Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis

We present a DSGE model where firms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external finance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the financial crisis of 2008–09, namely, the observed shift from bank finance to bond finance, at a time when the cost of market debt rose above the cost of bank loans. We show that the flexibility offered by banks on the terms of their loans and firms' ability to substitute among alternative instruments of debt finance are important to shield the economy from adverse real effects of a financial crisis.     

The effect of auditor litigation risk on clients' access to bank debt: Evidence from a quasi-experiment

We exploit staggered state-level shocks to third-party auditor legal liability in the U.S. to test whether auditor litigation risk affects client companies' access to private debt markets. We find that an exogenous increase in auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in both clients' likelihood of receiving bank loans and the average amount of the bank loans that clients receive. In support of our proposed mechanism that auditor litigation risk leads to improvements in clients' audit and financial reporting quality, we find that these same shocks lead to a reduction in accruals, an increase in going-concern opinions, a decrease in restatements, and an improvement in accruals' ability to predict future cash flows. We also find that increased auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in the contractibility of clients’ accounting numbers, as proxied by the use of debt covenants, and a decrease in the cost of borrowing.     

Trade-off Model of Debt Maturity Structure

In this paper, we suggest the trade-off model to explain the choice of debt maturity. This model is based on balancing between risk and reward of using shorter-term loans. Shorter-term loans have cost advantage over, but incur higher refinancing and interest rate risk than longer-term loans. Using the Compustat data, we show that the principal components of financial attributes are financial flexibility and financial strength. Therefore, only firms with greater financial flexibility and financial strength can use proportionately more short-term loans. We also document that financially strong firms take advantage of lower interest rates of short-term debt. They use proportionately more short-term loans when the term premium is high. The results of our study also provide evidence supporting the agency cost hypothesis, which is strongly supported by current literature.     

Accruals Quality and Debt Maturity Structure

In this paper we use panel data and GMM estimation to examine the effect of accounting quality on debt maturity structure in a bank‐based financial system and show that, even after controlling for unobservable heterogeneity, endogeneity, variables reflecting operating volatility and the cost of debt, firms with poor accounting quality face a shorter debt term than firms with higher accounting quality. This association between accounting quality and debt maturity is consistent with accounting quality as a means of reducing information asymmetry problems and improving the monitoring of managers.     

企业发债和贷款期限的差异化:基于增量法的实证研究

已有文献主要从资产负债表法来实证研究企业负债期限结构的影响因素,本文以我国企业在1998～2008年企业发行的各类债券和银行贷款为研究对象,运用增量法从企业财务特征和债务契约属性等方面对企业增量债务期限的影响因素进行实证研究,采用了GMM计量方法,并通过对比分析筛选出了影响企业发债和贷款期限差异化的关键因素。研究表明:企业规模越大,利润率越高,具备担保,信用评级和授信比率越高,其债务期限越长。企业若选择发债,债务期限会延长,而选择银行贷款则企业债务期限会缩短。     

债务结构优化与企业创新——基于企业债券融资视角的研究

本文在我国保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景下,从债券融资的视角,探讨债务结构优化对企业创新的影响。研究发现,债券融资与企业创新之间显著正相关,表明债券融资优化企业债务结构、提升企业创新能力的积极作用占据主导地位。进一步研究表明:(1)债券融资能够通过降低整体债务融资成本并延长整体债务期限促进企业创新;(2)债券融资对于银行贷款存在溢出效应,即企业通过债券融资,还能降低银行贷款利率、延长银行贷款期限,进而促进企业创新;(3)产品市场竞争和代理问题会在一定程度上削弱债券融资对企业创新的促进作用;(4)不同类型的债券对企业创新能力的作用存在异质性,债券发行的便利性是其影响企业创新的一个重要因素。     

The Choice of Debt Source by UK Firms

We examine the choice of borrowing source among public debt, syndicated bank loans, bilateral bank loans and non‐bank private debt. Using a sample of 400 non‐financial firms over the period 2000–2012, we find strong support for the reputational theory of borrowing source. Larger firms are more likely to borrow in public debt markets. Bank dependent firms are less likely to borrow in public debt markets and choose between bank and non‐bank private debt based on maturity, collateral available to lenders and other firm characteristics. These results are consistent with the role of borrower reputation being the primary determinant of borrowing source for UK listed firms.     

