Share repurchase,executive options and wealth changes to stockholders and bondholders

We test the signaling and wealth transfer hypotheses around the announcement of share repurchases using a recent and larger sample of data than previously examined while employing a methodology designed to enhance the power of our tests. Disentangling the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses is difficult; they are not mutually exclusive and can have opposite effects for bondholders. Wealth transfers decrease bondholder wealth while positive signals increase it; the combined result obscures tests of each hypothesis. By focusing on sub-samples where signaling is more and less likely to be present we increase our ability to isolate the separate effects. In addition to traditional tests of wealth effects, we feature information inherent in the correlation of wealth changes to equity and debt. Our results are generally consistent with the positive signaling effect of stock repurchases, but also provide some support for wealth transfer. Our work also emphasizes the importance of trying to disentangle the various hypotheses. In the subset of option funding repurchases, where signaling effects are less likely, the positive correlation of wealth changes between stockholders and bondholders is completely eliminated. Bond ratings are much more likely to be upgraded in samples without executive options which is precisely where the signaling effects are expected to be concentrated. Firms with weaker shareholder rights experience greater bondholder wealth losses at the announcement of stock repurchases.     

Do managers intentionally use repurchase tender offers to signal private information? Evidence from firm financial reporting behavior

Signaling is the most commonly cited explanation for stock repurchases in the academic literature. Yet, there is little evidence on whether managers intentionally use repurchases as signaling devices. Using a firm's financial reporting behavior to infer managerial intent, we find evidence suggesting that managers intentionally use fixed-price repurchase tender offers to signal undervaluation. In contrast, we find no evidence that managers use Dutch-auction tender offers to signal undervaluation. Instead, firms engaging in Dutch-auction repurchases act as if they are trying to deflate their earnings prior to the repurchases to further reduce the repurchasing price.     

BOND MARKET REACTION TO STOCK REPURCHASES: IS THERE A WEALTH TRANSFER EFFECT?

We reexamine the bondholder wealth impact of stock repurchases with a focus on the wealth transfer effect. We do not detect any transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders surrounding open market stock repurchases. For the overall sample (1994–2002), using daily data we document a significant decrease in bond yields surrounding repurchase announcements. Subsamples classified by attributes that capture wealth transfer propensity also do not reveal evidence consistent with a wealth transfer effect. Correlation analysis between bond and stockholder wealth effects similarly is not supportive of a wealth transfer effect. Contrary to the wealth transfer hypothesis, we document a greater proportion of bond rating upgrades than downgrades in the three months following a repurchase announcement. Our results are robust to alternate bond price data and event return methodology.     

Legal Institutions,Ownership Concentration,and Stock Repurchases Around the World: Signal Mimicking?

One of the central puzzles of signaling theory is how to assess signal quality, in particular the potential for signal mimicking. Our study provides evidence of signal mimicking in the context of stock repurchases. Employing an ex-ante proxy for the likelihood of mimicking stock repurchases and data on open market stock repurchases from 30 countries, we find that long-term operating and market performance following stock repurchases improve less for suspected mimicking firms. This finding contradicts the conventional characterization that managers use stock repurchases to signal undervaluation and enhanced future performance. We find that mimicking firms have smaller capital investments, need greater external financing, buy back fewer shares, and issue more new shares (and/or resell more treasury shares) in the year of the repurchase. Our analysis further shows that mimicking is more likely in countries with weak investor protections and in firms with higher ownership concentration. Further, mimicking associated with concentrated ownership is mitigated in countries with stronger investor protections and by the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Altogether, our findings provide evidence of signal mimicking in stock repurchases in international data that is influenced by market, ownership, legal, and financial reporting characteristics of countries.     

Do managers time the market? Evidence from open-market share repurchases

A contentious debate exists over whether executives possess market timing skills when announcing certain corporate transactions. Pseudo-market timing, however, has recently emerged as an important alternative hypothesis as to why the appearance of timing might be evident when, in fact, none exists. We reconsider this debate in the context of share repurchases. Consistent with prior studies, we also report evidence of abnormal stock performance following buyback announcements. Pseudo-market timing, however, does not appear to be a viable explanation. Our results are more consistent with the notion that managers possess timing ability, at least in the context of share repurchases.     

