Market Crashes and Informational Avalanches

This paper analyses a security market with transaction costs and a sequential trading structure. Transaction costs may prevent many traders from revealing their private information if they trade in a sequential fashion. Due to the information aggregation failure, hidden information gets accumulated in the market which may be revealed by a small trigger, yielding a high volatility in the absence of an accompanying event. The paper first characterizes the optimal trading strategy of the agent which constitute the unique equilibrium. Further properties of the price sequence are obtained using the concepts of informational cascade and informational avalanche.
The results are applied to the explanation of market crashes. In particular, the dynamics of market crashes are illustrated as evolving through the following four phases: (1) boom; (2) euphoria; (3) trigger; and (4) panic; where the euphoria corresponds to the informational cascade and the panic corresponds to the informational avalanche.     

A theoretical analysis of institutional investors' trading costs in auction and dealer markets

This paper compares trading costs for institutional investors subject to liquidity shocks, in auction and dealer markets. The batch auction restricts the institutions' ability to exploit informational advantages because of competition between institutions when they simultaneously submit orders. This competition lowers aggregate trading costs. In the dealership market, competition between traders is absent but private information is revealed by observing the flow of successive orders and so reduces aggregate trading costs. We analyse the relative effects on trading costs of competition and information revelation in the two systems and derive a parameter inequality which determines which system has lower costs.     

The revenue potential of a financial transaction tax for US financial markets

This paper estimates the revenue potential of a financial transaction tax (FTT) for US financial markets. We focus on analyzing the revenue potential of the Inclusive Prosperity Act that was introduced in the US House of Representatives in 2012 and the US Senate in 2015. The tax rates stipulated in this Act include 0.5% (50 basis points (bps)) for all stock transactions, 0.1% (10 bps) for all bond transactions and 0.005% (0.5 bps) on the notional value of all derivative trades. We examine three sets of evidence to generate potential revenue estimates: 1) the levels of transaction costs in US financial markets over time and within the range of financial market segments; 2) the extent of trading elasticities under various trading conditions; and 3) the current level of trading activity in US financial markets. Based on this evidence, we conclude that a US FTT operating at the tax rates stated above would generate about $220 billion per year, equal to about 1.2% of the current US GDP.     

The societal benefit of a financial transaction tax

We provide a novel justification for a financial transaction tax for economies where agents face stochastic consumption opportunities. A financial transaction tax makes it more costly for agents to readjust their portfolios of liquid and illiquid assets in response to liquidity shocks, which increase both the demand for and the price of liquid assets. The higher price improves liquidity insurance and welfare for other market participants. We calibrate the model to U.S. data and find that the optimal financial transaction tax is 1.6% and that it reduces the volume of financial trading by 17%.     

Private information and its origins in an electronic foreign exchange market

We study the risk of informed trading in an electronic foreign exchange market and test whether informed trading is driven by marketwide private information. Our framework is based on a structural microstructure trade model that measures the market makers' beliefs directly. Evidence of high concentration of informed trades is found to be inversely related to the overall 24-hour trading activity, i.e., early morning and late afternoon GMT rounds of trading involve the highest risk of informed trading. We structurally identify that the trades due to region-specific private information are dominant and explain between 5 and 25% of the variation in currency returns. In contrast, marketwide private information explains only about 1–5% of the variation in returns.     

Tobin tax and trading volume tightening: a reassessment

This article extends the previous literature on the Tobin tax. We find that very roughly, a doubling in transaction costs would reduce trading volume by 25% to 40% in the Forex. Most importantly, this article is the first contribution to specify the trading volume of the Forex through different (low and high volatility) regimes. Our results show evidence of nonlinear patterns for trading volumes and transaction costs on the Forex. Thus, the Tobin tax would not have a monotonic impact on trading activity across market conditions. The change in elasticity between low and high volatility regimes would be slight but significantly different. We may suggest that the high-variance regime might be the fundamentalist regime and the low-variance regime might be the chartist regime. It is a first step towards understanding which categories of agents would react to the introduction of a tax. Our results seem consistent with Tobin’s underlying thinking; since a tax would penalize chartists more than fundamentalists, it could reduce exchange rate volatility.     

