Competition and risk‐taking in investment banking

How does competition affect the investment banking business and the risks individual institutions are exposed to? Using a large sample of investment banks operating in seven developed economies over 1997–2014, we apply a panel VAR model to examine the relationships between competition and risk without assuming any a priori restrictions. Our main finding is that investment banks’ higher risk exposure, measured as a long‐term capital‐at‐risk and return volatility, was facilitated by greater competitive pressures for both boutique investment banks and full‐service investment banks. Overall, we find some evidence that more competition leads to more fragility before and during the recent financial crisis.     

Investment Dynamics and Earnings‐Return Properties: A Structural Approach

We propose the standard neoclassical model of investment under uncertainty with short‐run adjustment frictions as a benchmark for earnings‐return patterns absent accounting influences. We show that our proposed benchmark generates a wide range of earnings‐return patterns documented in accounting research. Notably, our model generates a concave earnings‐return relation, similar to that of Basu [1997], and predicts that the earnings‐return concavity increases with the volatility of firms’ underlying shock processes and decreases with the level of firms’ investments. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Overall, our evidence suggests that our proposed benchmark is useful for understanding the joint dynamics of variables of interest to accounting research (e.g., earnings, returns, investment, market‐to‐book) absent accounting influences, a necessary precondition for inferring the effects of accounting from these dynamics.     

Investment‐Based Corporate Bond Pricing

A standard assumption of structural models of default is that firms' assets evolve exogenously. In this paper, we examine the importance of accounting for investment options in models of credit risk. In the presence of financing and investment frictions, firm‐level variables that proxy for asset composition are significant determinants of credit spreads beyond leverage and asset volatility, because they capture the systematic risk of firms' assets. Cross‐sectional studies of credit spreads that fail to control for the interdependence of leverage and investment decisions are unlikely to be very informative. Such frictions also give rise to a realistic term structure of credit spreads in a production economy.     

Clawback provision adoption,corporate governance,and investment decisions

We examine the effect of corporate governance on the likelihood of clawback provision adoption, and its consequences in terms of corporate investment practices and risk‐taking behavior. We find that firms with strong governance (as proxied by board independence, diligence, and size) are positively associated with the firm's adoption of a clawback provision; whereas firms with weak governance (as proxied by management entrenchment, i.e., CEO duality status and tenure) are negatively associated with clawback provision adoption. Using the propensity‐score matching, difference‐in‐differences research design, and inverse Mills ratio to mitigate omitted variables and self‐selection biases, we find that after adopting a clawback provision, firms’ abnormal investment decreases and the firms’ investments are less risky.     

Multi‐period Asset Lifetimes and Accounting‐based Equity Valuation: Take Care with Constant‐growth Terminal Value Models!

The merits of accruals in forecasting cash flows or mitigating the volatility of financials shortly after the valuation date are indisputable. However, the usefulness of accounting in equity valuation is very limited if we step beyond a certain forecasting horizon. In this paper, this limitation is emphasized by shedding new light on the accounting‐based value driver model (VDM), a widely used constant‐growth terminal value tool that uses accounting variables as input. The paper shows that, if the lifetime of a firm's assets is, on average, longer than one period, the VDM works accurately only in an idealized academic environment with an even historical corporate investment activity, a single depreciation method for all assets, and no historical inflation volatility. Artificially adjusting real‐world figures to this steady state is possible in principle, but bloats the valuation model and requires exactly the same information that is used in our cash flow‐driven benchmark model (where no adjustment phase is necessary). Beyond these theoretical shortcomings, the VDM is also prone to being misused in valuation practice due to its reliance on book (rather than economic) rates of return, and to its shortcomings in dealing adequately with the assets with an ex ante indefinite lifetime.     

Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets

Inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud, where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors' beliefs, has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention. We reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets, building on shareholder‐manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets. Because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof, the optimal renegotiation‐proof contract induces overstatements by managers, accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors. Our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud.     

Over‐the‐Counter Market Frictions and Yield Spread Changes

We empirically study whether systematic over‐the‐counter (OTC) market frictions drive the large unexplained common factor in yield spread changes. Using transaction data on U.S. corporate bonds, we find that marketwide inventory, search, and bargaining frictions explain 23.4% of the variation in the common component. Systematic OTC frictions thus substantially improve the explanatory power of yield spread changes and account for one‐third of their total explained variation. Search and bargaining frictions combined explain more in the common dynamics of yield spread changes than inventory frictions. Our findings support the implications of leading theories of intermediation frictions in OTC markets.     

