Does personal background influence a finance minister to cook the books? An investigation of creative accounting in Swiss cantons

This article aims to identify the factors influencing the use of creative accounting in the public sector. Its distinctive feature is that it sheds light on creative accounting when used, not to hide public deficits, but to conceal surpluses. It especially explores the impact of the finance minister’s (FM)’s background on the phenomenon. We take advantage of the quasi-experimental settings of the Swiss cantons in which the financial management act sets out the possibility of implementing certain accounting gimmicks, including mainly additional ‘depreciation’ charges. These charges, which are depreciations in name only, enable the FM to artificially inflate expenses, thus increasing the deficit or reducing the surplus. Our panel data set of the 26 cantons over the period 1980–2012 includes a new data set of creative accounting and of 116 cantonal FMs. Our results indicate that the FMs cook the books irrespective of their personal or ideological background with the exception that trained economists tend to apply creative accounting more. Additionally, stringent fiscal rules urge FMs towards more surplus-hiding accounting.     

Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries

Many believe and argue that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling. To analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation, we present a career-concerns model with political parties. This allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto-separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt accumulation (at least by reducing an electoral cycle in deficits), that right-wing governments (at least for strategic reasons) tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments, and that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation. To test the predictions of the model, we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency on 19-country OECD data. Simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and deficits, independent of controls for explanatory variables from other approaches.     

The effect of fiscal system reform on fiscal policy outcomes

We investigate how reform in governmental accounting affects fiscal policy outcomes including debt, balance, and fiscal transparency. Since a change from cash to accrual accounting can be regarded as a natural experiment among governments, a fixed-effects model is exploited. We discover that the change diminishes debt in developed countries, but expands it in less-developed ones, with strong effects in highly indebted countries. The change improves balance in developed countries and worsens it in less-developed countries, which is significant for developed countries with large deficits. Transparency is improved only in less transparent developed countries.     

Interpreting budget deficits in Latin America: the methods with application to Argentina

Fiscal policy in Latin American countries is too often evaluatedon the basis of raw deficit figures. This study demonstrateshow the effects of inflation on the deficit must be removedin order to derive the discretionary component of fiscal policy.Once this correction is made, fiscal policy can be evaluatedby testing the movement of the deficit with respect to alternativepolicy targets. As an illustration I employ Argentine data inorder to decompose the deficit and determine the degree to whichit is a reflection of budget endogeneity versus populism/socialconflict.     

A Note on the (Un)Pleasant Arithmetic of Fiscal Policy: The Case of Italian Public Debt

Using the simple arithmetic of government budget constraint, we perform an illustrative analysis on the Italian case, investigating the consequences on the main public finance aggregates of the adoption of a fiscal policy rule responding to past real debt/GDP ratio. Such a rule, firmly grounded in the economic analysis, would allow the reduction of Italy's outstanding stock of debt without requiring the strict adherence to the 3 per cent criterion for deficit/GDP ratio, as prescribed by SGP (Stability and Growth Pact). We perform a forecasting exercise under five alternative scenarios and analyse the details of a structural debt reduction strategy with alternative yearly step.     

Fiscal adjustment in a panel of countries 1870–2016

The financial crisis from 2007 and, even more so, the Covid-19 pandemic caused large increases in public sector deficits and debts in many countries and prompted concern about fiscal adjustment. This paper examines fiscal adjustment to debt and deficits for a panel of 17 countries over 1870–2016 using the Jordà–Schularick–Taylor Macrohistory Database. This long span panel is informative since it contains many examples of large fiscal shocks similar to those recently experienced. The results from reduced-form models suggest that large deficits or surpluses tend to prompt stabilising feedbacks, mainly through changes in revenue, and there is greater pressure to adjust on countries running a deficit versus those running a surplus. However, the debt–GDP ratio prompts much less stabilising feedback by expenditure or revenue.¹     

The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?