建立多层次证券市场交易费用的分析

作者借助新制度经济学的交易费用理论,以金融体系与建立多层次证券市场的相互关系作为分析背景,针对我国民营企业逐步壮大以至于在很大程度上改变了金融市场之运作主体的事实,分析我国金融体系的现状和局限性。作者着重考察我国现阶段证券市场运行过程中交易费用的形成及其对行为主体参与金融活动的影响,并以此分析证券市场交易费用的存在对经济运行和经济发展的损害及建立有效率多层次证券市场体系的内在原因。     

Multinational firms, international trade and international telecommunications

The study analyses the determinants of international telephone, telex, telegram and leased lines communication between the United States and 46 countries. It focusses on the role of multinational firms, international trading firms and new information technologies within the framework of the theory of transaction costs.Results of the econometric estimates suggest that: (a) technological conditions of telecommunication infrastructure, i.e., international diffusion lags of new information technologies, play an important role in the explanation of international telephone and telex telecommunication flows but not in the demand for telegraph and leased lines, (b) multinational firms use international telecommunication to reduce the coordination costs and are strong customers of leased lines and telephones, but less so of telex and telegrams, (c) international trading firms exhibit less clear preferences in the use of the different media to reduce transaction costs.     

Predictability of equity returns during a financial crisis

An occurrence of a market crash or a financial crisis has long been considered a cause of market inefficiency. An inefficient market commonly implies return predictability and the existence of profitable opportunities for traders and speculators. Technical analysis has been a popular tool to identify predictable patterns in asset prices. The usefulness of a large universe of technical trading rules popularized in the existing literature on technical analysis is tested when they are applied to a set of equity markets that are generally considered developed and efficient during the two most recent periods of major financial turmoil: the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. Three major statistical deficiencies that existing studies on return predictability are commonly criticized for – data snooping bias, nonsynchronicity bias and transaction costs – have been incorporated in the analysis. Technical trading rules are largely unable to yield abnormal excess returns over the passive benchmark after data snooping bias, nonsynchronous pricing and transaction costs are accounted for. Chaotic price movements typical for a volatile market during a financial crisis are likely to have an adverse effect on the performance of active trend chasing trading strategies.     

Informed manipulation

In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number of trading periods before all private information is revealed, long-lived informed traders will manipulate in every equilibrium.     

Intraday trade in dealership markets

We develop and test a structural asymmetric information transaction model to characterize the price impact of information when markets are thin. Since orders are accepted individually, the model allows for transaction costs and brokerage fees. Equilibrium demands mixed entry strategies on the part of potentially informed traders. Estimation of the structural parameters is performed using a maximum likelihood procedure on NYSE data. The structural model is rejected primarily because the nonlinear restrictions do not allow for sufficient correlation between price movements and pricing errors. This leads to unreasonably low estimates of the probability of informed trade relative to an unrestricted alternative. The price impact of information is found to be positive and significant, but economically small. This is because although the amount of private information is substantial, the quality of the information signals is poor, particularly in the middle of the trading day. Informed agents do not trade small quantities, which suggests that their ability to divide orders is limited by transaction costs.     

No trade

We investigate a common value bilateral bargaining model with two-sided private information and no aggregate uncertainty. A seller owns an asset whose common valuation is a deterministic function of the two traders' private signals. We first establish a no-trade theorem for this environment, and proceed to study the effect of the asset valuation structure and the trading mechanism on extent to which asymmetric information induces individuals to engage in mutually unprofitable exchange. A laboratory experiment is conducted, where trade is found to occur between 19% and 35% of the time, and this depends in systematic ways on both the asset valuation function and the trading mechanism. Both buyers and sellers adapt their strategy to changes in the asset valuation function and to changes in the trading mechanism in clearly identifiable ways. An equilibrium model with naïve belief formation accounts for some of the behavioral findings, but open questions remain.     

Prices, Delay, and the Dynamics of Trade

We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading partner is costly, prices are determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values. As frictions vanish, transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero, even though the trading patterns continue to be inefficient and delay persists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D40, D50.     

Water quality trading with asymmetric information,uncertainty and transaction costs: A stochastic agent-based simulation

We examine the efficiency of emissions trading in bilateral and clearinghouse markets with heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents making decisions under imperfect and asymmetric information, and transaction costs. Results are derived using a stochastic agent-based simulation model of agents’ decision-making and interactions. Trading rules, market structures, and agent information structures are selected to represent emerging water quality trading programs. The analysis is designed to provide a strong test of the efficiency of trading occurring through the two market structures. The Differential Evolution algorithm is used to search for market trade strategies that perform well under multiple states of the world. Our findings suggest that trading under both bilateral and clearinghouse markets yields cost savings relatively to no trading. The clearinghouse is found to be more efficient than bilateral negotiations in coordinating point–nonpoint trading under uncertainty and transaction costs. However, the market under both structures is unlikely to achieve or even approximate least-cost pollution control allocations. Expectations of gains from water quality trading should, therefore, be tempered.     