Determinants of individual investment decisions in investment‐based crowdfunding

We investigate determinants of investment decisions in investment‐based (equity and bond) crowdfunding campaigns, using a novel investment‐, investor‐ and campaign‐level database, where equity refers to investments in entrepreneurial start‐ups and bonds to large real estate projects. We find that investors who have higher social interactions invest more. Social interactions are important in an equity crowdfunding context but do not affect participation in bond investments. This is consistent with the view that investors' social networks help reduce information asymmetry. Women invest less in the riskiest (equity) investments but more in safer ones (bonds). These findings are better explained by differences in risk aversion than differences in overconfidence between men and women. Overall, the findings contribute to the understanding of how investment‐based crowdfunding can be a viable source of entrepreneurial finance and how entrepreneurs' campaign decisions affect investor participation in this new form of entrepreneurial finance.     

Determinants of Sovereign Wealth Fund Cross‐Border Investments

Using a sample of 1,590 purchases of stock by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in listed firms in 78 target countries between 1985 and 2011, we study the country‐level determinants of SWF cross‐border investment. We find that SWFs from countries with high levels of openness and economic development, but with less developed local capital markets, will make more cross‐country transactions, while target countries with higher levels of investor protection and more developed capital markets will attract more SWF investment. Our findings support the investment facilitation hypothesis, suggesting that SWFs act purely or principally as commercial investors facilitating cross‐border corporate investment.     

The warning of haze: weather and corporate investment

This paper investigates whether air quality affects corporate investment. Using a sample of Chinese A‐share listed firms from 2007 to 2013, this paper finds that poor air quality is negatively associated with corporate investment and reduction of corporate investment due to air pollution intensifies with manager risk aversion. In addition, this paper provides evidence against the alternative explanation that corporate investment decreases due to government air‐quality regulations. Furthermore, this paper also suggests that poor air quality is negatively associated with investment efficiency. These findings complement existing literature on how weather conditions affect corporate financial decisions.     

Uncertainty,investment, and managerial incentives

This study provides evidence that managerial incentives, shaped by compensation contracts, help to explain the empirical relationship between uncertainty and investment. We develop a model in which the manager, compensated with an equity-based contract, makes investment decisions for a firm that faces time-varying volatility. The contract creates incentives that affect both the sign and magnitude of a manager׳s optimal response to volatility shocks. The model is calibrated using compensation data to quantify this predicted investment response for a large panel of firms. Our estimates help explain the variation in firm-level investment responses to volatility shocks observed in the data.     

Endogenous Financial Constraint and Investment‐Cash‐Flow Sensitivity

This paper studies a dynamic investment model with moral hazard. The moral hazard problem implies an endogenous financial constraint on investment that makes the firm's investment sensitive to cash flows. I show that the production technology and the severity of the moral hazard problem substantially affect the dependence of the investment‐cash‐flow sensitivity on the financial constraint. Specifically, if the production technology exhibits almost constant returns to scale in capital or the moral hazard problem is relatively severe, the dependence is negative. Otherwise, the pattern is reversed to some extent. Moreover, the calibrated benchmark model can quantitatively account for the negative dependence of investment and Tobin's Q on size and age observed in the data.     

Corporate efficiency,credit status and investment

This paper considers the relationship between financial frictions and investment. In an effort to clarify the role of cash flow in examining the impact of capital market imperfections, endogenous switching regression models are estimated for a panel of 1122 UK firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period of 1981–2009. Not only is the financial regime which the firm faces endogenous, we also allow the regime to change over time via modeling efficiency using stochastic frontier analysis. The results reveal that a firm's constrained credit status changes with the improvement of its efficiency. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that financially constrained firm's investment is comparatively more sensitive to its cash flow. Moreover, this sensitivity is statistically significant and is negatively related with corporate efficiency.     

Managerial Behavior and the Link between Stock Mispricing and Corporate Investments: Evidence from Market‐to‐Book Ratio Decomposition

We examine the impact of mispricing on corporate investments and its components: capital expenditures, research and development, acquisitions, and asset sales. By decomposing the market‐to‐book ratio into mispricing and growth components, we show that corporate investments are linked to mispricing through market‐timing and catering, after controlling for growth and financial slack. This investment‐mispricing link is more pronounced in financially constrained firms and in firms with short‐horizon shareholders. Overall, our study indicates that the sensitivity of investments to mispricing is a function of the nature of mispricing, the type of investment, and the firm's characteristics.     