Managerial rights,use of investment banks,and the wealth effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders

We examine the relation between managerial rights in acquiring firms and the decision to use an investment bank in merger and acquisition deals, and explore whether this relation impacts the wealth effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders. We find that acquiring firms whose managers have relatively strong rights are more likely to use investment banks to facilitate deals and are more likely to use reputable banks. The wealth effects to acquiring firms are inversely related to the use of investment banks when managerial rights are relatively strong. However, the wealth loss is mitigated when acquiring firms use reputable investment banks.     

Share Repurchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts

I show that share repurchases increase pay-performance sensitivity of employee compensation and lead to greater employee effort and higher stock prices. Consistent with the model, I find that after repurchases, employees and managers receive fewer stock option and equity grants, and that the market reacts favorably to repurchase announcements when employees have many unvested stock options. Managers are more likely to initiate share repurchases when employees hold a large stake in the firm. Moreover, since employees are forced to bear more risk in firms that repurchase shares, they exercise their stock options earlier and receive higher compensation.     

Stock repurchases and treasury share sales: Do they stabilize price and enhance liquidity?

Can companies reduce the volatility and increase the liquidity of their stocks by trading them? In the context of the Italian stock market, where companies have far more leeway to sell as well as buy their own stocks than in the U.S., the answer is yes. We examine the effects of trading (open-market share repurchases and treasury shares sales) on liquidity (bid-ask spread) and volatility (return variance). Further, we examine the impact of shareholder approvals of repurchase programs on liquidity and volatility. We find clear evidence that trading increases liquidity and reduces volatility. These results are consistent with our analysis of the motives Italian companies give for making share repurchases.     

Determinants of stock option use by Japanese companies

Japanese data show a negative relation between leverage and the probability of firms' use of stock options. Such a relation is more marked for firms affiliated with specific keiretsu or main banks. This evidence reflects the fact that Japanese companies are more reliant on debt financing and that the agency cost of debt is a central issue in corporate governance. Results show that the frequency of the firms' use of stock options is positively associated with firm size. Finally, independent firms, which reveal more concern about shareholder wealth, are more likely to use stock options.     

Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation

Equity-based compensation affects managers’ risk-taking behavior, which in turn has an impact on shareholder wealth. In response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 6%. This risk reduction is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives, in particular firms with low chief executive officer portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility. Furthermore, the risk reduction is value-destroying. Finally, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift by providing managers with greater incentives for risk-taking.     

Stock repurchasing and corporate social responsibility

Stock repurchases are controversial. Researchers often view the positive association between free cash flow and the volume of the stock repurchases to be in the shareholders’ interest and the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases to be in the managers’ interest. Using firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings as a measure of ethical culture—one that increases the cost of self-serving behavior for managers— we examine whether a firm’s CSR rating is related to its stock repurchase decisions. Although the baseline regression shows a positive association between CSR and repurchases, we find that CSR amplifies the positive association between free cash flow and stock repurchases and lessens the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases. These results indicate that ethical culture might play a role in repurchase decisions: it may encourage repurchases aligned with shareholders’ interests and discourage those primarily in managers’ interest. Furthermore, we also find that high CSR firms are associated with a greater completion rate of announced repurchase programs and receive more favorable stock market reaction to their repurchase announcements.     

The contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings around the world

Using corporate payout data from 33 economies, this study investigates the contribution of stock repurchases to the value of the firm and cash holdings in different country-level investor protection environments. We find that stock repurchases contribute more to firm value in countries with strong investor protection than in countries with weak investor protection. We also report that dividends contribute approximately 60% more to firm value than repurchases in countries with weak investor protection. Furthermore, as the proportion of repurchases in total payouts increases, the marginal value of cash increases in countries with strong investor protection, whereas it declines in countries with weak investor protection. In a poor investor protection environment, the marginal value of cash for a firm that makes 100% of its payouts via repurchases is 12 cents lower than that for a firm that distributes 100% of its payouts via dividends. Overall, our findings highlight that stock repurchases are less effective than dividends in mitigating agency problems associated with free cash flow in countries with poor investor protection.     

Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm

This paper models the optimal choice of shareholder liability. If investors want managers to be monitored, the monitors should be residual claimants (shareholders), and monitoring and firm value will increase as shareholders commit more of their wealth to the firm. When liquidating wealth is costly, contingent liability dominates direct investment as a wealth commitment device; however, if wealth is unobservable, under this regime only relatively poor investors will hold shares in equilibrium. This may be prevented at a cost by verifying shareholder wealth and restricting stock transfers. Comparative statics on various liability regimes are used to motivate actual contractual arrangements.     

Voluntary disclosures around share repurchases

Managers increase the frequency and magnitude of bad news announcements during the 1-month period prior to repurchasing shares. To a lesser extent, they also increase the frequency and magnitude of good news announcements during the 1-month period following their repurchases. These results are consistent with Barclay and Smith's [1988. Corporate payout policy: Cash dividends versus open-market repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 22, 61–82.] conjecture that share repurchases, unlike dividends, create incentives for managers to manipulate information flows. We further show that managers provide downward-biased earnings forecasts before repurchases and that managers’ propensity to alter information flows prior to share repurchases increases with their ownership interest in the firm.     

Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. More importantly, the pattern holds not only in firms that are underlevered relative to their optimal capital structure but also in overlevered firms. This evidence is inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; rather, it supports the hypothesis that stock options sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies.     

The Effect of Shareholder Approval of Equity Issuances Around the World

Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies considerably across and within countries. In the United States and a few other countries, management typically needs the approval of only its board of directors to issue common stock. In most countries, however, by law or stock exchange rule, shareholders must vote to approve equity issuances when using certain methods or contemplating offers that exceed a specified fraction of outstanding shares. In some countries, shareholders must approve all equity issuances. Even in the United States, shareholder approval is mandatory under certain circumstances. The differences in the stock market reaction to shareholder‐approved equity issuances and to issues undertaken unilaterally by management are strikingly and consistently large. When shareholders approve stock issuances, whether public or rights offerings, or private placements, the average announcement returns are significantly positive, on the order of 2%. But when managers issue stock without shareholder approval, as in the case of U.S. public offerings, returns are significantly negative and 4% lower, on average, than for shareholder‐approved issues. What's more, the closer in time the shareholder vote is to the issue date, and the greater the required plurality (say, two‐thirds instead of half the vote required for approval), the more positive is the market reaction to the issue—and these findings hold for each of the three main kinds of offerings that take place in all 23 countries in the author's sample. Also telling, in countries where shareholder approval is required, such as Sweden and Malaysia, rights offers predominate over public issues. But in countries like the U.S. and Japan, where managers may generally issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate over rights issues. These findings suggest that agency problems—the tendency of corporate managements to put their own interests before their shareholders'—play a major role in equity issuances. Such findings are also largely inconsistent with the adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations that currently dominate academic thinking about equity issuances by public corporations.     

Do analyst recommendations reflect shareholder rights?

We examine whether sell-side analyst recommendations reflect shareholder rights. Our rationale is that analysts should be influenced by external governance only if market participants do not efficiently price its value. We find that stronger shareholder rights are associated with more favorable recommendations. Further analysis reveals that analysts favor firms with strong shareholder rights only when strong rights appear to be warranted, but do not penalize firms for having strong rights when not needed. These findings occupy middle ground in the debate on the pricing efficiency of shareholder rights. Moreover, we find that firm value is positively associated with the strength of shareholder rights regardless of the expected external governance structure. The latter result is consistent with a “one-size-fits-all” interpretation, and implies that firms across the board could increase share value by reducing their number of anti-takeover provisions.     

Shareholder Rights,Insider Ownership and Earnings Management

This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.     

Top Management Incentives and Corporate Performance

There is little agreement about either the effect of executive compensation on corporate performance or the best way to measure the strength of executive incentives. With little guidance from academic research, managers and directors continue to rely heavily on the percentage of pay "at risk" as a proxy for incentive strength.
Starting with the premise that managers, like investors, are motivated by prospective changes in their wealth, this article presents a measure of incentive strength called "wealth leverage" that reflects the sensitivity of an executive's company-related wealth—total stock and option holdings plus the present value of expected future compensation, including future salary, bonus and stock compensation—to changes in shareholder wealth. After estimating top management's wealth leverage at 702 companies, the authors conclude that: 1) the median company has significant wealth leverage; 2) almost all corporate wealth leverage comes from their accumulated stock and option holdings, not from current compensation; and 3) companies with higher wealth leverage significantly outperform their industry competitors.