The paper investigates the rationale for, and the effectiveness of the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht treaty against the background of two questions: What are the incentives for an unsound fiscal policy in EMU, and what are the (potential) negative externalities if such a policy were to occur. The paper argues that EMU creates both incentives for a higher fiscal deficit while respecting solvency, and incentives for not rectifying a potentially unsustainable debt level once one is a member. Unsound fiscal policy could trigger important negative extermalities for the other member countries. The paper concludes that the current fiscal provisions of the Maastricht treaty are not sufficiently well defined and the envisaged sanctions not strong enough to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance. This leads to proposals of supplementary measures for surveillance and alternative sanctions. Staying within the framework of the Maastricht treaty, it is strongly suggested that both debt and deficit criteria should be strictly surveyed, but in view of their conceptual and operational deficiencies they should be supplemented by additional indicators. Based on this broader measurement concept, it is proposed to use semi-automatic and market-led sanctions to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance.     

Debt Stabilizing Fiscal Rules

Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be stabilized around a certain target level of debt by adjustments in various fiscal instruments, like government spending, transfers, or taxes. This paper investigates properties of debt stabilizing rules which link the needed budgetary adjustments to the state of the economy. The paper establishes that the magnitude of the target level of long‐run debt is a key determinant of whether it is possible to find a rule of this type that can be implemented under all available fiscal instruments. Specifically, considering linear feedback rules, the paper demonstrates that there may well exist a critical target level of debt beyond which this is no longer possible. From an applied perspective, this finding is of particular relevance in the context of a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policies. Depending on the target level of debt, there might be a conflict between a common fiscal framework that tracks deficit developments as a function of the state of the economy and the unrestricted choice of fiscal policy instruments at the national level.     

Fiscal deficits and growth in developing countries

This paper examines the relation between fiscal deficits and growth for a panel of 45 developing countries. Based on a consistent treatment of the government budget constraint, it finds evidence of a threshold effect at a level of the deficit around 1.5% of GDP. While there appears to be a growth payoff to reducing deficits to this level, this effect disappears or reverses itself for further fiscal contraction. The magnitude of this payoff, but not its general character, necessarily depends on how changes in the deficit are financed (through changes in borrowing or seigniorage) and on how the change in the deficit is accommodated elsewhere in the budget. We also find evidence of interaction effects between deficits and debt stocks, with high debt stocks exacerbating the adverse consequences of high deficits.     

FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICITS, MONEY, AND EXCHANGE RATES

The dollar's strength during the 1980s appears to many—particularly as reported in the financial press—to have been directly linked to the decade's large budget deficits and the subsequent increase in the stock of federal debt outstanding. The popular argument is that the budget deficit and the growth of federal government credit market demand caused U.S. interest rates to rise over that period, inducing large capital inflows from abroad to finance the deficit. According to the argument, the capital inflows caused the dollar to appreciate. Despite the argument's popularity, the empirical literature does not strongly support it. Evidence on the relationship between the federal deficit and the dollar is at best mixed.
This article reconsiders the effects of federal budget deficits on the exchange rate. The analysis involves estimating a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of exchange rates that includes monetary, fiscal, and price level variables. Within the VAR framework, impulse analysis traces the dynamic response of exchange rates to various budget deficit measures.
The analysis finds that deficits do not directly Granger cause exchange rates, but it also finds evidence of an indirect effect working through the money supply and price level. Moreover, the analysis reveals some evidence that foreign exchange markets are forward looking and react to expected budget deficits. The innovations accounting and impulse analysis also suggest a forward-looking dynamic relationship between deficits and exchange rates, but the relationship is sensitive to the ordering of the variables.     

Can the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU Cause Budget Deficit Cycles?

We study whether the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in EuropeanMonetary Union (EMU) can induce budget deficit cycles. The SGP provides a framework forsanctioning EMU-memberswith excessive deficits. If a government's optimal deficitpolicy is above the deficit threshold which triggers penalties then the deficit will be higherwith the SGP in force than without. The SGP may even induce deficit cycles in the sense thata government switches its optimal deficit between the threshold provided by the SGP and aneven larger deficit.     

Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies

In this paper we reconsider the trade-off between rules and discretion in fiscal policy in the presence of politically motivated fiscal deficits. We present a model of political bias in the budget process appropriately developed to allow for tax-smoothing-motivated deficits as well as for the consideration of deficit biases in open economies. We find that endowing politically-biased governments with the ability to respond to economic shocks with deficit finance will not exacerbate the existing biases. In an open economy, the ability to borrow abroad will significantly increase the deficit. However, restrictions to public foreign borrowing will not reduce the political bias as long as the private sector has access to international capital markets at the same terms as the government.     

