The Impact of Social Networks on Perceptions of International Opportunities

The paper emphasizes the importance of social networks in the gestation of international new ventures, particularly through their impact on the perceptions of nascent entrepreneurs. Their contribution consists not only in providing new information to assist new venture founders in identifying international opportunities but, and perhaps more importantly, in assessing them. By modifying the way in which entrepreneurs perceive the feasibility and desirability of opportunities, networks trigger the enactment of international opportunities. Whereas opportunity evaluations by more experienced international entrepreneurs tend to be linked to their strong network ties, the international role models of novice entrepreneurs seem to be transformational.     

Will the startup succeed in your eyes? Venture evaluation of resource providers during entrepreneurs' informational signaling

Experienced founders and investors are arguably the venture community members most likely to possess needed financial and social resources for startups. We present a model of venture evaluation where entrepreneurs solicit these resource providers for needed financial and social resources. Our model addresses how resource providers' venture investment propensity influences their evaluation of entrepreneurs' informational signals and how their venture evaluation predicts their willingness to provide financial and social resources. We test our model using real-time decisions and find resource providers with founding experience (both non-investor founders and investors with founding experience) leverage their investment propensity more than non-founder investors when evaluating new ventures. In addition, our post-hoc analysis reveals that resource providers' founding experience is associated with their willingness to confer social resources. Overall, this paper focuses on the perspective of resource providers and addresses how their investment propensity, types of venturing experience, and venture evaluation influence their willingness to render resource support to new ventures.     

Novice,portfolio, and serial founders: are they different?

There is growing interest in entrepreneurs who have been involved in more than one venture, yet to date there has been relatively little theoretical development and systematic empirical examination of the topic. In particular, there has been little attention to the potential heterogeneity of habitual entrepreneurship. This study aims to contribute to this emerging area in two ways. First, it outlines a conceptual typology of habitual entrepreneurs who have founded, purchased, or inherited businesses. Second, the empirical part of the study focuses on owner-managers, providing an exploratory analysis of the characteristics and effects of independent business ownership by novice, portfolio, and serial founders. Novice founders are those that have no prior entrepreneurial experience as either a founder, an inheritor, or a purchaser of a business. Portfolio founders retain their original business and inherit, establish, and/or purchase another business. Serial founders are those who sell their original business but at a later date inherit, establish, and/or purchase another business.The study derives propositions suggesting differences among the three types of founders. At the individual founder level of analysis, similarities as well as differences in the personal background, work experiences, reasons leading to the start-up of businesses, and personal attitudes to entrepreneurship of these three types of entrepreneurs are explored. At the organizational level of analysis, finance, employment and performance differences among the businesses owned by the three types of entrepreneurs are presented.The issues are examined using a sample of entrepreneurs who were the principal owner-managers of independent businesses in Great Britain. The sample included 389 novice founders (62.6%), 75 portfolio founders (12.1%), and 157 serial founders (25.3%). No statistically significant differences were found among the three groups of entrepreneurs with regard to the main industrial activity, geographical location, and the age of their businesses. Univariate and multivariate tests were used to examine potential differences between the groups.The results of the study show significant differences between portfolio and serial founders with regard to their parental background, work experience, and their age when they started their first business. Differences were also found with respect to reasons leading to start-up, personal attitudes to entrepreneurship, and sources of funds used during the launch period of the surveyed business. These findings suggest that habitual entrepreneurs cannot be treated as a homogeneous group. The analysis, however, failed to find any significant differences between the performance of the surveyed firms owned by habitual founders and novice founders and between the two types of habitual founders.The findings of the study indicate for researchers that there is a need to carefully define the unit of analysis in any examination of entrepreneurs. In particular, there is a need to take note of the heterogeneity of types of entrepreneur and to consider the entrepreneur as the appropriate unit of analysis rather than simply the firm. Although this study focused on habitual founders of businesses, the theoretical section of the study also identified other types of habitual entrepreneurs, such as serial corporate entrepreneurs and serial management buy-out and buy-in cases. These other types of habitual entrepreneurs would appear to warrant further analysis.The findings of this study have a number of implications for practitioners, especially venture capitalists. The absence of significant performance differences between novice and habitual entrepreneurs, which is consistent with the results from other studies, emphasizes the need for venture capitalists screening potential investees not to rely solely on previous experience.The study also has implications for policy-makers, especially with respect to decisions concerning the allocation of resources to assist nascent entrepreneurs, novice entrepreneurs, and habitual entrepreneurs. The similarities in business performance among novice, serial, and portfolio entrepreneurs suggests that policy-makers need to be careful in targeting scarce resources. Most notably, targeting resources to encourage talented nascent entrepreneurs to become novice entrepreneurs may offer returns which are at least as good as targeting resources to more experienced entrepreneurs.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

