MONSTERS ON THE HIGH SEAS

As China’s exports swell,Korea and Japan are launching gargantuan container ships Inthespringof2000,30man-agersfro…     

DOES DEFLATION IMPINGE ON A GOVERNMENT'S FISCAL STANDING?

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with money to investigate theoretically under what conditions deflation impinges on a government's fiscal standing. Focus is placed on an upper bound that is compatible with a no Ponzie game condition for the government and an equilibrium. A comparative dynamics analysis demonstrates that if a government's fiscal deficit is not so high, deflation has a negative impact on the upper bound, while if a government's fiscal deficit exceeds a critical level, deflation rather improves it. The critical level depends on a time stream of disposable real incomes and a preference parameter.     

IS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON TOBACCO USE EFFICIENT?

Numerous employers in over 20 U.S. states currently discriminate legally against smokers in their hiring policies. We analyze the cost of being a smoker, measured in annual hospital days, and compare this with the cost of being a former smoker, the cost of being obese, and the cost of a variety of other medical conditions, relative to the cost of being a never smoker, using three large recent surveys each having in excess of one hundred thousand observations. The paper also explores the cost of former smokers as determined by the number of years since quitting. Smokers as a whole are not found to be the most costly employees. Furthermore, health costs vary dramatically among smokers of different duration and intensity. As a consequence, our results question the efficiency of such discrimination. (JEL I10, I18, J71, J7)     

DO SOCCER ASSOCIATIONS REALLY SPEND ON A GOOD THING? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HETEROGENEITY IN THE CONSUMER RESPONSE TO MATCH UNCERTAINTY OF OUTCOME

The purpose of this study is to analyze whether previous results describing the effect of uncertainty of outcome on match attendance in team sports have been driven by heterogeneity in fan demand. We apply censored quantile regression methods and place particular emphasis on the relationship between match uncertainty and attendance demand, as previous results are highly ambiguous. This is more surprising, as each season association and league officials continue to spend millions on enhancing this uncertainty. We also control for season ticket holders, who are unlikely to be influenced by match specificities. Based on data from German soccer, our results indicate that fan demand shows heterogeneity across quantiles and that increasing match uncertainty of outcome exclusively benefits teams who already face strong attendance demand. ( JEL D12, C14, C24, L83)     

BETTER LATER THAN NEVER? AN EXPERIMENT ON BARGAINING UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION

A central result in the literature on bargaining with asymmetric information is that the uninformed party (buyer) can screen the informed party (seller) over time. Screening eliminates trade failures that are otherwise common in the presence of adverse selection, but the downside of the bargaining institution is the cost associated with repeated offers and time frictions. This article reports an experimental test of these predictions. We find that rates of trade are substantially higher in the bargaining institution than in control treatments in which we remove the possibility to make repeated offers (take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offer) or the time frictions. However, we also observe a persistent overdelay before agreements are reached, that is, bargaining takes longer than theoretically predicted. This lowers efficiency below its predicted level and below the level observed in the take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offer institution. We identify possible channels for overdelay in the form of fairness preferences and loss aversion, concluding that there are important behavioral deviations from the standard model that are detrimental to the efficiency of bargaining under incomplete information.     

POINTS OR PRISON? THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT SANCTIONS ON DRIVING BEHAVIOR

We compare two reforms aimed at reducing road accidents in Italy. The Penalty Points System (PPS) provides drivers with a score and curtails points after infractions. The license is temporarily suspended when points are exhausted. Losing points is easy, but the penalty is mild. The Road Homicide (RH) introduces heavy penalties in the rare event of injuries and/or fatalities. In terms of probability and intensity of the penalty the two policies are therefore diametrically opposed. We find that injuries and fatalities decrease more with PPS than with RH. Comparing costs and benefits, we conclude that strong penalties are not beneficial. (JEL D91, K14, K42, R41)     

ON TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION: A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE ‘SAILING-SHIP EFFECT’

One of the key features of our economies consists of the coexistence of different technologies supplying similar products and services. We often observe that an old technology is improved when a new one appears; behind this process of improvement often lies an intentional research activity. There thus begins a competition between the two technologies whose performances are improved via R&D. We focus our attention on this competition process and supply a formal model, based on the optimization of R&D expenditure of both technologies, which can describe the dynamics of the delayed overtaking of the new technology over the old one.     

HOW DO EUROPEANS EVALUATE INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS? AN ASSESSMENT BASED ON HAPPINESS SURVEYS

The purpose of this paper is to measure the evaluation of income inequality by European citizens. Starting from the concept of a social welfare function defined on income distributions the paper estimates the degree and nature of inequality aversion of Europeans. It uses subjective well-being (SWB) as an empirical measure of welfare and estimates how SWB is related to average income and measures of income inequality (from an appropriate class). The estimated relationship is used to determine those inequality measures which qualify as proper representations of people's inequality aversion.     