Targeting Debt and Deficits in India: A Structural Macroeconometric Approach

This study attempts to construct a consistent macroeconomic framework for India to review the macro-fiscal linkages over the 14th Finance Commission period, 2015–2019. A macroeconomic policy simulation model comprising of real, external, monetary, fiscal and macroeconomic block is built for the purpose. The estimated model is used for policy simulations to address three scenarios: (a) shock due to 7th Pay Commission award, (b) targeting deficit and debt and (c) targeting higher growth. The results suggest that while Pay Commission award would result in slightly higher growth compared to the base case, this also results in higher inflation, fiscal-revenue deficits, current account deficit as well as higher government liability. Further simulation results suggest that expenditure switching policy, which is the core of expansionary fiscal consolidation mechanism, of increasing higher government capital expenditure and reducing the government transfers could result in higher growth with a manageable fiscal deficit of 5.3% that also brings down the government (centre plus states) liability to around 60% by 2019–2020.

     

Fiscal strategies,foreign indebtedness,and overlapping generations

Conclusions This paper offers a unifying dynamic system approach to real government debt and real capital formation in a world economy. The sustainability of permanently maintained primary fiscal deficits is investigated in an open economy. In particular if national governments compete in the issuance of debt at an international capital market sustainable debt profiles appear only as a theoretical (i. e., not empirically valid) curiosity. Within the more realistic regime of an undercapitalized world economy a nation can only run a permanently maintained primary surplus. Starting from a PMP surplus the paper also demonstrates the viability of temporary deficits implying an increase in taxation later to stabilize the fiscal debt. By reversing the argument this shows, the right way to reduce government debt in a non-traumatic manner is to run a higher temporary surplus via higher taxation. Using this extrasurplus to buy back fiscal debt the economy may reduce taxation later while enjoying vigorous capital accumulation towards a higher capital-labour ratio. Furthermore, the paper shows that ceteris paribus a relatively high social security load and a relatively high size of a balanced budget causes external indebtedness via consumption oriented current account deficits. It is left for further research to see what happens if government borrows for public investment instead of public consumption.My research was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. While preparing the paper 1 had access to unpublished work by M. Carlberg and T. Ihori. Discussions with M. Carlberg, H. Großmann, J. Michaelis, and H. Schmid are gratefully acknowledged. The diagrams were mastered by C. Schwarz.     

Promoting sustainable public finances in the European Union: The role of fiscal rules and government efficiency

New indices of fiscal rule strength are constructed and, using a dynamic panel econometric model for 27 EU countries over the period 1990–2012, we assess whether national fiscal rules alone help to promote sustainable public finances in the EU or whether they must be supported by good governance in order to be effective. We find that fiscal rules are effective in reducing structural primary deficits at all levels of government efficiency. However, the effect is smaller as government efficiency increases, indicating that fiscal rules and government efficiency are institutional substitutes in terms of promoting fiscal sustainability. We also find that balanced budget rules are the most effective form of fiscal rules. Multiple fiscal rules are found to enhance fiscal solvency. Other institutional features that enhance the effectiveness of fiscal rules are transparency of policies and commitment to implementation of fiscal programs. Supranational rules, however, do not affect the effectiveness of national fiscal rules in reducing the deficit bias. Our results are robust to alternative estimation methods and endogeneity assumptions.     

The evolution of State-Local balance sheets in the United States, 1953–2013

State and local debt in the United States more than doubled as a share of gross domestic product between 1953 and 2007. Using a historical accounting framework, we find that there is no straightforward relationship over time between state and local deficits and debt growth. We find that only 17 percent of the variation in aggregate state–local debt ratios comes from variation in the fiscal balance. This is especially true in the 1980s, the period of most rapid increase in state–local debt ratios. Before 1980, there were small but persistent deficits, but stable debt ratios. In the 1980s, state and local sectors shifted toward budget surpluses but saw rising debt ratios. This is explained by a faster pace of asset accumulation. Our results demonstrate the autonomy of balance sheet variables and suggest that changing debt ratios cannot be explained by real income and expenditure flows.     

