Data portability effects on data-driven innovation of online platforms: Analyzing Spotify

The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) introduces a new right to data portability, which allows users to move their personal data to other platforms, potentially affecting competition between rival platforms offering similar (homogeneous/substitute) products or services within the European Union. However, it is still unclear what effects this new regulation could have on competition and, consequently, on innovation in digital markets. Therefore, this paper analyzes the effect of data portability driven by competition on the data-driven innovation response of online platforms such as Spotify, Google, and Facebook.We conduct an empirical analysis of Spotify, which is an online platform facing competition within the EU, and perform a comparison between data portability to number portability of the telecommunication sector to predict the future impact of the new regulation. Finally, we compare the observations on Spotify with Facebook and Google, which are companies in winner-takes-all markets.We argue that online platforms like Spotify, which face competition within the EU, will invest in two forms of data-driven innovation due to the effect of data portability. These types are ‘exploitation-innovation,’ by improving the existing technology, and ‘exploration-innovation’ by developing new technology. In ‘exploitation-innovation,’ firms, like Spotify, will increase investments in data-driven innovation to enhance users' engagement and retention to avoid churn. In ‘exploration-innovation,’ these firms will invest in data-driven innovation to develop new algorithms to include data from customers acquired from their competitors. On the contrary, online platforms, like Facebook or Google, which do not face real competition, will not have a substantial need to invest in data-driven innovation solely due to data portability.     

Research trends of digital platforms: A survey of the literature from 2018 to 2021

In recent years, there has been a vigorous discussion about digital platforms due to their emerging significance in the digital ecosystem. However, despite common interests in the digital platform, comprehensive literature reviews on the topic are still limited. Therefore, this study offers a systematic and interdisciplinary review of the literature on digital platforms by collecting and analyzing a sample of 1,224 articles published from January 2018 to December 2021. In particular, this study focuses on which country leads platform research. By interpreting the concentration of research fields that study platforms and financial funding for platform research, this article provides a new perspective on the countries leading academic platform research. Our findings show that those holding platform hegemony in the real world are also active leaders in platform research. Amid fierce competition among major countries and continents surrounding the platform industry, this paper aims to provide an understanding of the ongoing research trend regarding platforms and be a guideline for future research.     

Disclaiming responsibility: How platforms deadlocked the Federal Election Commission's efforts to regulate digital political advertising

Digital advertisements used to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election lacked disclaimers stating who paid for them. This was deliberate on the part of the platforms: Facebook and Google actively sought exemptions from mandatory disclaimer requirements that are standard for print and broadcast media. While prior research has placed blame squarely on the Federal Election Commission (FEC) for their lack of oversight of digital advertising, this paper demonstrates the way in which the platforms–Facebook in particular–engineered this regulatory failure in the form of capture on this specific issue. An analysis of documents submitted to the FEC demonstrates that Facebook and Google put profit ahead of the public interest in seeking exemptions from disclaimer requirements, refusing to change the size of their advertisements and downplaying the deceptive potential of political ads. Due to partisan gridlock and a lack of technological expertise, the FEC failed to rule decisively on exemptions or agree on alternative means of disclaimers for Facebook and mobile app ads, setting the stage for electoral interference in 2016. Implications for current regulatory efforts are discussed.     

ICT platforms and regulatory concerns in Europe

The rise of platforms in ICT markets invites a reappraisal of regulatory frameworks and practices. As platforms originating in entirely different sectors increasingly compete directly against each other, regulators ought to address platform competition issues regardless of their sector of origin, and taking into account the specificities of two-sided or multi-sided market business models. This paper identifies different types of such business models in ICT markets. It offers an exploration of a number of specific concerns that may arise related to specific platform types, and points at a number of instruments available to regulators to address these concerns.     

Platform competition with complementary products

We characterize the pricing structure in a model of platform competition in which two firms offer horizontally differentiated platforms and two sets of complementors offer products that are exclusive to each platform, respectively. We highlight the presence of indirect network effects: platforms and complementors benefit from the quality and number of firms in their group and suffer from the quality and number of firms in the rival’s group through their effects on prices and market share. We then determine the incentives of platforms to subsidize the independent complementors in an equilibrium. We further analyze the incentives of each platform to form a strategic alliance with complementors through contractual exclusivity or technological compatibility, or to integrate with the complementors. Finally, we discuss the welfare consequences of these strategies.     

