THE DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION CONVEYED BY SHARE REPURCHASE TENDER OFFERS AND DIVIDEND INCREASES

We identify the difference in the private information conveyed by the announcements of a share repurchase tender offer and of a regular dividend increase. We find that, after controlling for timing, industry, size of cash distribution, and other firm-specific characteristics, a share repurchase tender offer causes a much larger stock price response than a regular dividend increase. The results suggest that the two cash distribution mechanisms convey differential information. Further examination of the differential information indicates that (1) the upward revision in financial analysts' earnings forecasts following a share repurchase is, on average, greater than that following a regular dividend increase, and (2) a repurchase announcement is followed by a permanent decline in the firms' systematic risk while a dividend-increase announcement is not.     

Dutch Auction Repurchases: An Analysis of Shareholder Heterogeneity

This paper documents that firms face upward-sloping supply curves when they repurchase shares in a Dutch auction, and it analyzes the market reaction to these offers. The announcement price increase is highly correlated with the ultimate repurchase premium. Prices decline at expiration only for pro-rated offers. The cumulative return is positive and highly correlated with the repurchase premium, excepting pro-rated offers. Much of this price increase is consistent with movement along an upward-sloping supply curve. Trading volume around the Dutch auction parallels fixed-price repurchases. Supply elasticity is larger for firms with large trading volume, firms included in the S&P 500 Index, and takeover targets.     

The Valuation Effects of Warrant Extensions

In this paper, we examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions. As predicted by option-pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to an extension. Our principal finding is that the stocks of firms making the extension announcements experience positive abnormal returns on average. We interpret the evidence as supportive of an anticipation hypothesis in which the market perceives the decision to extend the warrants' expiration date as a favorable indication for the stock price before the subsequent expiration.     

Anomalous Price Behavior Around Repurchase Tender Offers

This paper reports anomalous price behavior around repurchase tender offers. Buying shares before the expiration date of a repurchase tender offer and tendering to the firm produces, on average, abnormal returns of more than 9 percent over a period shorter than one week. In addition, we find that repurchasing companies experience economically and statistically significant abnormal returns in the two years after the repurchase. The upward price drift is mainly caused by the behavior of the small firms in the sample.     

Common stock repurchases and market signalling: An empirical study

This paper examines the pricing behavior of securities of firms which repurchase their own shares. The results are consistent with a market in which investors price securities such that expected arbitrage profits are precluded. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms offer premia for their own shares mainly in order to signal positive information, and that the market uses the premium, the target fraction and the fraction of insider holdings as signals in order to price securities around the announcement date. The observation that repurchases via tender offer are followed by abnormal increases in earnings per share and that mainly small firms engage in repurchase tender offers, provides further support for the signalling hypothesis.     

Capital Gains Taxes and Stockholders' Response to Dutch Auction Tender Offers

Capital gains taxes are conjectured to explain upward sloping supply curves in tender offers. This paper analyzes expiration day returns in Dutch auction tender offers to examine this conjecture. A proxy measure for the capital gains of the marginal tendering stockholder is constructed, based on tender offer size and daily price-volume history for one year. Cross-sectional regressions suggest that the tender price increases with the capital gains of the marginal tenderer, but only for firms with low institutional holdings. This is consistent with capital gains tax effects being relevant only when tax-exempt holdings are low.     

In-the-Money Warrant Extensions

This paper examines the warrant price and stock price reactions to the extension of the expiration date of in-the-money warrants. The warrant prices increase significantly in response to the announcement, consistent with option pricing theory. Shareholders experience no significant abnormal returns at the announcement, contrary to the conjecture that an extension will transfer wealth from shareholders. There is support for the idea that firms extend warrant life because the existing assets' cash flow obviates the need for additional financing. The data show that both the stocks and the warrants perform poorly in the month following the extension announcement.     

Share buybacks in India

We examine the market price and liquidity reaction to 239 share repurchase announcements in India. The average abnormal return on announcement day is 2.07 percent. Firms with larger promotor ownership stakes experience higher market reactions. Using the Amihud illiquidity measure and volume, we show that liquidity improves after the announcement. Open market repurchase programs increase market liquidity while tender offers do not. Liquidity improves more for high promotor ownership firms. Lastly, shorter duration repurchase programs improve liquidity more than longer duration programs. These results are consistent with our discussion of the pecking order of ownership structure in the low information transparency environment of India.     