Investment sensitivity to lender default shocks

We investigate how lender default shocks impact corporate investment. Lenders with recent default experience write stricter loan contracts, especially to borrowers with pre-existing relationships, leading to a reduction in real investment for all borrowing firms. The decline in investment is more pronounced when agency problems with creditors like asset substitution and claim dilution are higher. Moreover, the decline in investment is not attributable to more frequent covenant violations or to market conditions. The evidence highlights the role of supply-side frictions through the asset side of lenders’ balance sheets on corporate investment and how agency problems may act as mechanisms.     

Why do large shareholders adopt a short‐term versus a long‐term investment horizon in different firms?

I ask why the same large shareholders have different investment horizons. Using data for 1998–2013, I examine four fundamental firm policies for their potential influence on blockholders’ investments with different time horizons. The panel ordinary least squares, difference‐in‐difference (using the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act), logistic, and dynamic generalized method of moments regression analyses reveal that blockholders adopt a short‐term horizon in smaller firms with a less independent board, high leverage, and high dividends while the same blockholders keep their investments longer in firms with a more independent board and low dividends. Under various economic conditions, different firm characteristics gain importance in blockholders’ decision on short‐term versus long‐term investments.     

The investment decision with technological and market uncertainties

This paper examines how technological uncertainty affects current investment; specifically, what is the impact on a firm’s investment in an existing technology when an improved technology might arrive in the future. The firm can invest in the current technology and upgrade to the new technology after its arrival (sequential investing), or it can bypass the current technology and invest directly in the new technology (leapfrogging). The main result is that, in the presence of market risk, future technological uncertainty has a non-monotonic effect on investment, with the investment trigger being a U-shaped function of the expected speed of arrival of the new technology. In this U-shaped relationship, the investment trigger starts rising later if the new technology is more attractive and also when volatility and interest rate are high and growth rate low; thus, technological uncertainty is more likely to have a positive effect on investment under these conditions. Finally, we apply the model to the sequential versus leapfrog investment decision, and find that leapfrogging becomes more attractive relative to sequential investment when interest rate and new technology earnings enhancement are higher, and when market volatility, growth rate and new technology investment cost are lower.     

R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds: New evidence on financing constraints and intangible investment

We examine the intersection between corporate divestitures of tangible assets and investment in intangible capital (R&D) to provide new tests for the impact financing constraints have on real activity. A positive R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds indicates binding financing constraints since cash inflows from tangible asset sales are negatively correlated with productivity shocks and not otherwise connected to intangible investment via non-financial channels. Using a variety of estimation approaches, we document a strong, positive link between cash inflows from fixed asset sales and corporate R&D investment, but only among firms most likely facing binding financing constraints. These results offer robust evidence that financing frictions impact the increasingly important yet understudied intangible corporate investments that drive innovative activity, and they highlight a previously unexplored but potentially valuable use of proceeds from fixed asset divestitures.     

Financing constraints, cash-flow risk, and corporate investment

Using an analytically tractable two-period model of a financially constrained firm, we derive an investment threshold that is U-shaped in cash holdings. We show analytically the relevant trade-offs leading to the U-shape: the firm balances financing costs for present and future investment, respectively. Our main argument is that financing costs today are more important than the risk of future financing costs. The empirically testable implications are that low-cash firms facing financing costs today are more reluctant to invest if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. On the other hand, cash-rich firms facing no financing costs today invest in less favorable projects (i.e., forgo their real option to wait) if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. The magnitude of these effects is amplified by the degree of market frictions that the firms are facing.     

Agency cost of debt overhang with optimal investment timing and size

The concept of debt overhang (that is, an equity‐maximizing levered firm will under‐invest relative to a firm‐value‐maximizing firm) is well established in the literature. A number of papers have demonstrated it as delayed investment (when investment size is specified) or smaller investment (when investment time is specified). However, there is no work on the underinvestment effect when the firm chooses both size and timing of investment, as it usually does in real life. This is what our paper focuses on. When the firm has the flexibility to choose both size and time, the effect is complicated by the fact that delayed investment results in larger investment, which suggests that the underinvestment problem might be mitigated. We find, however, that the effect depends on how underinvestment is measured. When measured by the expected present value of investment, flexibility can mitigate or exacerbate the underinvestment problem, depending on the cost of installing capacity. But when measured by the agency cost, flexibility always exacerbates the underinvestment problem. It is shown numerically that, at the optimal leverage ratio, the agency cost with plausible parameter values can be economically significant. Thus, with the flexibility of choosing both time and size of investment, the debt overhang problem can be of significant practical relevance in corporate investment decisions.