Fiscal policy rules,budget deficits,and forecasting biases

In this paper, we analyze the impact fiscal policy rules have on budget deficits and forecasting biases in official budget outlooks. Persistent budget deficits and over-optimistic budget forecasts have been observed in many countries in the past, especially in the euro area. To prevent such developments from happening in the future, fiscal rules have been revised or implemented with the aim to strengthen both preventive (ex-ante) and corrective (ex-post) elements of fiscal rules frameworks. Do such ex-ante and ex-post rules differ in their effects? In an attempt to answer this question, we build a two-period model and distinguish between ex-ante rules that apply to budget forecasts and ex-post rules that apply to realized budget deficits. Our model indicates that effectively enforced ex-post rules are more effective than ex-ante rules at reducing budget deficits. Interestingly, ex-ante rules differ from ex-post rules in their effects on forecasting biases. Only ex-post sanctions reduce forecasting biases, while ex-ante rules have no impact on such biases. In addition, we show that political stability and the size of government increase the effectiveness of fiscal rules. If, however, financial markets have a disciplining effect on governments, the effectiveness of fiscal rules is reduced. Our results imply that if fiscal policy rules cannot be effectively enforced, reforming other areas such as electoral rules or financial market regulations might be a more promising approach to ensuring sound public finances than fiscal policy rules.     

Sustainable fiscal strategies under changing demographics

This paper develops an overlapping generations model to evaluate, first, the steady state growth-maximizing level of public debt around which an economy needs to stabilise; second, how the optimal level of public debt varies as a function of key population parameters; third, how fiscal rules designed to stabilise the economy around that debt level need to vary with the population parameters; and, fourth, how well the model performs as a reasonable and plausible representation of the advanced economies that face fiscal strain and deteriorating demographics. The main conclusion is: despite diminished fiscal space and flexibility due to deteriorating population parameters, a relatively benign steady state is feasible and available under mild fiscal restraints. The bigger problem will be how to get there without financial or fiscal breakdowns along the way. We offer some political economy perspectives on how best to manage that risk.     

Euro Crises and Euro Scams: Trade not Debt and Deficits Tell the Tale

The euro crisis has been typically presented as excessive fiscal deficits leading to the accumulation of unsustainable public debts. This debt and deficit diagnosis applied most notably in Greece and Italy, but also in Portugal and Spain (the ‘PIGS’). Implicit in much of the analysis, and occasionally explicit, is the suggestion that these were not only profligate but also lazy PIGS that spent beyond their means and abandoned a commitment to international competitiveness. This article demonstrates that the German export-led growth strategy generated large trade and current account deficits throughout the eurozone in the 2000s. When the global financial crisis struck the continent in 2008, these trade-based deficits proved unsustainable. With the exception of Greece, neither public debts nor fiscal deficits represented a major problem among eurozone countries prior to 2008. The analysis leads to measures that could have avoided the crisis of sovereign debt entirely, as well as corrected the unsustainable trade balances in the euro zone. These policies were not seriously considered, with the result that in the second decade of the 21st century the future of the common currency is in doubt.     

The unintended composition effect of the subnational government fiscal rules: The case of Italian municipalities

Although numerical fiscal rules may be introduced to achieve several objectives, to date the maintenance of fiscal sustainability is their predominant goal. This is particularly true at subnational level; maintaining fiscal discipline in a decentralized setting is challenging and subnational government fiscal rules are considered one of the most valid solutions to the problem. While theoretical and empirical literature has mainly focused on their effectiveness in containing subnational deficit and/or debt, little attention has been paid to the possible trade–offs and side effects of the rules on the composition of subnational expenditure. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by exploiting the case of Italian municipalities, which have been subject for fifteen years (1999–2015) to a set of rules called Domestic Stability Pact. The Italian DSP framework – imposing rules only on municipalities above a population threshold (5000 inhabitants) – allows us to implement a quasi–experimental technique to investigate the unintended composition effects of the rules. A difference–in–discontinuities design permits to find rigorous empirical evidence that the switching in 2007 to rules which are more binding in terms of fiscal discipline leads to a recomposition of municipal expenditure against investment spending. The analysis is then integrated by evaluating the impact of the rules on six categories of investment expenditure. Investment in human capital and infrastructure seems to be the most affected.