Linking prefunding factors and high-technology venture success: An exploratory study

This study reports on the exploratory phase of a research project on prefunding factors influencing the success of high-technology start-up companies. The study was done in collaboration with two major West Coast venture capital firms that allowed the authors full access to the due diligence files, investment proposals, and closing documents associated with eight ventures. Half of the eight ventures studied are currently public companies with sales that range from $65 million to $500 million and with an after-tax profit of about 10% of sales. The other half have either been dissolved or did not reach $3 million in sales within the five years following their funding.Information was obtained on those prefunding factors that were available for investor review prior to funding, such as the founders track records, the characteristics of the founding team, the nature of the target market, the technological strategy of the firm, the proposed composition of the board, and the deal structure.In spite of the small sample size, findings of this research revealed discernible differences between successful and unsuccessful firms. The founders of the successful ventures had more prior experience working together; tended to form larger, more complete teams; and had more extensive experience in the function they performed in the new venture. Successful founders also had experience in rapid growth firms that competed in the same industry as the start-up.The successful ventures targeted product-market segments with high buyer concentration in which, through technological advantage, their products could attain and sustain a competitive edge. Often this advantage was achieved by careful management of the product-development process, which resulted in early market entry and its corollary, reduced competition.On the other hand, some factors that the authors had predicted would allow them to distinguish between success and failure were not found to do so. Both successful and unsuccessful ventures targeted high growth markets, anticipated high gross margins, had founders with over five years of relevant experience, had experienced venture capitalists on their boards, and were characterized by a wide range of founder equity shares.     

Entrepreneurship ecosystems and women entrepreneurs: a social capital and network approach

This study investigates the effects of venture typology, race, ethnicity, and past venture experience on the social capital distribution of women entrepreneurs in entrepreneurial ecosystems. Social network data from two municipal ecosystems in Florida, USA (Gainesville and Jacksonville), suggest that network connectivity and the distribution of social capital are significantly different for men and women entrepreneurs. This difference is contingent on the venture type. Male entrepreneurs show higher comparative scores of bridging social capital in aggressive- and managed-growth venture networks, while women entrepreneurs surpass their male counterparts’ bridging capital scores in lifestyle and survival venture networks. Lastly, experienced women entrepreneurs that self-identified as white showed a higher degree of network connectivity and bridging social capital in the entrepreneurial ecosystem than less experienced non-white female entrepreneurs. Implications for entrepreneurship practice and new research paths are discussed.

     

Exploring the innovation strategies of young firms: Corporate venture capital and venture capital impact on alliance innovation strategy

We investigate how governance structure and power influence alliance exploration strategy. Adopting a real options perspective and the agency view, we suggest that innovation strategies differ based on the firm's governance authority. We find that the motivations of corporate venture capitalist firms, venture capitalists, and firm founders may have an impact on the formation of exploratory alliances among adolescent firms. Using a sample of 122 adolescent firms, we examine the influence that governance structure has on the firm's alliance portfolio and innovation potential. While the influence of corporate venture capitalist firms alone do affect alliance formation strategy, corporate venture-backed firms with founders having high influence (knowledge or ownership in the firm) are more likely to form innovation-focused alliances. In contrast, venture capitalist-backed firms tend to avoid innovation-focused alliances, preferring more exploitive ones, even when founders have high influence within the firm.     