Analytical Screens for Electricity Mergers

Electricity mergers pose distinct challenges for competition policy. Electricity demand is highly inelastic in the short run, storage is limited, and transmission constraints limit the ability to substitute generation at other locations. As a result, a merger can affect prices in many different markets and even generators with small market shares may be able to exercise market power. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approach for screening horizontal mergers, based on the concentration thresholds in the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, can fail to identify mergers that lessen competition, and mergers that fail the FERC screen may have no significant anticompetitive effect. We propose competitive residual demand (CRD) analysis, which examines the supply curves of the markets affected by a merger and considers the ability and incentive of firms to raise prices before and after a proposed merger. CRD analysis is a relatively easy way to address the incentives for generators to exercise market power and relies on data that are often available. Vertical (convergent) mergers between electricity and gas raise additional concerns, and we propose a methodology to screen vertical mergers.     

The role of epistemic communities in the “constitutionalization” of internet governance: The example of the European Commission High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence

In the last few years, digital constitutionalism has emerged as a novel, alternative, Internet Governance approach aiming at ordering and limiting the exercise of power by both states and private operators, as well as at promoting people's control over digital technology development.Although digital constitutionalism is encountering growing popularity, the prevalent non-binding nature of its initiatives, the discrepancy between the jurisdictional border and transnational digital processes, and the technological embedment of governance mechanisms, have hindered the effectiveness of its impact.This paper identifies epistemic communities as a crucial factor for the constitutionalization of the digital technologies since they have the necessary technical expertise and policy commitment to create norms and standards at transnational level, informing the policy choices of both state and non-state actors.In order to illustrate this nexus, the article performs an in-depth investigation on the case of the European Commission High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (HLEG-AI). The analysis revealed that the HLEG-AI effectively gathered an epistemic community strongly committed with fundamental rights promotion and capable to influence the following policy-making activities of the European Commission, as well as of other non-state stakeholders, whose involvement is essential in order to embed digital constitutionalism principles within the design of AI systems.     

Copyright Protection in the Digital Single Market: Potential Consequences for Content Platform Competition

This paper scrutinizes the effects of the European Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market on platform competition. Platforms that are online content-sharing service providers must have a license agreement with collective management organizations that control the content platform that users may – or must not – upload to the platform. The paper shows that the new directive may imply market concentration and an aggregate welfare loss. The reason is that only users of the large platform (in a dual platform setting) will be allowed to upload content if the content assets are sufficiently valuable and if network effects are strong.

     

Recent Developments at the CMA: 2016–2017

We discuss three interesting cases that the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has dealt with over the past year. First, we cover the ICE/Trayport vertical merger, which was prohibited by the CMA. Second, we discuss the CMA’s recent market investigation into the UK energy sector. The CMA arrived at the unexpected finding that markets with homogeneous products, multiple players and low entry barriers can still lead to significant competition concerns. Finally, we discuss the CMA’s work in relation to retail most favoured nation clauses, and include econometric results showing the impact of these clauses on platforms’ commission fees .     

Tax-free digital news?

News platforms are struggling. Their printed readership is predominantly old, and their digital product struggles to win the attention of the young. For several decades tax reductions have been used in Europe to increase the circulation of printed newspapers. Would extending these reductions to digital platforms stimulate digital consumption? Using a two-sided pricing model where a print platform and a digital platform compete for multi-homing consumers and advertisers we show that the answer is no. The two-sidedness of the market means that the digital price would increase. Not only would digital circulation decrease but so too would the fraction of consumers that access news from both platforms. Key media policy goals of reach (circulation) and pluralism (multi-homing) would be harmed.     

Fifty is the New Forty: EU Merger Policy Permits Higher Market Shares After the 2004 Reform

I analyze empirically all of the European Commission’s decisions regarding “unilateral effects” aspects of horizontal mergers before and after the 2004 reform, which introduced the “significant impediment to effective competition” test in merger policy. I find that, after the reform, the Commission did not change its stance toward mergers to monopoly or quasi-monopoly (almost always challenged) and mergers in un-concentrated markets (almost never). The new test produced more frequent challenges when the combined entity is not the largest firm, but these cases remain rare. The Commission’s stance toward mergers that fall between these polar opposites appears to have been tougher pre-reform ceteris paribus.     