Trading Activity,Trade Costs and Informed Trading for Acquisition Targets and Acquirers

Abstract

Microstructure effects of tender offer acquisitions on targets and acquirers differentiated by listing venue and payment method are examined. Trading activity increases more for targets than for acquirers upon offer announcement. Investors are more likely to sell targets upon announcement using direct market orders against ask limit orders for cash payment offers. While target liquidity improves as spread costs fall and quoted depths increase, acquirer liquidity falls continuously to successful offer completion. Due to increased trading differences, temporary trade costs fall more for targets than for acquirers. Permanent trade costs decline over the tender offer cycle for both parties, and especially for targets for cash tender offers and for acquirers for shares tender offers. The probability of informed trading declines (remains constant) for targets (acquirers) because increased trading intensity is greater (the same) for uninformed versus informed traders. As expected, abnormal returns and changes in own-firm permanent return volatility are negatively (but weakly) and positively (and strongly) related, respectively, to changes in information asymmetry upon announcement.     

Adverse Information and Dealer Spreads: Evidence from Dutch Auction Repurchases

The Dutch auction repurchase has become an increasingly popular alternative to open market repurchases and self-tender offers for the distribution of earnings to shareholders. In a Dutch auction, the repurchase price is not determined by a managerial decision, but by shareholders. The extent to which a Dutch auction signals private information is tested by examining stock returns and bid-ask spreads. Stock prices increase and bid-ask spreads widen during the announcement of a Dutch auction; prices decrease and spreads narrow at expiration. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the final repurchase price, Dutch auctions initially increase the risk to which security dealers are exposed. As information asymmetry among managers, investors, and dealers is reduced at expiration, security dealers no longer need to protect themselves from information trades.     

A Note on Unsuccessful Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns

Recent research shows that unsuccessful tender offers may affect target share returns for two years past the offer's announcement. This note examines target returns in the interim between the announcement and one year after the offer's withdrawal. Analyzing a recent sample of targets that did not get another bid in the year following a failed tender offer, this study reaches two conclusions. First, all of an offer's premium disappears by the time failure becomes public. Second, excess returns are zero in the post-failure year. An explanation that is based on the causes of the tender offers' failures is presented.     

Trading Profits in Dutch Auction Self-Tender Offers

We document abnormal trading profits in Dutch auction self-tenders. Tender period profits—buying after announcement and selling just before expiration—are 1.74 percent ( Bhagat, Brickley, and Lowenstein (1987) report similar profits for interfirm tenders). Buying just before expiration and tendering yields abnormal profits of 1.36 percent ( Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) report 9 percent for fixed-price self-tenders using a filter rule). Total profits from buying just after announcement and tendering remain positive after adjusting for bid-ask spreads. Trading profits are higher for smaller firms, and positively correlated with tender period unsystematic risk, suggesting that they arise due to the pricing of event risk.     

Speculation spreads and the market pricing of proposed acquisitions

This paper examines speculation spreads following initial acquisition announcements in 362 cash tender offers spanning the 1981–1995 period. Speculation spreads in acquisitions, defined as the percentage difference between the bid price and market price one-day after the initial announcement, are the starting point for arbitrage returns, a subject receiving increased attention in practice and in the literature. Speculation spreads exhibit a positive mean, with considerable cross-sectional variation. In fact, over 23% of speculation spreads are negative, indicating a post-announcement price greater than the initial bid price. In spite of its importance, the informational content of the speculation spread and the reasons for its cross-sectional variation have not been previously examined. We model speculation spreads as the visible component of total speculative returns of the target. Rational traders set speculation spreads anticipating the expected price resolution and length of the acquisition bid. Empirically, we find strong support for key implications of our model. Speculation spreads are significantly related to bid and offer characteristics observable ex ante. Consistent with our model, they are also significantly negatively related to the magnitude of price revision and significantly positively related to offer duration. These results are robust to the inclusion of bid and offer characteristics known ex ante as well as those only revealed ex post. The results are consistent with market pricing of both offer duration and price resolution at the time of the initial announcement.     

PRICE AND VOLUME EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CREATION OF STANDARD & POOR'S MIDCAP INDEX

In this paper we explore price and volume effects associated with the 1991 creation of Standard & Poor's MidCap 400 index. Prior work on changes in the composition of existing indices finds a significant price response to the announcement. Various authors link the effect to price pressure, information, an outwardly shifting demand curve for securities, and the increased attention that comes with inclusion in an index. Using event study methodology, we find significant price and volume effects during the two weeks leading up to the Standard & Poor's announcement, but no significant effect in the two-day interval around the event. Apparently, information leakage and/or anticipation preceded the creation of the index. The price run-up is permanent since the positive abnormal returns leading up through the announcement are not associated with significantly negative abnormal returns after the announcement. In addition, MidCap stocks significantly outperform the market during the fifty-two weeks following the announcement. Using cross-sectional regressions, we show that these prior-period abnormal returns are positively related to abnormal volume and institutional holdings. We also find that firms trading over-the-counter had larger price run-ups than NYSE or AMEX firms.     

