐targeted non‐EU countries.     

China＇s Trade Acceleration and the Deepening of an East Asian Regional Production Network

China＇s recent surge in trade has been associated with its deepening but contrasting trade relations with its two groups of key trading partners. On the one hand, China＇ s trade surpluses with the USA and the EU have risen rapidly, reaching US$144bn and US$91bn in 2006, respectively. On the other hand, China is importing heavily from its Asian neighbors. This diverging pattern of trade relations between China and its main trading partners reflects the continuous expansion and intensification of a complex cross-border production network in Asia, particularly for consumer electronics. In the process of deepening manufacturing sharing, China serves as an essential export platform for firms headquartered in the more advanced economies. These firms export intermediate goods from the relatively more advanced Asian economies to their affiliates in China where these inputs are assembled and then shipped to key export markets, including primarily the USA and the EU. One apparent outcome of the growing processing and assembly trade is the increased interdependency among Asian economies, which are now more dependent on each other than ever. It has also led to substantial structural changes and technological upgrading in China＇ s traded goods.     

国外对华反倾销的经济与政治动因

中国是世界上遭遇反倾销诉讼最多的国家,以反倾销为手段的贸易保护已经成为制约中国对外贸易可持续发展的巨大障碍。本文重点分析对华反倾销的成因,探究进口国宏观经济和政治因素对反倾销行为的影响。研究发现:各国对华反倾销立案的宏观经济与政治动因存在显著的差异性。本文揭示了各国对华反倾销立案的内在动因,得出了具有价值的比较研究结论。     

Past Successes and New Challenges： China＇s Foreign Trade at a Turning Point

Since 1979, China has recorded a remarkable trade performance, which has been driven by international processing and the offshoring strategies of foreign firms. The diversification of Chinese exports and their technological upgrading have been phenomenal However, there is also inertia, illustrated by the persistent dualism of the trade sector, the unrelenting specialization in downmarket products and the deteriorating terms of trade. These weaknesses have helped its partners to adjust to the rise of this new trade power. In the past decade, China＇s economy has faced the adverse effects o fan export-led growth and the global crisis has revealed its vulnerability. China is now forced to rebalance its economy. This will imply major changes in foreign trade, in favor of ordinary trade and away from processing. In the foreseeable future, China is unlikely to become the driver of international demand but will remain the engine of Asian economic integration.     

Blue Box Policy Reform in the Doha Round Negotiations： Effects and China＇s Position

This paper uses an agricultural trade policy simulation model to quantitatively evaluate the effects of Blue Box policy reform on agricultural production and trade, and further provides specific proposals regarding China ＇ s reform position. The results indicate that, if the reform could achieve a reduction in distorting supports in more developed countries, China＇ s total agricultural production would increase, accompanied by a decrease in agricultural imports and a slight increase in exports. In terms of social welfare, producers would gain significantly, consumers would lose and government would not suffer greatly, which is in accordance with current agricultural policies in China. As a core member of G20, China should approve a subsidy level as low as possible required by Blue Box to achieve ＂substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic supports＂.     

Trade in factor income and the US-China trade balance

US multindoational enterprises sell considerable amounts of products to China's domestic consumers that are “made” in either China or other countries. However, these sales are not counted as US exports to China. To account for this, we propose a beyond-borders approach to measuring trade flows that explicitly considers firm ownership, termed “trade in factor income (TiFI),” that defines the US-owned factor income induced by China's final demand as US exports to China. Applying this approach to OECD data, we find that on average from 2005 to 2016 in TiFI terms, US exports to China were 20.34% and 8.21% greater, China's exports to the US were 1.64% and 16.04% less, and the US trade deficits with China were 17.4% and 32.0% less than the trade figures reported in value added and gross terms, respectively. The concept of TiFI transforms trade measures from a territory-based “made in” label to a factor income-based “created by” label.     

International Trade and R&D Investment: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms

A current concern for China's long‐term growth prospect is whether China can become an innovative economy and achieve industrial upgrading to compensate for the gradually declining competitiveness resulting from low‐cost labor. The present study examines this issue by exploring how trade participation impacts on the R&D investment of manufacturing firms through various channels. Merging China's Annual Manufacturing Survey Dataset and the Chinese Customs Dataset allows us to study such a relationship at the individual firm level. The empirical results suggest that channels such as geographical diversification of export markets, share of imports from high‐income countries, average unit value of imports, number of intermediate goods and capital goods imports, and the trade regime are significant factors that influence firm‐level R&D investment. The study discusses the policy implications of the empirical findings in relation to industrial and trade policies that may be potentially beneficial for China's transition towards an innovative economy.