I can't get no sleep—The differential impact of entrepreneurial stressors on work-home interference and insomnia among experienced versus novice entrepreneurs

When founding and managing a new business, entrepreneurs are frequently confronted with stressors hampering their daily work. The present study examines how these entrepreneurial stressors affect two important interrelated indicators of entrepreneurs' recovery and well-being—that is, their ability to detach from work during non-work times (work-home interference) and their sleep (insomnia). We introduce prior entrepreneurial experience as an important moderator to these relationships, arguing that due to their different learning and coping experiences and their different interpretations of the entrepreneurial role, experienced versus novice entrepreneurs would react differently to entrepreneurial stressors. In an empirical study with 122 entrepreneurs, we found that among experienced entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial stressors primarily had a direct sleep-impairing effect. Among novice entrepreneurs, the same stressors primarily initiated an indirect effect by leading to increased work-home interference and consequently also increased insomnia. Overall, thus, our study shows that both novice and experienced entrepreneurs suffer from insomnia when encountering entrepreneurial stressors—however, the underlying mechanisms differ. Implications are discussed in terms of both theory and practice.     

Venture capitalists and serial entrepreneurs

Habitual entrepreneurship is receiving growing attention, much of which has focused on entrepreneurs who have started more than one venture. This paper examines the importance of habitual entrepreneurs to the venture capital industry, with particular emphasis on those who have exited from an initial investment in the venture capitalist's portfolio, termed serial entrepreneurs. As venture capital markets mature, increasing numbers of entrepreneurs are likely to exit from their initial enterprises, creating a pool of entrepreneurs with the potential for embarking on subsequent ventures. Venture capitalists making investments may invest both in entrepreneurs starting new ventures and those who purchase a venture through a management buy-out or buy-in. On this wider basis, the paper develops a classification of types of serial venture. A number of issues are raised for venture capitalists, notably the relative attractiveness of reinvesting in exited entrepreneurs and the policy they adopt in tracking and assessing such individuals.The paper addresses venture capitalists' perspectives on investing in serial entrepreneurs based on a representative sample of 55 UK venture capitalists (a response rate of 48.7%, and a follow-up survey of those who had more extensive experience of serial entrepreneurs (23 respondents). The results of the survey show that despite a strong preference for using an entrepreneur who had played a major role in a previous venture, the extent to which exiting entrepreneurs are funded from their own portfolio again is limited, though there is more extensive use of such individuals in a consultancy capacity. In screening entrepreneurs exiting from previous ventures for subsequent investments, venture capitalists scored attributes relating to commercial awareness, experience in a particular sector, and personal ambition of the entrepreneur most highly.Venture capitalists do make extensive use of serial entrepreneurs who have exited from other venture capitalists' portfolios, primarily to lead management buy-ins. Indications from the survey are that venture capitalists rarely assess entrepreneurs formally at the time of exit and that it is unusual to maintain formal links with entrepreneurs after they have exited. These apparent shortcomings suggest that perhaps investment opportunities are being missed. Those venture capitalists preferring serial entrepreneurs generally had a larger volume of funds under investment and were rather older than those venture capitalists who do not prefer to use serial entrepreneurs, reflecting the possibility that longer established venture capitalists have had more opportunity and experience in relation to second-time entrepreneurs.Investment appraisal factors were subject to a principal components analysis to identify underlying dimensions/relationships between them. With respect to the general investment appraisal factors, five factors were identified. Two factors were related to track record; one of these reflected ownership experience, while the other represented management experience. The third factor was related to personal attributes such as age, knowledge, and family background. The fourth factor represented links to the funding institution, and the final factor (a single variable factor) concerned financial commitment. The principal components analysis for screening factors on management buy-ins produced a single factor comprising all variables. These factors were then subject to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with preference for use of a serial entrepreneur as the independent variable. The results suggest that there are significant differences between venture capitalists who prefer serial entrepreneurs and those who do not in respect to their business ownership experience, the length of their entrepreneurial careers, and the number of their previous ventures.The results of the study have implications for practitioners. First, the findings emphasize the importance of not considering previous venture experience in isolation but in the context of other key investment criteria. Second, the lack of strongly greater performance from serial, versus novice, entrepreneurs further emphasizes the care to be taken in assessing experienced entrepreneurs. Third, the relatively low degree of formal and rigorous post-exit assessment and monitoring by venture capitalists suggests that important opportunities to invest in experienced entrepreneurs may be missed.     