The Decision to Repurchase Debt

The authors examined the market reaction to announcements of 208 corporate offers to repurchase outstanding debt during the period 1989–1996. In most tender offers, debtholders receive either a fixed price or a fixed spread over a benchmark Treasury security, or a range of prices based on a Dutch Auction. In most cases, management cites as its main motive the desire to reduce leverage and/or interest expense. But such tender offers are also often—in fact, in 70% of cases—accompanied by consent payments intended to induce bondholders to vote to remove covenant restrictions. The authors found that tender offers are wealth‐increasing events, with positive average market reactions of almost 1.5%. But the means of funding has a major impact on the market reaction. Whereas tender offers financed with equity receive a neutral market response, those offers financed with the proceeds from asset sales are associated with equity announcement returns of 3.8%. What's more, shareholders respond positively to the removal of covenants, especially asset sale covenants, with abnormal returns averaging 11% in such cases. Before their offers, companies that tender for their debt tend to have less cash and more long‐term debt than comparable companies, and to have lower operating returns and to trade at a discount to their peers. But after the tender offer, assets increase, operating returns improve, and the tendering firms trade at a premium.     

Tender Offers and Target Management Responses: Managerial Entrenchment Versus Stockholder Interest Revisited

Defensive actions by managements facing hostile tender offers have generally been interpreted as entrenchment-oriented behavior. In this paper, longitudinal wealth effects on target firm stockholders are examined for the 1978–1985 period. The sample of firms where target management resists the tender offer registers significantly higher post-tender offer announcement gains as compared to the sample of firms where target management remains passive. The evidence appears to support the stockholder interest hypothesis.     

The skinny on the 2008 naked short-sale restrictions

On July 15, 2008, the US Securities and Exchange Commission announced temporary restrictions on naked short sales of the stocks of 19 financial firms. The restrictions offer a unique empirical setting to test Miller’s (1977) conjecture that short-sale constraints result in overpriced securities and low subsequent returns. Consistent with Miller’s overpricing hypothesis, we find evidence of a positive (negative) market reaction to the announcement (expiration) of the short-sale restrictions. Announcement returns are higher for firms that appear to be subject to more naked short selling in the days immediately preceding the announcement of the restrictions. The restrictions are successful in eliminating naked short sales for the restricted stocks, but naked short sales increase dramatically for a closely matched sample of financial firms during the restricted period. We also find that the restrictions negatively impact various measures of liquidity, including bid-ask spreads and trading volume. From a public policy perspective, our findings suggest that, at a minimum, policymakers should pause when considering further short sale restrictions.     

The intraday impact of company responses to exchange queries

This study investigates Australia’s unique continuous disclosure regime using intraday data on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) over the period January 2010–April 2012. We examine abnormal returns and trading volumes that accrue to shareholders immediately after an announcement responding to a trading induced query. The use of intraday data permits us to examine the direct impact of these events, and the length of time the market takes to incorporate this information with a higher degree of precision than the research currently on offer. The study is framed within an event study methodology, with a number of robustness measures: a matched sample approach; analysis of cross-sectional determinants; the removal of penny stocks; and, procedures to account for sample selection bias. We find significant share price reversals following a query announcement, with a reversal of 3.3% by the end of the widest event interval. Our study also provides evidence that the market takes up to 60 min to impound this information. Overall, we provide support for the efficacy of the query framework administered by the ASX.     

The Price Elasticity of Demand for Common Stock

We study the price elasticity of demand for the common stock of an individual corporation. Despite the prevelance of assumptions that demand is perfectly elastic, there is little if any direct evidence in the literature to either support or reject that contention. Consistent with the notion of finite price elasticities, we find that the announcement of primary stock offerings by regulated firms depresses their stock prices and little if any evidence that this decline is the result of adverse information about future cash flows. Attempts to relate offer announcement effects directly to possible determinants of price elasticities, however, are inconclusive.     

The Chinese Stock Dividend Puzzle

In this paper, we examine the announcement effects of dividends with an emphasis on stock dividends in China's capital market. We find that dividend-paying stocks exhibit significantly positive abnormal returns while non-dividend-paying stocks show a negative announcement effect. Further, we document that the cumulative abnormal returns for pure stock dividends and combined dividends are the main drivers of this announcement effect. In contrast, pure cash dividend stocks experience no significant price run-up before announcement. The significant announcement effect of stock dividends is robust to controlling the earnings surprise effect. We offer some discussion of the possible explanations.