Cooperative and noncooperative R&D with spillovers: The case of labor-managed firms

This research focuses on the behavior of not-for-profit enterprises. In particular, using a familiar model of cost-reducing R&D with spillovers, we examine strategic interactions between labor-managed firms in a duopoly. Research spillovers have not been previously considered in the context of labor-managed firms. Among four market scenarios involving (i) competition in research and production; (ii) cooperation in research and production; (iii and iv) competition or cooperation in research and the reverse in production, our results show that research is greatest under full cooperation, while output is greatest under full competition. Output and R&D are the lowest in the case when firms compete in research, but form a production cartel. The degree of research spillovers has a crucial bearing upon these rankings. Some of these results differ from those for profit-maximizing firms. The effects of changes in research spillovers on employment (output) are shown to depend upon the nature of the underlying production technology. Policy implications are discussed.     

Strategic Location Behaviour: The Case of Japanese Investments in Europe

SUMMARY

We address the question of competition within the location choices of firms. In a framework of agglomeration effects, both spatial and temporal dimensions of the firms' decisions are studied. We show that the competition consequences of preemptive move and optimal time of entry can interfere with the geographical decisions. Our results contrast with those of agglomeration economics models which generally provide extreme results of mono-location. The equilibria described here tend to demonstrate that the relation between competition strength and spatial differentiation remains pertinent in a context of agglomeration economies. A conditional logit empirical study analyses the geographical choice of Japanese firms in Europe. Agglomeration variables, public policies and labour market determinants are tested, highlighting the existence of temporal and spatial proximity in the behaviour of firms. The competition conditions experienced by firms of each specific sector also appear to be important in the location decision of Japanese investors.     

Spatial Price Discrimination in the Spokes Model

The spokes model allows to address nonlocalized spatial competition between firms. In a spatial context, firms can price discriminate using location‐contingent pricing. Nonlocalized competition implies that neighboring effects are not relevant to firms. This paper analyzes spatial price discrimination and location choices in the spokes model. Highly asymmetric location patterns are one outcome if the number of firms is sufficiently high: in that case, one firm supplies a generally appealing product whereas others focus on a specific niche. Moreover, multiple equilibria arise for intermediate values of the number of firms. In this case, the location patterns do not always globally minimize the sum of transport costs: asymmetric configurations distribute more efficiently the cost between firms.     

Spatial competition with free entry, Chamberlinian tangencies, and social efficiency

Free entry in Löschian spatial competition leads to a tangency between each firm's negatively sloped average revenue and the downsloping portion of average costs—as in Chamberlin's monopolistic competition. It is generally concluded that this equilibrium involves too many inefficiently small firms. However, this conclusion is incorrect. The difference between price and firm marginal production costs in spatial equilibrium is just sufficient to cover the additional marginal cost of output resulting from availability of multiple locations. This Chamberlinian tangency does not imply inefficiency, because it does not include all the social costs and benefits resulting from spatial competition.     

Regulation of Duopoly: Managed Competition vs Regulated Monopolies

This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated-product industries. The regulator can control prices and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control the quality choices of the firms. We inquire about the optimal choice of regulatory regime—whether and under what conditions managed competition or segmentation of the market between regulated monopolies achieves better results. In the spatial duopoly model analyzed here, unhindered competition generally results in an inefficient allocation. When the regulator knows the technologies, optimal managed competition results in distortions of the quality choice, but an optimal regulated-monopolies regime achieves the first best outcome. When the regulator is uncertain about the technologies, neither of these methods yields the first-best outcome. The regulated-monopolies regime still tends to produce better quality choices, but managed competition tends to be more effective at extracting rents from the firms. The overall comparison depends on some finer details of the environment.     

Natural oligopolies with exogenous sunk costs: A non-Suttonian result

In a spatial competition model with exogenous fixed costs and divisible goods, we obtain non-Suttonian results. When the economy is infinitely replicated, the number of firms does go to infinity but, as consumers’ income goes to infinity, the equilibrium number of firms tends toward a finite value. This occurs because the global demand to each firm becomes in the limit infinitely sensitive to price differentials since they give then rise to infinitely large differences in purchase expenditure.     