金融生态环境、银行关联与债务融资——基于我国民营企业的实证研究

本文以我国2004-2008年583个A股民营上市公司样本为研究对象,实证研究了银行关联与债务融资的关系。我们的研究发现:银行关联有助于民营企业获得更多的长期借款增量,同时降低了企业的短期借款增量,从而导致长期借款占总借款的比重更高。在金融生态环境好的地区中,银行关联与企业债务融资并不存在显著的关系;但在金融生态环境差的地区中,银行关联有助于民营企业获得更多的长期借款增量,并显著影响企业的债务期限结构。进一步将银行关联区分为高层银行关联与低层银行关联,发现不同层级的银行关联与债务融资的关系也存在不同。     

Agency problems,accounting slack,and banks’ response to proposed reporting of loan fair values

We investigate the determinants of bank representatives’ responses to the United States Financial Accounting Standard Board’s 2010 Exposure Draft that proposes fair value measurement for most financial instruments. Over 85% of the 2971 comment letters were received from bank representatives, with most bank-affiliated letters addressing—and opposing—one issue: fair value measurement of loans. The Exposure Draft proposes that companies report both fair value and amortized cost measures for loans; thus, the proposal should result in increased levels of loan-related information and improved financial reporting transparency. We investigate three reasons for bank representatives’ resistance. First, fair value measurement should result in less accounting slack than the current incurred-loss model for loan impairments; therefore, we propose that representatives from banks that historically utilized that slack will resist fair value measurement for loans. Second, we propose that agency problems are an important motivating factor because bank representatives reaping more private benefits from their franchises have less incentive to support increases in financial reporting transparency. Third, we test whether the most common reasons for opposition included in the comment letters are associated with negative letter writing. Our analyses support the first two determinants of bank representatives’ resistance to the Exposure Draft. Specifically, accounting slack and lower demand for accounting transparency are strongly associated with resistance to the standard. However, we find that stated reasons for resistance are not associated with letter writing. Specifically, representatives at firms with difficult to value loans and firms that mostly hold loans to maturity are no more likely to resist the standard than others. The narrow scope of bank representatives’ comments and our empirical findings suggest that bankers’ responses to the Exposure Draft may be more driven by concerns over reduced availability of accounting slack and accompanying de facto regulatory forbearance than by the conceptual arguments they offer. Our results have implications for standard setters, who must navigate special interests as they attempt to promulgate high quality accounting standards, and for users of financial statements who must consider how political forces shape generally accepted accounting principles.     

产权性质、债务融资与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以我国A股上市公司2002-2006年的数据为样本,采用Basu模型研究了债务(尤其是不同期限的银行借款)对会计稳健性的影响,研究结果表明:银行要求短期借款比例高和长期借款比例低的公司采取更加稳健的会计政策,考虑到两类产权性质时,银行对终极控制人为私有产权控股的公司有更加稳健的要求,且对短期借款比例高的私有产权控股公司会计政策要求更加稳健,而对长期借款比例高的国有产权控股公司会计稳健性的要求相对更低。     

Does the use of tax haven subsidiaries by U.S. multinational corporations affect the cost of bank loans?

This study examines whether the use of tax haven subsidiaries by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) is associated with the cost of bank loans. We find that more intensive tax haven subsidiary use by MNCs is positively associated with the cost of bank loans. In cross-sectional analyses, we identify channels through which the positive association between tax haven intensity and bank loan costs is more pronounced, such as a weak information environment, poor corporate governance, high CEO pay-for-performance and corporation-related wealth, and low managerial ability. We also find that intensive tax haven use is positively (negatively) associated with non-price loan contract terms, such as collateralization and financial covenants (loan maturity and general covenants). Our main result holds when public bonds are substituted for bank loans. Finally, additional analysis shows that MNCs with high levels of tax haven intensity are more likely to rely on bank loan financing than on raising debt from the bond market. Overall, this study adds to an emerging body of literature on corporate taxation and debt policy.     

地方政府债券置换对银行信贷及货币供给的影响

通过构建基于商业银行资产负债结构的地方债置换分析框架,研究表明,地方债置换将通过商业银行资产结构在贷款与债券之间的配置调整影响货币供给,它将使银行可贷资金增加,并导致贷款规模的变化,在贷款创造存款的信用放大机制下,引起货币供应量的变化,进而造成货币政策的扩张(收缩).贷款市场的供求弹性将决定地方债置换的扩张效应或收缩效应.在经济增长放缓、银行为弥补持有地方债收益下降、地方债纳入货币政策工具的抵押品和质押品范围的情况下,地方债置换具有货币政策扩张效应.为减少地方债对金融市场的冲击,央行需密切监测商业银行资金运用情况,提高货币政策操作的针对性,并加强同财政政策的协同配合.     

房价调控、地方政府债务与宏观经济波动

在地方政府债务高企的背景下,房价调控能否使资本流向非房地产部门？房价调控如果触发地方政府债务违约,宏观政策应如何应对？本文基于中国宏观经济的特征事实,引入地方政府的土地财政行为,将房价变动与地方政府的偿债能力联系起来。研究表明,由于地方政府依赖土地出让和土地抵押贷款筹集收入,房价管控导致的地价下降会带来地方政府收入的下降,直接影响地方政府的偿债能力。如果地方政府债务不出现违约,那么房价管控带来的地价下降会降低地方政府从金融部门获得的抵押融资额,使非基建部门的融资成本下降,非基建部门投资和产出上升。而如果调控房价带来的地价下降导致地方政府出现债务违约,金融部门资产受损,使金融中介减少贷款和提高贷款成本,带来整个社会的信贷紧缩,经济中各个部门的产出大幅下降。进一步的政策分析表明,有必要在避免地方政府债务违约的同时,使用财政资金补充银行资本金等多种方式稳定金融中介的资产负债表,从而将房价调控对经济的负面影响程度降到最低。     