Exclusive Versus Non-exclusive Dealing in Auctions with Resale

We consider a seller who can either sell exclusively through resellers, or allow potential consumers to purchase directly from him. The consumers’ willingness to pay is private information. All transactions are in the form of second-price sealed bid auctions. We show that, if the resellers can gain access to a substantially bigger portion of the market than the seller himself, the seller obtains a higher revenue by dealing exclusively through them, i.e., by committing to not sell to any consumer. The result is due to a “winner’s curse” effect: the resellers win only if the consumers that they compete against submit lower bids, i.e., if part of their customer base has low valuations. This depresses the resellers’ willingness to pay relative to what they would be willing to pay under an exclusive resale contract. Our results do not depend on the presence of transaction costs: exclusive dealing yields strictly higher revenue even when the resellers can market the item at zero cost. We would like to thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Michael Rothkopf and seminar participants at Iowa State University, the Midwest Mathematical Economics meetings, the Milken Institute, Rutgers University, SUNY at Stony Brook Summer Workshop on Game Theory, for helpful comments and suggestions.     

What Collusion? Unilateral Market Power as a Catalyst for Countercyclical Markups

This paper presents and tests a simple model of competitive and unilateral market power regimes that yields countercyclical markups. Following a decrease in demand in the short run, capacity-constrained firms may have a strong incentive not to lower their prices to the new competitive price. Demand shocks may introduce market power into a previously competitive market. Experimental posted offer markets support this conjecture with complete information on the market structure. With only private information, there appears to be a hysteresis effect concerning supracompetitive prices, i.e., markets with a history of supracompetitive pricing continue to generate supracompetitive prices following demand shocks. However, competitive markets also remain competitive following demand shocks when firms only have private information on costs and capacities.     

管理者交易的市场择时能力对市场流动性的影响

利用国泰安数据服务中心数据,采用事件研究法,考察中国上市公司中管理者买入交易和卖出交易对我国股票市场流动性的影响,结果显示:管理者买入后的市场流动性减弱,归因于管理者与其他市场参与者之间的信息不对称;管理者卖出降低管理者的股权,提高市场流动性,信息不对称减弱。管理者在市场交易比较活跃的日期交易,可能是因为在高的市场交易量下能隐藏管理者的私人信息。     

Unconventional optimal open market purchases

We build a model in which verifiability of private debt and a timing mismatch in debt settlements can lead to a liquidity problem in the financial market. The central bank can respond to the liquidity problem by adopting an unconventional monetary policy that purchases private debts in the open market. This policy is effective if the timing mismatch is nominal (i.e., a settlement participation risk). It is ineffective if the limited participation is driven by a real shock (i.e., preference shock).     

Market power,private information,and the optimal scale of pollution permit markets with application to North Carolina's Neuse River

We extend the analysis of optimal scale in pollution permit markets by allowing for both market power and private information. We characterize the total costs (abatement costs and damages) under market power and private information and compare them to total costs under competition. It is possible for both market power and private information to lead to lower total costs than competition, but generally the differences between the three market structures will be small. We also conduct an optimal scale analysis of nitrogen pollution from waste water treatment plants (WWTP) into North Carolina's Neuse River System. An economic model of damages and abatement costs is integrated with a hydro-ecological model of nitrogen flow through the Neuse. We determine the optimal number of trading zones and allocate the WWTP into these zones. Under the most likely regulatory scenario, we find cost savings of 1.55 million dollars per year under the optimal market design relative to the typical 303(d) regulation in which the WWTP are not allowed to trade.     

Imagery and Financial Judgment

Many studies have indicated that a buy-and-hold investment strategy is superior to a trading strategy. This is thought to be true because trading incurs transaction costs that lower net returns compared to a buy-and-hold strategy. We propose a behavioral finance argument to illustrate that merely switching between positive expected return assets can lead to a long-run negative expected return, even when transaction costs are ignored. This counterintuitive result may obtain because of Parrondo's Paradox. We provide a stylized theoretical example that demonstrates how a trader can lose money by trading between assets with positive long-run expected returns. We also present simulation results to support our example. Thus, long-run negative results from trading may not be due entirely to transaction costs. A trading strategy may prove inferior to buy-and-hold for agents simply because of their singular trading patterns, as we outline in the paper.