Successful U.S. Entrepreneurs: Identifying Ethical Decision-making and Social Responsibility Behaviors

This two-part study analyzed some of the ethical choices made by founding entrepreneurs during the creation and development of their ventures in order to identify the areas in which founding entrepreneurs must make decisions related to ethics or social responsibility during venture creation and development. Content analysis was used to identify decisions with ethical components and/or implications from in-depth interviews with 10 successful business founders. The research for part one of the study was guided by the following research question: In what areas must entrepreneurs make decisions with ethical and/or social responsibility implications during new venture creation and development? The authors identified four distinct categories of decisions where ethical or social responsibility components exist: (1) individual entrepreneurial values-related decisions, (2) organizational culture/employee well-being decisions, (3) customer satisfaction and quality decisions, and (4) external accountability decisions. In the second part of the study, the decisions identified in part one were analyzed using a framework derived from prior research in ethics. This framework was developed from the work of Kant (1964) who theorized about human morals and Rawls (1971) who developed theories about justice. Part two of the study was guided by the following research questions: Do entrepreneurs have values and ethics similar to those held by society in general? If they don’t, how do their values and ethics differ? The comparison revealed that the ethics and/or values that the entrepreneurs either explicitly or implicitly acknowledged were in fact similar to those of society in general.     

Early-stage business model experimentation and pivoting

Recent literature suggests entrepreneurs struggle to pivot—or fundamentally change aspects of their venture—due to identity-based resistance to change. Yet, when entrepreneurs receive negative feedback, overcoming this resistance may be important to pivoting their business model. We adopt a convergent, mixed methods research design to explore when and why some entrepreneurs overcome resistance to change in response to negative feedback during early-stage business model experimentation. Building upon qualitative data that we gathered and analyzed, we theorize entrepreneurs may resist pivoting their value proposition relative to other business model components despite receiving negative feedback on this aspect of their business model. However, we find three factors – entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size – may enable entrepreneurs to pivot in response to negative feedback. We theorize that these factors broaden a startup team's perspective, enabling value proposition pivoting during early-stage business model experimentation. We test these relationships with quantitative data from 80 startups engaged in business model experimentation and find support across hypotheses. We contribute to understanding when and why entrepreneurs pivot aspects of their business models in response to negative feedback during early-stage business model experimentation.Executive summaryThe entrepreneurship literature suggests startups may benefit from experimentation and pivoting different parts of their business model in response to negative feedback from stakeholders (Andries et al., 2021; Camuffo et al., 2020; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). In early stages of starting a new venture, a business model refers to a cognitive schema or belief about an activity system that could potentially create and capture value (Massa et al., 2017; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). Business model experimentation is the process of testing assumptions underlying this potential business model and pivoting business model assumptions in response to negative feedback (Andries et al., 2013; McDonald and Eisenhardt, 2020; Leatherbee and Katila, 2020). Building upon prior literature, we define business model pivoting as a fundamental change to parts of the business model (Berends et al., 2021; Snihur and Clarysse, 2022; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). Yet, literature also suggests founders often struggle to pivot assumptions despite negative feedback. Motives to preserve and protect certain assumptions relevant to founders' identities can interfere with pivoting (Grimes, 2018; Kirtley and O'Mahony, 2023; Zuzul and Tripsas, 2020). Despite the general understanding that founders struggle to change their ideas, however, the entrepreneurship literature currently lacks precise insight into when and why founders can overcome resistance to pivoting.In this research, we explore when and why startups pivot different parts of their business model. We do so within the context of early-stage business model experimentation, where founders explicitly state assumptions about different parts of their potential business model, test those assumptions against stakeholder feedback, and are encouraged to pivot business model components in response to negative feedback. Through a mixed methods research design, we find (1) founders tend to resist pivoting their value propositions relative to other parts of a business model in response to negative feedback; and (2) entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size enables startups to overcome this resistance to pivoting in response to negative feedback. We theorize these factors broaden founders' perspectives (Warshay, 1962), contributing to a greater willingness to pivot during experimentation.We contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial pivoting by explaining nuanced variation in pivoting distinct business model components during experimentation. This contribution is important because it reveals that resistance to pivoting the business model may be more complex than previously thought. We also contribute to the literature at the nexus of business model experimentation and entrepreneurial cognition by finding that entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size enable startups to pivot despite psychological resistance to pivoting in response to negative feedback because it broadens founders' perspectives. This insight is important theoretically because it advances what we know about enabling experimenting with business models under conditions of uncertainty. The research presented here has clear and important implications for practice. This research suggests founders often resist changing the value proposition versus other components of their business models in early stages of venture development. This resistance can impede experimentation and pivoting in response to negative feedback. To the extent founders want to broaden their perspective to enable pivoting their value propositions in response to negative feedback during early stages of venture development, our data suggest they may be able to do so by recruiting members with entrepreneurial experience on their team (or gain entrepreneurial experience themselves), engage frequently with startup mentors, and increase the size of their team. Overall, we view the breath of perspective that comes from experience and interactions with others as an advantage for entrepreneurs when experimenting with their business models during early stages of venture development.     

