The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World War

This paper traces the history of prices and wages in European cities from the fourteenth century to the First World War. It is shown that the divergence in real incomes observed in the mid-nineteenth century was produced between 1500 and 1750 as incomes fell in most European cities but were maintained (not increased) in the economic leaders.     

The Swedish iron industry during the First World War and the Post-War depression

Abstract

In a paper read at the annual meeting of Jernkontoret (The Swedish Ironmasters' Association) in 1912 Professor E. F. Heckscher gave an estimate of the proportion of the total annual outpout of the Swedish iron industry which was exported. Including material entering into the exports of steelusing industries, it was estimated at 65–70 %. Assuming this to be correct, then only the saw-milling and paper- and pulp-making industries were at that time more dependent upon foreign markets than the iron industry. ¹ Jernkontorets Annaler (hereafter cited JKA) 1912. p. 183 ff. Cf. E. F. Heckscher, Svenska produktionsproblem, p. 107 and JKA 1919, pp. 181–202.      

Dutch and Danish agricultural exports during the First World War

Abstract

The Danish agricultural sector continued to maintain agricultural exports to Great Britain during the First World War, even when higher prices ruled on the German market. Dutch agricultural exporters, 011 the other hand. continued to sell to the highest bidder; until, in 1916, British pressure forced them to do otherwise. It was not the Danish government but the Danish cooperatives who were responsible for Danish agricultural export policy, especially in the first years of the war. More than was the case with the Dutch exporters, the Danes were highly dependent on the British market. The strong Danish cooperatives (in contrast to the weaker Dutch agricultural organizations) forced the Danish government to support their strategy in order not to lose their suppliers to the newly establishedfirms who were exporting to Germany.     

The Dollar-Pound Exchange Rate During the First Nine Months of World War II

Between August 25, 1939 and June 7, 1940, there was a free market for British pounds in New York. German success at the outset of World War II caused the value of free sterling to fall relative to the official exchange rate. This imposed an externality that made it more difficult for Britain to finance the war. Eventually, the externality became large enough that Britain chose to take extreme measures to abolish it, even at the expense of tarnishing the reputation of London’s financial markets. We collected daily data to investigate how the market reacted to war news and to policy changes. Using methods developed by Bai and Perron (Econometrica 66:47–78, 1998; Journal of Applied Econometrics 18:1–22, 2003), we find 17 breaks in the exchange rate. Fourteen are associated with military events and three are associated with policy changes. The episode illustrates how markets can fail to serve the public interest during times of war.     

Latin American manufacturing and the First World War: An exploratory essay

In the 1960s many writers on Latin America accepted the idea that the conditions for industrial growth were most propitious when international commercial and financial flows were disrupted, as in the First World War. Recent work has raised doubts, however, about the extent of manufacturing expansion between 1914 and 1918, while drawing attention to the growth of industry in the 20 years preceding 1914. This paper, through a discussion of the secondary literature and a sampling of primary sources on five countries, seeks to explain why increases in production and profits during the war were not accompanied by significant new investment or a diversification of Latin America's industrial structure.     

The grain trade in northern Europe before 1350

A network of interregional grain routes extended across northern Europe in the century before 1350. With an interlude from c . 1310 to 1330 English grain was shipped to western Norway and the last decades before 1350 witnessed increasing English deliveries to the Netherlands. The most important of these commercial links were the grain routes from Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and Prussia to Norway, England, and the Netherlands established on a regular basis c . 1300. In western Europe the Baltic grain deliveries were an alternative source of supply which affected prices, urbanization, and the profitability of arable farming.     

The organization of the grain trade in the early Roman Empire

Rome was an exceedingly large city at the start of the Roman Empire, and it required massive grain imports to feed its population. We argue that Roman merchants organized these imports and that they used a variety of mechanisms to deal with the informational problems of long‐distance trade at that time. They used general institutions of Rome, such as its legal and social structures, as well as specific mercantile institutions, such as contracts, companies, and invoices. They exploited information in the Roman social structure as well as in the facilities for trade. This combination of social and economic institutions enabled Roman merchants to operate on as large a scale as any other pre‐industrial merchant group.     

The soviet gain from trade with the west in fuel,grain, and machinery

Zusammenfassung Sowjetische Gewinne aus dem Westhandel mit Brennstoffen, Getreide und Maschinen. — Der Verfasser sch?tzt den Ressourcengewinn, den die UdSSR von 1970 bis 1985 daraus erzielte, da\ sie Roh?l und Erdgas in den Westen exportierte und Getreide und Maschinen importierte. Es zeigt sich, da\ der Austausch von Erdgas gegen Getreide und Maschinen für die Sowjets recht profitabel war, der von Erd?l gegen Getreide dagegen nur einen geringen Gewinn erbrachte und da\ der Verkauf von Erd?l gegen Maschinen sogar zu einem marginalen Verlust geführt hat. Die Ergebnisse deuten au\erdem darauf hin, da\ der gesamte sowjetische Gewinn aus dem Westhandel relativ zum sowjetischen Bruttosozialprodukt gering gewesen ist.

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Résumé Le gain soviétique du commerce extérieur avec l’ouest en pétrole, grain et machines. — Cette étude estime le gain en ressources pour l’URSS en exportant du pétrole brut et du gaz naturel à l’ouest en échange du grain et des machines pendant les années 1970–1985. Les résultats indiquent que le gaz naturel en échange du grain et des machines a été assez profitable pour l’URSS, le pétrole en échange du grain seulement un peu profitable et la vente du pétrole brut en échange des machines a mené à une marge négative. En conséquence, les résultats démontrent que le gain total de l’URSS du commerce avec l’ouest a été, relatif au produit intérieur brut en URSS, peu considérable.

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Resumen Los beneficios soviéticos del comercio de combustibles, granos y maquinaria con Occidente. — En este trabajo se estima en términos de recursos el beneficio que la URSS derivó de la exportación de petróleo crudo y gas natural a Occidente con el fin de importar granos y maquinaria durante el periodo 1970–1985. Los resultados indican que el intercambio de gas natural por granos y maquinaria ha sido beneficioso para los soviéticos, mientras que el de petróleo por granos ha sido sólo marginalmente beneficioso y el de petróleo crudo por maquinaria marginalmente deficitario. Los resultados también sugieren que de acuerdo a las ventajas comparativas el beneficio total para la URSS del comercio con Occidente ha sido marginal en relación al PBI soviético.

     

The First World War and the origins of the dual policy of development in Kenya 1914–1922

This article examines the impact of the First World War and its aftermath on decisions relating to the economic development of Kenya. The rather incoherent and inconsistent pre-war policy towards development was transformed by the coming of the war into a concentrated and exclusive concern for the future of European settler agriculture. The labour and taxation aspects of post-war policy in Kenya aroused much opposition. The Colonial Office in the face of challenges from the settlers, the Indian population and from rioting Africans and of a financial crisis in Kenya declared itself in favour of a dual policy of development.