The stalemate of cable digital switchover: A study of competition effects and deregulation

This paper addresses the phenomenon of delayed cable digitization in Taiwan and reports the results of a longitudinal analysis, determining that (1) inter-platform competition, primarily from internet protocol television (IPTV), generates a strong and positive impact on the digitization of cable service after it acquires numerous customers; (2) the installed cable base induces economies of scale that increase its digital penetration; (3) the overbuild of the equivalent-size rivalry can increase digital adoption, whereas unequal-sized competition might reversely decrease it; and (4) the monthly flat fee charged to customers does not influence digital adoption. In addition, this paper presents a discussion on the policy instruments derived from econometric results. Although repealing the horizontal integration cap in the cable TV industry could generate economies of scale, doing so may encourage monopolization over several franchises. The efficacy of intra-platform competition is reserved only for certain cases. Combining the results of these analyses reveals that inter-platform competition most effectively stimulates cable operators’ digital conversion. Hence, regulators should create a level playing field among various TV platforms, such as equal programming access and open standards, to ensure a high degree of cable digitization     

Value co-creation and appropriation of platform-based alliances in cooperative advertising

Digital platforms help develop the open value co-creation strategic alliances, reshape traditional B2B relationships, and promote inclusive social innovation. This research explores the nature of coopetition between the digital platform and its participants. The focus is on how the platform-based alliance balances the contradiction between value creation and appropriation. The support evidence derives from a Stackelberg game in the context of cooperative advertising. Either the platform or the participant supporting advertising in the alliance prompts a Pareto improvement for all players. But the increased profit would be mainly occupied by the dominant platform. The incentive mechanism of profit sharing can promote the alliance to co-create value in a sustainable manner. The game illustrates the significance of cooperative relationships to co-create a larger total value and the existence of an unequal win-win relationship in the strategic alliance. The contradictory logic of cooperation and competition can be accommodated in the platform-based alliance. The dynamic coopetition is involved in a partially convergent interest structure and impacted by power asymmetry. The results highlight the balance between the tensions and harmonies through value creation and appropriation.     

Convergence and regulation of multi-screen television: The Singapore experience

This article addresses complicated convergent and regulatory issues arising from cross-platform audiovisual services and analyzes Singapore's multi-screen television experience. A “platform neutrality” multi-screen TV regulatory scheme is proposed to concentrate on content classification in order to respond to the fast-changing audiovisual industry and competition. Under the scheme, different content and license regulations are applied to four types of TV-like services which are categorized by “socio-cultural impact” (i.e., broadcasting and mass market vs. VOD and niche market)” and “content production/aggregation model” (i.e., gatekeeping vs. participatory mechanism). In addition, competition, content regulation, and digital copyright are identified as key issues involved in the fast-growing cross-platform audiovisual media industry. Finally, this study analyzes market development, regulatory issues, and national plans for multi-screen TV services in Singapore and examines them under the proposed regulatory scheme. Market and policy recommendations are discussed.     

25 years of European merger control

We study the determinants of common European merger policy over its first 25 years, from 1990 to 2014. Using a novel dataset at the level of the relevant antitrust markets and containing all relevant merger cases notified to the European Commission, we evaluate how consistently arguments related to structural market parameters – dominance, rising concentration, barriers to entry, and foreclosure – were applied over time and across different geographic market definitions. On average, linear probability models overestimate the effects of structural indicators. Using non-parametric machine learning techniques, we find that dominance is positively correlated with competitive concerns, especially in markets with a substantial increase in post-merger concentration and in complex mergers. Yet, its importance decreased following the 2004 merger policy reform. Competitive concerns are also correlated with rising concentration, especially if entry barriers and foreclosure are of concern. The impact of these structural indicators in explaining competitive concerns is independent of the geographic market definition and does not change over time.     