Price competition in the spatial real estate market: allies or rivals?

This paper examines whether real estate firms can avoid price competition when properties in the vicinity are priced by allies. An oligopoly model with differentiated products generally suggests that real estate firms engage in price competition with their spatially closest rivals. Yet, they can raise property prices when the market share of their allies increases. To test this prediction, a spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive disturbances, including a share of allies in the vicinity, is estimated using data on the prices of residential condos in central Tokyo, Japan. The model prediction is supported by the empirical results. In the data set, the magnitude of the market share on property prices increases with the expansion of the size of the spatial market.     

LOCATION OF VERTICALLY LINKED OLIGOPOLISTS

This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its relation to the creation of an industrial cluster. In a two-region spatial economy, a monopolist firm supplies an input to N consumer goods firms that compete in quantities. When the transport cost of the input increases, downstream firms prefer to agglomerate where the upstream firm is located, to save in production cost. However, simultaneous increases in the transport cost of the input and of the consumer good or increases in the number of downstream firms lead to a relative dispersion of these firms, to reduce competition and locate closer to the local final consumer. In contrast to Mayer (2000) , when both transport costs increase, the location decision of downstream firms is based more on the geographical point that maximizes accessibility to the local final consumer than on the geographical point that minimizes the production cost.     

Privatisation or Competition?

Market competition is essential for any economy to be efficient. In order to develop competition in a transition economy, it is conventionally thought that privatisation should take place first. This wisdom has been challenged by the Chinese reform experience of the last two decades, which modified the incentive structure of state enterprises and created markets and market competition in the absence of large scale privatisation. China's experience, however, raises the question of whether its chosen type of reform is sufficient to promote competition in a market dominated by public firms. To answer this, we need to know what kind of markets were created – regional markets closed to trade or unified markets with easy access – and whether or not improved incentives for state firms have led to competition. This paper investigates these questions on the basis of a survey of both theory and empirical evidence; and finds that the Chinese reform policies did succeed in stimulating competition among state firms.     

Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm

Review of Economic Design - We study spatial competition by firms which is often studied in the context of linear markets where customers always shop at the nearest firm. Here, customer behavior is...     

Disclosure Regulation in Duopoly Markets: Proprietary Costs and Social Welfare

Abstract

The argument of proprietary costs is commonly used by firms to object against proposed disclosure regulations. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the welfare consequences of disclosure in duopoly markets and to identify market settings where proprietary costs are a viable argument for firms to remain silent. We, therefore, solve the optimal disclosure strategies and distinguish two different potentially costly effects of disclosing private information: the strategic information effect and the market information effect. We identify the market settings for which a regulator prefers to impose disclosure regulation so as to maximise consumer surplus or total surplus. Regulation may be necessary because (i) the increase in welfare outweighs proprietary costs to the firms, or (ii) firms are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma. The first primarily applies to Bertrand competition with demand uncertainty and, to a lesser extent, to Cournot competition. The second applies primarily to Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty.     

Inward investment and endogenous development. The convergence of the strategies of large firms and territories?

Inward investment is often understood as an inadequate instrument for self-sustained growth and as being responsible for the insufficient development of peripheral areas. Globalization and increasing competition within the markets, however, changed the firms' and regions' adjustment environment, and led to the convergence of spatial strategies of the large innovative firms and the development strategies of regional and local governments. This process contributes toward the integration of the external firms within local productive systems and, therefore, large innovative firms can play a relevant role in endogenous development processes. Although the convergence of strategies is not a phenomenon that can be generalized for all types of firms and territories, a new line of action opens up that permits improved productive restructuring and economic development, even in less favoured and peripheral regions.     

Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare

I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.     

Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS AND LOCATION THEORY

ABSTRACT. Imperfectly competitive markets, such as those involving spatial separation of producers and consumers are characterized by interactions between competing firms. Actions call forth reactions and the possible reactions form an important part of the information set that should be used to determine the initial actions. One method for dealing with this is the 'conjectoral variation' approach. Despite some shortcomings this methodology sheds considerable light on decision-making in the space economy. Equally importantly, it sheds light on more general microeconomies modelled as spatial analogs. This paper shows that conjectural variations and the nature of competition between rival firms do indeed 'matter' in location choice and more generally in product design. In particular, we shall be concerned with showing how the conjectured responses of rival firms affect their desire to agglomerate.     

Existence of equilibrium configurations of competitive firms on an infinite two-dimensional space

This paper analytically examines the existence of equilibrium configurations of competitive firms on an infinite two-dimensional space. It is shown that the Löschian configuration (a regular-hexagonal lattice) and a square lattice are in global equilibrium; the Löschian configuration is in the strongest global equilibrium among the regular lattices (in this sense, spatial competition leads to the social optimum); and the so-called back-to-back configuration is not in equilibrium. These results are in marked contrast to those obtained from a one-dimensional model, implying that spatial equilibrium configurations in a two-dimensional space should not be inferred only from one-dimensional models frequently employed in spatial economics.     

Multiproduct Firms in Hotelling’s Spatial Competition

Oligopoly models are usually analyzed in the context of two firms, anticipating that market outcomes would be qualitatively similar in the case of three or more firms. The literature on Hotelling’s location‐then‐price competition is not an exception. In this paper, we show that the main finding of brand bunching in Hotelling’s duopoly no longer holds once three or more firms are allowed to enter the market. That is, in oligopoly with three or more firms, firms proliferate brands.     

Personalized Pricing and Quality Customization

We embed the principal–agent model in a model of spatial differentiation with correlated consumer preferences to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing and quality allocation (PPQ), whereby duopoly firms charge different prices and offer different qualities to different consumers, based on their willingness to pay. Our model sheds light on the equilibrium product-line pricing and quality schedules offered by firms, given that none, one, or both firms implement PPQ. The adoption of PPQ has three effects in our model: it enables firms to extract higher rents from loyal customers, intensifies price competition for nonloyal customers, and eliminates cannibalization from customer self-selection. Contrary to prior literature on one-to-one marketing and price discrimination, we show that even symmetric firms can avoid the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma problem when they engage in personalized pricing and quality customization. When both firms have PPQ, consumer surplus is nonmonotonic in valuations such that some low-valuation consumers get higher surplus than high-valuation consumers. The adoption of PPQ can reduce information asymmetry, and therefore sellers offer higher-quality products after the adoption of PPQ. Overall, we find that while the simultaneous adoption of PPQ generally improves total social welfare and firm profits, it decreases total consumer surplus.     

Bertrand oligopoly in a spatial context: The case of quantity independent transportation costs

The theory of spatial competition [for a review, see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1985)] is usually based on the assumption of transportation costs which are proportionate to distance and quantity. In reality, however, there exist frequently considerable economies of scale, especially with respect to the conveyed quantity of goods. A good case in point is transportation cost incurred by a consumer patronizing a shopping area. Cost economies of scale will in general influence consumers' optimal choice with respect to quantities and best market places. In the extreme, consumers' outlays on transportation can be considered independent of the purchased quantity, but approximately proportionate to distance. In the present paper, the impact of this assumption on spatial competition is analysed. It will be shown, that existence and uniqueness of spatial oligopolistic equilibrium is restored. Furthermore, due to some residual monopolistic power, prices do not converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium prices when the distance between the firms shrinks to zero. In conclusion the model exhibits a fundamental difference in the market structure, when the spatial aspect is incorporated.     

Optimal zoning of managerial duopoly

This paper investigates optimal zoning of two managerial firms in an unconstrained linear city. Comparing with the case in which firms are not managerial type, the strategic delegation increases the incentives of one firm to locate farther from the rival. Then, a welfare function is introduced to highlight zoning regulation as an influential competition policy tool. Depending on the regulator's objective function and the timing of location choice, we provide a new mechanism that allows the regulator to attain the optimal locations of managerial firms and can lead to strong or weak competition.