THE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON THE QUALITY AND VARIETY OF INFORMATION PRODUCTS†

Anecdotal evidence suggests that producers of information products (TV programs, movies, computer software) may respond to potentially cost-saving technological change by increasing, rather than reducing, their total production investments in the ‘first copy’ of each product, possibly at the expense of product variety. Comparative statics show that under reasonable assumptions about consumer demand and production technology, competitive firms in a monopolistically competitive industry are in fact induced to increase first-copy investments as a result of either what we define as ‘quality-enhancing’ or ‘cost-reducing’ types of technological advance, whereas product variety either falls or stays the same. Results suggest that contrary to often held expectations, potentially cost-saving technological advances in information industries may result in greater market concentration.     

DOES SIZE MATTER? THE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN GERMANY

Income inequality in Germany has been continually increasing during the past 20 years. One cause of this development, among others, could be structural shifts in household formation due to long‐term societal trends. These affect per capita incomes, which has repercussions for the income distribution even if wages remain constant. The aim of this paper is to quantify the proportion of changing household structures in the increase in inequality. We find that the growth of the income gap in Germany (for both East and West from 1991 to 2007) is indeed strongly related to changes in household structure and employment behavior, and a large part of this increase is compensated by the welfare state.     

WASTIN’ AWAY IN MARGARITAVILLE? NEW EVIDENCE ON THE ACADEMIC EFFECTS OF TEENAGE BINGE DRINKING

Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, this study examines the relationship between teenage binge drinking and three measures of academic performance: grade point average, out-of-school suspensions, and unexcused absences from school. While ordinary least square estimates show that binge drinking is associated with diminished academic performance, individual fixed-effects estimates suggest that much of this relationship can be explained by unmeasured heterogeneity. After controlling for individual fixed effects and for changes in drug use, psychological well-being, and time preference, binge drinking has a much smaller and often statistically insignificant effect on school performance. ( JEL I10, I21, I18)     

DO CHINESE UNIONS HAVE “REAL” EFFECTS ON EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION?

In this article, we use enterprise population‐level data to investigate the effectiveness of Chinese unions in improving employee wage and nonwage compensation. We show that the effectiveness of Chinese unions stems from a “collective voice” face rather than from a “monopoly” face. The empirical findings on the effectiveness of unions are remarkable: unions in the workplace significantly improve employee wage and nonwage compensation, along with employee training. Moreover, the presence of unions within the same region and industry generates positive spillovers for employee compensation. The unions in China do have “real” effects. (JEL J30, J50, J51, K31)     

SHOULD YOU ALLOW YOUR EMPLOYEE TO BECOME YOUR COMPETITOR? ON NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS*

We discuss a principal–agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a noncompete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal, as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is sufficiently small relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict noncompete agreement.     

DOES SIZE MATTER? THE INFLUENCE OF FIRM SIZE ON WORKING CONDITIONS,JOB SATISFACTION AND QUIT INTENTIONS

Using a detailed survey on Spanish workers, this paper investigates the relationship between firm size and working conditions, the extent to which firm size differences in workers' job satisfaction can be accounted for by differences in their work environment and the impact of firm size on workers' quit intentions. The results indicate that: (1) employees in larger firms face a worse work environment; (2) working in large firms significantly reduces job satisfaction when no controls for working conditions are included, but taking them into account makes differentials across size categories statistically insignificant; and (3) no systematic differences exist in intentions to quit across firm size categories, irrespective of conditioning on wages.     

HOW CONSERVATIVE DOES THE CENTRAL BANKER HAVE TO BE? ON THE TREATMENT OF EXPECTATIONS UNDER DISCRETIONARY POLICYMAKING

This paper explores an issue that arises in the delegation process. The paper shows that a myopic central banker, one who treats expectations as constant in setting discretionary policy, can replicate the behaviour of output and inflation under policy from a timeless perspective. For that to happen, society must delegate a price level target or a speed limit policy to a central banker who is more weight-conservative than society.     

DO ACTIONS SPEAK AS LOUD AS WORDS? COMMITMENTS TO “GOING GREEN” ON CAMPUS

Signatories to the American College and University Presidents' Climate Commitment (ACUPCC) pledge to pursue a path toward carbon neutrality through the choice of a set of Tangible Actions (TAs). The actions can be chosen either because they will lead to reductions or because they are the easiest to achieve. By exploiting the variation in the TAs chosen by colleges, we find evidence for both of these motivations. We find evidence that schools focusing their efforts on improving energy efficiency have achieved swift reductions. Conversely, schools pledging to use green power are generally already utilizing it and therefore do not achieve additional reductions. We conclude with suggestions for improvement in the ACUPCC reporting system that would improve potential for analysis. (JEL Q01, Q40, Q56)