Decisions,Actions, and Performance: Do Novice,Serial, and Portfolio Entrepreneurs Differ?*

A conceptual framework is extended to take into account differences between inexperienced novice entrepreneurs (that is, individuals with no prior private business ownership experience) and experienced serial and portfolio entrepreneurs. Some policymakers and practitioners are considering whether resources could be more effectively utilized if they were targeted toward serial and portfolio entrepreneurs, rather than in the form of additional initiatives to increase the pool of “pure” nascent entrepreneurs and novice entrepreneurs. To inform this policy debate, similarities and differences between novice, serial, and portfolio entrepreneurs are highlighted with regard to their decisions, actions, performance, and aspirations. We detected that portfolio entrepreneurs were more likely to express dimensions of entrepreneurial behavior. A case for targeted support tailored to the aspirations and needs of novice, serial, and portfolio entrepreneurs is presented.     

How venture capitalists respond to unmet expectations: The role of social environment

In this paper, we seek to explain venture capitalists' reactions to disappointments caused by entrepreneurs. Our basic assumption is that venture capitalists' social environment, defined as exposure to venture capital and business communities, will influence their responses to problematic situations. The results of our study suggest that venture capitalists with strong ties to their colleagues and with managerial experience are more inclined to use active and constructive approaches than venture capitalists with a lesser exposure to the venture capital and business communities.     

The entrepreneur's investor choice: The impact on later-stage firm development

This article analyzes how early-stage financing decisions may affect how entrepreneurial firms ultimately grow. This theoretical study considers an entrepreneur seeking early-stage financing from either a specialist or a generalist investor in the context of stage financing. It is assumed that an early-stage specialist is less efficient in assisting a venture beyond the early-stage round than a generalist. This leads to the following tradeoff: by initially selecting an early-stage specialist, the entrepreneur benefits from increased investor incentives in the first round. Such incentives generate additional value for the entrepreneurial venture, improving valuation in the interim round and thereby mitigating the risk of dilution against follow-up investors and potentially even of premature discontinuation of the project. However, early-stage specialists are more reluctant to finance later rounds. Conversely, using a generalist secures efficient follow-up funding but also leads to weaker investor incentives in the early stage. With this tradeoff, the presence of asymmetric information about the quality of entrepreneurial projects particularly affects generalists; entrepreneurs with strong projects more often choose specialists, while entrepreneurs with weak projects select generalists to secure efficient continuation. The use of convertible securities or adjustment warrants in contracts cannot always eliminate the effect of asymmetric information. Several empirical implications derived from this tradeoff are provided for optimal investor choice.     