Evaluating the impact of divestitures on competition: Evidence from Alberta’s wholesale electricity market

Asset divestitures play a central role in antitrust and competition policy. Despite their importance, empirical evidence on their impacts on market competition is limited. We analyze market power in Alberta’s wholesale electricity market, where transitional arrangements that virtually divested generation assets from large incumbents were put in place during market restructuring in the early 2000’s and expired at the end of 2020. Subsequently, average peak hour prices rose by 120% the year after their expiry. We demonstrate that nearly two-thirds of this increase can be explained by elevated market power from the large suppliers. Further, exploiting variation in the allocation of the divested assets across heterogeneous firms, we demonstrate that market power execution is elevated when the divested assets are controlled by large strategic firms. Our findings highlight the important role that asset divestitures and their allocations can have on market competition. Our analysis also raises concerns over the ability of restructured electricity markets to facilitate sufficient competition through entry and the potential need for regulatory intervention.     

Complementors as connectors: managing open innovation around digital product platforms

In the digital age, open innovation is increasingly organized around platform ecosystems. This paper investigates how firms can coordinate open innovation as a platform strategy for the development of complementary products by independent third parties. We draw on a qualitative case study of Philips Hue – a connected lighting platform for consumers with its variety of complementary products. We identify three increasingly complex ways in which independent complements connect to a focal platform. Our findings show that managing these connections requires a hybrid open innovation approach that combines arm’s length coordination, with a large number of complementors through open interfaces, and intensive bilateral collaboration, with a selected number of partners. Our findings demonstrate that complex interconnections across digital platforms and products lead to the management challenge of navigating an ‘ecology of platforms’, which warrants future research.     

开放平台与所有权平台的竞争:网络效应与策略选择

开放平台（标准）的出现给所有权平台带来很大冲击，也给经济学家提出了挑战．这种免费的资源提供的动机何在？它对创新活动有何影响？它会如何影响市场竞争的结果？本文提供了一个分析开放平台和所有权平台（双寡）竞争的理论模型，在考虑网络效应以及所有权平台拥有者的兼容策略选择等情形下。分析了不同平台的目标和均衡策略选择。在此基础上。我们还拓展分析了社会对不同产业结构（开放＋所有权VS所有权＋所有权）的选择激励．结果发现不同的参数设定会得到不同的结论。     

Platform Competition With Cash-Back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules

We analyze competing strategic platforms setting fees to a local monopolist merchant and cash-back rebates to end users, when the merchant may not surcharge platforms’ customers, a rule imposed by some credit card networks. Each platform has an incentive to gain transactions by increasing the spread between its merchant fee and user rebate above its rival's spread. This incentive yields non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in many natural environments. In some circumstances, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists where platforms choose fee structures that induce merchants to accept only one platform with equal probability, a form of monopolistic market allocation.     

Measurement and characterisation of the Digital Divide of Spanish regions at enterprise level. A comparative analysis with the European context

Until now, a reduced number of research is observed on the adoption and use of ICTs in enterprises and on the digital divide (DD) between them at regional scale in Europe. What is meant by DD are the differences in the levels of digital development of the enterprises; being the digital development the degree of adoption and use of ICTs and e-commerce by the firms. The aim of this piece of work is to characterise and measure the DD in the Spanish regions and those in the countries of the European Union based on the data of their enterprises with more than 10 employees which have used ICTs. The methodology is developed in the following stages: 1) Construction of a synthetic index of digital development (Enterprise Digital Development Index –EDDI-) for countries in the EU and Spanish regions. The production of this index is carried out based on the factors obtained with the factor analysis (FA) with the aim of identifying the key variables which define the different EDDI components. These variables come from the “Community survey on ICT usage and e-commerce in enterprises” of Eurostat. 2) Classification of Spanish regions into the groups of European countries with a similar level of EDDI components based on the discriminant analysis. Those groups are previously obtained by using cluster analysis. And 3) Comparative analysis of the DD between the Spanish regions and those in countries of the EU based on EDDI components and the identified groups. The study provides a synthetic index (EDDI) at European scale comprising 3 dimensions which permits obtaining: i) a ranking from more to less digital development of countries and regions permitting the measurement of the DD among them is established; and ii) a typology of European countries and Spanish regions is defined according to the 3 dimensions of EDDI. The main results of this piece of work show that the Spanish regions at enterprise level: i) are in a medium or higher level of digital development than their European counterparts, presenting, furthermore, a lower DD between them in relation to what happens in European countries; ii) stand out for having a higher digital inclusion than European countries in the ICTs related to infrastructures of internet access and for the interaction with the public authorities; and iii) have a digital development deficit in the integration of ICTs for e-commerce.