Debt maturity dispersion and the cost of bank loans

This paper examines the relation between corporate debt maturity dispersion and the pricing and terms of bank loans. Analyzing a sample of U.S. bank loans from 2002 to 2016, we find that firms with a dispersed debt maturity structure pay a lower interest rate. The rate-reduction effect is significant only for firms without a credit rating. For these firms, spreading debt maturity dates also results in lower commitment fees, fewer covenant restrictions, and less collateral in their loan contracts. The impact of debt maturity dispersion on the pricing and structure of bank loans is stronger when borrowers have higher rollover risk or when the need for monitoring is greater. Our results suggest that dispersion in debt maturity structure mitigates the agency problem associated with shareholder–creditor conflicts by reducing rollover risk and alleviating the need for monitoring, which results in borrowers receiving more favorable terms in loan contracts.     

Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low‐risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high‐risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.     

行业特征、金融加速与企业债务融资

在政策择优供给、产业转型升级的关键阶段,考察特定行业的企业债务融资及其宏观、微观层面的影响因素,对于资金、资源的行业优化配置意义重大。本文以我国2003~2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本,检验企业受到货币政策冲击时行业特征对其银行债务获取的影响。研究发现,对于行业劳动力越密集、行业竞争越激烈的企业,货币政策紧缩对于债务融资的不利影响会被显著削弱。进一步研究发现,行业劳动要素在货币政策紧缩时引起的企业债务融资效应随着行业资本密集度的下降而增强;对于产出是耐用品的行业,货币政策的企业债务融资效应与产品市场竞争较弱的行业一致。本文是对货币政策传导机制下金融加速分析的拓展,补充了货币政策行业债务融资效应的经验证据。     

An Integrated Model of Debt Issuance, Refunding, and Maturity

We integrate previous work in this area and develop a multiperiod model that simultaneously determines bond refunding, bond issuance, maturity structure, cash holdings, and bank borrowing policies. The focus here is on providing the required debt funds in the most cost efficient fashion. A strength of the model is that it allows for time varying interest costs, transaction costs, issuance costs, and refunding costs to be firm specific. The output of the model lays out the optimal financing decisions for each time interval that minimize the total discounted cost of providing the funds that match the requisite funds. By limiting the surplus funds available, the model minimizes the management incentive to over invest and thereby reduces the agency costs. The model has economic implications for the financing decisions and the firm's default risk, growth opportunities, riskiness of cash flows, and firm size. JEL Classification: G30     

Debt Issues around Mergers & Acquisitions

We investigate firms’ debt financing choices among bank loans, public bonds and privately placed debt around mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that prior to M&As, firms with above-optimal leverage tend to pursue arm’s-length debt financing in lieu of bank debt. We find that three-day CARs for highly levered firms and acquirer’s long-run performance are negatively associated with non-bank financing. This supports a monitoring avoidance hypothesis for highly levered firms’ non-bank debt financing decisions in M&As. As a falsification test, we do not find the same debt financing considerations of acquirer firms during their post-M&A period.     

中国民营上市公司债务融资破产威胁功效的实证研究

以2002～2007年陷入财务危机的民营上市公司（ST公司）为研究样本．通过相关分析实证检验了中国债务融资的破产威胁功效.研究发现,中国民营上市公司债务融资总体上对财务状况恶劣的公司起到了债务治理作用,发挥了破产威胁功效。短期债务能够对陷入财务危机的民营上市公司起到改善业绩的作用,较好地发挥破产威胁功效,而长期债务未能发挥破产威胁作用。银行贷款能够促进陷入财务困境的民营上市公司改善业绩,发挥破产威胁功效,而商业信用却没能发挥破产威胁功效。     

The Effects of Corporate and Country Sustainability Characteristics on The Cost of Debt: An International Investigation

We investigate the relationship between corporate and country sustainability on the cost of bank loans. We look into 470 loan agreements signed between 2005 and 2012 with borrowers based in 28 different countries across the world and operating in all major industries. Our principal findings reveal that country sustainability, relating to both social and environmental frameworks, has a statistically and economically impactful effect on direct financing of economic activity. An increase of one unit in a country's sustainability score is associated with an average decrease in the cost of debt by 64 basis points. Our international analysis shows that the environmental dimension of a country's institutional framework is approximately twice as impactful as the social dimension, when it comes to determining the cost of corporate loans. On the other hand, we find no conclusive evidence that firm‐level sustainability influences the interest rates charged to borrowing firms by banks. Our main findings survive a battery of robustness tests and additional analyses concerning subsamples, alternative sustainability metrics and the effects of financial crisis.