Signaling for more money: The roles of founders' human capital and investor prominence in resource acquisition across different stages of firm development

We use signaling theory to explain how new ventures effectively signal future prospects to acquire external resources. Based on a sample of 235 new ventures drawn from a unique dataset combining multiple sources, we examine the signals of founders' human capital (i.e., education, industry experience, and founding experience) and investor prominence and their influence on the amount of external funding received across two stages of venture funding. We find that founders' founding experience and education have the greatest effects for acquiring first-round financing, but in later stages, only the signaling effect from education remains. Furthermore, we find important interactions between founders' human capital and investor prominence in the second round of funding. By utilizing lagged funding information, we show that different types of signals have a dynamic and temporal impact on new ventures' resource acquisition, including the persistence of some signals and the temporariness of others.     

Venture Creation Speed and Subsequent Growth: Evidence from South America

Though time is an important dimension of the venture creation process, our understanding of why some entrepreneurs are able to act more quickly than others is limited. Equally, not much is known about the relationship between venture creation speed and the subsequent venture growth. In this paper, we use a resource‐based perspective to provide insights into the factors that quicken or retard venture creation and to explore how speed impacts on subsequent growth. This is important because the topic remains generally underresearched and because even less is understood about venture creation speed in the context of South American economies. Data were collected from face‐to‐face interviews with 647 entrepreneurs in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. Using a multivariate regression framework, we find that entrepreneurs make use of their human and social capital resources to shape the speed by which their venture is created. Moreover, their perceptions of unfavorable environmental conditions seem to retard venture creation. Findings also suggest that entrepreneurs who take more time to create a more solid resource base tend to receive better growth outcomes. Implications from the findings are discussed.     

Gender,Social Networks,and Entrepreneurship in Ghana

This article reports the results of an exploratory study on gender-based differences in the motives underlying entrepreneurial activities in Ghana, the barriers and opportunities that the operational environment presents, and the manner in which entrepreneurs leverage resources. The evidence suggests that female entrepreneurs tend to have more difficulties in accessing bank financing but they compensate by cultivating social relationships and using the social capital derived from them as a resource leveraging mechanism. Women also tend to depend more on their social relationships for moral and emotional support during the initial stages of their enterprise development. No other substantial gender-based differences have been noted.     

Financing High Technology Startups in Belgium: An Explorative Study

The results of an explorative study on the financing of 18 high technology Belgian startups are reported. On a counts basis, the most important sources of financing at the startup are the entrepreneurs and the banks, but the sources that provide the largest amounts of funds are the venture capital companies and private investors. Private investors and venture capitalists have a complementary role, with the former investing mostly at the startup and the latter financing the early growth. The role of the government, universities and other companies is limited.     

Innovative opportunity pursuit, human capital and business ownership experience in an emerging region: evidence from Ghana

This study explores whether an entrepreneur??s ability to assemble and leverage human capital, particularly specific human capital relating to prior business ownership experience, is associated with seven types of product and work practices innovation in an emerging region, namely, Ghana. Logistic regression estimation revealed that portfolio entrepreneurs were more likely than novice entrepreneurs to report ??innovation tried??. Multinomial logistic regression analysis revealed that portfolio entrepreneurs were more likely than other entrepreneurs to report ??innovation tried and introduced??. If the goals of policy are to increase the ??quality?? of new business start-ups and maximize investment returns, there is a case to target assistance to portfolio entrepreneurs.     

Entry and innovation: an analysis of the fabless semiconductor business

The relationship between pre-entry experience and patenting for a sample of 133 firms active in the fabless semiconductor business between 1984 and 2005 is studied. Controlling for variables such as venture capital, post-entry experience and parent involvement in the creation of the new venture, it is found that firms with better educated founders have a higher hazard to patent soon after entry. Additionally, firms whose founders have a longer tenure in the parent firm have a relatively higher hazard of patenting. Finally, firms whose founders have innovated in the past are more likely to innovate. Results suggest that both general and specific human capital are important preconditions of pre-entry experience.